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Summary 
Business enterprises have assumed a prominent role in the international arena. With operations 
and relations encompassing the entire globe, their activities have impacts on essential interests of 
an economic, financial, environmental and social nature. There is an established concern that 
many, if not most, national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to exercise effective control over 
business enterprises. The legal challenges faced in disciplining the increasingly powerful, 
wealthy and mobile business enterprises are well documented. The focus and aspirations of 
human rights has shifted towards corporate social responsibility (‘CSR’) initially. Calls for 
business enterprises to assume governance responsibilities have resulted in a proliferation of 
international CSR regulatory schemes and transnational norms that have acquired non-negligible 
regulatory effects. As part of the social aspect of CSR, human rights have developed into one of 
the core considerations of CSR. Calls for legal corporate accountability for negative human 
rights impacts gained in strength as the legitimacy and effectiveness of voluntary CSR initiatives 
became questioned. However, the attempts to create a legally binding instrument on business and 
human rights at the international level have not materialized.  
The polarization of the debate on the Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises with regard to human rights (‘UN Norms) along the conflicting 
positions of the CSR and the business and human rights movement resulted in the failure of this 
initiative, with the result of the appointment of John Ruggie as the UN Secretary-General’s 
Special Representative on Business and Human Rights (the ‘SRSG’) in 2005. The SRSG opted 
for an approach of ‘principled pragmatism’ in the pursuit of what was, in essence a macro-
project. The SRSG developed a three-pillared ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy’ Framework for a 
better functioning systems for business and human rights governance on a global scale. Adopted 
by the Human Rights Council (the ‘HRC’) in 2008, this Framework articulated a common 
definition of corporate responsibilities to respect human rights, which furthermore linked 
business conduct to the public construction of internationally recognized human rights. This 
responsibility is a soft norm founded in social expectations, and thus, strictly speaking from a 
formalistic positivist perspective, of a non-legally binding nature. However, such responsibility 
is not without any legal relevance. The SRSG developed the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights (the ‘UNGPs’) to serve as a platform for guidance and action to translate the 
above mentioned Framework to practice. The HRC ‘endorsed’ the UNGPs in 2011. The UN 
Working Group on Business and Human Rights (the `WG BH`) was created in 2011 to promote 
the effective implementation and dissemination of the UNGPs.  
Looking back at five years of implementation efforts, the point of the legalization of the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights has become increasingly noteworthy. The basic 
assumption is that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, as it is currently 
conceived, should further evolve and acquire normative force and ‘binding-ness’ in practice. 
Whilst it is always a matter of legal obligation for States to adopt the necessary rules and 
regulations to ensure that business enterprises respect human rights in practice, the scenario of 
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights acquiring normative force and the translation 
of such responsibility into a ‘hard’ (legally binding) norms at the national, regional and 
international level has become less distant. There are ever-increasing calls for legislation creating 
legal obligations of due diligence for companies at the national and supranational (EU) level. 
Further legal developments at the international level are anticipated with the creation, within the 
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HRC, in 2013 of an inter-governmental working group with a mandate to develop an 
internationally legally binding instrument on business and human rights. 
Partially as a result of the substance of the corporate responsibility to respect being indicative of 
the content of potential future legal (‘hard’) norms, an analysis of such responsibility, its legal 
character and content becomes of the utmost legal relevance. The thesis examines the intensity of 
implementation efforts, identifies gaps and assesses the extent to which States have an obligation 
to incorporate and embed the concept of human rights due diligence into existing laws and 
regulations. This analysis, in turn, generates novel insights and impetus for reconsidering the 
international legal personality of business enterprises in a global governance context. CSR 
regulatory initiatives are trends in global governance that increasingly question the relevance of 
the (arguably still dominant) positivist perspective and, hence, conventional doctrines on 
international legal personality. This thesis will confront, and test the validity of, existing 
doctrinal approaches to the legal personality of business enterprises with the evolving realities in 
the emerging business and human rights regime. In doing so, insights will be drawn from 
theoretical approaches to global governance to determine the impact of CSR in the thorny topic 
of ‘subjects of (international) law’ and what, if anything, makes business enterprises ‘legal 
persons’ in a global governance context. 
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 Objective of the Thesis 1
The objective of this thesis is to examine the desirability of a revision of current doctrinal 
approaches to the legal status of business enterprises in light of recent developments in the 
definition and regulation of business responsibilities for human rights within the context of 
global governance. The objectives of the thesis are the following: 
The first objective is to assess the conception that currently reflects an international consensus, 
i.e. the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, the (legal) character of this concept and 
its substantive content. This entails an examination of the origins, goal and objectives of the 
UNGPs in which this concept has been recognized and ‘endorsed’ by the HRC.  
A second objective is to assess in detail the basic assumption that the implementation of the 
UNGPs will affect the evolution of this soft-law instrument (as the UNGPs have been 
conceived), into a more binding norm and, possibly, its translation into ‘hard’ norms, be it under 
national, supranational (EU) and international law. The thesis sets out a possible future scenario 
for the ‘legalisation’ of corporate responsibility to respect human rights that keeps within the 
thrust of the UNGPs and reflects current realities in the human rights landscape. The thesis will 
assess the way in which the design of this responsibility and, more precisely, its core element of 
human rights due diligence, enables such legalisation. The thesis will also address the intensity 
of implementation efforts, identify gaps and demonstrate the need and obligations of States to 
adopt regulatory measures in order to scale up efforts.  
Third, the thesis will link these findings to doctrinal debates on the international legal status of 
business enterprises. It will be concluded that traditional legal perspectives have become 
increasingly unhelpful in appreciating how CSR is becoming legalized within a global 
governance context. A new doctrine on international legal status is therefore called for. This 
thesis aims to fill this gap in academic literature. 
This project aims to answer to the following research questions. 
Have CSR, and the responsibilities of business enterprises for human rights, been legally defined 
in and fully adopted by international law, European law and national law? (with a particular 
emphasis in UK and US law). 
In the affirmative, have these responsibilities been defined as a new category of legal obligations 
with corresponding rights and obligations or as a reconceptualization of other areas of the 
law? 
If the answer to preceding question is that a new category arises, does this constitute the 
breakthrough that makes business enterprises subjects of international law from a positivist 
legal perspective? 
Can new forms of international CSR regulation be analysed in legal terms, even if they are found 
not to be a part of international law in the legal positivist sense of the word? Why? (or why 
not?). 
What makes CSR have ‘legal status’ in a global governance context? 
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 The Problem Statement of the Thesis 1.1
1.1.1 The Legal Definition of Corporate Social Responsibility and Business` Human Rights 
Responsibilities. 
Business enterprises have assumed a prominent role in the international arena. With operations 
and relations encompassing the entire globe, their activities have impacts on essential interests of 
an economic, financial, environmental and social nature. In the 1990s, the benefits of 
globalization were increasingly questioned. Concerns about unprecedented power of 
corporations and the perceived negative impact of their activities, including an alleged ‘race to 
the bottom’ in business regulations and an alleged regulatory vacuum at the domestic and 
international level, triggered calls for business enterprises to assume greater governance 
responsibilities. The focus and aspirations of human rights shifted towards corporate social 
responsibility (`CSR`) initially. A rich history of theories, approaches and terminologies on CSR 
has developed since the 1950s, when it was first introduced as a management idea.1 CSR gained 
new momentum and a CSR ‘movement’2 arose, which resulted in a proliferation of a plethora of 
CSR regulatory initiatives ranging from principles, codes of conduct and norms to guidelines and 
framework conventions.3 Business enterprises play an important role in the development of these 
initiatives, claiming to protect human rights in production processes and business activities.4  
The notion of business enterprises having responsibilities towards human rights is not new to 
CSR scholarship. Human rights developed into a key social concern of CSR in the 1970s, 
although it was more narrowly defined then as encompassing labour and worker rights.5 It is by 
now well-established that the human rights responsibilities of business largely inform and define 
the social aspect of CSR. However, the CSR approach to human rights diverges considerably 
from the positivist approach based on the understanding of human rights as moral and legal 
entitlements with corresponding legally binding obligations. This approach views human rights 
as part of a broader CSR agenda that covers substantive issues like transparency, management 
and community investment. It holds, moreover, that human rights address corporate activities 
directly and are premised on the notion that it is not governments, but rather employees, 
investors, consumers and the public who should be the drivers and enforcers of CSR initiatives.6  
The voluntary/mandatory dichotomy has long captured the CSR discourse. Still today, many 
scholars continue to view business responsibilities as mere voluntary undertakings. CSR is 
                                                
 1 See, e.g., Rangan Kasturi, et al. Business Solutions for the Global Poor: Creating Social and Economic Value, 
(Jossey-Bass 2007). 
 2 Michael R. Macleod, Emerging investor networks and the construction of corporate social responsibility, The 
Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 69-96 (2009).  
 3 Deborah Leipziger, The Corporate Social Responsibility Code Book (Greenleaf Publishing, 2003).  
 4 CRS has not only left a mark on management literature, the phenomenon has been analysed philosophically, 
sociologically, economically, psychologically and even aesthetically. O. Alvar Elbing, The Value Issue of 
Business: The Responsibility of the Businessman 13 The Academy of Management Journal, 79-89 (1970).  
   5  Florian Wettstein, From side show to main act: can business and human rights save corporate responsibility, in 
Business and Human Rights: From Principles to Practise (Dorothe Baumann-Pauly & Justine Nolan eds., 2016). 
 6 Id. 
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viewed as voluntary not only in the sense of non- binding legally speaking, but also discretionary 
in a moral sense, and thus ‘hardly a ‘must` for companies`.7 CSR has been traditionally referred 
to as obligations beyond the law and voluntary commitments of firms towards the societies in 
which they operate. 8  Whilst legal scholars take (‘hard’ law) obligations, compliance and 
corporate liability as point of departure, the CSR narrative has focused on ‘softer’ forms of 
responsibility, self-regulation and sustainability. Conventional conceptions of CSR perceive 
markets and business enterprises as belonging to the private domain, which is separated from the 
public domain, which is organised by the State.9 The scarcity of domestic and international legal 
regulation imposing binding obligations upon business enterprises vis-à-vis a specified legal or 
natural person is thus often emphasised. This narrow approach to CSR and its human rights 
aspect more specifically, has not only caused uncertainty about its exact scope, it has also made 
scholars question the role of law in it.10  
CSR has therefore long remained outside the scope of legal analysis. A legal debate on CSR 
unfolded as scholars began to point to the various manners in which CSR has legal implications 
including for legal studies; to demonstrate why CSR constitutes a legitimate field of legal study;11 
establishing that certain substantive issues of CSR like health and safety are already subject to 
legal regulation;12 setting out how the principles that underlie international CSR initiatives are 
often derived from legal instruments;13 according to which CSR embodies values of the spirit of 
the law that serve as inspiration and guidance to CSR;14 explaining that the law can act as a 
driver for greater corporate accountability and, conversely, that CSR can influence national and 
international legal trends.15 As scholars seek to assess these (reciprocal) linkages between CSR 
and law, the voluntary/mandatory distinction pervasive the CSR debate has been noted to 
become ‘unhelpful’.16 
The status quo in the CSR legal debate was pushed forward by a publication by Kerr, Janda & 
Pitts (2009) entitled ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: a legal analysis’. The authors review 
seven sustainable development principles that fuse in the concept of CSR to examine how ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ law have given substance, meaning and accountability to CSR initiatives. The 
                                                
 7    Wettstein, supra note 5, at 80. 
 8 Andrew Crane, et al., The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford University Press 
2009).  
 9    Wettstein, supra note 5, at 80. 
 10 J.A. Zerk, Multinationals and corporate social responsibility: limitations and opportunities in international law 
(Cambridge University Press. 2006).  
 11 M. Torrance, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Legal Analysis (book review), 56 McGill Law Journal, 
483-480 (2011). 
 12 Zerk, supra note 10.  
 13 K Buhmann, Regulating Corporate Social and Human Rights Responsibilities at the UN Plane: 
Institutionalising New Forms of Law and Law-making Approaches?, 78 Nordic Journal of International  1-52 
(2009). 
 14 Michael Kerr, et al., Corporate Social Responsibility: A Legal Analysis (LexisNexis. 2009). 
 15 Zerk, supra note 10. 
 16 Kerr, et al., supra note 14.  
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argument of these authors holds that these principles have merged with formal law to such an 
extent that CSR can be characterized as a legally meaningful concept.17 Whilst their work 
provides further justification for legal interest in CSR and presents a valuable framework to 
explain the manner in which CSR can be analysed from a legal perspective, it has been noted that 
the authors often struggle to find definite conceptual anchors for their analysis.18 Moreover, the 
authors pay scant attention to whether CSR has been legally defined in the law and, if so, how? 
The legal debate on the human rights responsibilities of business enterprises (BHR) has 
developed independent from and in parallel to the debate on CSR.19 Its origins can be traced back 
to the 1990s when the true impact of globalisation became more apparent. The BHR scholarship 
views an active role for States and national and international legislation to hold business 
enterprises legally accountable for human rights abuses, including through selective human 
rights litigation. Calls for legal corporate accountability gained in strength as the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of voluntary CSR initiatives became questioned. However, the attempts to create a 
legally binding instrument on business and human rights at the international level have not 
materialized. The polarization of the debate on the Norms on the responsibilities of transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights (‘UN Norms’) along the 
conflicting positions of the CSR and the business and human rights movement led to the failure 
of this initiative, with the result of the appointment of John Ruggie as the UN Secretary-
General’s Special Representative on the issue of human rights and transnational and other 
business enterprises (the ‘SRSG’) in 2005.  
The SRSG developed a three-pillared ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy’ Framework for a better 
functioning systems for business and human rights governance on a global scale. Adopted by the 
Human Rights Council (the ‘HRC’) in 2008, this Framework articulated a common definition of 
corporate responsibilities to respect human rights, which furthermore linked business conduct to 
the public construction of internationally recognized human rights. The responsibility to respect 
entails not only that business enterprises must comply with all applicable laws, it also includes a 
responsibility to respect internationally recognized human rights, wherever they operate. This is 
a negative responsibility to do no harm, yet it calls for affirmative ‘due diligence’ steps to 
identify, prevent and mitigate the human rights risks deriving from their operations and account 
how these are addressed.20 This responsibility is a soft norm founded in social expectations, and 
thus, strictly speaking from a formalistic positivist perspective, of a non-legally binding nature.  
The responsibility to respect human rights may not constitute, in and of itself, a legal definition 
of CSR or create international legal obligations for business enterprises as such. John Ruggie has 
clearly stated that, in his view, business enterprises presently do not have direct human rights 
obligations under international law. The emphasis is therefore placed in the corporate 
‘responsibility’, rather than a ‘duty’ to respect, and in ‘social expectations’ rather than ‘legal 
obligations’.21 However, such responsibility is not without any legal relevance. The SRSG 
                                                
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19   Wettstein, supra note 5, at 80. 
 20 Kerr, et al., supra note 14, at 15. 
 21 Id. 
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developed the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the ‘UNGPs’) to serve as 
a platform for guidance and action to translate the above mentioned Framework to practice. The 
HRC ‘endorsed’ the UNGPs on 23 June 2011. The UN Working Group on Business and Human 
Rights (the `WG BH`) was created in 2011 to promote the effective implementation and 
dissemination of the UNGPs.  
The UNGPs have spurred new legislative and policy initiatives at the national, supranational 
(EU) and international level across the globe. The EU Commission`s new policy initiative on 
CSR including proposals on the further implementation of the PRR Framework is a case in point. 
Also, the UNGPs have served as input in the process of updating and creating new global CSR 
instruments, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the International Finance Corporation (IFC)’s 
Performance Standards, the Global Reporting Initiative (‘GRI’), and ISO26000. Recent years has 
seen the development of hybrid and private initiatives, some sector or issue specific, instruments 
and tools that seek to enhance standards and practices through innovative approaches. It is in this 
aspect that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights may constitute the point of 
departure that elevates, once and for all, the responsibilities of business enterprises for human 
rights from the management narrative to a firm legal plane.  
The basic assumption is that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, as it is 
currently conceived, should further evolve and acquire normative force and ‘binding-ness’ in 
practice. Whilst it is always a matter of legal obligation for States to adopt the necessary rules 
and regulations to ensure that business enterprises respect human rights in practice, the scenario 
of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights acquiring normative force and the 
translation of such responsibility into a ‘hard’ (legally binding) norms at the national, regional 
and international level has become less distant. There are ever-increasing calls for legislation 
creating legal obligations of due diligence for companies at the national and supranational (EU) 
level. Looking back at five years of implementation efforts, the point of the legalization of the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights has become increasingly noteworthy. Further 
legal developments at the international level are anticipated with the creation, within the HRC, in 
2013 of an inter-governmental working group with a mandate to develop an internationally 
legally binding instrument on business and human rights. 
1.1.2 CSR and the International Legal Status of Business Enterprises 
Clarity about whether and how CSR has been legally defined is highly relevant within the 
broader context of international law, specifically in relation to the international legal personality 
of business enterprises. The international legal personality of business enterprises remains a 
contested and intensely debated issue. The (arguably still dominant) positivist legal perception of 
a State-based international legal system holds that States are the only or primary international 
legal subjects of international law. This reasoning finds a (perhaps counterintuitive) support in 
the conclusion of the International Court of Justice in the Reparations for Injuries case, 
according to which the UN is a subject of international law ‘capable of possessing international 
rights and duties’ with a capacity to ‘maintain its rights by bringing international claims’.22 In the 
                                                
 22 See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 
179 (Apr 11). 
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absence of a treaty or convention that regulates the international legal personality of business 
enterprises, or an explicit recognition by States of business enterprises as legal persons in 
international law, some legal scholars do not consider business enterprises to have any legal 
personality.23 Others view business enterprises as participants in international law with a legal 
capacity recognized by customary law to obtain international rights and duties. The extent and 
nature of the rights and duties of business enterprises may not be identical to those of States,24 
nevertheless there is support for the view that international law confers at least some degree of 
international legal status to business enterprises. 
This conventional view on the international legal personality of business enterprises increasingly 
stands challenge. Legal scholars have argued that such traditional approaches fail to capture the 
legal relevance of non-State actors in today’s international system. The legalization of CSR 
could shed new light on this controversial matter. If CSR has been defined as a new category of 
legal obligations at the international level, an analysis of the exact legal capacities that CSR 
confers on business enterprises under customary international law and international treaty law 
becomes crucial in the assessment of the current legal status of business enterprises in 
international law. This involves a study of whether (1) CSR imposes rights and duties upon 
business enterprises, (2) whether these can be legally enforced and (3) whether these rights and 
duties have been recognized by States. Could this be the breakthrough required to interpret the 
current status of business enterprises as making them international legal persons of international 
law? Is it desirable? 
1.1.3 Business and Human Rights and International Legal Status in a Global Governance 
Context 
Business and Human Rights as a new field of ‘global governance’ has had a profound impact on 
modern international law. According to Fauchald and Stigen, ‘global governance’ is a concept 
widely used by scholars across disciplines to capture certain empirical characteristics of 
evolutions in international politics that are largely left unaccounted for by traditional 
perspectives on international relations. In the midst of an ever expanding and diversifying body 
of research on this hot, yet controversial topic, legal literature on global governance most often 
ponders on two key observable phenomena: the emergence of new normatively relevant global 
regulatory processes and the role played by non-State actors in their development and 
enforcement.25 The emergence of civil society actors, business enterprises and various CSR 
regulatory initiatives in the business and human rights domain are illustrative of such global 
governance trends. Also referred to as ‘poly-centric governance’,26 the SRSG has noted three 
                                                
 23 O.K. Fauchald & J. Stigen, Corporate Responsibility Before International Institutions, 40 The George 
Washington International Law Review (2009). 
 24 See Reparations for Injuries, supra note 22, at 179. 
 25 K. Nowrot, Global governance and international law (Inst. für Wirtschaftsrecht. 2004). 
 26 Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout, and Robert Warren (1961) first introduced the concept of ‘polycentricity’, in 
the words of nobel price winner Elinor Ostrom: 
  In their effort to understand whether the activities of a diverse array of public and private agencies engaged 
in providing and producing of public services in metropolitan areas was chaotic, as charged by other 
scholars – or potentially a productive arrangement. ‘Polycentric’ connotes many centers of decision making 
that are formally independent of each other. Whether they actually function independently, or instead 
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distinct governance systems that have come to affect the conduct of business enterprises in 
relation to human rights. Apart from the system of public law and policy, national and 
international, there is ‘the civil governance system involving external stakeholders that are 
affected by or otherwise have an interest in multinationals’ and the ‘corporate governance, which 
internalizes elements of the other two’.27  
In this context, as noted by Mares, the SRSG’s ‘project was not a legalistic one, to begin with, 
[…]. [The SRSG’s] project would be one of mobilizing many more sources of leverage for the 
protection of human rights, rather than moving liability upwards towards the parent company. To 
succeed, this “leverage project” would require a multifaceted narrative of globalization that 
accounted explicitly for its threats and opportunities for protecting human rights 
transnationally’.28  As a result, in the words of […] Sauvant ‘policies have become more 
nuanced, international guidelines have been strengthened and new ones added, and some 
agreements have become more cautious […]. Rulemaking may therefore be haphazard, messy 
and uneven, depending on what is needed and what is feasible in a given constellation of 
interests and forces. But, hopefully, over time, the combination of various instruments add up to 
a regime that covers, comprehensively and in a balanced manner, the range of issues related to 
international investment, including issues related to human rights’.29 
Positivist legal doctrines increasingly fail to capture these trends, partly because the initiatives 
are not legally binding in the traditional sense of the law and are not directly linked to the will of 
sovereign States or governments. Legal theories on global governance, notably regulatory theory, 
have studied these phenomena. They describe and conceptualize how new forms of global 
regulation are generated, what their legitimate sources of law are and the regulatory authority 
they exercise.30 31 Theories on global governance thus analyse new regulatory initiatives in legal 
                                                                                                                                                       
constitute an interdependent system of relations, is an empirical question in particular cases. To the extent 
that they take each other into account in competitive relationships, enter into various contractual and 
cooperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the various political 
jurisdictions in a metropolitan area may function in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable 
patterns of interacting behavior. To the extent that this is so, they may be said to function as a ‘system’. 
  Ostrom, Elinor, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, Prize 
Lecture, (Dec. 8, 2009), https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/2009/ostrom_lecture.pdf. Vincent Ostrom, et al., The Organization of Government in 
Metropolitian Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry 55 The American Political Science Review, 831-32 (1961). 
 27  John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business Multinational Corporations and Human Rights, xliii (W.W. Norton & 
Company. 2013). 
 28 R. Mares, A Rejoinder to G. Skinner`s rethinking limited liability of parent corporations for foreign 
subsidiaries` violations of international human rights law 73 Washington and Lee Law Review Online, 1-24 
(2016). 
 29 Karl P. Sauvant, Looking Back, Looking Ahead: What lessons should we learn from past UN efforts to adopt a 
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, Institute for Business and Human Rights (Apr. 16, 2016), 
http://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-rights/looking-back-looking-ahead. 
 30 Kevin Kolben, Transnational labor regulation and the limits of governance, Theoretical inquiries in law 
(2011). 12 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 403(2011). 
 31 These include Global Administrative Law (‘GAL’), ‘New Governance’31 and ‘Legal Pluralism’. GAL, for 
example, provides a unique perspective of explaining global governance as administrative action. It presupposes 
the existence of a global administrative space where the distinction between national and international becomes 
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terms without relying on international law in the legal positivist sense of the word. However, if 
CSR becomes increasingly ‘legalized’ in a non-traditional legal manner, several relevant 
questions arise including, inter alia, ‘what makes global CSR regulation “legal’” and ‘what 
makes business enterprises have “legal personality” in the global governance context’? 
 Structure of the Thesis 1.2
Chapter 2 examines the evolution of the regulatory landscape on CSR and business and human 
rights. These origins are traced back to the 1970’s when the first international codes of conducts 
were adopted. The chapter provides a condensed overview of the most important regulatory 
initiatives and their conceptions of business’ responsibility for human rights, as well as the 
evolving socio-political context in which these arose. The ideological, institutional and political 
factors that have played a role in previous efforts to create international legally binding standards 
on business and human rights will be identified. This chapter addresses two movements that have 
emerged in the 1980’s, namely the CSR movement and the Business and Human Rights 
Movement. While these movements are aligned in their quest to respond to the regulatory 
problems deriving from the activities of corporations in a globalized world, their conceptions and 
regulatory agenda’s differ in crucial aspects. The divisions between them resulted in a 
polarization of debates in the UN and in negotiations on a previous UN initiative of the UN 
Norms to go into impasse. These political challenges that the former UN Commission on Human 
Rights (replaced by the HRC in 2006) faced have informed also the SRSG’s approach of 
principled pragmatism and the strategic and normative considerations that have guided the SRSG 
in the fulfilment of his mandate. 
Chapter 3 assesses the SRSG’s project in its own terms, and analyses the theoretical foundations 
underpinning the UNGPs. The focus is on the character of the UNGPs as a global normative 
framework for business and human rights, and their functionality in advancing a dynamic 
approach to institutional developments on a global scale. The UNGPs are set out to begin a long 
term process of enhancing standards and practices that can result in more effective governance 
systems and a global regime for the effective prevention of, and remedy for, business-related 
human rights harm. This chapter will provide a synopsis of the SRSG’s views on the embedded 
liberalism compromise, which has been of importance in framing the problem in the business 
and human rights domain. This is followed by a brief description of the SRSG’s views on the 
constitutive global public domain and ‘polycentric’ governance. The UNGPs incorporate these 
views, and articulate norms that correspond with the public role and responsibilities that business 
enterprises and other non-state actors have in the current human rights landscape. The SRSG’s 
approach of principled pragmatism will be addressed next. This is followed by an explanation of 
the ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy’ Framework and the UNGPs as a platform for systemic change 
and the characteristics of the institutional approach that the UNGPs promotes in order to advance 
                                                                                                                                                       
blurred and in which regulatory activities are also carried out beyond formally public, government structures, 
most notably by ‘hybrid private-public or purely private institutions’. N. Krisch & B. Kingsbury, Introduction: 
Global governance and global administrative law in the international legal order, 17 European Journal of 
International Law (2006). Kevin Kolben, Transnational labor regulation and the limits of governance, 
Theoretical inquiries in law (2011). 12 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 403(2011). Schiff Paul Berman, Global 
legal pluralism, 80 Southern California Law Review, 1155-1237 (2007). 
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towards the constitution of a global business and human rights regime. This is followed by a 
description of the UNGPs. 
Chapter 4 examines the SRSG’s soft law approach to the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights. The focus is the potential contribution of the UNGPs to the evolution of this norm 
from ‘soft’ law into more binding, and their potential translation into a hard law norm 
(‘legalisation’) at the national, supranational (EU) and international level. This responsibility is a 
social norm founded in international social expectations. While this norm is thus not non-legally 
binding in a strict legal sense, this ‘soft’ norm is not without legal effects. This chapter explores 
the factors (i.e., context, content, and institutional setting) that can explain compliance (i.e., 
factual adherence) by business enterprises with this norm. The UNGPs promotes a regulatory 
dynamic that affects and coordinates the regulation of these factors. This dynamic draws from 
the implementing measures adopted by key stakeholders and their governance systems (national 
and international public law and governance, civil and corporate governance). The resulting 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights may take on normative force as result of its 
restatement in more precise language and acceptance by State and non-state actors, and binding 
force as a result of ideational factors and its internalization in business practices and cultures. 
This chapter argues that a transposition of this norm into a hard norm at the national level can 
and should happen if the duties and responsibilities of States and business enterprises, as 
recognized by the UNGPs, are given full effect in order to promote the normative objective of 
ensuring human rights and fundamental freedoms. The following section explores the degree and 
intensity of efforts to implement the UNGPs. This involves an examination of the strategic 
priorities and activities of the WG BH, inter alia, National Action Plans, State and business 
surveys, stakeholder engagement and the UN Forum on Business and Human Rights. 
Chapter 5 examines in greater detail the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. The 
focus is on the concept of human rights due diligence and its potential to drive analytical 
improvements in, and facilitate convergence across national laws affecting business behaviour. 
The focus of this chapter is the (legal) character of the human rights due diligence concept as a 
standard of conduct and form of compliance. The human rights due diligence concept may be 
used also in the sense of a forward-looking management process aimed at the prevention of 
adverse human rights impacts. The UNGPs do not exclude the resort to the human rights due 
diligence concept in either way, as a management process or a standard of conduct. This chapter 
will explain and emphasise human rights due diligence as a legal concept. This involves an 
analysis of the interpretations of this concept and an evaluation of differences and similarities 
between this concept and other (legal) due diligence concepts used in various areas of law. The 
substantive and procedural aspects of human rights due diligence will be explained in relation to 
due diligence under corporate law and securities law. The legal character of human rights due 
diligence will be explored by comparison to the duty of care concept which currently exists 
under certain national (tort) laws of non-contractual obligations. The balancing act that the 
human rights due diligence concept entails will be explored further through a parallelism with 
the due diligence obligations that are applicable to States under International Human Rights law. 
The chapter will reflect on the functionality of the human rights due diligence concept in terms 
of enabling and promoting future legal developments within legal systems. The design and open-
endedness of the concept lends easily to its implementation in different areas of law. This 
facilitates the further crystallization of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights and 
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its transposition into legal obligations at the national (or even supranational, i.e., EU) level. The 
further ‘hardening’ of the human rights due diligence concept into a legal obligation under 
different national laws is desirable to foster corporate cultures respectful of human rights. It 
should be recalled, in this regard, that International Human Rights law imposes obligations on 
States to adopt such regulatory measures as necessary in order to ensure that business enterprises 
meet their responsibility to respect human rights in practice. The human rights due diligence 
concept may thus be viewed as a reformatory concept, bound to fruitfully redefine the standards 
of due diligence that different areas of the legal order currently set out for business enterprises. 
The human rights due diligence through the restatement of these standards in other areas of law 
that affect business behaviour may contribute to the reconceptualization of such laws. 
Chapter 6 examines the legal implications of giving effect to the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights as defined in the UNGPs through Tort law and EU and national Private 
international law. The chapter examines the intertwinement of private international law with 
human rights in general and, more specifically, with human rights due diligence. It will be found 
that the human rights due diligence concept can have a role in a court’s decisions on jurisdiction 
and which country’s substantive law to apply to the underlying dispute. The chapter explores in 
detail the main approaches to establishing civil liability of a parent entity for human rights 
breaches that are the result of the activities of its subsidiary outside the EU. These three 
approaches are: (i) negligence; (ii) complicity; and (iii) piercing the corporate veil. The chapter 
examines the extent to which these approaches are challenged by and can be reconciled with the 
concept of human rights due diligence.  
It will be argued that, if the concept of human rights due diligence is to be operationalized in an 
optimal manner, a rebuttable presumption of a legal duty of human rights due diligence as the 
standard for liability should be considered. Such presumption would be construed on the basis of 
the human rights due diligence concept as defined by the UNGPs. Amendments to EU Private 
international law to achieve such objective will also be suggested. The possibility of creating a 
legal duty of human rights due diligence through statute will be discussed next. Finally, a 
reference will be made to the proposed French law creating a legal duty of vigilance, since it 
constitutes a particularly illustrative example of the manner in which such duty of care can work 
in practice. The Chapter examines the effects of such duty in reinforcing State responses to 
UNGP 7(d), according to which ‘States should take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness 
of domestic judicial mechanisms when addressing business-related human rights abuses, 
including considering ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead 
to a denial of access to remedy’. 
The value of creating such a legal duty of human rights due diligence is assessed within the 
broader context of the business and human rights system and the regulatory dynamics within this 
system. The legal duty of human rights due diligence is viewed as a method to advance towards a 
maximum reduction in adverse human rights impacts by business enterprises through 
legalisation. Attention will be drawn to the transnational regulatory effects that such duty may 
create and the solution it could offer to current challenges in regulating transnational corporate 
networks, which are of particular focus in business and human rights domain. From the 
perspective of polycentric governance, the focus more generally is on the potential impact of 
such legal duty on the incentives and capacities of business enterprises, and other related factors 
that explain human rights compliance behaviour by such entities in practice.  
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Chapter 7 will examine the legal implications of giving effect to the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights as defined in the UNGPs, through EU and national mandatory disclosure 
legislation. The focus is on Directive 2014/95/EU, of 22 October 2014, as regards disclosure of 
non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups (‘the 
Directive’). The chapter examines the potential of the Directive in fostering a culture of reporting 
and communication by business, in conformity with UNGPs 17 and 21, which articulate the 
responsibility of business enterprises to communicate. Chapter 7 also examines the effect of the 
Directive in reinforcing State responses to UNGP 3, according to which, in meeting their duty to 
protect, States should ‘encourage, and where appropriate require business enterprises to 
communicate how they address their human rights impacts’. More precisely, this chapter 
explores the connections between the approaches of the Directive to defining the scope of the 
application, obligation and required substance and the human rights due diligence concept.  
First, the chapter analyses the so-called ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ of the Directive. It is argued that 
the Directive is unlikely to acquire direct effect, inter alia, since to the extent that such direct 
effect is framed as obligations for (non publicly-owned) corporations vis à vis stake holders 
(NGOs, shareholders, etc.), it would be hard for the Directive to overcome the CJEU’s 
prohibition of direct effect of Directives. Which is not to say that the Directive will not have any 
legal effects. Apart from the indirect effects the Directive may have, stakeholders might file a 
complaint for a breach of EU law before the European Commission in order for the Commission 
to bring an action against the Member State in question before the CJEU pursuant to Article 258 
TFEU. All in all, it is concluded that by enacting the Directive, the EU opted for a type of legal 
instrument which has potentially sweeping implications in the rights of stakeholders when it 
comes to the disclosure obligations of corporations. However, irrespective to the type of 
instrument chosen, as will be explained in detail, in particular, in relation to the ‘comply or 
explain’ framework, it is uncertain whether the content of the Directive will contribute to further 
the rights of stake-holders.   
Second, the chapter will set out the manner in which the Directive confirms the importance of 
regulating and increasing the transparency of human rights due diligence within a corporate 
group. It was found that the Directive supports a functional approach to the notion of ‘group’ that 
might potentially go beyond the more traditional conception of the group entity in law that 
centers on notions of control and ownership. The application of such traditional approach to 
delineate the boundaries of the group entity for the purpose of disclosure on human rights would 
be unduly restrictive. Third, this chapter will also argue that the Directive, in the light of its 
objectives and pursuant to well-established case-law supporting a purposive interpretation of 
secondary EU legislation should have certain extraterritorial effects. The analysis in the chapter 
suggests, in short that the adoption by the EU of disclosure requirements for certain companies 
on human rights due diligence, while being a welcome development, nonetheless provides only a 
partial response to the UNGPs, and in certain aspects, may even restrict EU Member States in 
their implementation of the UNGPs.  
The analysis in the chapter, concludes, in relation to the Directive, that the adoption by the EU of 
disclosure requirements for certain companies on human rights due diligence, while being a 
welcome development, nonetheless provides only a partial response to the UNGPs, and in certain 
aspects, may even restrict EU Member States in their implementation of the UNGPs. Finally, the 
chapter will briefly reflect on recent developments which indicate that the information on human 
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rights due diligence that companies may disclose in order to comply with the requirements of the 
Directive, or national legislations in the United Kingdom (‘UK’) and United States (‘US’) that 
regulate the disclosure by companies on slavery and trafficking-related risks in corporate supply 
chains, may be used by Non-Governmental Organisations (‘NGOs’) for the purpose of 
transnational supply chain litigation. 
Chapter 8 sets out the efforts of the EU to foster responses to the UNGPs and examines the 
potential contribution of the EU to the normative evolution of the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights in the EU and beyond. The European Commission issued the 
Communication ‘A renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility’ (the ‘EU 
CSR Strategy’) on 25 October 2011. This communication provides the European Commission’s 
internal policy framework for the promotion of CSR, and business respect for human rights and 
sets out a renewed European Strategy for CSR. 32 The European Commission recognizes in this 
communication human rights as a prominent aspect of CSR that business enterprises should 
address, and indicates that it seeks policy consistency with global approaches in promoting CSR, 
inter alia, the UNGPs. The European Commission’s CSR Strategy presents a new definition of 
CSR, ‘the responsibility of enterprises for their impact on society’. Also a new plan of action is 
introduced, one which advances a ‘smart-mix’ approach pursuant to which, besides voluntary 
measures, a role for complementary regulation is envisaged.  
This chapter assesses the EU’s concrete efforts to foster respect for human rights by business 
enterprises in the EU and beyond. The chapter focuses on the activities of the EU to affect and 
coordinate the regulation of factors (context, content, institutional setting) that explain human 
rights compliant conduct in practice. The EU advances a dynamic regulatory approach that 
fosters responses by the EU itself, EU Member States, third countries, business enterprises, 
NGOs and other relevant stakeholders. Special attention will be paid to aspects of EU CSR 
policy that signal the possible translation of the corporate responsibility to respect from ‘soft’ 
law into more binding norms and, potentially, its translation into ‘hard’ hard law norms 
(‘legalisation’) at the national, European and international level. The EU advances a dynamic 
regulatory approach that fosters responses by the EU itself, EU Member States, third countries, 
multi-stakeholder initiatives and business enterprises. This chapter argues that there is scope for 
the EU to increase its level of engagement with the UNGPs in order to actively implement this 
commitment. The chapter also notes that the substance of the efforts of the EU and the regulatory 
responses by the EU, States, business enterprises and other actors to the UNGPs, provide 
indication of evolving practices in relation to corporate responsibility and accountability for 
human rights and the crystallization of corporate respect for human rights in the EU context.   
Chapter 9 examines the legal status of business enterprises in the international system. This 
chapter sets out different doctrinal approaches to international legal personality and how such 
status has been conferred to actors in the international system, including to non-State actors. The 
chapter will reflect the different doctrinal perspectives on the legal status of business enterprises. 
These perspectives will be confronted with the evolving reality in the business and human rights 
regime. I will examine the extent to which developments in the implementation of the UNGPs 
inform these debates and the validity of these approaches in light of the current state of affairs. It 
                                                
 32 Commission Staff Working Document on Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights - State of Play, 6, SWD (2015) 144 final (Jul. 14, 2015).  
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will tackle the question whether CSR can be analysed in legal terms without recourse to 
international law in the traditional positivist sense of the concept and, if so, how. This will allow 
the identification and analysis of those characteristics that makes CSR have ‘legal status’ and 
business enterprises have ‘legal personality’ in a context of global governance. In a critique of 
these theories, the thesis will determine whether the theories adequately capture today’s global 
governance realities and if an adjustment or expansion of these theories is called for. It will be 
argued that a new doctrine on international legal status is called for, one which adequately 
reflects today’s global governance realities. The new insights gained will pave the way for the 
construction of a new doctrine on international legal status. 
 Research Methodology 1.3
This thesis resorts to a combination of desk-top research and comparative studies. The 
specificities of the methodology resorted to will be set out in detail below. More precisely, I 
conduct a study of primary sources (i.e., legislation and case law at the national, regional and 
international level) to find, organize and interpret legal standards, practices and developments 
that are relevant for the regulation of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights as 
defined in the UNGPs. 
I will examine legal materials in the national legal system of the UK. The analysis is confined to 
this legal system, partially due to the ease of availability of reliable sources in the English 
language. Perhaps more importantly, the Common law jurisdiction of the UK is one of the most 
advanced European legal systems in terms of legalizing CSR. For example, the UK Company 
Act 2006 placed CSR at the heart of director’s functions by rendering it mandatory for directors 
to take into consideration the interests of stakeholders when managing the company. New 
director’s duties were supplemented by new reporting requirements for UK public companies 
that call upon directors to prepare a report each financial year reflecting on certain social and 
environmental matters. Unlike in most other jurisdictions, these duties are accompanied by 
penalties for non-compliance.33 The UK has been regarded as a precursor in terms of having been 
the first to launch a national action plan on business and human rights in 2013. Moreover, the 
UK has been a prominent venue for the enforcement of business activities through corporate 
liability. The analysis of how the responsibilities of business enterprises in relation to human 
rights have been defined within the UK legal context and the UK’s engagement with the UNGPs 
is therefore highly relevant. 
The thesis will furthermore examine selected legal materials from the legal system of the US. 
The reason for this is threefold. It was in the US that the idea of CSR originated and the practice 
of CSR first emerged. CSR has flourished in the US partly due to the its loosely regulated 
markets for labour and capital, the low level of welfare state protection and the emphasis placed 
on individual freedom and responsibility. As one of the world’s largest economies with business 
enterprises having impacts on a global scale, the commitment of the US to CSR is of great 
significance. More importantly, legislative initiatives in the US in the area of, inter alia, conflict 
minerals and modern-day slavery and trafficking have served as a drivers and inspiration for 
policy changes and regulatory initiatives at the national (i.e., UK) and European level. Moreover, 
the enforcement of corporate liability has been firmly established in the US: the US is one of few 
                                                
 33 See the UK Companies Act 2006, c.46, S 423. 
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legal systems, which provides an effective venue for adjudicating civil liability for harm 
committed by companies operating abroad, under the US Alien Tort Claims Act (the ‘ATCA’).34 
At the regional level, this Chapter will conduct a study of the principle sources of primary and 
secondary EU law (i.e., Regulations, Directives and Decisions) as well as the rulings which the 
European Court of Justice (the ‘CJEU’) has rendered in this context. The analysis of the legal 
concept of CSR in the EU has been timely, with the EU Commission having issued a 
communication setting out a renewed CSR Strategy in 2011. Relevant considerations are that this 
Communication presents a renewed EU definition of CSR, the EU aim of seeking policy 
alignment with the global approaches to CSR, the commitment of the EU to the implementation 
of the UNGPs, as well as the renewed Agenda for Action for 2011-2014, which encompasses 
regulatory actions besides voluntary actions to promote CSR. The European Commission’s 
departure from the entirely voluntary approach to CSR policy it adopted in several previous 
initiatives, has revived hopes for further regulatory developments supportive of business respect 
for human rights in the EU context. 
In European countries (unlike, to some degree in the US), issues core to CSR, like healthcare and 
education, have been considered part of the government agenda and have been object of 
regulation.35 Some aspects of CSR are already object of EU regulation, such as reporting 
obligations, misleading advertising, 36  unfair commercial practices and public procurement 
standards. Many of these regulations can be applied directly by judges in domestic courts.37 Also, 
in the light of the EU’s large internal market, role in foreign direct investment and community 
values, its stance on CSR can influence business enterprises and suppliers from every region in 
the world.38 
                                                
 34 The ATCA, 28 U.S.C. §1350 provides that ‘[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’. 
Alien Tort Claim Act, U.S.C. United States. 
 35 Andrew Crane et al., Corporate Social Responsibility: Reading and Cases in a Global Context (Routledge 
2008).   
 36 A business enterprise may be held liable for inaccurate or incomplete representation about CSR or 
non-compliance with codes of conduct on the basis of the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. 
Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 
84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (`Unfair Commercial Practice 
Directive`), 2005, O.J. (L 149), 22. Also see, the updated version of the guidance document on the application 
of this Directive. Commission Staff Working Document: Guidance on the Implementation/Application of 
Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices, accompanying the document Communication From the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the 
Regions; A comprehensive approach to stimulating cross border e-commerce for Europe`s citizens and 
businesses {COM(2016) 320}, COM(2016) 163 final (May 25, 2016). Corporate liability may also arise on the 
basis of the 2006 Directive Concerning Misleading and Comparative Advertising. Directive 2006/114/EC, of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 concerning misleading and comparative 
advertising, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 21. 
 37 Cf.  e.g., Case 213/89 Factortame, 1990, E.C.R.  I-02433. 
 38 Kerr, et al., supra note 14, at 568. 
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At the international level, I will undertake an examination of the legal obligations of States and 
business enterprises under international law, deriving from treaties or international custom and 
practice in different areas of international law (international human rights law, international 
criminal law and international economic law) and case law interpreting these obligations, as well 
as secondary academic sources. 
Two comparative studies will be conducted.  
First, I will compare the elements of the human rights due diligence component of the corporate 
responsibility to respect, as defined in the UNGPs. The study will analyse the elements of this 
concept by comparison to legal definitions of the due diligence that have been used in other areas 
of law (e.g., Civil law, Company law, Securities law and, of course, International Human Rights 
Law). A comparison of due diligence definitions can result in an enhanced understanding of the 
elements of the human rights due diligence concept and hence, the (legal) character of the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights as a standard of conduct. 
Second, on the basis of these findings, the legal definitions of CSR as identified in the policies 
and laws adopted within the respective legal systems will be examined. This will involve a 
comparison between corporate responsibility to respect human rights, as defined in the UNGPs 
and the definitions of CSR encountered in EU policy and legislation, as well as the national legal 
system of the UK and the US in the specific areas that regulate business responsibilities in 
relation to human rights (e.g., conflict minerals and modern-day slavery). The examination of the 
reasons for the similarities and differences in concepts to the UNGPs and implications will be 
based on a study of secondary sources (i.e., academic journal articles, books, policy documents 
etc.) elaborating upon the legal context and origins of the respective legislative or measures and 
the legal system more generally. 
   
 Factual and Legal Origins of the UN Guiding Principles: The Emergence of the 2
Business and Human Rights Agenda 
 
 Introduction 2.1
This chapter provides an overview of relevant initiatives that emerged over the course of the 
previous decades to regulate the conduct of business enterprises in relation to human rights. The 
first attempts to regulate these at the international level can be traced back to the early 1970s 
when the first international codes of conduct were adopted, though business practices of CSR 
date back centuries.1 The analysis will shed light on the problem that regulatory initiatives seek 
to address, which relate to the challenges that globalisation has posed to society to regulate 
business in order to ensure that individuals are protected against infringements of their human 
rights by business, and that remediation is available in case such abuses have occurred. The 
chapter will address various contextual, ideological and political factors that caused previous 
attempts to create international legally binding standards on business and human rights to be 
unsuccessful. Attention will be drawn to two movements that emerged in the 1980s to respond to 
the negative impacts by globalization; the CSR movement and the Business and Human Rights 
Movement. The division between these movements whose agendas divert on critical points has 
affected previous attempts to create international standards for business and human rights. 
Prominent among such attempts is the initiative of draft UN Norms that stranded after the debate 
in the UN had turned divisive and polarized. This initiative will be examined in further detail. 
The aim of this chapter is to shed light on factual and legal origins of the mandate of the SRSG. 
The context in which the mandate of the SRSG was created and the factors that led to previous 
unsuccessful attempts to regulate business enterprises through hard obligations proved to be of 
importance in the SRSG`s choice for the approach of ‘principled pragmatism’, which guided the 
SRSG in the fulfillment of his mandate. The next chapter will examine this approach and the 
SRSG`s project. 
 The 1970s: International Codes of Conduct 2.2
The 1970s witnessed increasing concerns about the overarching power of MNEs on the national 
development agendas of countries at different stages of development.2 The power of MNEs was 
reflected in their size and geographical spread. Their sales in goods and services amounted to 
billions of dollars. They exceeded the size of the domestic economies of most of the 150 
countries existing at the time. While headquartered in developed countries, the majority of 
MNEs had affiliates in many developing countries across the world. MNEs employed a large 
percentage of the global workforce. Their production-distribution systems extended globally. 
The MNEs had significant financial resources at their disposal for research and innovation. Due 
                                                
 1 John Ruggie & Tamaryn Nelson, Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: 
Normative Innovations and Implementation Challenges (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Corporate 
Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 66, 2015). 
 2 A. Ramasastry, Closing the governance gap in the business and human rights area: lessons from the anti-
corruption movement, in Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to 
Respect? (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013). 
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to the capabilities of companies to satisfy the needs of both advanced and developing countries, 
their operations where perceived as important attributes to greater interdependence in 
international economic relations.3 4 
While the expansion of business enterprises was a welcome development to some,5 6 most 
developing countries perceived it as a threat to their economic and social development and 
possibly, to democracy.7 A concern of newly emerging colonial States was that the asymmetry in 
economic relations among States and companies would create new dependencies and restrictions 
on their national autonomy. The hope was that by inviting the influx of large companies, 
business would lead to the creation of wealth, jobs, tax revenues, technological innovation, 
scientific know-how, and more generally, economic growth and development. These benefits 
were not necessarily forthcoming, however. Policies of export restrictions, repatriation of profits 
and intra-company transfer pricing resulted in earnings to flow out of the country, and the costs 
for technology, consumer goods and healthcare to rise.8 
Reaping the benefits of increased economic activity could come at significant political and social 
cost for developing countries. Social tensions could run high over labor rights9 and growing 
inequalities. Political misconduct by business enterprises was also not uncommon. Companies 
were known to leverage governments in case of conflicting interests, sometimes having the latter 
act under direct instructions of the foreign diplomacy of the home countries of the corporations.10 
                                                
 3 Werner J. Feld, Multinational Corporations and UN Politics: The Quest for Codes of Conduct, 5 (Pergamon 
Press, 1980). 
 4 Their importance in developing countries varied per country and sector. In developing countries, MNEs were 
active especially in the extractive, agriculture and public utilities area, manufacturing and the service sector, 
especially banking. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Multinational corporations in world 
development (United Nations, 1973). 
 5 Companies were perceived by some as ‘key instruments for maximizing world welfare’. Id. at 1. 
 6 As catalysts of economic progress in both home and host countries, companies and their activities could 
equalize living standards and narrow the economic and social gap, it was argued. Centre of Transnational 
Corporations, International Action on the Problem of Corrupt Practices, 1 The CTC Reporter, 19 (1977). 
 7 Sten Niklasson, The OECD Guidelines for MNEs and the UN Draft Code of Conduct: Some Political 
Considerations, in Studies in Transnational Economic Law (Horn ed. 1980). 
 8 Feld, supra note 3, at 29. 
 9 As explained by Hepple, wage costs and labour standards were unfairly oppressed due to social oppression, for 
instance wage differential per sex or forced and child labour, which has been linked to social dumping. Social 
dumping refers ‘to costs that are for their part depressed below a ‘natural’ level by means of ‘social oppression’ 
facilitating unfair pricing strategies against foreign competitors. Remedial action would either consist of the 
offending firms consenting to raise their prices accordingly or failing that, imposing equivalent import 
restrictions. Bob Hepple, A Race to the Top? International Investment Guidelines and Corporate Codes of 
Conduct (1999) 20 Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, 347 (1999). 
 10 Companies could influence governments for instance through advertisement in local media, support for corrupt 
practices and direct infringement in domestic affairs. Foreign diplomacy may give direct instructions to 
companies to exert their influence, relying on their presence in developing countries to pursue their economic 
policies of external raw material supply, currency rates, balance of payment equilibrium more effectively. 
Centre of Transnational Corporations, supra note 6, at 17. It has been noted that negotiations on a binding code 
of conduct for business enterprises begun after corporate involvement in efforts by the United States to 
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The perceived threat of companies encroaching on national affairs left leaders of developing 
countries at unease. The 1970s witnessed strategic maneuvering by these countries to consolidate 
international controls over the conduct of business enterprises through different forums at the 
international level. 
The issue of MNEs was integral to a broader agenda advocated by developing countries to found 
a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The purpose of the NIEO was agreed at the 
Bandung Conference in 1955.11 The NIEO was propelled on the UN agenda with support from 
the G77,12 after which it received official backing by the UN General Assembly (‘UNGA’). The 
1974 Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order first introduced 
the concept of the NIEO, and outlined a list of core principles upon which the new order was to 
be founded. These principles alluded to the sovereign equality of States, broadest cooperation of 
all States based on equity, full and equal participation in solving world economic problems, and 
full permanent sovereignty of every state of its national resources and all economic activities.13 14 
The Plan of Action and The Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States were passed at the 
same time. Article 1 of the Charter stipulated; 
Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system as well 
as it political, social and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, 
without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever.15 
The Charter recognized the right of States to regulate and control foreign investment and the 
activities of transnational corporations within its national jurisdiction, including through 
nationalization and expropriation of foreign property, and to settle disputes before domestic 
courts.16 The Plan of Action called for the development and implementation of an international 
code of conduct to regulate business enterprises.17 
                                                                                                                                                       
destabilize regimes in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile in the 1950s and 1970s came to the light. Jeffrey J. Dunoff, et 
al., International law: norms, actors, process: a problem oriented approach, 220 (Aspen Publishers, 2006). 
 11  Ramasastry,  supra  note 2, at 165. 
 12 The Group of 77 (G77) is a loose coalition of developing nations, designed to promote its members’ collective 
economic interests and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the United Nations (for more 
information refer to: http://www.g77.org/doc/). 
 13 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/S-6/3201 (1 May 1974). 
 14 With regards to MNC`s, the Declaration stated the following principle; ‘Regulation and supervision of the 
activities of transnational corporations by taking measures in the interest of the national economies of the 
countries where such transnational corporations operate on the basis of the full sovereignty of those countries’. 
Id. Principle 4(g). 
 15 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Article 1, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), A/RES/29/3281  (Dec.12, 
1974). 
 16 Id. art. 2. 
 17 The code was intended for the following purposes: 
1. to prevent interference in the internal affairs of the countries where they operate and their collaboration 
with racist regimes and colonial administrations; 
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Through a strong joint representation as the G77, developing countries raised their concerns at 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which was established 
in 1963. UNCTAD issued various reports and resolutions, and developed codes addressing two 
practices that could impact negatively on the economic development of developing countries; a 
special technology transfer draft code,18 as well as principles and rules governing the use and 
control of restrictive business practices.19 
Discussions were also started in the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which resulted in 
the adoption by the ILO Governing Body of the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (ILO Tripartite Declaration) in 1977.20 The ILO 
Tripartite Declaration was as a nonbinding declaration inviting the governments of the State 
Members of the ILO, the employer’s and workers’ organisations in these host and home 
countries and Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) operating in their territories to observe a set of 
principles in the areas of employment, training, conditions of work and life, and industrial 
relations. These principles offered guidance on appropriate laws, policies, measures and actions 
that these actors may take to further social progress. They are founded on the international labour 
conventions and recommendations that the ILO developed since 1919, which are referenced in 
the text.21 States that joined the ILO Tripartite Declaration were urged to ratify these conventions 
and recommendations if they have not done so already. 
The ILO Tripartite Declaration recognises that MNEs make an important contribution ‘to the 
promotion of economic and social welfare; to the improvement of living standards and the 
satisfaction of basic needs; to the creation of employment opportunities, both directly and 
indirectly; and to the enjoyment of basic human rights, including freedom of association, 
throughout the world’.22 However, the ILO Tripartite Declaration also warned that ‘the advances 
made by multinational enterprises in organising their operations beyond the national framework 
may lead to abuse of concentrations of economic power and to conflicts with national policy 
                                                                                                                                                       
2. to regulate their activities in host countries, to eliminate restrictive business practices and to conform to 
the national development plans and objectives of developing countries, and in this context facilitate, as 
necessary, the review and revision of previously concluded arrangements; 
3. to bring about assistance, transfer of technology and management skills to developing countries on 
equitable and favourable terms; 
4. to regulate the repatriation of the profits accruing from their operations, taking into account the legitimate 
interests of all parties concerned; and 
5. to promote reinvestment of their profits in developing countries. 
 18 Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, U.N. GA Res. A/RES/40/184, 119th Sess. 
(Dec. 17, 1985). 
 19 Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. GA Resolution 35/63 (Dec. 5, 1980). 
 20 The following three paragraphs originate from: Bijlmakers, et al., Report on tracking CSR responses FRAME 
Deliverable 7.4 (Nov. 2015, 2014), http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Deliverable-7.4.pdf. 
 21 ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO (2006), 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---
multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf. 
 22 Id. 
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objectives and with the interest of the workers’.23 Therefore, the aim of the MNE Declaration 
was to provide principles and recommendations to Governments, MNEs and workers ‘to 
encourage the positive contribution that MNEs can make to economic and social progress and to 
minimize and resolve the difficulties to which their various operations may give rise’.24 
The ILO Tripartite Declaration calls on MNEs ‘to fully take into account’ and to act ‘in harmony 
with’ the established general policy objectives of the countries in which they operate, especially 
the development priorities and social aims of these countries.25 To this effect, consultations must 
be held between the MNEs, the government and the national employers and workers 
organisations in these countries. Governments of home countries ‘should promote good social 
practice in accordance with this Declaration of Principles’. These governments in so doing, must 
give ‘regard to the social and labour law, regulations and practices in host countries as well as to 
relevant international standards’.26  Both home and host countries should be prepared to have 
consultations with each other on these issues when need arises. The Declaration is structured 
around five areas, for which recommendations on particular themes are developed: (i) general 
policies; (ii) employment; (iii) training; (iv) conditions of work and life; (v) industrial relations. 
The MNE Declaration was amended in 2000 and 2006. An addendum was added in 2000, 
recognizing that MNEs should ‘fully take into account’ the objectives of the 1998 ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.27 
Public concerns about the political and social-economic impact of the operations of individual 
MNEs gave impetus to the development OECD Guidelines on MNEs in 1974, in the context of 
negotiations on international investment matters.28 The first edition was adopted on 21 June 
1976. The Guidelines purported to help ensure harmony between MNEs operations and the 
national policies of the countries in which they operated and to consolidate relations of mutual 
                                                
 23 Id. ¶ 1. 
 24 Id. ¶ 2. 
 25 Id. ¶ 10. 
 26 Id. ¶ 12. 
 27 Id. Addendum II. 
Article 2 of this ILO Declaration establishes that: 
2. Declares that all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an obligation 
arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to realize, in good 
faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the 
subject of those Conventions, namely:  
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective  bargaining; 
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; 
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and 
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
 28 Theo W. Vogelaar, The OECD Guidelines: Their Philosophy, History, Negotiation, Form, Legal Nature, 
Follow-up Procedures and Review, in Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 130-
131 (Norbert Horn ed. 1980). 
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confidence between MNEs and States.29 The underlying rationale was the improvement of the 
international investment climate. The OECD Guidelines were adopted in an Annex to an OECD 
Declaration on international investment and MNEs.30 
The Declaration introduced policy principles to strengthen the cooperation and consultation 
between member countries with regards to issues related to both international investment and 
MNEs.31 The issuance of a set of joint recommendations by the members of the OECD to MNEs 
operating in their territory to observe the Guidelines as Annexed thereto, the OECD Guidelines 
for MNEs, was one of these policy principles. Governments identified a common interest in 
encouraging the positive contributions of MNEs to social progress and to minimize and resolve 
problems that could arise due to their international structure and to contribute to improving the 
foreign investment climate.32 The OECD Guidelines were intended as part of a framework 
comprising of interrelated and complementary instruments. The OECD Council promulgated two 
other decisions simultaneously, as part of this framework, relating to national treatment for 
foreign-controlled entities and international investment incentives and disincentives.33 
The OECD Guidelines for MNEs were thus adopted by States as joint recommendations to the 
MNEs that operated in their territories. The Guidelines had been created by mutual agreement 
between States on the Declaration. This agreement was sanctioned by a declaratory act not of the 
OECD, but of governments acting within the framework of the OECD.34 While thus distinct in 
form from decisions and recommendations of the OECD Council, the Guidelines assumed the 
same effects since their implementation was entrusted to the OECD.35 The Guidelines introduced 
international standards on the activities of MNEs in the different Member countries.  The 
guidelines established that enterprises should ‘take fully into account established general policy 
objectives of Member countries in which they operate [. . .] in particular, give due consideration 
to those countries` aims and priorities with regards to economic and social process’. It also 
addressed disclosure of information, competition, financing, taxation, employment and industrial 
                                                
 29 Norbert Horn, Legal problems of codes of conduct for multinational enterprises, 4 (Kluwer 1980). Since 1979, 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises were revised on several occasions, in 1984, 1991, 2000 and 
2011. The latest 2011 version phrases the aim of the OECD Guidelines as follows; “The Guidelines aim to 
ensure that the operations of these enterprises are in harmony with government policies, to strengthen the basis 
of mutual confidence between enterprises and the societies in which they operate, to help improve the foreign 
investment climate and to enhance the contribution to sustainable development made by multinational 
enterprises”. OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Publishing, preface, ¶ 1 (2011), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en. 
 30 After its adoption on 21 June 1976, the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises was reviewed on several occasions (1979, 1984, 1991, 2000 and 2011), see 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-
policy/oecddeclarationoninternationalinvestmentandmultinationalenterprises.htm. 
 31 Vogelaar, supra note 28, at 134. 
 32 Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (June 21,1976) in Legal Problems of 
Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 452 (Horn ed. 1980). 
 33 OECD, supra note 29, Introduction, ¶ 5. 
 34 Vogelaar, supra note 28, at 133. 
 35 Id. 
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relations and science and technology. Directed at MNEs, the Guidelines sought to correct36 their 
conduct, but did not levy sanctions for noncompliance. While their promotion by States was 
mandatory, the Guidelines stipulate that observance by MNEs was ‘voluntary and not legally 
enforceable’.37 
In a separate decision related to intergovernmental consultation procedures, the Council 
established a follow-up and consultation procedure allowing for discussions on the application of 
the Guidelines by individual MNEs. The Committee on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprise was tasked to hold exchange of views on relevant issues and 
experiences in the application of the Guidelines, and to report periodically to the Council on 
these matters, to which the BIAC and the TUAC were allowed to contribute. Business 
enterprises could be given the opportunity to express their views. The purpose of the 
consultations was not to evaluate the individual conduct of MNEs, but to express views, and to 
provide understanding and clarification of the Guidelines that would inform the 1979 review of 
the Guidelines.38 The Commission was not authorized to issue conclusions on the conduct of 
individual enterprises.39 In 1984, the Members of the OECD agreed to establish a complaints 
mechanism in each government, so-called ‘National Contact Points’ (NCPs), that were tasked to 
not only promote the OECD Guidelines, but also ‘to contribute to the solution of problems that 
may arise’ related to the observance of the Guidelines.40 
Another international initiative to regulate the conduct of business enterprises was adopted in 
1977, the (then) EEC code for South Africa (also known as the ‘Anti-Apartheid code’). The 
‘Anti-Apartheid code’ was as a foreign policy document41 setting the expectation that MNEs 
uphold specified industrial relations, employment and social policies with regards to their ‘Black 
African’ employees. The purpose was to mitigate the effect of apartheid and segregation policies 
in South Africa.42 
In 1981, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched the International Code of Marketing of 
Breast Milk Substitutes. This international code was narrowly focused on the product infant-
formula. The WHO enacted the Code on the face of evidence that certain Western business 
enterprises, including Nestle, employed intense advertising and marketing methods to promote 
instant formula in developing countries. 43  These methods, which encompassed mass 
                                                
 36 Id. at 135. 
 37 OECD, supra note 29, ¶ 6. 
 38 Roger Blanpain, The OECD Guidelines and Labour Relations: Badger and Beyond, in Legal Problems of 
Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 145, 148 (Kluwer ed. 1980). 
 39 Decision of the Council on Inter-Governmental Consultation Procedures on the Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, in Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 462 (Horn ed. 1980). 
 40 John Ruggie & Tamaryn Nelson, supra note 1. 
 41 Martin Holland, The EEC Code for South Africa: a reassessment  41 The World Today, at 12 (1985). 
 42 Hans W. Baade, Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises: An Introductory Survey, in Legal Problems of 
Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 429 (Kluwer ed. 1980).  
 43 Kathyn Sikkink, Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: The Case of the WHO/UNICEF Code, 40 
International Organization, 182 (1986).  
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campaigning, free samples and the so-called ‘mother-craft nurses’ promoting the formula at 
health care facilities, failed to inform about the conditions under which the instant formula could 
be used safely and effectively. Due to poverty, illiteracy and unsanitary conditions, misuse 
became common, and this transformed the infant-formula into a potentially hazardous 
substance.44 
Prior to these initiatives, the UN started a process to establish a multilateral framework, the 
Transnational Code of Conduct. The theme of MNCs was fostered on the UN Agenda by the 
ECOSOC in 1972, after the Chilean Representative addressed the ECOSOC earlier that year, 
denouncing the US International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITTC) for its interference 
in Chilean internal politics.45  46 The ECOSOC requested the appointment of a Group of 
Immanent Persons to study the role and impact of business enterprises.47 Upon the Group`s 
recommendations, the Commission on Transnational Corporations (CTN) was created in 1974 in 
the form of an intergovernmental forum.48 49  The CTN chairman presented the first formulations 
of the UN Code of Conduct in 1979.50 The text addressed three subjects: the activities of 
transnational enterprises, their treatment by the countries in which they operated, and 
intergovernmental cooperation. 
The draft text identified, amongst other general and political aspects, the obligations for 
transnational enterprises to ‘respect the national sovereignty’ and ‘observe the laws, regulation 
and administrative practices of the countries in which they operate’. Transnational enterprises 
were furthermore obligated to ‘take effective measures to ensure that their activities are 
compatible with and make a positive contribution towards the achievement of the economic 
goals and established development objectives of these countries. Where the treatment of 
companies is concerned, the draft stipulated the criteria of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ of 
transnational enterprises by the countries in which they operate, as well as the right of States 
‘acting in the public interest, to nationalize property in their territory’. 51  It furthermore 
emphasized the relevance of intergovernmental co-operation ‘in encouraging the positive 
                                                
 44 Id. 
 45 Helen Keller, Corporate Codes of Conduct and their Implementation: the question of legitimacy, 9, 
http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/Heken_Keller_Paper.pdf. 
 46 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, supra note 4. 
 47 The Group was to study the role of business enterprises, their impact on the process of development and their 
implications for international relations, and to formulate conclusions and recommendations for international 
action. Report of the Secretary General: The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and 
International Relations, UN Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev.1 ST/ESA/6 (Jun. 14, 1974). 
 48 The Commission was supported by a group of 16 expert advisors from developed and developing countries, 
with expertise from different stakeholder groups and reflecting a functional and geographical balance. Centre of 
Transnational Corporations, supra note 6, at 17. 
 49 ECOSOC resolution 1913 (LVII) of 5 December 1974. 
 50 UN ECOSOC, Transnational Corporations: Code of Conduct; Formulations by the Chairman, in Horn, 493 
(Norbert Horn ed. 1979). 
 51 Id. at 502. 
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contributions that transnational corporations can make to economic and social progress and in 
alleviating difficulties to which the activities of transnational corporation may give rise’.52 
The final draft of the UN draft code of conduct, which was issued in 1991,53 did not feature any 
human rights.54 After a lengthy and costly process, negotiations were suspended in 1992. No 
consensus could be achieved due to opposition by most industrialized home-state governments 
and TNCs to the initiative.55 
 The 1980s-90s: Globalization and the CSR Movement 2.3
2.3.1 The Regulatory Challenges Posed by Globalization: Closing the Gaps 
The concerns about the negative impacts of powerful business enterprises on national 
development agendas of developing countries in particular subsided in the 1980s.56 The 1980s 
was a decade of economic regulatory reforms and shifts in regulatory approaches.57 State policies 
in the 1960s and early 1970s were set out to control and regulate the activities of business 
enterprises and foreign direct investment.58 By the early 1980s, policies had shifted towards neo-
liberalist-inspired de-regulatory, market-friendly policies and processes. ‘De-regulation’ 
involved the withdrawal of the State from certain areas of the economy by relaxing or removing 
regulations and the opening up of certain industries to competition.59 The privatization60 of 
certain government activities and the subcontracting of certain of these to private service 
providers was part of this trend.61 Certain public regulatory functions were delegated to public 
                                                
 52 Id. at 503. 
 53 Proposed Text of the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, UN ECOSOC, 2d Sess., Annex, 
U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990). 
 54 J. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 2 (John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 31, 2007). 
 55 A. Ramasastry, Corporate Social Responsibility Versus Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Gap Between 
Responsibility and Accountability, 14 Journal of Human Rights, 241 (2015). Karin Buhmann, The Development 
of the ‘UN Framework’: a Pragmatic Process towards a Pragmatic Output, in The UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation, 87 (R. Mares ed. 2012). 
 56 David Levy & Rami Kaplan, Corporate Social Responsibility and Theories of Global Governance: Strategic 
Contestation in Global Issue Arenas in The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility, 2  (A. Crane, 
et al. eds., 2008). 
 57 Keller, supra note 45, at 12. 
 58 Hans W. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for MNEs: Commentary, in Legal Problems of Codes of 
Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 354 (Horn ed. 1980). 
 59 Peter Utting, Regulating Business Via Multistakeholder Initiatives: A Preliminary Assessment (UNRISD project 
on Business Responsibility for Sustainable Development, Technology, Business and Society, 2001), 
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/35F2BD0379CB6647C1256CE6002B70AA/$file
/uttngls.pdf. 
 60 Privatization entails ‘the introduction of contracting into public arenas and the delegation of a range of activities 
(from waste disposal to the running of prisons) to service providers’. Sol Picciotto, Regulating Global Corporate 
Capitalism, 9 (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
 61 This is said to have contributed to a de-centralization of responsibility for the provision of public goods to 
managerial actors. 
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bodies and agencies operating autonomously from government.62 This involved a transfer of 
regulatory authority from States to non-state actors.63 ‘De-regulation’ at national level was 
accompanied by ‘re-regulation’ that involved the strengthening of rules at multiple levels, from 
the local to the international, to facilitate and protect economic prerogatives.64  
Nearing the end of the 1980s, neo-liberal policies and reform programs were widespread.65 
These programs were generally associated with dis-embedding or economic liberalisation.66 
Implementation varied in both the North and South, however, according to the model of 
capitalism and local and industrial contexts.67 The reform programs accelerated after the collapse 
of the Soviet economic model in 1989. 68  They involved far-reaching state policies of 
privatisation and deregulation. These were promoted and on occasions, imposed on debt-ridden 
countries by International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as a condition for financial 
support, in certain cases with detrimental results.69  These programs brought the ‘market-
fundamentalist’-inspired policies set out in the Washington Consensus to reality, also in the 
developing world.70 
International regimes of trade, finance and investment, as organized through the mechanisms of 
the Bretton Woods Institutions and from 1995 onwards, the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’), 
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created a permissive environment for the emergence of international transaction flows. 71 
Controls on currency exchanges and capital movements were lifted. Cross-border financial and 
capital flows increased significantly.72 Successive negotiation rounds of the former General 
Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) had facilitated free trade and the reduction of trade 
barriers. This contributed to increased trade in goods, services and capital. The global FDI 
investment regime through BITs, FTAs and other IIAs consolidated far-reaching legally 
enforceable protections of investor`s interests, creating favorable conditions for FDI investment 
flows.73 Legal protections granted through the intellectual property regimes (e.g., the TRIPS 
agreement of the WTO) allowed enterprises to exploit and reap the economic benefits of their 
inventions, at least for a certain time period.74 
These global regimes created favourable environments that allowed business enterprises to grow 
and their power to rise to unprecedented levels.75 Business enterprises benefited from advances 
in technology, transportations, telecommunications,76 and financial instruments that reduced 
costs of investing abroad. Changes in production systems and the vertical integration of 
production flows and transactional costs into companies created economic incentives for 
business enterprises to engage in profit-creating activities abroad.77 78 Business enterprises 
served as vehicles for the movement of foreign capital, currency and management to all corners 
of the world. Cross-border investments by business enterprises drove the flow of capital, goods 
and ideas on a global scale. By linking different production sites and locations, business 
enterprises contributed to wider patterns of social, political and economic integration. Companies 
experienced incremental growth in size, geographical spread, economic power and influence.79 
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While business enterprises had been perceived in the 1970s as evil creatures eager to make 
profits at any cost, by the 1980s and 1990s they were viewed more positively as embodiments of 
progress, competitiveness and globalization.80 This perception corresponded to the underlying 
neo-liberal policies according to which business enterprises, as a source of jobs, capital, 
technology and investment, made significant contributions to national economic growth. This 
growth could potentially promote the socioeconomic conditions conducive to the realisation of a 
wide range of human rights, including the economic rights to an adequate standard of living and 
the right to development.81 82 The positive effects of globalisation on human rights were far from 
self-evident, though. As studies have shown, economic growth would not automatically translate 
into progress,83 and, in fact, could potentially have detrimental effects on human rights. When 
promoting human rights through development,84 types of economic growth that do not create 
conditions conducive to human rights are simply unwelcome. 85  Economic growth that 
exacerbates growing inequality, and in gender relations in particular, is a case in point.86 Certain 
developing countries in the South were (and are) in a relatively worse position than developed 
countries to reap the benefits of globalization.87 
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Globalisation has been paired with disparities in the distribution of these benefits globally, and to 
developing countries in particular.88 These countries also often faced barrier to effectively 
participate in the decision-making processes and policies in the WTO that affected them and to 
have their voice heard and views considered. This is in part due to the asymmetric influence of 
developed countries in the WTO structures and a lack of resources and expertise that often 
inhibited developing countries to effectively participate in these processes.89 90 There were 
established concerns that developing ‘host’ States were in a worse position to mitigate the 
adverse effects of globalization.91 In the pursuit of a neo-liberal reform agenda and economic 
prosperity, certain countries lacked the economic and/or political incentives or capacity to 
impose and enforce human rights on business enterprises. Institutional capacity to discipline 
powerful corporations could be lacking as a result of corruption, a weak rule of law and weak 
democratic control.92 Resource-rich countries in development frequently suffered the so-called 
‘resource curse’ and ended up ‘blighted by inequality and bad governance’.93 Implementation 
gaps more generally have been attributed to State’s changing regulatory role and an alleged loss 
of capacity to steer the market forces and capital flows that globalization unleashed towards 
public interest objectives.94    
By the time globalisation entered into an advanced stage, in the 1990s, its true negative effects95 
had become increasingly visible. A series of events involving MNEs with high public profiles 
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drew public attention to the adverse human rights impacts caused by these enterprises 
themselves, or more commonly, their involvement in human rights violations by other actors, 
including grave human rights violations by government in high-risk areas. The 1984 Bhopal 
disaster is one example of an event causing poisonous gas to leak from a pesticide plant operated 
by Union Carbide India Ltd in Bhopal, resulting in over 7000 deaths and hundreds of thousands 
injured. Other cases involving Shell, Rio Tinto, Nike and other large multinationals also exposed 
the prevalence of implementation gaps in domestic jurisdictions. States had ratified and 
committed to international human rights law and assumed a primary obligation to protect human 
rights against infringements by business enterprises. The willingness, capacity and autonomy96 
of States to govern in the interest of human rights seemed relegated to the interest and demands 
of business enterprises, investors and markets. 
Business enterprises reaped great benefits from arranging their business activities and operations 
in ways that allowed them to escape the regulatory grip of any single State or group of States.97 
The corporate legal structures and mobility were used to their commercial advantage by 
descending their production, activities, operations and money to the most favorable regulatory 
regimes. Business enterprises engaged in strategic manoeuvring to take optimal advantage of 
variations between national regulatory regimes. Often combined with rent-seeking behavior and 
cronyism, this exacerbated competition between States in certain cases. States sought to retain or 
attract foreign investment through loosening regulatory economic and social restraints on 
companies. Examples are exemptions from tax and labour laws and free-trade conditions in 
export processing zones as well as favourable safety, labour and environmental regulations.98 
This raised concerns about the so-called race to the bottom, which is well documented in the 
literature, at least in theory.99 
There were also concerns about the State capacity, and potentially autonomy to regulate in the 
public interest being affected by the obligations and commitments of States under BITs and 
FTAs. After the first BIT was signed in 1959, the protection and promotion of FDI came to be 
governed through a multifaceted, multilayered, and increasingly complex network of 
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International Investment Agreements (IIAs).100 This is in part because previous attempts to 
negotiate a multilateral investment treaty failed.101 The triumph of the market capitalism model 
from the 1980s until the end of the 1990s triggered a surge in the number of BITs.102  BITs 
afforded foreign investors, prima facie, extensive one-sided protections of their economic 
expectations without imposing obligations. These were guarded through an investor-to-state 
dispute mechanism agreed to by the parties.103 104 The potential economic and political costs 
incurred by FDI arbitration potentially caused a ‘regulatory chill’ on national regulation. This 
meant that States were unwilling to enact regulation, design policies in the interest of human 
rights, or to take on new human rights obligations in fear of costly lawsuits from investors.105 
In the context of perceived and actual cases demonstrating negative effects of economic forces 
and actors on human rights, combined with the regulatory vacuum at the domestic and 
international level that left the adverse human rights impacts of business enterprises largely 
unattended to, a new wave of social activism ensued in an attempt to regain social control over 
these forces. An increasing number of international and globally active NGOs106 began to target 
markets and business enterprises directly, rather than indirectly through states and conventional 
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political means at the national level. Grass-root human rights NGOs demanded greater 
responsibility and accountability from business enterprises for their adverse human rights 
impacts. Technological developments facilitated widespread media coverage of corporate abuses 
on a global scale, giving greater visibility to NGO’s cause. NGOs became empowered with new 
tools and platforms to retrieve and distribute information, foster awareness, mobilize support and 
leverage public debates. 
NGOs employed strategies and confrontational tactics107 that went beyond traditional tools of 
awareness raising.108 Examples are public chastisement, demonstrations, inflicting reputational 
damage, consumer boycotts,109 110 shareholder activism and divestments. These were intended to 
incite business enterprise to change their behavior, inter alia, by leveraging their cost-benefit 
analysis of noncompliance and to engage business enterprises in the creation of international 
codes. Significant economic, political and moral pressures came to bear on business enterprises 
and mounted as also consumers, investors, and trade unions became more diligent in evaluating 
their social performance.111 There was a tendency for NGO and consumer activism to target 
renowned multinationals,112 which were especially vulnerable to such pressures,113 as well as 
specific products and sectors.114 
A pioneering initiative in the human rights domain, which relied on shareholder activism to 
leverage corporate behavior, was the Sullivan Principles. Initiated by anti-apartheid activist 
Reverent Leon Sullivan in 1977, the Sullivan Principles specified six operating principles 
relating non-discriminatory labour standards of US corporations conducting business in South 
Africa. These included non-segregation in work facilitates, equal and fair employment practices 
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of all employees, equal pay for equal or comparable work and others. Sullivan used his position 
as a member of General Motors, one of the largest employers of black workers in South Africa at 
the time, to get companies to publicly endorse and implement the six Sullivan Principles.115 A 
new requirement was added in 1984 that business enterprises engage in political activism. It 
challenged the commonly held view that business enterprises should not interfere in the internal 
domestic affairs of a host country.116 This is said to have contributed to the Principles themselves 
enjoying limited success,117  although the Sullivan Principles served as a precursor for other 
initiatives, including the 1984 MacBride Principles relating to the conduct of business enterprises 
in Northern Ireland.118 
2.3.1.1 The CSR Movement 
Within this context and in response to social pressure,119 business enterprises started to embrace 
the concept of CSR120 in the late 1980s-90s. While there was potentially a compelling business 
case for CSR (e.g., improved market image, employment morale, insurance premiums, consumer 
confidence, avoiding legal costs, maintaining long-term competitiveness, etc.), it had not been 
substantiated at the time. Imperatives for CSR were mainly political for this reason.121 CSR 
presented a strategic tool for companies to accommodate external NGO and consumer pressures 
by displaying their commitment to human rights and demonstrating a capacity to self-regulate. 
Codes of conduct could create positive perceptions of their policies and actions in the eyes of 
public affected by their activities.122 CSR also served as a means to preempt external legal 
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regulation and accountability at the national and international level for which many NGOs 
advocated.123 Business enterprises presented private and self-regulation as an alternative and 
sufficient tool to fill the regulatory void. 
Individual codes adopted by companies unilaterally and industry-wide codes undertaken jointly 
by companies or by an associations representing a particular industry124 figured prominently 
initially.125 The uptake and substance of these codes were not uniform across countries. Codes 
emerged in the US at first, and later in Europe.126 The national institutional environment in the 
US is said to have been more conducive to MNEs assuming explicit responsibility through 
voluntary commitment, programs and strategies as compared to European countries.127 Industry-
wide codes were adopted at the regional and the international level. An early example is the 1975 
International Council of Infant Food Industries (ICIFI) code of business ethics. The self-
regulatory approaches drew from the scholarly works in business management and found a basis 
in ethics, corporate citizenship and the triple-bottom line concept.128 
The CSR agenda then covered only a few of the broad range and diversity of CSR issues that the 
concept encompasses today. These issues were mainly environmental and social.129 The social 
aspect of CSR furthermore was confined to only a limited range of labour issues.130 This has 
been explained in relation to the strategic approaches to CSR prevalent in the 1970s-80s, which 
were reactive. Codes of conducts tended to emerge especially in those industries that sold their 
products on consumer markets and that for this reason were especially vulnerable to social and 
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consumer pressure. Examples of these industries are apparel, carpets, retail, tourism, electronics 
and the coffee industry.131  The codes tended to focus on labour rights, and child labour in 
particular, because of the relatively high (child) labour intensity of these industries and their 
global supply chains.132 Western companies often extended the scope of their codes to cover 
labour issues that they may be involved in through their suppliers and contracts.133 The ILO`s 
core labour standards, as codified in the ILO Labor Conventions relating to children, forced 
labour, freedom of association, collective bargaining and discrimination issues often served as a 
reference for these codes.134 
In the 1990s, the integrity of these responsive displays of CSR and self-regulation approaches 
became increasingly questioned.135 Perceptions and exposures of actual business malpractices 
led to accusations of self-regulation amounting to nothing more than ‘public relations’136 and 
‘green-washing’137 exercises.138 This critique was also directed at the proliferation of codes that 
varied greatly in order to respond to issues and stakeholder concerns, and the fact also that these 
did not address these concerns in a comprehensive and objective manner. The actual 
implementation of the codes in the workplace and supply chains was deemed inadequate, hence 
leaving the substance of codes meaningless in practice. 139  Independent verification and 
monitoring mechanisms that could expose these shortcomings in performance and encourage 
compliance was often lacking or insufficient.140 
In what has been perceived as an attempt to overcome the limitations of self-regulation, as well 
as those of government regulation,141 regulatory approaches took a turn to civil regulation and 
multi-stakeholder initiatives.142 If business enterprises sought self-regulation, NGOs collaborated 
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with business enterprises in the development of new regulatory arrangements to govern this 
change of practices in a manner externally perceived as legitimate.143  Also multi-stakeholder 
initiatives were created to improve both the legitimacy and quality of CSR activities. The 
engagement of a broad range of stakeholder interests other than business in decision-making 
made these initiatives seem more credible.144 145 The initiatives were intended to assist business 
enterprises in improving their CSR policies and practices for a more systematic integration of 
CSR within corporate structures.146 They developed standards and systems for monitoring, 
verification and reporting.147 
The Kimberly Process, a multi-stakeholder process engaging governments, industry and civil 
society, was created to control the flow of so-called conflict diamonds that are used by rebels to 
finance war. The impetus for this initiative was a report by Amnesty International exposing the 
role of the diamond industry in fuelling bloody armed conflict in Sierra Leone through the 
purchase of these diamonds.148 The Fair Labor Association (FLA), another multi-stakeholder 
initiative in the apparel and footwear industries, was created in response to public discontent 
about sweatshop practices in the supply chain of key brands involving Nike, Wall-Mart and 
GAP.149 Other examples of multi-stakeholder initiatives are the Global Network Initiative (GNI), 
the GRI, accounting schemes (SA8000) and standard-setting and monitoring schemes (CCC, 
Ethical Trading Initiatives). Certain multi-stakeholder initiatives were also created to harmonize 
and standardize a proliferation of standards creating confusion and possibly imposing diverging 
and conflicting requirements on companies.150 
The UN Global Compact (the ‘UNGC’) was created in 2000 as a network-model organisation to 
promote constructive engagement between powerful business and market leaders and other 
actors, including NGOs, around best practices based on the UNGC Principles. Business 
enterprises that voluntarily joined the initiative, embrace, support and enact within their sphere 
of influence a set of ten core principles in the area of human rights, labor standards, the 
environment and anti-corruption. The aim of the UNGC was, through social learning and 
accumulated business experiences, to arrive at a common understanding of these Principles and 
desired best practices. The initiative sought to induce change in corporate behavior through such 
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learning and the internalisation of the Principles in business enterprises, conforming to best 
practices.151 
Multi-stakeholder initiatives involved a cooperative engagement between State and non-state 
actors, including civil society, companies, business associations, and governmental and 
intergovernmental organisations.152 The active participation by certain business enterprises in 
these initiatives has been explained by these business enterprises having a clear interest in not 
only averting criticism, but also in leveraging the CSR movement, or even by taking a lead in 
order to shape the CSR agenda at their convenience.153 New academic theories signalled the 
significance of stakeholder engagement and the clear strategic, organisational and economic 
benefits that can be gained through such proactive engagement. 154  The role of business 
enterprises alongside NGOs and citizens in ‘good governance’ was supported by the 
Commission on Global Governance in its 1995 report,155 in which it called for ‘more inclusive 
and more participatory mechanisms of global governance that included not only the traditional 
state-based actors but also NGOs, citizen movements and TNCs’.156 
While these multi-stakeholder initiatives emerged in part to improve the quality of self-
regulation, they came to be perceived as inhibiting similar shortcomings.157 Multi-stakeholder 
initiatives reached limited scale in efforts.158 They engaged only a small portion of the tens of 
thousands of business enterprises that spanned the globe, and their hundreds of thousands 
affiliates and suppliers. They also addressed only those initiatives that decided to join the 
initiatives on a voluntary basis. 159  Corporate laggards thus fell outside their scope. The 
companies tended to belong to certain sectors and firm categories particularly sensitive to brand 
reputation.160 The adverse impacts of business enterprises operating in other sectors and contexts, 
and beyond the supply chains were thus left largely unregulated and unaccounted for by these 
multi-stakeholder initiatives. 
Critique about weak standards and procedures for monitoring and verifying compliance also 
figured prominently.161 The UNGC lacked such procedures and faced accusations for assisting 
signatory business enterprises with half-hearted CSR performances in ‘blue-washing’ their 
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public image by associating themselves with the blue flag of the United Nations.162 Other multi-
stakeholder initiatives were poorly implemented. 163  This was in part because they were 
responsive to a wide range of issues. Monitoring actual compliance with all these issues 
throughout vast corporate structures and complex global supply chains proved highly 
challenging.164 ‘Given the scale and international reach of TNC activities, the costs involved, and 
the reliance on commercial auditing techniques and analytical frameworks that often ignore the 
root causes of noncompliance and fail to obtain reliable information from workers and managers, 
mainstream monitoring and reporting often simply scratch the surface’.165 The standards and 
systems that multi-stakeholder initiatives developed were considered ‘relatively superficial’.166 
There were also concerns that CSR standards and procedures were ineffective and had adverse 
implication for workers, business enterprises and government in the global South.167 Where the 
design of multi-stakeholder initiatives reflected the interests and agendas of Northern actors, the 
standards and measurement were not necessarily relevant or appropriate to the priorities, 
concerns and problems of Southern workers.168 The institutional and economic conditions in 
developing countries made for an environment that was hardly conducive to achieving progress 
on CSR.169 Where standards and practices are incompatible with domestic laws, or inappropriate 
to local practices and traditions, this could incite noncompliance. Southern firms have, relative to 
companies in the North, also lesser capacities to comply. 
The challenges of southern firms were amplified by the need to abide by a growing number of 
standards and processes imposing diverging and contradicting requirements. This risked 
introducing confusion and enhancing the cost of doing business considerably. Multi-stakeholder 
initiatives were charged of having protectionist implications by erecting non-tariff barriers or 
obstructing access to global markets for such southern firms.170 Also more generally, the 
growing body of multi-stakeholder initiatives was perceived as problematic. This was especially 
the case because there were significant differences between the substantive CSR standards, 
approaches and methods and levels of stakeholder involvement of these initiatives.171 Some 
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initiatives were said to be in competition with other initiatives for influence, authority and 
business adherence.172 
Multi-stakeholder initiatives were also considered lacking in legitimacy and democratic 
governance. Concerns were raised relating to participation, representivity and accountability. 
Stakeholder participation was not perceived as ‘genuine’. There were imbalances in the 
participation of different stakeholders’ interests and North/South interests. 173  In certain 
initiatives, the governance structure, design and implementation processes exhibited a clear 
business interest.174 Calls were made for an expansion of stakeholder participation in all stages of 
verification, monitoring and certification processes, and at all levels. Some argued that both civil 
society organisation and business enterprises are unaccountable and not legitimate 
representatives of the public interest. Multi-stakeholder initiatives were considered as ‘largely 
detached from democratic processes and public policy’.175 There were also calls for complaint 
mechanisms to redress corporate malpractices.176 
2.3.1.2 The Corporate Accountability and the Business and Human Rights Movement 
Concerns resulted in efforts being reframed and redirected towards enhancing corporate 
accountability, including through law and public policy. The corporate accountability movement 
has been identified as the main driving force behind this shift. The quest for accountability grew 
in strength and legitimacy as concerns about the credibility of multi-stakeholder initiatives 
increased. This movement had emerged around the same time as, and had evolved in parallel to, 
the CSR movement, also in response to similar concerns about the negative effects of 
globalization. It incorporated ideas of the human rights approach to development and ‘anti- or 
alternative globalization’,177 hence it differed from the CSR movement in significant aspects, 
however.   
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The ideas of the human rights-based approach, which the accountability movement incorporates 
and that had gained traction in policies and practice after the end of the Cold War, sets the 
realisation of human rights as the objective of development.178 It applies the human rights 
discourse, which has its foundation in law at the national, regional and international levels.179 
Accountability is understood in terms of legal justiciability, however alternative approaches that 
rely on performance standards and employ monitoring, reporting, public debate, and citizen 
participation to determine conformity were also relied upon as complementary means to 
operationalize the rights-based approach.180 The demand for compliance mechanisms to enhance 
the accountability of multi-stakeholder initiatives has been related to this accountability 
movement.  
The accountability movement also has been linked to the efforts of certain NGOs and lawyers 
advocating for criminal accountability for business enterprises before the International Criminal 
Court (‘ICC’).181  This prompted France to issue a proposal at the 1998 Rome Diplomatic 
Conference on the establishment of the ICC to include a provision in the Rome Statute that 
would grant the ICC jurisdiction over juridical persons.182 This proposal triggered deeply 
diverging responses. Amongst the opponents were countries whose domestic criminal law did 
not provide for corporate liability for international crimes. It followed from the concept of 
complementarity183 that the ICC would gain jurisdiction automatically if a company would 
commit a crime in a State’s jurisdiction and this country would be unable to carry out the 
prosecution. The proposal was eventually withdrawn, after it had become clear that no consensus 
could be reached in the short time span foreseen for the negotiations. The ICC was granted 
jurisdiction over natural persons only.184 
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The signing of the ICC gave impetus for national jurisdictions to the creation of new avenues for 
corporate criminally liable for violations of international crimes. In certain jurisdictions, these 
avenues were created incidentally185 through the implementation of the Statute of the ICC and 
the integration of its provisions in national criminal law. Where national criminal laws applied 
the same standards to individual and legal persons, the incorporation of the ICC statute in these 
laws extended responsibility and liability for international crimes to corporations.186 In other 
jurisdictions, criminal codes were amended in order to create new causes of action for 
prosecuting also legal persons for violations of international crimes under national criminal law. 
These developments enable victims to sue corporations under national law for having committed 
an international crime that is codified in the Rome Statute. This possibility remains theoretical 
however, since no cases have been brought on this basis thus far.187 
The incorporation of the ICC into national criminal laws has had some influence on the 
development of national criminal law norms. National judges have turned to the jurisprudence 
and law of the ICC for guidance when developing concepts for attributing criminal liability to 
corporations and corporate officers under national criminal laws. National courts have also 
drawn from the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg Trials in the post WW-II period and the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals on individual liability that has been 
developed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.188 
In the late 1990s, NGOs begun to rely on civil law avenues in national jurisdictions of Western 
‘host’ States to challenge business conduct. In continental Europe, tort claims alleged 
‘negligence’ of a parent company involving its subsidiary, ‘complicity’ or vicarious liability 
based on ‘agency’ in human rights abuses.189 In the Americas, hopes were vested on the Alien 
Tort Claims Act (ATCA), a jurisdictional statute created in 1789 that allowed foreign nationals 
to sue foreign nationals for an alleged tort committed in violation of international customary law 
norms.190 Unocal, Royal Dutch Shell, Coca Cola, Union Carbide, Drummond and Daimler 
Chrysler found themselves in court facing allegations of complicity in egregious human rights 
violations of governments, including torture, extra-judicial killings, kidnapping, murder, battery 
and assault.191 The ATCA was rediscovered in the 1980s, after its existence having been 
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unnoticed for over a century.192 The ATCA’s ambiguity in relation to its origins and intended 
purpose created scope for the ATCA to take on a judicial function in providing a civil law 
avenue in the aforementioned scenarios. This same ambiguity contributed to the ATCA losing in 
functional importance later one, however, as judges became more cautious in their interpretation 
of the ATCA’s jurisdictional scope in order to not overstep their judicial mandate by creating 
(extraterritorial) legal effects where none may have been intended by the US Congress. Such 
legal effects could furthermore create frictions in the relation with foreign nations and go against 
the international comity that the ATCA was set out to promote.193 
In Sosa, the US Supreme Court affirmed that the ATCA extends jurisdiction only to a small 
category of egregious human rights abuses falling within the ambit of the law of nations, those 
‘accepted by the civilized world and defined with specificity comparable to the features of the 
18th century paradigms’.194 Precarious was the landmark decision of Kiobel v. Royall Dutch 
Petroleum in 2013, in which the US Supreme Court ruled that a ‘presumption against 
extraterritoriality’ applied to the ATCA, excluding from ATCA’s applicable scope those cases 
that do not sufficiently ‘touch and concern’ the US. Most cases have been dismissed or ended in 
a settlement. Also in light of the significant hurdles that victims face, which are jurisdictional, 
substantive, procedural and practical, the relevance of the ATCA in providing access to remedies 
for victims has been depicted as merely existential.195 
The efforts of those supportive of the accountability movement had mixed results. The aim was 
to trigger legislative and policy action at the national, regional, international and global levels to 
advance corporate accountability. 
Legal reform at the national level seemed more oriented at bridging the accountability gap 
through domestic laws that legally enforced CSR practices. State command control regulatory 
approaches paved the way for alternative ‘softer’ approaches as new laws, regulations and 
judicial practice emerged to legally encourage, permit or oblige business enterprises to discharge 
social responsibilities.196 Examples include an interpretation of directors’ duties of loyalty and 
care in company law that permit or require directors to consider social interests in managing their 
business enterprise197; the integration of social concerns into public procurement legislation;198 
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the creation of public reporting and disclosure obligations for companies relating to social 
issues;199 and legislation on unfair business practices that subjects business enterprises to liability 
risks for false or misleading statements in their CSR reports.200  Such soft forms of regulations 
have been referred to as ‘responsive regulation’201 and ‘regulated self-regulation’.202 States 
advanced indirect regulation and internal corporate control systems as an adequate substitute to 
direct command-control regulation. ‘According to this logic, the social responsibility of business 
may be best ensured through persuasion, education and the development of non-state voluntary 
codes and social standards by ‘civil society’ organizations’.203 
 The 2000s: The Business and Human Rights Movement and the UN Norms 2.4
The rise of the accountability movement marked the beginning of a new phase in which 
processes were initiated at the national, regional and international level to strengthen the law and 
enforcement of corporate respect for human rights, and in which also the legal business and 
human rights (BHR) discourse took flight. The BHR movement,204 whose origins lie in the 
works of human rights legal scholars and the activities of human rights advocates, is more 
narrowly focused on corporate accountability for human rights. This movement centres on the 
victims and impaired communities and responds to their quest for corporate accountability for 
the prevention and mitigation of negative impacts on their human rights, and legal responsibility 
for actual impacts the company caused or to which it contributed. The responsibilities of 
business enterprises are articulated by reference to universal human rights principles codified in 
international human rights instruments. The rationale is that these instruments provide a clear 
basis for remedies and justice.205 The BHR movement furthermore views an important role for 
business enterprises, States and civil societies in benchmarking the performance of business 
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enterprises against ‘universally recognized human rights principles embodies in a key set of 
treaties’.206 
The business and human rights movement has been supportive of civil litigation before the 
ATCA. The movement has also been a driving force behind the initiative of the UN Norms. 
2.4.1 The UN Norms 
Within the UN, concerns about the influence of business enterprises operating globally propelled 
interest in codifying legally binding international human rights standards for business 
enterprises. The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, a 
subsidiary body of the former Commission on Human Rights, created a five-member sessional 
Working Group in 1998 with a mandate to examine the working methods and activities of 
business enterprises.207 Initially created for a three-year period, this mandate was extended in 
2001 for an additional three years. The Working Group was officially tasked to compile and 
contribute to drafting relevant human rights norms.208 This led to the UN Norms.209 The UN 
Norms were presented as a restatement of existing international norms210 and applying the 
principle that business enterprises ‘within their respective spheres of activity and influence [. . .] 
have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect 
human rights recognized in international as well as national law, including the rights and 
interests of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups’.211 The Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights approved the UN Norms in its Resolution 2003/16, 
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13 August 2003. In the same Resolution, it transmitted the text to the former Commission on 
Human Rights for its ‘consideration and adoption’ and recommended the Commission to invite 
interested parties to submit comments on the draft text.212 
The UN Norms were controversial and unsuccessful in obtaining the backing from the Members 
of the former UN Commission on Human Rights. States articulated objections on the basis of 
various considerations. There were concerns among developing states that the UN Norms might 
de facto transfer the authority for the implementation of human rights standards from States to 
companies.213 The UN Norms could undermine their economic interests as host States in case the 
extension of foreign direct liability would cause divestment and companies to disengage from 
their country.214 Developed countries emphasized the State`s role as the primary legal actor 
responsible for the implementation of human rights standards, and regulating the conduct of 
companies under domestic law. Some objected to the fact that the UN Norms may oblige 
transnational enterprises to adhere to treaties that did not apply or were not enforced in the 
countries where they operated. 215  Certain States were skeptical about the enforcement 
mechanisms proposed by the UN Norms, and expressed their preference for voluntary initiatives 
creating awareness. The OECD Guidelines and the ILO Tripartite Declaration were mentioned as 
successful examples in this regard.216 The US challenged the legal status of the UN Norms, 
noting that they ‘have no status – legal or otherwise’. It also challenged the democratic nature of 
the UN Norms, emphasizing how their development fell outside the mandate of the Sub-
Commission, and how it ‘was undertaken wholly without consideration for the views of the 
States’.217 This position was reflected in the Commission’s resolution stating that the UN Norms 
‘had not been requested by the Commission’.218 
Also the business community’s firm opposition to the UN Norms had influence in the rejection 
of this text by the UN Commission. The business community outlined their main concerns in a 
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40-page-long joint statement of the ICC and IOE. Several objections that were raised in this 
document related to the so-called ‘privatisation of human rights’. This phrase was explained as 
the separation of the activities of private business from the duties of the State, the real duty-
holder according to business.219 If the draft UN Norms were to be given effect as international 
law, it was argued, business enterprises would be required to make balancing decisions that 
States should make. They would have to carry the burden for human rights protection while 
States could avoid theirs.220 They would exercise the power to determine the substance of the 
vaguely formulated obligation of conduct, which should be incumbent on States.221 
The joint statement furthermore noted that the artificial definition of human rights, and the draft 
Norm’s vague provisions ‘turn human rights into highly subjective, politicized claims—and this 
will undermine the credibility of international human rights law that so many people have 
worked so hard to achieve’.222 These legal arguments are said to obscure the real intent of 
business enterprises behind objecting to the UN Norms, i.e. to evade regulation creating 
corporate legal accountability for human rights.223 
Civil society made public statements to express their support for the UN Norms. NGOs 
commended the UN Norms as a ‘major step forward’ in arriving at a common global framework 
on business and human rights. The communication countered points of critique launched from 
the perspective of business. The contribution of the UN Norms was not to create new legal 
obligations, they argued, but to add coherence to existing standards. ‘The Norms do not create 
new legal obligations, but simply codify and distil existing obligations under international law as 
they apply to companies’.224 NGOs cited the provision in the UN Norms clearly referring to 
States as the primary duty bearers for human rights obligations.225 They restated that the nature 
and scope of the responsibilities of business enterprises as defined in the UN Norms and 
potential contribution to favorable environments for business; ‘[i]ndeed the entire thrust of the 
Norms is to encourage the development of stable environments for investment and business, 
regulated by the rule of law, in which contracts are honored, corruption reduced, and where 
business enterprises, both foreign and domestic, have clearly defined rights and 
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responsibilities’.226 The communication was furthermore an attempt by civil society to preempt 
the Commission from acting against the UN Norms, which they argued ‘to be detrimental to the 
notion of corporate accountability’. 
The outcome was discouraging for those supportive of the accountability movement. As civil 
society begun to rely on the document as an authoritative interpretation of human rights law,227 
the Commission distanced itself from it. The latter noted that the UN Norms ‘contain useful 
elements and ideas’, but ‘had not been requested by the Commission and, as a draft proposal, has 
no legal standing’.228  The draft UN Norms never received formal legal authority.229 The 
Commission requested the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) to 
issue a report on human rights and corporations, which was published in February 2005.230 As 
the controversies had not been resolved the following year, the Human Rights Commission 
requested the creation of the mandate of the SRSG.231 
On 25 July 2005, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Harvard Professor and 
former United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning John Ruggie to the 
position.232  The mandate of the SRSG is discussed in detail in the next section. 
The following section reflects on the SRSG’s response to the UN Norms. The SRSG was 
compelled to give an assessment of the UN Norms early in his mandate. The SRSG embarked on 
this examination in part out of political necessity. The controversies that had surrounded the UN 
Norms, which had triggered divisive debate and had contributed to its eventual demise, risked 
spilling over to the SRSG`s mandate and complicating his efforts to clarify standards.233 The 
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SRSG aligned himself with the position of the former Commission, highlighting that the UN 
Norms were ‘engulfed by its own doctrinal excesses’ and ‘exaggerated legal claims and 
conceptual ambiguities’.234 The following sections will examine the main aspects of his critique: 
the legal authority of the UN Norms and the principles by which the UN Norms allocated rights 
and responsibilities between States and firms. 
2.4.2 The Legal Authority of the UN Norms 
One of the main objects of the SRSG’s critique of the UN Norms was the claim that ‘the Norms 
largely reflect, restate, and refer to existing international norms, in addition to specifying some 
basic methods for implementation’.235 236  The UN Norms stipulate that international law 
imposes a wide range of human rights obligations directly on business enterprises, stating that: 
Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, 
respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as 
national law, including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable 
groups. 
The SRSG rejected this dual claim that the UN Norms restated international law when stipulating 
that international law imposes on business enterprises direct human rights obligations across the 
entire spectrum of human rights, and that the UN Norms were non-voluntary and thus binding on 
companies. 
The authors of the UN Norms had derived justification for their claim in the pre-ambular 
language of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, which the UN Norms reference in 
their own preamble: 
Recalling that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims a common standard 
of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that Governments, other organs 
of society and individuals shall strive, by teaching and education, to promote respect for 
human rights and freedoms, and, by progressive measures, to secure universal and 
effective recognition and observance, including of equal rights of women and men and 
the promotion of social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. 
The authors of the UN Norms inferred from this language that ‘all organs of society’ include 
business enterprises, and that consequently, human rights obligations apply to business 
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enterprises like any other ‘organ’ in society.237 This idea was famously articulated by Louis 
Henkin: ‘[e]very individual and every organ of society includes juridical persons. Every 
individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace. 
The Universal Declaration applies to them all’.238 
The SRSG disagreed with the notion that the pre-ambular language of the UDHR provides an 
authoritative legal basis for attributing human rights obligations to companies. The UDHR was 
intended to be non-binding at its inception. For this reason, the SRSG did not consider the 
UDHR in itself to have legally binding effect. The SRSG acknowledged the possibility that 
moral claims and aspirational language in the UDHR could take on legal effects indirectly, 
through their codification in international human rights treaties or crystallisation as norms of 
customary international law. Certain provisions of the UDHR may have taken on legally binding 
effects, for instance through their elaboration in the ICCPR and the ICESCR, but these 
provisions did not include the language ‘all organs of society’. The SRSG noted that; 
‘preambles, even to binding international instruments are not themselves legally binding’.239 
The SRSG furthermore argued that it cannot be inferred from the pre-ambular language of the 
UDHR that international law treats companies as functionally equivalent to States, or to other 
‘organs’ of society. The SRSG did not consider that, by analogy, the UDHR could be interpreted 
to impose on business enterprises the same human rights obligations as applicable to States. 
Companies as economic actors ought to be differentiated from States as ‘specialized organs of 
society’, the SRSG argued. They do not perform a general role like States, but ‘a specialized 
function’ in relation to human rights, which is economical.240 The character and scope of the 
corporate responsibilities for human rights ought to reflect these special natures and function.241 
Since corporations are not functionally equivalent to States, attributing general obligation to 
companies on an equal footing to States would be unfair, he argued. Companies should not 
shoulder all, or the same, obligations as States. The approach of the SRSG towards identifying 
the human rights responsibility of business enterprises reflects this stance of the SRSG, namely 
that human rights norms ought to correspond to the factual reality of the social role and function 
of business enterprises in society: 
While corporations may be considered “organs of society”, they are specialized economic 
organs, not democratic public interest institutions. As such, their responsibilities cannot 
and should not simply mirror the duties of States. Accordingly, the Special 
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Representative has focused on identifying the distinctive responsibilities of companies in 
relation to human rights.242 
The SRSG furthermore objected to the draft Norm’s approach to impose on companies an 
extensive, although not comprehensive list of international human rights obligations. These 
obligations ranged, generally speaking, from the right to equal opportunity and non-
discriminatory treatment, the right to security of persons, the right of workers, right for national 
sovereignty and human rights, consumer protection and environmental protection.243  The SRSG 
considered the assertion that international human rights law created a wide range of direct human 
rights obligations for companies to have ‘little authoritative basis in international law - hard, soft, 
or otherwise’.244 Customary law may create corporate obligations for a very limited set of grave 
human rights violation, the SRSG argued, but this was not the case for the entire body of human 
rights. International human rights treaties only addressed business enterprises indirectly through 
States, he argued. 
The SRSG furthermore held that the UN Norms wrongly identified certain international 
instruments as sources of human rights obligations for companies.245  The UN Norms upheld a 
broad definition of human rights and international human rights law.246 The preamble of the UN 
Norms identified a wide range of treaties and soft-law documents. Some of the documents 
referenced were of a declaratory or soft-law nature and without general legal effects. The list of 
human rights contained rights that had not been recognized by States or that were still in the 
process of being negotiated. Examples were: ‘consumer protection, the “precautionary principle” 
for environmental management, and the principle of “free, prior and informed consent” of 
indigenous peoples and communities’.247  The SRSG could not discern a principled basis for 
determining why certain human rights were said to apply to business enterprises, while others 
not.248 This may result in higher benchmarks being imposed on companies than on States in 
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certain situations, the SRSG argued. Companies furthermore would be bound to human rights 
standards that they had not agreed to.249 The conception of a selective list of human rights was 
not considered consistent with the international human rights regime that accords equal 
importance to all human rights.250 
The SRSG’s critique of the UN Norms seemed anchored on the claim that the UN Norms were a 
‘restatement’ of international law. The UN Norms, however, did not reflect the status quo in 
international law, at least not how international law applied to business enterprises at the time.251 
The UN Norms provided an interpretation and prescription of the ‘progressive’ development of 
international human rights law. The authors of the UN Norms sought to apply international 
human rights principles as they applied to States as well as non-state actors in areas of 
international law by analogy to business enterprises. In this top-down legal approach, the UN 
Norms borrowed language and conceptions as applied elsewhere in international law and relied 
on these concepts to conceptualise the corporate human rights obligations and their attribution to 
business enterprises. The principle author of the UN Norms explains as follows: 
The Sub-Commission Norms, of course, do not constitute a treaty an therefore cannot 
bind either states or corporations in the same way that treaties are binding once they are 
ratified. If, however, one wanted to identify the humanitarian law principles most 
applicable to both state and non-state actors, the Geneva Conventions, the ICC Statute, 
the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the Basic Principles on Firearms, 
and the Voluntary Security Principles are the most relevant. United Nations drafters 
regularly follow this approach of borrowing provisions from one instrument to develop 
another. This approach to borrowing language is not at all uncommon. It should also be 
noted that the Sub-Commission carefully consulted the International Committee of the 
Red Cross to make sure that these provisions of the Norms were consistent with 
humanitarian law.252 
The UN Norms thus embraced a conventional approach to international law-making of setting 
aspirational standards. These standards derived legal authority from their in-principle conformity 
with international human rights law. As a soft-law document that contained aspirational 
language, the UN Norms in themselves were not legally binding. They would derive normative 
force from their acceptance by States and take on binding force through their actual 
implementation.253 They aimed to propel progressive reform. The drafters indicated that the UN 
Norms did not opt for a static approach, but an approach that would ‘incorporate and encourage 
further evolution’.254 
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The UN Norms, as noted by Baxi, reflected de lege ferenda, a view of the law as it ought to be, 
rather than de lege lata, positive law as it exists.255 The SRSG seems to have criticized and 
discarded the UN Norms (wrongly) for presenting an inaccurate account of de lege lata. While 
the UN Norms were drafted in a treaty format, they did not constitute a treaty, nor were they 
intended as such.256 For the UN Norms to have this status as instant international treaty law was 
inconceivable at that time. Having been developed by a small group of experts, the UN Norms 
lacked the State consent that was a prerequisite for the UN Norms to attain such status.257 
While the UN Norms thus did not have the legally binding force of an international treaty,258 to 
conceive them as strictly voluntary was not correct either. Various implementation procedures 
were foreseen in the draft text that required action on the part of business enterprises.259 Actual 
implementation would give the UN Norms binding effects beyond those of aspirational language 
of voluntary instruments, it was argued.260 The UN Norms furthermore derived legal authority 
from their restatement of international human rights law; ‘[t]he legal authority of the Norms 
derives principally from their sources in treaties and customary international law, as a 
restatement of international legal principles applicable to companies’.261 
The UN Norms thus presented a proposition of a progressive account of international human 
rights law. The UN Norms were intended as a soft-law document that resembled in its non-
legally binding form the OECD Guidelines and the ILO Tripartite Declaration and other existing 
international standards that addressed the behavior of business enterprises, at least indirectly. 
Their added value was their focus on human rights, their applicability to all companies and their 
significance derived from their approval by the UN.262 
Rather than dispensing of the UN Norms all together, the SRSG could have built on the draft text 
in order to set an aspirational standard proper. While inhibiting conceptual problems, these were 
not insurmountable, as the SRSG and other scholars have rightly pointed out, and could have 
been resolved. The SRSG’s decision to distance himself from the UN Norms met with disdain by 
NGOs, which had requested the SRSG to further build on the UN Norms as an aspirational 
standard from which legal obligations could follow in the future.263 
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To be noted is that the development of such an aspirational standard may have gone beyond the 
scope of the SRSG’s initial mandate, however. This mandate merely requested the SRSG ‘to 
identify and clarify’ existing human rights related standards of corporate responsibility and 
accountability business enterprises, rather than to set new aspirational standards. Also with 
regards to the role and duties of States, the SRSG was merely tasked ‘[t]o elaborate’, rather than 
to raise existing standards of international human rights law.264 To propose a progressive account 
of international law that, if acceptable to States, would push the status quo in international 
human right law, as the UN Norms had intended to do, was outside the SRSG’s official purview. 
The HRC appeared to have pre-empted the SRSG from going this route by framing his mandate 
in restricted terms. 
The SRSG thus rejected the UN Norms, but not without conceding, as the former Commission 
on Human Rights had done previously265, that the UN Norms contained useful elements.266 Some 
of the concepts that the UN Norms recognized later appeared in the UNGPs. 
2.4.2.1 The Concept of ‘Business Enterprise’ 
The UN Norms addressed transnational corporations, which it defined in broad terms, as ‘an 
economic entity operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities operating in 
two or more countries – whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or country of 
activity, and whether taken individually or collectively’, 267  and extending its scope of 
applicability to ‘other business enterprises’. The term ‘other business enterprises’ was defined as 
including ‘any business entity, regardless of the international or domestic nature of its activities, 
including the transnational corporation, contractor, subcontractor, supplier licensee or distributor, 
the corporate, partnership, or other legal form used to establish the business entity and the nature 
of the ownership of the entity’. 268 
While it was recognized that large transnational enterprises caused greatest public concern at that 
time, the drafters did not want to restrict the application of the UN Norms to include only this 
category of business enterprises, for several reasons.269 The drafters believed that in principle, all 
business enterprises should respect the human rights standards as set in the UN Norms, and that 
therefore the UN Norms should apply to all.270 The UN Norms were intended to apply to 
domestic and transnational business enterprises equally where the principles of the UN Norms 
were relevant to both. To the extent that the scope of the UN Norms pertaining only to the latter 
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group would have been discriminatory, it was argued. It would have furthermore provided 
opportunity for companies to avoid responsibility by concealing their transnational nature, by 
financial or other means, for the purpose of falling outside the scope of the UN Norms.271 
Accordingly, the UN Norms were ‘written to include all business enterprises’ and ‘[i]ts breath 
de-emphasizes the definition of transnational corporations and does not restrict the Norms’ scope 
of application’. 272  In this regard, the draft Norm`s approach to defining transnational 
corporations was similar to that of the ILO Tripartite Declaration273 and the OECD Guidelines274. 
The SRSG would later adopt a similar functional approach to defining business enterprises, 
arguing that because all business enterprises can have negative impacts on human rights the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights applies ‘full and equally to all business 
enterprises’.275 GP 14 stipulates: ‘The responsibility of business enterprises to respect human 
rights applies to all enterprises regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and 
structure’.276 
2.4.2.2 Sphere of Influence and Leverage 
The UN Norms relied on the concept of ‘sphere of activity and influence’ as the basis to attribute 
human rights obligations to companies. The underlying rational was that the international human 
rights law ought to reflect on the increasing power of business enterprises. The responsibility of 
business enterprises must be commensurate to their power and influence.277 The UN Norms point 
to the relevance of the capacity of business enterprises in its pre-ambular language: 
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Noting that transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the capacity to 
foster economic well-being, development, technological improvement and wealth as well 
as the capacity to cause harmful impacts on the human rights and lives of individuals 
through their core business practices and operations. 
The ‘sphere of influence concept’ aligns with the drafter`s vision of a system of ‘relative 
application’ that, instead of imposing absolute standards on companies, accommodates for 
flexibility. It would be mindful of the factors that bear on the ability of a business enterprise to 
affect human rights, for instance the type, size and activities of a business enterprise.278 The 
larger its resources, the broader its activities and the more influence a corporation has, the greater 
its responsibilities to protect and promote human rights will be.279 280 
The SRSG considered the concept problematic, for a number of reasons. First, the concept had 
‘no legal pedigree’.281  Also, its operationalisation would pose challenges in delineating the 
duties and responsibilities of business enterprises and States in practice. The application of the 
‘sphere of influence’ concept would imply that, in practice, the duties of States and the sphere of 
influence of corporations could overlap. After all, the UN Norms recognized the same duties that 
applied to States, applied corporations.282 The sphere of influence concept would make it 
difficult to discern the outer limits of business’ responsibilities for human rights, where the 
duties and responsibilities of one actor would begin and end and how these duties and 
responsibilities would relate to one another. ‘If responsibilities were entangled with State 
obligations, it makes it difficult if not impossible to tell who is responsible for what in 
practice’.283 
Reliance on the sphere of influence concept could also result in a State evading its responsibility 
by simply transferring its human rights obligations to corporations. This was a possible scenario 
where the capacity of companies exceeded that of a State, when a State had not ratified a 
particular treaty, or when a State failed to implement or enforce its treaty obligations. According 
to the SRSG, such transfer was problematic if this would reduce the government’s discretion for 
‘making trade-offs and balancing decisions, and especially for determining how best to “secure 
the fulfillment” of, precisely those economic, social, and cultural rights on which corporations 
have the greatest impact’. 284  In weak governance zones, it could furthermore undermine 
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domestic political incentives ‘to make governments more responsive and responsible to their 
citizenry’.285 
Overlapping obligations furthermore could result in strategic gaming, the situation where both 
States and companies would seek to avoid their responsibilities.286 The SRSG viewed ‘influence’ 
as a relational concept. A government may choose not to discharge its duties ‘in the hope or 
expectation that a company will yield to social pressures to promote or fulfill certain rights’.287 A 
company can ‘minimize its apparent influence by creating any number of hollow subsidiary 
entities, and thereby seek to diminish or duck its responsibilities’.288 For these reasons, the SRSG 
was of the opinion that ‘State duties and corporate responsibilities must be defined independently 
of one another’.289 
In addition, attributing responsibility on the basis of the influence that a company may have had, 
and thus ought to have, exercised over the actor causing human rights harm was in-appropriate, 
according to the SRSG. This principle rests on the assumption that ‘can implies ought’, meaning 
that a company may be held responsible for harm that it is not related to. A company may also 
undermine its responsibility for harm to which it is related, but where ‘influence’ cannot be 
shown.290 The SRSG furthermore considered that emphasis on ‘proximity’ could mislead parties 
into thinking that companies could have no adverse effects on human rights at far distance, 
which is not the case.291  The SRSG mentioned that ‘[i]t is one thing to ask companies to support 
human rights voluntarily where they have influence, as the Global Compact does; but attributing 
legal obligations to them on that basis for meeting the full range of human rights duties is quit 
another’.292 
The SRSG does not discard the concept of leverage completely, however. The UN Norms note 
that business enterprises ‘shall use their influence in order to help promote and ensure respect for 
human rights’. 293  The UN Norms explain influence as leverage, which differs from the 
understanding of influence as the SRSG would later define it, namely by reference to impact. 
The SRSG acknowledges that leverage is a relevant factor in determining whether a company 
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has taken appropriate action to address adverse impacts that it is linked to through its business 
relationships.294 The UNGPs note a responsibility for undertakings to exercise their leverage to 
prevent or mitigate the adverse effects. ‘[I]f it lacks leverage there may be ways for the 
enterprise to increase it’.295 Leverage entails that ‘the enterprise has the ability to effect change in 
the wrongful practices of an entity that causes a harm’.296 Some have argued that the provision in 
the UNGPs that stipulates the leverage concept may be read as a ‘full endorsement’ of the 
leverage-based approach to attributing responsibility for human rights to companies.297 However, 
this does not seem to be the case, because leverage in itself does not determine responsibility 
pursuant to the UNGPs. The argument that the responsibility of business enterprises may take on 
a ‘protect’ nature is correct.298 
In short, the SRSG argued that, as a general proposition, the concept of leverage is unsuited for 
attributing human rights responsibility to business enterprises because of the difficulties this 
poses for delineating the responsibilities between States and enterprises.299 In the specific 
situation where human rights are linked to adverse human rights impacts through their business 
relationships the concept may not pose said legal or practical difficulties, however, because the 
responsibilities of States and business enterprises would be differentiated and mutually 
exclusive. 
2.4.2.3 The ‘Human Rights Due Diligence’ Concept 
The UN Norms articulated a ‘due diligence’ responsibility for companies `to use` due diligence 
in avoid involvement in human rights abuses through contribution or direct or indirect linkage; 
Transnational corporations and other business enterprises, shall have the responsibility to 
use due diligence in ensuring that their activities do not contribute directly or indirectly to 
human rights abuses, and that they do not directly or indirectly benefit from abuses of 
which they were aware or ought to have been aware.300 
The UN Norms thus not only specified the obligations of business enterprises in negative 
prohibitions, it also identified that business enterprises were obligated to undertake positive 
action. With respect to the right to security of persons, for instance, the UN Norms noted that 
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companies ‘shall establish policies’, ‘engage with due diligence in investigations’ and ensure 
that their guards are ‘adequately trained’ and that provisions of the UN Norms are incorporated 
into contracts.301 
The element of the due diligence as identified in the UN Norms bears close resemblance to 
human rights due diligence that was later recognized by the UNGPs as core to the corporate 
responsibility to respect. The language of the UN Norms ‘to use’ suggests that due diligence is a 
process that business enterprises should employ to discharge their human rights responsibility. 
In the case of the UNGPs, due diligence is applied slightly differently and, arguably, carries 
more weight. The UNGPs establish human rights due diligence not only as a method302 for 
discharging this responsibly, but as a standard integral to the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights itself. While under the UN Norms, companies were regarded as responsible for the 
human rights abuse in first instance, under the UNGPs companies are regarded as responsible for 
having human rights due diligence policies and processes in place to prevent potential human 
rights impact from occurring. The depiction of the UNGPs as process, rather than performance-
oriented, seems accurate in this respect.303 
The UN Norms identified a standard that resembles in various aspects the corporate 
responsibility to respect under the UNGPs, which essentially requires business enterprises to 
‘know and show’ their respect for human rights.304 The UN Norms indicate that business 
enterprises ‘shall inform themselves’ of the human rights impacts of their activities, ‘so that they 
can further avoid complicity in human rights abuses’. This standard finds an equivalent under 
UNGP 17, which articulates the responsibility of business enterprises to undertake human rights 
risk inquiries as part of their human rights due diligence process in order to avoid contributing to 
human rights abuse. 
The UN Norms note that business enterprises must be transparent, by ‘disclosing timely, 
relevant, regular and reliable information regarding their activities, structure, financial situation 
and performance’.305 The UNGP 17 recognizes that a responsibility to communicate is integral to 
the human rights due diligence process, which requires that business enterprises ‘account for’ 
how they address their adverse human rights impacts. The human rights due diligence 
responsibility requires assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and 
acting upon the findings, tracking responses and communicating how impacts are addressed.306 
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The UN Norms furthermore call on business to conduct ‘periodic evaluations’ of their human 
rights impacts in conformity to the UN Norms.307 Such evaluations must reflect the views of 
indigenous people and communities. The outcome of the assessment must be made available to 
stakeholders. The UNGPs require business enterprises to undertake human rights impact 
assessments, the purpose of which are to determine the nature of actual and potential adverse 
human rights impact with which a company may be involved. This will provide clarity on the 
specific impacts on a specific people within a particular operational context.308 It informs 
subsequent steps in the human rights due diligence process,309 as the findings must be integrated 
and acted upon.310 Special attention to adverse human rights impacts on ‘individuals from groups 
or populations that may be at heightened risk of vulnerability or marginalization’ is warranted.311 
The UN Norms established that business enterprises must undertake ‘plans of action or methods 
of reparation and redress’ in case of inadequate compliance.312 The UNGPs also require active 
engagement in remediation, ‘by itself or in cooperation with other actors’, where business 
enterprises have caused or contributed to adverse impacts.313 
The UN Norms define stakeholders as ‘stockholders, other owners, workers and their 
representatives, as well as any other individual or group that is affected by the activities of 
transnational corporations or other business enterprises’. 314  The concept is interpreted 
functionally in light of the objectives of these Norms. 
 Conclusion 2.5
The first initiatives to regulate the conduct of business enterprises originated in the 1970s and 
emerged out of the quest of developing countries to consolidate their control over the activities 
of large western companies in their territory and their autonomy to pursue domestic socio-
economic development objectives free from external interference. These countries asserted 
themselves in intergovernmental fora to create international non-legally binding codes of 
conducts. These codes were meant to regulate the transnational operations and practices of these 
companies and their relations with States, and in particular host states. Attempts to develop 
issue-specific agreements were more successful and resulted in the adoption of, inter alia, the 
adoption of the ILO Tripartite Declaration and the OECD Guidelines on International Investment 
and MNEs. These successes have been attributed, in part, to the member-ship composition.315  
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These international codes of conduct articulate principles as applicable governments and 
transnational corporations in order to improve relations between each other in the areas of 
investment and economic development. 316  States were the primary addresses of the codes. The 
recommendations by States set out in these codes addressed business enterprises indirectly. The 
codes were an attempt to achieve greater coherency in domestic policies related to business 
enterprises and foreign direct investment. Where these codes were meant to regulate the 
responsibilities of business enterprises in relation to human rights, this was only with regards to a 
limited range of labour and workers’ rights. Negotiated within multi-lateral settings and between 
States, the codes had an international-governmental and public character.317 Business enterprises 
were generally excluded from participating in these law-making processes, not without 
consequences.318 
The 1980s witnessed a shift toward neo-liberalist-inspired reforms of de-regulation and 
privatisation across countries at different stages of development. Legal instruments were 
developed supportive of trade liberalisation, investment and production at the international level. 
These initiatives contributed to environments conducive for business enterprises to grow in size, 
geographical spread, economic power and influence. Business enterprises came to be perceived 
more favourably as engines of growth and prosperity that, as sources of jobs, capital, technology 
and investment, could make valuable contributions to the realisation of a wide range of human 
rights. This was not automatic, however. These governance gaps became more apparent as NGO 
brought to light the involvement of corporations with high public profiles in egregious human 
rights abuses, exposing the true impacts of globalisation on human rights. These gaps have been 
partly the result of a lack of capacity and/or willingness of developing host states especially to 
impose and enforce human rights regulations on powerful enterprises, by reason of weak rule of 
law, lax regulatory frameworks or weak democratic control. 
Business enterprises started to self- impose CSR responsibilities on a voluntary basis and 
integrate human rights demands through non-binding individual or industry-wide codes of 
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conduct. These were supplemented by multi-stakeholder initiatives. The UNGC and the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme are two examples of a great diversity319 of CSR 
instruments320 321 that emerged, ranging from corporate codes of conduct and multi-stakeholder 
initiatives of certification and labelling, model codes, sectorial initiatives, international 
frameworks, and socially responsible investment.322 These initiatives were driven by the CSR 
movement, which had gained in strength as a business response to public condemnation of these 
irresponsible practices and as an attempt to avert legal regulation and accountability by 
demonstrating a capacity to self-regulate. This movement advanced many approaches to 
regulating the role and responsibilities of business enterprises. These drew from a rich body of 
theories dating back to the 1950s, which is when CSR is alleged to have emerged as a 
management idea.323 These theories range from corporate citizenship and the triple-bottom-line 
to enterprise social responsibility, ethical responsibility and socially responsible investment.324  
Partially because CSR responded dynamically to evolving changes in expectations and needs 
over time, conceptions of CSR vary.325 CSR is generally perceived as a voluntary undertaking by 
business enterprises that extend beyond the law. CSR is not centred on human rights, but views 
human rights as an integral element of a broader CSR agenda, which covers substantive issues 
like environmental responsibilities, corruption, labour rights, consumer relations, workforce and 
community activities.326 Narrowly focused on a selection of labour rights initially, human rights 
has come to be understood more expansively as encompassing a wider range of human rights, 
which the linkage to international human rights standards could explain.327 The CSR discourse 
premises on the understanding that human rights can be best advanced through softer forms of 
responsibility, self-regulation and sustainability.328 It also premises on the understanding that 
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employees, investors, consumers and the public, rather than States, should be the drivers and 
enforcers of CSR initiatives.329   
The 1990s also witnessed attempts at strengthening the corporate accountability for negative 
impacts on human rights through laws and policies at national and international level. Prominent 
examples are the reinvigoration of the ATCA for the purpose of corporate civil liability, and the 
French proposal for the ICC’s jurisdiction to extend to legal persons. The accountability 
movement and the BHR movement, which is primarily concerned with human rights, were 
important driving forces behind these initiatives. They had gained in strength and legitimacy as 
self-regulation and multi-stakeholder initiatives had lost in credibility and effectiveness. The 
BHR movement is more narrowly focused on the quest for corporate accountability for the 
negative human rights impacts through binding laws and access to remedies and justice for 
victims or impacted communities.330 The presumptions of the business and human rights 
movement differ fundamentally from those advanced by the CSR movement, though both 
emerged in response to the same challenge, to address the regulatory gaps that globalisation has 
posed to society. Unsurprisingly, debates involving both movements often polarised and resulted 
in an impasse.331   
This chapter provided a brief analysis of the UN Norms, the failure of which resulted in the 
appointment of John Ruggie as the ‘SRSG’) in 2005. The UN Norms had been developed as a 
soft-law document. While thus not intended to have the legally binding force of a treaty, the UN 
Norms were expected to derive normative force from their recognition and acceptance by States 
and business enterprises, and take on binding effects in law and practice as a result of their actual 
implementation. Their presentation as a restatement of International Human Rights Law and the 
language in the UN Norms indicating that a broad selection of human rights obligations applied 
directly to companies met with criticised, including by the SRSG, which later discarded the UN 
Norms as ‘exaggerated legal claims and conceptual ambiguities’. This chapter reflected on the 
points raised by the SRSG in his critical assessment of the UN Norms. While the SRSG 
distanced himself from the UN Norms and decided not to build further on this initiative, some of 
the concept that the UN Norms recognized later re-appeared in the UNGPs, inter alia, the 
concept of human rights due diligence.   
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 The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Theoretical Foundations 3
and Principled Pragmatism 
 
 Introduction 3.1
The previous chapter reflected on the context in which the need for the creation of the mandate 
of the SRSG was created. The previous decades saw several failed attempts to create 
international legal binding standards on business and human rights. A prominent example is the 
draft UN Norms that stranded in the Commission on Human Rights (replaced by the HRC in 
2006) after the debate had turned divisive and polarized. Partially because of these political 
dynamics, which had not fully settled by the time the SRSG entered his mandate, it was 
reasonable to assume that recommending full-on negotiations on an all-encompassing treaty on 
business and human rights was not feasible at the time. The SRSG pursued an alternative 
approach of constructing the ‘Protect, Respect Remedy’ Framework, which was welcomed by 
the HRC on 18 June 2008. The SRSG subsequently developed the UNGPs, which the HRC 
unanimously ‘endorsed’ on 16 June 2011. The key stakeholders – States, civil society, business 
enterprises – seemed aligned and many expressed their support for the UNGPs. The SRSG 
describes the significance of this achievement as follows: 
The GPs are the first authoritative guidance that the Council and its predecessor 
body, the Commission on Human Rights, have issued for states and business 
enterprises on their respective obligations in relation to business and human 
rights; and it marked the first time that either body ‘endorsed’ a normative text on 
any subject that governments did not negotiate themselves.1 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the SRSG’s project on its own terms, in order to uncover 
the UNGP’s theoretical foundations. This assessment is also aimed at determining the character 
and function of the UNGPs. This chapter finds that the UNGPs are set out to advance a dynamic 
approach to institutional developments and to start a process to create a better functioning 
governance system for the effective prevention of, and remedy for, business-related human rights 
harm. The next chapter will focus on the legal status of the UNGPs as soft law and their 
normative potential to affect and coordinate the regulation of business behavior related to human 
rights. The effective implementation of the UNGPs should result in the further evolution of 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights into a more binding norm and, possibly, a ‘hard’ 
obligation at the national and international level. 
The first part of this chapter (Section 3.2) will examine the theoretical foundations of the 
UNGPs. This section will provide: a synopsis of the SRSG’s views on the embedded liberalism 
compromise, which has been of importance in framing the problem in the business and human 
rights domain (Section 3.2.1); the SRSG’s views on the `global public domain`, which the 
UNGPs reflect by articulating norms that correspond with the public role of business enterprises 
and other non-state actors in the current human rights landscape (Section 3.2.2); the SRSG’s 
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approach of principled pragmatism, which guided the SRSG throughout his mandate (Section 
3.2.3); the function of the PRR Framework and the UNGPs as a starting point and integral part of 
a process of advancing towards enhanced standards and practices on a global scale (Section 
3.2.4); and the characteristics of the institutional approach that the UNGPs promote and that is 
essential for the constitution of a global business and human rights regime (Section 3.2.5). 
The second part will provide a description of the UNGPs. 
 The SRSG’s Project and Its Theoretical Foundations 3.2
3.2.1 Embedded Liberalism Compromise and the Pursuit of a Macro Agenda: Framing the 
Problem 
This section addresses first the SRSG’s understanding of today’s challenges of global 
governance2 and their solution, which he describes as the ‘embedded liberalism compromise’. 
The SRSG’s framing of the problem in the business and human rights domain will be discussed 
next. The SRSG has described business and human rights as ‘a microcosm of a larger crisis in 
contemporary governance: the widening gaps between the scope and impacts of economic forces 
and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences’.3 
The SRSG developed his view on global governance in his earlier writings,4 in which he used the 
term embedded liberalism as a characterization of the liberal international economic order as it 
had developed until the 1980s. According to Ruggie, the essence of embedded liberalism is the 
pursuit of an international economic liberalization agenda under the condition that States can 
cushion its deleterious domestic effects by means of economic and social policies. The 
presumption underlying this notion is that economic liberalism must be embedded in social 
values and principles to ensure that commitments to free trade and open markets are compatible 
with the requirement of domestic social and economic stability. Stability is also a prerequisite for 
markets to thrive and deliver optimal results. The compact between States and society to 
accommodate for the socially disruptive effects of economic liberalization is referred to as the 
embedded liberalism compromise. 
Embedded liberalism is predicated on the understanding of a multi-lateral economic order that 
existed in a world that was international. Separate and distinct national economies conducted 
external transactions between one another, mainly at arm’s length. Government could intervene 
to attend to adverse societal effects of free trade by employing conventional policy measures at 
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the border in the form of tariffs, exchange rates and capital controls.5 International order regimes 
helped to sustain the economic order. Such regimes played a mediating role by ‘providing the 
permissive environment for the emergence of certain kinds of transactions, specifically 
transactions that are perceived to be complementary to the normative frameworks of the regimes 
having a bearing on them’.6 Some of these basic premises of embedded liberalism stand 
challenged under the transforming forces of globalization. 
The delicate balance of this embedded liberalism compromise was disrupted by the forces of 
globalization.7 The SRSG links the negative impacts of globalization mainly to its economic 
dimension, and particular the expanding power of economic forces and actors. The operations of 
transnational corporations, which the SRSG refers to as globalization’s ‘most visible 
embodiment’,8 have come to have impacts on the daily lives of people across different countries 
as a consequence of their expanding scope9 and changes in their modality of operation. In this 
regard, the SRSG draws attention to the transnational corporate networks, whose ‘network-based 
operating models involving multiple corporate entities, spread across and within countries’.10 
The SRSG explains: 
Transnational corporate networks pose a regulatory challenge to the international 
legal system. To begin with, in legal terms purchasing goods and services from 
unrelated suppliers generally is considered an arms-length exchange, not an intra-
firm transaction. Among related parties, a parent company and its subsidiaries are 
distinct legal entities and even large-scale projects may be incorporated 
separately. Any one of them may be engaged in joint ventures with other firms or 
governments. Due to the doctrine of limited liability, a parent company generally 
is not legally liable for wrongs committed by a subsidiary even where it is the sole 
shareholder, unless the subsidiary is under such close operational control by the 
parent that it can be seen as its mere agent. Each legally distinct entity is subject 
to the laws of the countries in which it operates, but the transnational corporate 
group or network as a whole is not governed directly by international law. 11 
                                                
 5 J. Ruggie, Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate Connection 2 (2002), 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/events/papers/LSE-final.pdf.; Interim Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 2006) [hereinafter Ruggie, 2006 Interim Report] (by John 
Ruggie). 
 6 Ruggie, supra note 4, at 404. 
 7 Ruggie, J. G, Globalization and the Embedded Liberalism Compromise: The End of an Era? 2 (MPIfG 
Working Paper No. 97/1, 1997). 
 8 J. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda (John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 31, 2007). 
 9 The SRSG notes that the sheer increase in the number of transnational enterprises that spanned the globe then in 
itself illustrated this expansion, which he estimated at ‘some 70,000 transnational firms, together with roughly 
700,000 subsidiaries and millions of suppliers’. Ruggie, 2006 Interim Report, supra note 5, ¶ 11. 
 10 Ruggie, supra note 8, at 7. 
 11 Id. at 7. 
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The SRSG recognized the urgency of addressing these challenges, noting that the current state of 
affairs is unsustainable.12 The possibility that the so-called ugly ‘isms’ of the post-Cold War era, 
‘protectionism, populism, nationalism, ethnic chauvinism, fanaticism and terrorism’, might 
resurface unless these problems were attended was real and called for action.13 These nationalist 
and fundamentalist sympathies and political agendas may revamp as economically disadvantaged 
but powerful segments of society demand social protection.14 For the SRSG, the solution is a 
reconfiguration of the international economic order in order to restore the balance and to bring it 
into alignment with social values. ‘Embedding global markets in shared values and institutional 
practices is a far better alternative; contributing to that outcome is the broadest macro objective 
of this mandate’.15 
The SRSG refers to business and human rights as a microcosm of the transformations and 
governance challenges in the global domain, which the SRSG describes as follows: 
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the 
governance gaps created by globalization – between the scope and impact of 
economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse 
consequences. These governance gaps provide the permissive environment for 
wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or 
reparation. How to narrow and ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to human 
rights is our fundamental challenge. 16 
The SRSG thus advances a narrative of globalization that recognizes that economic forces and 
actors can make positive contributions to the realization of human rights. The SRSG notes that 
‘[b]usiness is the major source of investment and job creation, and markets can be highly 
efficient means for allocating scarce resources, capable of generating economic growth, reducing 
poverty, and increasing demand for the rule of law, thereby contributing to the realization of a 
broad spectrum of human rights’.17 The problem arises where activities of business enterprises 
and markets impacting human rights on a global scale are not embedded in an adequate 
regulatory framework. While globalization has created favourable environments for the 
expansion of economic forces and actors, these developments have not been paralleled with 
policies and regulations that embed these forces in social values and principles. As a 
consequence of this imbalance, a permissive environment exists in which the business can have 
negative impacts on human rights without adequate sanctioning and the rights of victims of 
human rights abuses to an effective remedy for these abuses are by and large ineffective. The 
                                                
 12 Ruggie, 2006 Interim Report, supra note 5, ¶ 18.  
 13 Ruggie, supra note 5, at 3. 
 14 Ruggie, 2006 Interim Report, supra note 5, ¶ 18. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Report of the Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶ 3, U.N. 
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fundamental challenge in business and human rights thus is framed in terms of narrowing and 
overcoming the so-called ‘governance gaps’ that globalization has posed to society. 
The fundamental challenge is to resolve the institutional misalignments between individual and 
market forces and the governance capacity of States and other social actors. The SRSG focuses 
on the evolving power of business enterprises. Transnational corporations that have come to pose 
the main regulatory challenges in this respect for the reasons mentioned above. There is an 
increasing number of such companies in emerging markets, hence the North-South divide has 
become less clearly defined.18 The presumption is, however, that all companies can affect all 
human rights, in virtually any type of operational context.19 The SRSG also draws special 
attention to the regulation of companies that operate in conflict areas, because the ‘worst 
corporate related human rights abuses, including acts that amount to international crimes, take 
place in areas affected by conflict, or where governments otherwise lack the capacity or will to 
govern in the public interest’.20 The capacity gap is also reflected in the deficient capabilities of 
States to take effective action, as well as collective action problems at the international level. 
According to the SRSG, the strengthening of the institutional underpinnings of globalization is 
necessary in order to sustain globalization as a positive force in the long term. 
3.2.2 The Constitutive Public Domain and Polycentric Governance 
This section reflects on what the SRSG’s refers to as the ‘global public domain’, which is 
described as ‘an increasingly institutionalized transnational arena of discourse, contestation and 
action concerning the production of global public goods, involving private as well as public 
actors. It does not by itself determine global governance outcomes any more than its counterpart 
does at the domestic level. But it introduces opportunities for and constraints upon both global 
and national governance that did not exist in the past’.21 The SRSG’s understanding of the 
‘global public domain’ is important, because the UNGPs incorporate this idea.22 This section will 
also reflect on the related idea of ‘polycentric governance’ that the SRSG drew from when 
developing the UNGPs. This idea reflects how the behavior of business enterprises in relation to 
human rights is shaped by governance systems other than the State-law system and by standards 
and practices of States and business enterprises that correspond with the public role these actors 
have in the world political landscape. 
In his earlier writings on the ‘global public domain’,23 Ruggie draws attention to the public role 
that transnational enterprises and other non-state actors have come to perform and the 
transforming effects that their political activities are having on the world polity. Ruggie points to 
                                                
 18 Ruggie, Life in the Global Public Domain: Response to Commentaries on the UN Guiding Principles and the 
Proposed Treaty on Business and Human Rights, 5  (Jan. 23, 2015), available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2554726. 
 19 Draft UNGPs, supra note 17.  
 20 Id. 
 21 Ruggie, supra note 18. 
 22 Id. 
 23 John Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain Issues, Actors, and Practices, 10 European Journal of 
International Relations 500 (2004). 
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business involvement in articulating and enacting new expectations regarding CSR through 
private governance arrangements as a concrete instance of the public role in business 
enterprises.24 Such practices are indicative of the public at the global level no longer being 
equated with States. These governance arrangements involve the creation of ‘a new transnational 
world of transaction flows that did not exist previously’. Ruggie notes: 
The growth of such ‘private governance’ arrangements is highly significant, and it 
represents another building block for my own argument. But the rubric of 
privatization encompasses too much, thereby obscuring the fundamental fact that 
in many instances of ‘private governance’ there has been no actual shift away 
from public to private sectors. Instead, firms have created a new transnational 
world of transaction flows that did not exist previously, and they have developed 
and instituted novel management systems for themselves and for relations with 
their subsidiaries, suppliers, and distributors that they deem necessary given the 
scope, pace, and complexity of operating in those transactional spaces. In other 
words, TNCs have gone global and function in near real time, leaving behind the 
slower moving, state-mediated inter-national world of arm’s-length economic 
transactions and traditional international legal mechanisms, even as they depend 
on that world for their licenses to operate and to protect their property rights. 25 
The SRSG notes that the creation of these new systems provides ‘a historically progressive 
platform by creating a more inclusive institutional arena in which, and sites from which other 
social actors, including CSOs, international organisations and even states can graft their pursuit 
of broader social agendas onto the global reach and capacity of TNCs’.26 
Ruggie also points out that these governance systems may create new opportunities for non-state 
actors to exercise and expand their global public role. The processes of global rulemaking and 
the roles of non-state actors become further institutionalized as shared practices and predictable 
patterns of action emerge. These practices can have transformative effects in terms of changing 
the incentive structures of the different actors involved and the political imbalance of power in 
the global public sphere. 27  These systems are constitutive to an emerging broader 
institutionalized arena at the global level in which these non-state actors perform their public 
functions. The SRSG refers to this process as ‘the reconstitution of the global public domain – 
away from one that equated the “public” in international politics with states and interstate realm 
to one in which the very system of states is becoming embedded in a broader, albeit still thin and 
partial, institutionalized arena concerned with the production of global public goods’.28 
According to Backer, the PPR framework represents ‘a microcosm of the tectonic shifts in law 
and governance systems, and the organization of human collectives confronts the consequences 
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 25 Id. at 503. 
 26 Id. at 503 
 27 Id. at 504. 
 28 Id. at 500. 
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of globalization’.29  The SRSG’s furthermore departs from the existing reality that corporate 
conduct at the global level is shaped by multiple governance systems (national and international 
public law and governance, civil and corporate governance) that co-exist. The SRSG describes 
this idea of poly-centric governance as follows: 
It rests on the observation that corporate conduct at the global level today is 
shaped by three distinct governance systems. The first is the traditional system of 
public law and governance, domestic and international. Important as it is, by itself 
it has been unable to do all the heavy lifting on this and many other global policy 
challenges, ranging from poverty eradication to combating climate change. 
Indeed, formal state-based multilateralism has become harder, not easier in the 
past decade or so. The second is a system of civil governance involving 
stakeholders affected by business enterprises and employing various social 
compliance mechanisms, such as advocacy campaigns, law suits and other forms 
of pressure, but also partnering with companies to induce positive change. The 
third is governance by business enterprises of their own affairs, which internalizes 
elements of the other two. In the case of multinational corporations, corporate 
governance so conceived is a distinct transnational law-making system in its own 
right—the private law of contracts, with direct consequences that can equal and in 
many cases surpass the scale and effectiveness of public governance in particular 
issue areas.30 
The PRR Framework and the UNGPs are a response to and reflect these changes in the business 
and human rights landscape. States and non-state actors and their respective governance systems 
have come to exercise social roles in the regulation of business conduct in relation to human 
rights. These roles are differentiated and complementary. The PRR Framework address these 
roles of States and business etnerprises and identifies, clarifies and organizes the duties and 
responsibilities that these actors have in a coherent template. The UNGPs elaborate on the 
implications of the operationalization of these principles and provide further guidance on means 
for their effective operationalization. The presumption is that States and business enterprises will 
enhance their standards and practices as they actively implement their duties and responsibilities 
as set out under the UNGPs.31 A regulatory dynamic should abound as a result of the individual 
and combination of implementation measures that actors adopt. These should contribute to the 
constitution of better functioning global system. According to the SRSG: 
The Framework and GPs reflect what international relations scholars call 
‘polycentric governance’. This refers to an emerging regulatory dynamic under 
which public and private governance systems each add distinct value, compensate 
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 30 Ruggie, supra note 18. See also, Ruggie, supra note 1, at 2. 
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for one another’s weaknesses, and play mutually reinforcing roles—out of which 
a more comprehensive and effective global regime might emerge.32 
3.2.3 The SRSG’s Approach of Principled Pragmatism 
The SRSG opted for the approach of ‘principled pragmatism’, which he defined as an 
‘unflinching commitment to the principle of strengthening the promotion and protection of 
human rights as it relates to business, coupled with a pragmatic attachment to what works best in 
creating change where it matters most in the daily lives of people’.33 This formulation reflects a 
dual character. The approach of principled pragmatism is both value based and strategic. The 
SRSG’s normative concern was the promotion and protection of human rights as they relate to 
business, and his primary attention went to the pursuit of this overall end. To be noted is the 
SRSG’s understanding of human rights, which was inspired by the writings of Amartya Sen. Sen 
views human rights as primarily articulations of significant ethical demands, the substantive 
content of which reflects (and assert the importance of) freedoms of human beings.34 The 
recognition of these ethical demands translates into ethical requirements or ‘imperfect 
obligations’ on the part of anyone that is in a plausible position to contribute to the realization of 
these freedoms to be willing to consider seriously doing just that, what is reasonably expected of 
them to do, taking into account the parameters of the cases involved. 35  The SRSG’s 
understanding of human rights differs from the one adhered to by the law-centric approach, 
which views human rights as legal demands or ‘laws in waiting’.36 
The SRSG’s approach of principled pragmatism is strategic in its pursuit of the realization of 
human rights in relation to business. The SRSG described its main strategic objective as 
‘achieving the maximum reduction in corporate-related human rights harm in the shortest 
possible period of time’.37 This strategic aspect of SRSG was also pragmatic in that the SRSG 
did not favour one particular ideological or governance approach to accomplishing this strategic 
objective. The SRSG did not opt for the legalistic approach that had been adhered to in the 
development of the draft UN Norms, nor did he choose to advance the voluntary approach that 
supporters of the CSR movement favoured. Instead, the SRSG steered a middle course and, 
                                                
 32 See Berne Declaration interview with John Ruggie (November 2011), https://business-
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 33 Ruggie, 2006 Interim Report, supra note 5, ¶ 81. 
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 37 John Ruggie, Address at the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufacturers and Commerce, Sir 
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drawing from the perspective of polycentric governance, decided to give consideration to all the 
ways and means that may be relevant for enhancing the realization of human rights by making 
possible contribution to the reduction of corporate-related harm to human rights. The SRSG 
concentrated on practical measures that ‘provide the best mix of effectiveness and feasibility’.38 
The SRSG elaborated in a letter issued in 2006: 
My mandate, as I read it, is not to devise new ways or grounds for regulating 
transnational corporations per se; rather, it is to strengthen the promotion and 
protection of human rights as they relate to transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises by identifying and advocating the adoption of whatever 
measures work best in creating change where it matters most: in the daily lives of 
people. This is the ‘principled pragmatism’ of which I wrote in my report. It has 
guided me from the moment I accepted this important assignment, and I shall 
abide by it through to the mandate’s end.39 
Principled pragmatism is also concerned with addressing the institutional misalignments that 
impede the realization of human rights in relation to business. Relevant aspects supporting these 
misalignments are the norm clashes that are inherent to the business and human rights domain, 
which are supported in some measure by the fragmentation in international law.40 In the absence 
of a meta-system that can resolve these norm clashes, these misalignments must be resolved 
through practice. The SRSG also points to the institutional incapabilities of the key stakeholders 
and their misaligned incentive structures. 41  Systemic changes in the way States and business 
enterprises operate are necessary in order to build these competences.42 As a consequence, the 
strategic aspect of principled pragmatism is concerned with the objective of realizing institution 
reform through a process of enhancing standards and practices of States and business enterprises 
that govern business responsibility and accountability.43 
The approach of principled pragmatism finds expression in various facets of the SRSG’s 
mandate. At an early stage, the SRSG decided to not recommend the negotiation of a treaty 
placing binding obligations on business enterprises. The SRSG emphasized the importance of 
short-term practical measures to address immediate challenges and to provide immediate relief 
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for human rights abuses.44 The view of the SRSG was that a treaty-making process could take 
(too) long and risked ‘undermining effective shorter-term measures’. The SRSG reasoned that it 
was in the interest of victims of human rights that results were delivered sooner rather than later, 
noting that ‘[e]ven if we were to go down the treaty route, we still need immediate solutions to 
the escalating challenge of corporate human rights abuses’. The former UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights remarked that absent such immediate solutions, ‘much damage [to victims] 
could be done in the meantime’.45 46 
Also, the fact-based foundation and consultative process that the SRSG relied on in the 
development and building of a consensus around the PRR Framework and the UNGPs reflect 
‘principled pragmatism’. The SRSG constructed a knowledge base and forged a consensus 
around these instruments through an extensive program of systemic research and multi-
stakeholder consultations. 47  The extensive research was aimed at informing the debate, 
moderating excessive claims and providing a knowledge foundation that was shared across 
different stakeholder groups. 48  The UNGPs reflect this knowledge foundation and derive 
substantive legitimacy49 from its factual underpinnings. Future debates and collaboration on 
business and human rights can build on and draw legitimacy from this knowledge foundation.50 
Another feature of principled pragmatism is the inclusive multi-stakeholder consultative process 
that the SRSG organised throughout his mandate. The process was open to all stakeholders and 
highly participatory, engaging participants from the various stakeholders groups, including 
business enterprises, at all stages of the mandate.51 52 This approach was a method of garnering 
legitimacy53 and support for both the development process and the UNGPs across these 
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stakeholder groups more generally.54 Appending the influence of business lobbying on derailing 
the negotiations on the draft UN Norms,55 the SRSG attached considerable importance to 
business involvement.56 The degree of engagement by business organisations in the process was 
remarkable57 and, according to the SRSG, imperative to ensure the buy-in of business enterprises 
and to secure their commitment to the implementation of the UNGPs.58  
The multi-stakeholder approach was also aimed at achieving a so-called ‘thick stakeholder 
consensus’.59 Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters describe how a normatively superior benchmark of 
‘thick stakeholder consensus’ is emerging as a ‘code of good practice’ in new cooperation.60 61 
                                                
 54 The participation of stakeholder individuals, groups and institutions that had contributed to the mandate had 
come to constitute ‘a global movement of sorts in support of a successful mandate’. UNGPs, supra note 43, 
introduction. 
 55 For an analysis of value of an expansion of business participation in international law making from the 
perspective of public international legal theory, as well from pragmatic political and procedural points of view, 
see Jonathan I Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International Law, Duke Law 
Journal 748, 750-51 (1983). Charney notes: 
[T]he development of international TNC codes has merely tended to convert festering disputes in the 
political and economic arenas into legal disputes. By failing to resolve most of these disputes before 
formulating normative concepts, the TNCs will be motivated to use their power and transnationality to 
frustrate attempts to enforce these norms. Their likely success will prejudice the credibility of the law-
making process.... Permitting greater TNC participation in the current process […] may facilitate resolution 
of underlying disputes and minimize conflict over the resulting norms.  
Id. at 776,777.  Charney furthermore notes:  
Prohibiting direct business participation in the development of these rules poses certain risks: (1) that the 
rules may be impracticable, (2) that the developments will needlessly promote conflict between nation-
states and TNCs, and (3) that the international community’s current respect for the international legal 
system will diminish. Nevertheless, including in the rulemaking process representatives of organizations 
with direct interests in the rules under consideration might both minimize these risks’ and maximize the 
positive results.  
Id. at 787.  
 56 The stakeholder approach was informed by the draft history of this resolution, and in particular the previous 
experiences in the development of the draft UN Norms. The draft UN Norms had been criticized for being 
opaque and insufficiently consultative. David Kinley & Rachel Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for 
Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law, 6 Human Rights Law Review (2006).  But 
also see, contra,  David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 16, 959 (2004). 
Surya Deva, Multinationals, Human Rights and International Law: Time to Move beyond the “State-Centric” 
Conception, in Human Rights and Business: Direct Corporate Accountability and Human Rights 27, 37, fn 45 
(Jernej Letnar Černič & Tara Van Ho eds., 2015). 
 57 Karin Buhmann, Navigating from ‘train wreck’ to being ‘welcomed’: negotiaton strategies and argumentative 
patterns in the development of the UN Framework, in Human Rights Obligaitons of Business: Beyond the 
Corporate Responsibility to Respect? 29, 30 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013); K Buhmann, 
Regulating Corporate Social and Human Rights Responsibilities at the UN Plane: Institutionalising New Forms 
of Law and Law-making Approaches? 78 Nordic Journal of International Law (2009). 
 58 Ruggie, supra note 37. 
 59 Ruggie, supra note 18. 
 60 The authors uphold the normative threshold that ‘any exercise of public authority must be kept accountable’. 
The authors adhere to the explanation of ‘exercise of public authority’ by Bogdandy and Goldmann as ‘any kind 
 83  
The underlying presumption is that non-binding instruments and informal modes of cooperation 
can be constraining in a way that traditional international law can and should therefore meet 
certain essential substantive requirements in order to ensure ex ante and ex-post legitimacy and 
generate legal effects. These criteria relate to the source (and authority) and the procedural and 
substantive quality of a norm.62 The concept of ‘thick stakeholder consensus’ has been contrasted 
with ‘thin state consent’, which refers to the state consent that is often viewed as sufficient to 
justify international law.63 
The approach of principled pragmatism also finds expression in the PRR Framework and the 
UNGPs. The UNGPs are presented as a set of ‘universally applicable and yet practical Guiding 
Principles on the effective prevention of, and remedy for, business-related human rights harm’.64 
The UNGPs define their objective as ‘enhancing standards and practices with regards to business 
and human rights so as to achieve tangible results for affected individuals and communities, and 
thereby contributing to a socially sustainable globalization’.65 The UNGPs advance an approach 
of institutional development, the characteristics of which will be discussed next. 
3.2.4 The UNGPs as a Platform for Institutionalist Reform 
The UNGPs note: 
The Guiding Principles’ normative contribution lies not in the creation of new 
international law obligations but in elaborating the implications of existing 
standards and practices for States and businesses; integrating them within a single, 
logically coherent and comprehensive template; and identifying where the current 
regime falls short and how it should be improved. Each Principle is accompanied 
by a commentary further clarifying its meaning and implications.66 
The PRR Framework and the UNGPs serve several aims. A principle aim is to achieve clarity 
and convergence among existing and newly emerging standards with regards to business and 
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 62 More specifically, the substantive requirements of the ‘thick consensus’ benchmark are: ‘(i) the source and 
authority of the norm-creating body, (ii) transparency, openness, and neutrality in the norm’s procedural 
elaboration, and (iii) the substantive quality; consistency, and overall acceptance (consensus) of the norm’. Id. at 
761. 
 63 Id. at 748. 
 64 UNGPs, supra note 43, ¶ 16. 
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 84  
human rights.67 68 The scope of this effort is not limited to the identification of existing legal 
standard and practices in the State-law system. The UNGPs also reflects emerging norms that 
have been recognized by State and non-state actors through their respective governance systems. 
The SRSG distilled these interpretations from intense research and stakeholder engagement 
through multi-stakeholder consultations.69 To be noted is that the UNGPs thus in and by 
themselves do not create new standards. 
Apart from providing clarity, the UNGPs reflect a framework for the interaction and re-
organisation of the expected contributions of key State and non-state actors and their respective 
governance systems. The PRR Framework organises these in a template with view of 
coordinating the actions of these actors and their respective governance systems. The PRR 
Framework thus reflects a holistic and coherent template for a better functioning system for 
governing the behavior of business enterprises. This system not only affects the behavior of 
business enterprises, but also the preventative and remedial measures by which this behavior is 
governed. 
The structure of the PRR Framework rests on three differentiated and complementary 
foundational pillars, which the SRSG described as follows: 
The Framework rests on three pillars: the State duty to protect against human 
rights abuses by third parties, including business; through appropriate policies, 
regulation, and adjudication; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, 
which means to act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others 
and to address adverse impacts that occur; and greater access for victims to 
effective remedy, judicial and non-judicial. Each pillar is an essential component 
in supporting what is intended to be a dynamic system of preventative and 
remedial measures: the State duty to protect because it lies at the very core of the 
international human rights regime; an independent corporate responsibility to 
respect because it is the basic expectation society has of business in relation to 
human rights; and access to remedy because even the most concerted efforts 
cannot prevent all abuse. 
The three pillars reflects the different components of this system. The pillars are differentiated, in 
that each component reflects on the social role that a different actor – State and business 
enterprises – and their respective governance systems have in regulating business conduct. The 
duties and responsibilities of States and business enterprises that are recognized under each pillar 
correlate with the social roles of these actors and exist independently of, and do not jeopardize, 
one another. These pillars draw from, but do not change, the rationales and discourses that reflect 
these social roles and that exists within the governance systems of these respective actors.70 They 
                                                
 67 Backer, supra note 29, at 81.  
 68 The SRSG noted, ‘insofar as the overall global context itself is in transition, standards in many instances do not 
simply “exist” out there waiting to be recorded and implemented but are in the process of being socially 
constructed. Indeed, the mandate itself inevitably is a modest intervention in that larger process’. Ruggie, 2006 
Interim Report, supra note 5, ¶ 54. 
 69 Addo, supra note 31, at 135. 
 70 The SRSG notes that: 
 85  
are also complementary; the pillars are connected, interrelated and each is essential in supporting 
this system.71 
The PRR Framework reflects an international consensus around this regulatory framework and 
serve as ‘an authoritative focal point around which the expectations and actions of relevant 
stakeholders could converge’.72 The UNGPs elaborate on the meaning and implications of these 
principles for law, policy and practice.73 They provide ‘concrete and practical recommendations’ 
that actors can rely on for implementing the PRR Framework, and thus serve as a focal point for 
the operationalization on this framework.74 The UNGPs thus provide a focal point for the 
development of a better functioning system for regulating the behavior of business. They are 
designed as a platform on which cumulative action can be built. Their effective implementation 
is expected to foster greater alignment in the interactions between social institutions and actions 
that cohere and generate reinforcing effects that will cumulate into progress over time.75 The 
expectation is that once these actions reach a sufficient scale, they may compound into systemic 
change and eventually, lead to the institutionalization of a new harmonized global business and 
human rights regime.76 
3.2.5 An Institutional Approach to Resolving Governance Gaps 
 
The UNGPs thus advance an approach of institutional reform and expansion of capacities to 
resolve the fundamental challenges in the business and human rights domain. According to 
                                                                                                                                                       
To foster that alignment, the GPs draw on the different discourses and rationales that reflect the different social 
roles these governance systems play in regulating corporate conduct. Thus, for states the emphasis is on the 
legal obligations they have under the international human rights regime to protect against human rights abuses 
by third parties, including business, as well as policy rationales that are consistent with, and supportive of, 
meeting those obligations. For businesses, beyond compliance with legal obligations, the GPs focus on the need 
to manage the risk of involvement in human rights abuses, which requires that companies act with due diligence 
to avoid infringing on the rights of others and address harm where it does occur. For affected individuals and 
communities, the GPs stipulate ways for their further empowerment to realize a right to remedy. I described this 
approach as principled pragmatism. 
Ruggie, supra note 1, at 3. 
71  The UNGPs indicate that ‘[e]ach pillar is an essential component in an inter-related and dynamic system of 
preventive and remedial measures: the State duty to protect because it lies at the very core of the international 
human rights regime; the corporate responsibility to respect because it is the basic expectation society has of 
business in relation to human rights; and access to remedy because even the most concerted efforts cannot 
prevent all abuse’. Report of the Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing 
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, ¶ 6, U.N.Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (March 21, 2011) 
(by John Ruggie). 
 72 UNGPs, supra note 43, Introduction, at 3. 
 73 Ruggie, supra note 18. 
 74 Draft UNGPs, supra note 17, ¶ 12; Backer, supra note 29, at 93. 
 75 ‘Lacking was an authoritative basis whereby these governance systems become better aligned in relation to 
business and human rights, compensate for one another’s weaknesses, and play mutually reinforcing roles – out 
of which cumulative change can evolve over time’. Ruggie, supra note 1, at 2. 
 76 Ruggie, 2008 Report, supra note 16, § 6. 
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Ruggie:  
 
The idea that business enterprises might have human rights responsibilities independent 
of legal requirements in their countries of operation is relatively new, in large part a 
byproduct of the most recent wave of globalization. 
The successful expansion of the international human rights regime to encompass business 
enterprises must activate and mobilize the full array of rationales and institutional means 
that affect corporate conduct. That is what the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights seek to do.77 
The following key features can characterize the SRSG’s approach. 
Multi-faceted: The approach advanced by the PRR Framework and the UNGPs appreciates the 
governance systems in all their facets and leverages the plurality of institutions, processes and 
actions within these systems to the extent relevant to achieving progress. The UNGPs address the 
social role and responsibilities of the key stakeholders and their governance systems contributing 
to the regime, which are examined in detail below. The approach recognizes the role of 
individuals and non-state actors within these systems and how their dynamic interplay and 
activities contribute to progress. The UNGPs, for instance, indicate that NGOs are a credible, 
independent expert resource that business enterprises should consider consulting when 
undertaking human rights impact assessments in situations where consultations with potentially 
affected stakeholders themselves are not possible.78  Business enterprises are also advised to 
draw on the expertise of NGOs when assessing how to respect the principles of internationally 
recognised human rights when operating in complex country and local contexts.79 The UNGPs 
also expressly addresses the roles of NHRI,80 multilateral institutions81 and multi-stakeholder 
initiatives.82  
                                                
77   John Ruggie, Opinion: Business and Human Rights – The Next Chapter (Mar 7, 2013).  To be noted is that the 
SRSG found inspiration in the work of Amartya Sen: 
 
Sen insists that human rights are much more than law`s antecedents or progeny. Indeed, he states, such a 
view threatens to ‘incarnate’ the social logics and processes other than law that drive public recognition of 
rights. My work, including the Guiding Principles, has sought to contribute to the freeing of human rights 
discourse and practice from these conceptual shackles, by drawing on the interests, capacities and 
engagement of states, market actors, civil society, and the intrinsic power of ideational and normative factors. 
  
  Ruggie, supra note 18.  
 
 78 UNGPs, supra note 43, Commentary to GP 18. 
 79 Id. at 23. 
 80 Business enterprises are advised to consult and draw on the expertise of NHRIs in meeting their responsibility 
to respect human rights, for instance, when assessing how to respond to human rights issues in country and local 
contexts (Commentary to GP 23). NHRIs are identified as an example of a State-based grievance mechanism ( 
Commentary to GP 25), and an important role is foreseen for NHRIs in providing effective and appropriate non-
judicial grievance mechanisms (Commentary to GP 27). The GPs recognise a supporting role for NHRIs in 
assisting States to align with their international human rights obligations, and in providing guidance on human 
rights to business enterprises. (Commentary to GP 2). UNGPs, supra note 43. 
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Poly-centric: The PRR Framework and the UNGPs appreciate the governance systems in their 
own terms and do not alter but reflect their different discourses and rationales. As such, the 
States remain the main subject of public law systems of governance (national and 
international).83 The UNGPs affirm that States have a primary duty to protect human rights 
against infringements by non-state actors, including business enterprises. This duty is firmly 
established in international human rights law. The UNGPs elaborate on the methods through 
which States can discharge this duty in terms of effective policies, legislation, regulations and 
adjudication to prevent, investigate, punish and redress human rights abuses. States are expected 
to ensure internal coherence. They are also expected to cooperate with other States and 
stakeholders to advance towards more consistent approaches to discharging their duty to protect, 
through multi-lateral institutions.84 
The SRSG poly-centric governance outlook is not centered on the State and the public law 
system. The poly-centric governance that the UNGPs encompass recognize and draw from the 
social role of civil society and business enterprises and their governance systems in the 
regulation of business conduct. 
The responsibilities of non-state actors are differentiated and complementary to the duties of the 
State. 
Regulatory dynamic: The PRR Framework and the UNGPs foster a regulatory dynamic that 
draws from a wide range and diversity of methods that key stakeholders and their respective 
governance systems adopt in the pursuit of the common goals of reducing harm caused by 
corporate-related activities. This dynamic thus does not depend only on the state action to 
effectuate change in business conduct, but builds on the actions of all three stakeholders and their 
respective governance systems to affect business conduct. These actions are interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing, reflecting a ‘smart mix of measures – national and international, mandatory 
and voluntary’.85 These actions are founded on different and interlinking sources of obligation 
(legal, social, moral).86 They are drawn from different types of hard and soft laws that serve as a 
basis to apply norms. 
The regulatory dynamic and the measures from which it draws, individually and in combination, 
potentially affect and coordinate the regulation of the conduct of business enterprises. The 
UNGPs define the duties and responsibilities of State and business enterprises. The expectation 
                                                                                                                                                       
 81 The UNGPs recognize a role for multi-lateral institutions to promote shared understandings that align with the 
UNGPs and advance ‘international cooperation in managing business and human rights challenges’. (GP 10) Id. 
 82 The UNGPs suggests that multi-stakeholder initiatives can contribute to tracking business responses by 
committing to respect for human rights-related standards and through their standard-setting function, and can 
help identify, elaborate and further specify expectations regarding the application of the UNGPs in specific 
operational contexts. Multi-stakeholder initiatives should ensure the availability of effective remediation 
mechanisms, at the level of individual members and/or the collaborative level. GP 30. Id. 
 83 Addo, supra note 31, at 146. 
 84 UNGPs, supra note 43, Commentary to GP 10. 
 85 Ruggie, supra note 1, at 3. 
 86 Backer, supra note 29, at 96. 
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is that States and business enterprises will enhance their standards and practices as they actively 
implement the UNGPs. The regulatory dynamic that abounds can affect the factors that explain 
such adherence by these actors to their duties and responsibilities (e.g. incentives, capacities and 
engagement). As a consequence of this regulatory dynamic, business enterprises should be 
exposed in an evolutionary manner to legal or normative constraints that bind business 
enterprises to meeting their responsibilities for human rights.87 The UNGPs confirm that ‘both 
voluntarism and law have relevant and reinforcing roles to play in governing business 
behavior’.88 The PPR and the GPs have been described as ‘a platform of guidelines by which 
stakeholders may define mechanisms using either compelling regulatory mechanisms or indeed 
voluntary initiatives’.89 
Flexibility: The PRR Framework and the UNGPs allow for flexibility to facts and circumstances 
in the application of the duties and responsibilities to States and business enterprises. The PRR 
Framework and the UNGPs point to various incentives and opportunities that businesses have to 
respect human rights in practice. These incentives relate to the factual circumstances and 
characteristics of the company. The UNGPs allow flexibility for companies to exercise their 
responsibilities to respect human rights by adopting measures that are appropriate and 
proportionate to their circumstances.90 
The ‘smart mix’ of methods that States and non-state actors employ to discharge their roles and 
responsibility can be of instrumental importance in fostering business respect for human rights 
by leveraging the afore-mentioned factors. Also, States have discretion to adopt measures that 
are appropriate to their capabilities and the country context. The UNGPs advance the 
understanding that there is not one single formula when it comes to progress in achieving the 
strategic goal of more effective prevention and remedy for corporate-related human rights harm. 
The SRSG notes: 
The Guiding Principles are not a tool kit, simply to be taken off the shelf and 
plugged in. While the principles themselves are universally applicable, the means 
by which they are realized will reflect the fact that we live in a world of 192 
United Nations Member States, 80,000 transnational enterprises, ten times as 
many subsidiaries and countless millions of national firms, most of which are 
small and medium-sized enterprises. When it comes to means for implementation, 
therefore, one size does not fit all.91 
Participatory: Stakeholder engagement is embedded in all three pillars of the PRR Framework.92 
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There are various reasons for the SRSG to promote such stakeholder engagement. A first reason 
is the intrinsic importance to right-holders of stakeholder engagement. The right to participate in 
political and public life is after all a human right. The new spaces and opportunities that 
stakeholder engagement opens up for right-holders to exercise this participation right and other 
human rights connected thereto, are valuable in themselves. The prerequisites of stakeholder 
engagement can have an empowering effect. The process creates opportunities for dialogue and 
communication, which stakeholders can use to form their perspectives and demands. In this 
regard, stakeholder engagement can articulate right-holder perspectives and demands. The right 
to participate is also a core aspect of the human rights approach to development. 
Second, stakeholder engagement can be valuable from the view of political pragmatism and 
procedure. It can be of instrumental importance by providing opportunities for those affected to 
have a voice in the process. Meaningful stakeholder engagement creates political incentives and 
to respond to the views of right-holders and to respond to their demands. The process also allows 
right-holders to have a certain degree of control over the decision-making and measures that 
affect them. The process furthermore can contribute to a better understanding of expectations and 
priorities from a right-holder perspective. Stakeholder engagement can facilitate the formation of 
more-informed and more-functional concerted action between stakeholders.93 
Third, the effective implementation of stakeholder engagement can help make the process and 
outcomes more democratic and more responsive to the public.94  
The fact that stakeholder engagement is embedded in all three of these pillars above, suggests 
that the PRR Framework and the UNGPs promote stakeholder engagement in a systemic fashion. 
The effective implementation could contribute to more systemic practices of stakeholder 
engagement. This depends on how stakeholder engagement is operationalized in practice and the 
extent to which stakeholders seize the opportunities to partake in these processes. Stakeholder 
engagement has intrinsic and instrumental importance, as well as a constructive role in the 
process towards enhanced standards and practices. Stakeholder engagement is also a feature of 
the emerging global business and human rights regime. Its effective operationalization in 
practice can serve as a democratizing force that renders this regime more responsive to the 
public. 
 The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 3.3
3.3.1 The General Principles 
The first section of the UNGP, entitled ‘General Principles’, provides guidance on how the 
sections of the UNGP should be interpreted and applied generally. 
These Guiding Principles are grounded in recognition of: 
                                                
 93 This paragraph corresponds to and builds on the views of Amarthya Sen on the ‘intrinsic relevance, the 
protective role and the constructive importance of democracy’. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, 152-59 
(Oxford University Press. 1999). 
 94 Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, The Impact of Corporations on Global Governance 
(2004). 
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(a) States’ existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights and 
fundamental freedoms; 
(b) The role of business enterprises as specialized organs of society performing 
specialized functions, and required to comply with all applicable laws and to 
respect human rights; 
(c) The need for rights and obligations to be matched to appropriate and effective 
remedies when breached. 
This section suggests that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights should be read in 
recognition of the foundational structure that the UNGPs reflect and are set out to promote for 
the emerging governance regime on business and human rights. The role of business enterprises, 
which is cast as an essential component of this structure, is hierarchically inferior to the role of 
States, which are recognized as primarily responsible for the realization of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 95  The source and scope of States’ obligations are determined by 
International Human Rights Law. The social role of business enterprises is differentiated from 
States’ roles and reflects their nature as specialized organs of society. The responsibilities of 
business enterprises reflect the specialized functions they perform and are of a dual character; 
(i) to comply with all applicable law and (ii) to respect human rights. The need for appropriate 
and effective remedies is casted as a necessary consequence of a breach of human rights or 
obligations resulting from corporate related activities. 
The General Principles furthermore note that the UNGPs ‘should be understood as a coherent 
whole and should be read, individually and collectively, in terms of their objective of enhancing 
standards and practices with regard to business and human rights so as to achieve tangible results 
for affected individuals and communities, and thereby also contributing to a socially sustainable 
globalization’. The UNGPs thereby specify that the UNGPs, and the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights, should be interpreted to conform the circumstances and conditions that the 
UNGPs specify. They should furthermore be read in light of the UNGPs as a whole and their 
strategic objective, which the UNGPs define as the pursuit of enhanced standards and practices 
on business and human rights. 
The General Principles note that: ‘Nothing in these Guiding Principles should be read as creating 
new international obligations, or as limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State may 
have undertaken or be subject to under international law with regard to human rights’.96 This 
provision reflects the understanding that the UNGPs in and by themselves do not create any new 
international obligations or alter the obligations that States have under International Human 
Rights Law. The UNGPs instead reflect an interpretation of standards and practices of States and 
business enterprises as they exist, rather than as they should be, and elaborate on their meaning 
and implications.97 98 
                                                
 95 Larry Catá Backer, From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance: The Guiding 
Principles for the Implementation of the United Nations Protect, Respect and Remedy and the Construction of 
Inter-Systemic Global Governance, 25 Global Business & Development Law Journal 69, 86 (2012). 
 96 Id. at 106. 
 97 UNGPs, supra note 43, ¶ 14. 
 91  
The General Principles also indicate that the UNGPs apply generally ‘to all States and all 
business enterprises, both transnational and other, regardless of their size, sector, location, 
ownership and structure’. 
The General Principles furthermore note that: 
These Guiding Principles should be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner, 
with particular attention to the rights and needs of, as well as the challenges faced 
by, individuals from groups or populations that may be at heightened risk of 
becoming vulnerable or marginalized, and with due regard to the different risks 
that may be faced by women and men. 
The UNGPs thereby stipulate the principle of non-discrimination under international human 
rights law, which entails that human rights are subject to enjoyment without distinction of any 
kind.99 The General Principles specify that the UNGPs should be implemented with particular 
regard to the rights, needs and challenges faced by individuals who belong to groups at 
heightened risk of becoming vulnerable or marginalized, and that thereby due regard should be 
had of gender-related risks. 
3.3.2 The State Duty to Protect 
3.3.2.1 The State Duty to Protect Human Rights: International Law 
UNGP sections 1 to 10 elaborate on the State duty to protect human rights. These Principles 
reaffirm100 the primary role of States as bearers of human rights obligations, and their duty to 
respect, protect and fulfill human rights.101 The State duty to protect human rights entails that 
States must protect against human rights infringements by third parties, including business 
enterprises, within a State’s territory and/or jurisdiction. This duty entails that States must take 
appropriate measures to prevent, investigate, punish and redress corporate abuse within the 
States’ territory or jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 98 This does not automatically exclude the UNGPs from having any legal effects. The UNGPs, as will be 
elaborated below, can be viewed as soft law that can affect the course of legal development in the future 
through their potential normative affects on the behavior of States and business enterprises. 
 99 This principle is contained in Art.2 of the UDHR and a number of principle international human rights treaties. 
Also see, for instance, Art. 14 ECHR and Art. 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR. Oliver de Schutter, et al., 
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Social and Cultural Rights, 34 Human Rights Quarterly, 1087 (2012). 
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Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises in Accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 17/4, transmitted by note of the 
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the Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its General Comment 12, The Right to Adequate 
Food. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, Right to adequate food (20th 
Sess., 1999), ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and 
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(2003). 
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UNGP 1 stipulates: 
States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or 
jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking 
appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through 
effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication.102 
The State duty to protect human rights against infringements by third parties derives from 
International Human Rights Law and State commitments to human rights that the international 
community has widely recognized.103 The commentary to UNGP 1 stipulate that the States have 
a duty to promote the rule of law, including ‘by taking measures to ensure equality before the 
law, fairness in its application, and by providing for adequate accountability, legal certainty, and 
procedural and legal transparency’.104 
The State duty to protect is inherent to the State duty to ‘ensure’ human rights, which is codified 
in various human rights treaties, including the ICCPR and the ICESCR. A brief analysis follows. 
Pursuant to Article 2(1) ICCPR: 
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant […]. 
Art. 2(2) ICCPR stipulates that: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in 
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present 
Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give 
effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.105 
In its General Comment 31, the UN Human Rights Committee held that Article 2 of the ICCPR 
imposes a general obligation on State parties to respect and to ensure that the rights protected by 
the Covenant are respected in relation to all individuals within a State’s jurisdiction. More 
specifically, the positive obligation ‘to ensure’ involves that States must protect individuals not 
only against violations by the State’s agents of their rights, but also ‘against acts committed by 
private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they 
are amenable to application between private persons or entities’. The Committee indicated that 
                                                
 
 102 Also see, Ruggie, 2008 Report, supra note 16, ¶ 18. 
 103 Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
supra note 100, ¶ 7. 
 104 UNGPs, supra note 43, Commentary to GP 1. 
 105 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art.2.2, opened for signature 16 December 1966. UN 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to  
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the State’s obligations under Art. 2 will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by 
the State against violations of their rights by these entities.106 
The obligation of States to ensure the human rights of all individuals ‘within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction’ entails that States have an obligation towards all individuals within ‘its 
power and effective control’, even if the individual is not situated within the territory of the State 
party. The enjoyment of human rights must furthermore be available to all individuals, 
irrespective of nationality or statelessness. This principle also applies to individuals within the 
power or effective control of the forces of a State acting outside the territory107 and in situations 
of armed conflict in which the rules of International Humanitarian Law apply. 
A failure to ensure the rights guaranteed by the ICCPR could give rise to violations by a State of 
those rights ‘as a result of States Parties’ permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to 
exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by 
private persons or entities.108 In this respect, as the commentary to the UNGPs also indicate, the 
State’s duty to protect human rights is an obligation of conduct, rather than an obligation of 
result.109 A State is not responsible for human rights violations by a private person or entities, 
unless (i) the act can be attributed to the State; or (ii) if the State has not taken adequate due 
diligence steps to prevent the respective abuse.110 In addition, the existence of a State duty to 
undertake adequate due diligence has been confirmed by the Committee on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights,111 as well as a number of other international and regional human rights bodies 
and tribunals.112 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) provided clarification to the State duty to 
‘ensure’ human rights in the Velasquez Rodrigues Case (1988). Article 1 of the Inter-American 
Convention of Human Rights provides the following: 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms 
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free 
and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for 
reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition. 
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The IACtHR held that to discharge the duty ‘to ensure’ human rights, States must ensure ‘the 
free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to every person subject to its 
jurisdiction’.113 As a result of this duty, the State must: 
prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the 
Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right violated and 
provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the violation.114 
In addition, the Court held that acts of private individuals that violate human rights, in and of 
themselves, may not be directly imputable to a State, however they can trigger State 
responsibility ‘because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as 
required by the Convention’.115 The Court also noted that the occurrence of a violation does not 
automatically entail that the State has acted in breach of its duty to take preventative measures.116 
As a consequence of the State duty to prevent, the following additional obligations arise for 
States: 
The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights 
violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation 
of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to 
impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate 
compensation.117 
This duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political, administrative 
and cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights and ensure that 
any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts, which, as such, may lead 
to the punishment of those responsible and the obligation to indemnify the victims 
for damages.118 
The UNGP 2 articulates the obligation of States to set out clearly their expectation that all 
business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights 
throughout their operations.119 It is within this context that the SRSG addresses the obligations of 
States to regulate the extraterritorial activities of business enterprises. 
There has been a debate for many years about the international legal obligations of States to 
regulate the extraterritorial activities of business enterprises to prevent human rights abuses 
abroad. The Commentary to UN Guiding Principle 2 states that International Human Rights Law 
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does not impose such legal obligations on States, but nevertheless recognizes that States are 
permitted to regulate extraterritorially if this does not amount to a breach of international law. 
More specifically according to the said Commentary: 
At present States are not generally required under international human rights law 
to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory 
and/or jurisdiction. Nor are they generally prohibited from doing so, provided 
there is a recognized jurisdictional basis. Within these parameters some human 
rights treaty bodies recommend that home States take steps to prevent abuse 
abroad by business enterprises within their jurisdiction.120 
This language suggests that States are generally permitted but not required under International 
Human Rights Law to act to regulate the extraterritorial activities of the business enterprises 
domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction in the interest of human rights, although human 
rights treaty bodies ‘recommend’ home States to do so. For many this interpretation seems to 
give an inaccurate account of the legal position that a number of UN human rights treaty bodies 
have adopted, namely that extraterritorial obligations for States in relation to corporate-related 
activities arise on the basis of certain obligations set out in international human rights 
instruments. 
Despite the preceding paragraph, there is increasing support among experts that States have at 
least some extraterritorial obligations, although the scope and implications of such obligations 
remain disputed. The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Maastricht Principles) affirm that ‘all States have 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, including civil, cultural, economic, 
political and social rights, both within their territories and extraterritorially’.121 122 Principle 8 
defines extraterritorial obligations as follows: 
8. Definition of extraterritorial obligations. 
For the purposes of these Principles, extraterritorial obligations encompass: 
a) obligations relating to the acts and omissions of a State, within or beyond its 
territory, that have effects on the enjoyment of human rights outside of that 
State’s territory; and 
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b) obligations of a global character that are set out in the Charter of the United 
Nations and human rights instruments to take action, separately, and jointly 
through international cooperation, to realise human rights universally. 
The Commentary to this principle provides an example in the context of corporate-related 
conduct to demonstrate that extraterritorial obligations for the State may arise on both grounds. 
A State has a duty to ensure ‘that a corporation domiciled within its jurisdiction does not provide 
loans to projects leading to forced evictions […] (a) because the state has the legal and factual 
power to regulate the corporation’s conduct [and] (b) due to the obligation to take separate and 
joint action to realise human rights internationally’.123 
Expert opinion has derived from the authoritative opinions of various UN human rights bodies 
that States have an obligation to control the conduct of corporations that are domiciled in a 
State’s territory/jurisdiction, when such conduct may lead to human rights violations abroad.124 
According to De Schutter, the UNGPs do not reflect current developments in the evolving body 
of International Human Rights Law. These developments have witnessed a gradual strengthening 
of the extraterritorial duties of States to regulate the conduct of companies.125 While the 
interpretations of the UN Treaty Bodies are not legally binding, they have been recognized as 
authoritative. The claim that, at present, international law generally does not create any 
extraterritorial obligations in the context of corporate activities’ seems inaccurate where there is 
increasing acknowledgement that such extraterritorial obligations arise under International 
Human Rights Law. The argument according to which the SRSG adopts a somewhat regressive 
approach to International Human Rights Law126 appears on point. Knox has rightly observed that 
the SRSG could have better characterized the interpretation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’) as ‘disputed or unsettled’, rather than 
discarding the proposition of the extraterritorial State duty to protect entirely.127 
UNGPs 3 to 10 provide the operational principles. UNGP 3 reflects on the general regulatory and 
policy function of the State: 
3.  In meeting their duty to protect, States should: 
(a) Enforce laws that are aimed at, or have the effect of, requiring business 
enterprises to respect human rights, and periodically to assess the adequacy of 
such laws and address any gaps; 
(b) Ensure that other laws and policies governing the creation and ongoing 
operation of business enterprises, such as corporate law, do not constrain but 
enable business respect for human rights; 
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(c) Provide effective guidance to business enterprises on how to respect human 
rights throughout their operations; 
(d) Encourage, and where appropriate require, business enterprises to 
communicate how they address their human rights impacts. 
The UNGPs stipulate that States should ensure that the laws in place that ‘aim at, or have the 
effect of’ requiring business enterprises to respect human rights, are enforced, and undergo an 
assessment periodically to determine their adequacy in the light of evolving circumstances. The 
laws and policies that govern the creation and ongoing operation of business enterprises should 
not pose barriers but enable business’ respect for human rights. In addition, States should provide 
effective guidance on how business enterprises can respect human rights throughout their 
operations. States should adopt policies and, if appropriate, regulations that require business 
enterprises to communicate on their respect for human rights. 
The Commentary reaffirms that States have a range of measures at their disposal to discharge 
their duty to protect, ranging from policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication. These 
measures can be voluntary or mandatory, international or national, and form part of what the 
UNGPs refer to as a ‘smart mix’ of permissible, preventative and remedial measures. States 
should consider such measures to foster respect for human rights by business. The commentary 
suggests that the laws and policies should be functional in providing an environment conducive 
to the business respect for human rights. In other words, States must review their legal systems 
and, in particular, the laws that govern the creation and conduct of business enterprises, 
including corporate law, to ensure that conditions are in place that make it legally possible and 
attractive for business enterprises to discharge their responsibility to respect human rights.128 
These conditions contribute to fostering a ‘corporate culture respectful of human rights at home 
and abroad,’ as human rights become firmly embedded in corporate structures and become a part 
of their standard practices. 
Other aspects of the operationalization of State duty to protect relate to the State-business 
nexus,129 the need to act in support of respect for human rights in conflict areas130 and to improve 
policy alignment.131 
3.3.2.2 The State-Business Nexus 
The UNGP 4 to 6 addresses the State-business nexus. UNGP 4 addresses the State duty to ensure 
that individuals are protected from infringements of their human rights by State-owned 
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or -controlled business enterprises, or business enterprises that receive substantial support and 
services from State agencies (e.g. export credit agencies, official investment insurance, guarantee 
agencies). The UNGP recognizes that States should take additional steps to protect against 
human rights abuses by these types of business enterprises, including, where appropriate, by 
requiring human rights due diligence. 
The Commentary to UNGP signals that there are strong policy rationales for States to ensure that 
State-owned or -controlled enterprises respect human rights. Abuse by these enterprises can give 
rise to a State’s violation of its own human rights obligations. This policy rationale becomes 
stronger ‘the closer a business enterprise is to the State, or the more it relies on statutory 
authority or taxpayer support’.132 133 Indeed, there are clear legal incentives to act more diligently 
with regards to State-owned or -controlled enterprises, as compared to other business enterprises. 
The reason is that States may incur international responsibility in case a State-owned/controlled 
business enterprise commits an illegal act, by act or omission, in violation of international human 
rights and this act can be attributed to the State.134 The State may incur responsibility for the act 
where the business enterprise was an organ of the State or, if not an organ of the State, exercised 
elements of Government authority and acted in that capacity in that particular instance.135 In both 
scenarios, State responsibility arises irrespective of whether the conduct exceeded authority or 
contravened instructions. State liability can also arise where a business enterprise acted under the 
instructions, or under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the conduct.136 Another 
scenario where the State adopts or acknowledges the conduct of the business enterprise as its 
own, in the case of which the State can also incur international responsibility.137 
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According to the Commentary, States have greater means within their power to ensure that 
relevant policies, legislation and regulations are implemented. The greater scope for scrutiny and 
oversight that government departments have to ensure the implementation of effective due 
diligence by companies is noted as an example. The UNGPs also indicate that States should 
‘encourage and, where appropriate, require human rights due diligence’ by agencies that are 
linked formally or informally to the State (e.g. export credit agencies, official investment 
insurance or guarantee agencies; development agencies, development finance institutions) and by 
business enterprises or projects receiving their support and services. A failure on the part of these 
agencies to exercise due diligence in order to manage the human rights risks of beneficiary 
entities can expose these agencies to reputational, financial, political or legal risks. 
UNGP 5 and 6 indicate that States should promote respect by business enterprises for human 
rights through State commercial interactions with these enterprises, including through exercising 
adequate oversight.138 The Commentary to UNGP 5 notes that States do not relinquish their 
international human rights obligations when privatizing the delivery of service. States are 
responsible for setting out the expectation that business enterprises respect human rights, 
including through relevant service contracts and enabling legislation, and ensuring that adequate 
independent monitoring and accountability mechanisms are in place to oversee the enterprise’s 
activities. 
3.3.2.3 To Improve Policy Alignment 
UNGPs 8 to 10 address the issue of ensuring policy alignment.139 These UNGPs reaffirm the 
importance for States to address both the vertical and horizontal incoherencies at the domestic 
level that undermine the effective implementation of human rights obligations. UNGP 8 explains 
such coherences as follows: 
Vertical policy coherence entails States having the necessary policies, laws and 
processes to implement their international human rights law obligations. 
Horizontal policy coherence means supporting and equipping departments and 
agencies, at both the national and subnational levels, that shape business practices 
– including those responsible for corporate law and securities regulation, 
investment, export credit and insurance, trade and labour – to be informed of and 
act in a manner compatible with the Government’s human rights obligations. 
In order to ensure vertical coherence, States must address the implementation gap between a 
State’s legal human rights obligations and commitments at the international level and the 
policies, laws and processes to implement these at the domestic level. In order to avoid or 
address horizontal incoherence, States must ensure that the government departments, agencies 
and other State-based institutions that are responsible for policies and issues that affect business 
behavior, have the capacity to abide by International Human Rights Law when fulfilling their 
respective mandates. 
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Pursuant to the UNGPs, States must ensure coherence between a State’s human rights 
obligations and policy objectives and its business agenda. Horizontal and vertical incoherencies 
are plausible where States face the difficult task of balancing conflicting social needs. For 
instance, a State’s decision to enter into bilateral investment treaty is commonly premised on the 
understanding that reciprocal investment protections foster investment and economic prosperity. 
As is well-established, however, FDI can also have an impact on essential interests other that 
economic growth, including human rights. There are well-established concerns that present 
arrangements under FDI arbitration constrain States’ exercise of national sovereignty, 
particularly their regulatory autonomy to design policies in the interest of human rights140 or to 
adopt or commit to new international human rights obligations or evolving standards.141 
In this regard, GP 9 establishes that States must maintain sufficient domestic policy space when 
pursuing economic interests through bilateral investment treaties, free-trade agreements or 
contracts of investment projects.142 The Principles for Responsible Contract imply, for example, 
that when a host State and a business investor negotiate a contract for a large-scale investment 
project and consider including a contractual stabilization clause, this clause should be carefully 
drafted, ‘so that any protections for investors against future changes in law do not interfere with 
the State’s bona fide efforts to implement laws, regulations or policies in a non-discriminatory 
manner in order to meet its human rights obligations’.143 
According to UNGP10, States are furthermore encouraged to use their membership of 
institutions to ensure that these institutions, within their respective mandates and capacities, do 
not restrict but encourage and support States and business enterprises in their efforts to meet their 
human rights duties and responsibilities.144 The Commentary to the UNGPs note that States 
retain their international human rights obligations when participating in multi-lateral institutions 
that deal with business related issues, e.g. international trade and financial institutions. 
3.3.2.4 Conflict Areas 
The State duty to protect imposes an obligation on States to help ensure that companies operating 
in conflict-affected areas are not involved in gross human rights abuses. The risk of such abuses 
occurring in these contexts is heightened as a result of governance gaps resulting from the host 
State’s lack of effective control. These heightened risks trigger a more demanding duty on the 
part of States to engage with and provide assistance to companies, with a view to avoiding 
contributing to human rights harm in these areas. The UNGPs recognize that States have an 
obligation to engage with companies as early as possible, and to assist companies to ‘identify, 
prevent and mitigate’ human rights risks in these conflict-affected areas. States furthermore 
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should provide ‘adequate’ assistance to business enterprises to assess and address the heightened 
risks of abuses and pay special attention to gender-based and sexual violence. Assistance should 
be combined with policy coordination between government agencies, host-Government actors 
and business enterprises. The State duty to protect imposes on States a duty to employ a smart-
mix of measures145 to ensure that businesses are not involved in gross human rights abuses in 
these areas. This includes establishing laws and policies that incentivise companies to be diligent 
by denying or withdrawing public support or services to companies that are involved in such 
abuses and refuse to co-operate.146 This entails reviewing and, where necessary, adapting 
existing policies, legislation, regulations and enforcement measures in order to ensure their 
effectiveness in addressing these heightened risks, including through provision of human rights 
due diligence. The UNGPs note that these measures are ‘in addition to States’ obligations under 
international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict, and under international criminal 
law’.147 
3.3.3 Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights 
The UNGPs recognize that business enterprises have a responsibility to respect human rights, 
meaning ‘that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address 
adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved’.148 The corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights is, in and of itself, not a legally binding and enforceable standard under 
International Human Rights Law. It is a ‘global standard of expected conduct’ that is founded on 
international social expectations rather than on international legal obligations, and thus has a 
‘non-legal character’.149 
The responsibility of business enterprises is ‘to respect’ human rights, rather than ‘to promote’ 
and ‘to fulfil human rights’. Business enterprises may be permitted to undertake commitments or 
activities to promote or fulfill human rights, however such action does not contribute to the 
managing of adverse human rights impacts. Philanthropic activities thus fall outside the scope of 
the corporate responsibility to respect and do not ‘offset a failure to respect human rights 
throughout their operations’.150 
The corporate responsibility to respect is coined as a negative responsibility, in that business 
enterprises must ‘do no harm’. This means that business enterprises should ‘avoid infringing on 
the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are 
involved’.151 Business enterprises must be pro-active in discharging their responsibility. The 
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positive prescription is that business enterprises must ‘know and show’152 their respect for 
human rights. The UN Guiding Principles provide that this entails the following: 
In order to meet their responsibility to respect human rights, business enterprises 
should have in place policies and processes appropriate to their size and 
circumstances, including: 
(a) A policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights; 
(b) A human rights due-diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and 
account for how they address their impacts on human rights; 
(c) Processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they 
cause or to which they contribute.153 
Business enterprises are expected to exercise ‘human rights due diligence’, i.e., to comply with 
domestic laws – or, in case these are insufficient, to comply with an international framework and 
have policies and processes in place to manage the human rights risks of their operations in order 
to avoid those risks. To manage their human rights risks, business enterprises must take firm 
steps to identify, prevent and mitigate actual or potential adverse human rights impacts and to 
give account of how these are addressed. The process of human rights due diligence must contain 
at least the following four elements: ‘assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, 
integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts 
are addressed’.154  
Where a business enterprise has caused or contributed to adverse human rights impact, it should 
actively engage in remediation, by providing remediation on its own, or in cooperation with 
other actors.155 
Since business enterprises are expected to have appropriate policies and processes in place, the 
corporate responsibility of business enterprises appears, in first instance, to be process-oriented 
rather than performance oriented.156 Similarly, the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights in first instance is a standard of conduct, rather than a standard of result. The standard is 
however closely linked to performance. For instance, the findings of a human rights due-
diligence test must be integrated and acted upon.157 
The scope of the human rights due diligence is delimited by the adverse human rights impacts, 
more specifically ‘the adverse human rights impacts that the business enterprise may cause or 
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contribute to through its own activities, or which may be directly linked to its operations, 
products or services by its relationships’.158 
The responsibility of business enterprises covers adverse human rights impacts caused by a 
company directly through its own activities, both by actions and omissions. 159  Business 
enterprises are also responsible for adverse impacts they are directly linked to through their 
business relationships. These relationships include ‘relationships with business partners, entities 
in its value chain, and any other non-State or State entity directly linked to its business 
operations, products or services’.160 
Human rights due diligence must be ongoing in order to be responsive to changes in human 
rights risks over time. Continuity is important because the operations and operating context of 
business enterprises evolve over time.161 
Human rights due diligence is a relative standard. Processes must thus be appropriate to the 
circumstances of the company and can vary in complexity depending on ‘the size of the business 
enterprises, the risk of severe human rights impacts, and the nature and context of its 
operations’.162 Business enterprises thus meet their responsibility in varying ways in terms of 
form, scale, degree and character. 
The responsibility is broad in scope in that it applies to the entire spectrum of internationally 
recognized human rights that business enterprises are capable of impacting.163 This encompasses 
all human rights, civil and political, as well as social, economic and cultural rights. 
The International Bills of Human Rights and the principles of fundamental rights as codified in 
the eight ILO Labor Conventions, provide an authoritative list of international human rights 
standards, and serve as a main, but not an exclusive, reference for the substance of the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights. Additional standards may apply depending on the 
circumstances.164 These can include the international human rights treaties that elaborate on 
human rights that apply to particular categories of people and types of human rights, as well as 
International Humanitarian law. 
The corporate responsibility to respect is a baseline responsibility that all business enterprises 
must uphold ‘regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and structure’. The 
corporate responsibility to respect applies to companies irrespective of whether they have 
accepted or approved the norm. It is thus not restricted to large enterprises that most often stand 
accused of human rights abuses. Nor does it exempt small or medium-sized companies who 
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might find it difficult, for reasons relating to capacity, resources and management structure, to 
fully respect human rights, or business enterprises that operate in conflict areas. The corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights applies ‘fully and equally’ to all business enterprises.165 
This is unrelated to the place where business enterprises operate.166 Consequently, business 
enterprises must uphold the responsibility irrespective of geographical location or territorial 
boundaries. 167  The responsibility to respect human rights is furthermore a universal standard. 
This universality can be understood in two manners: (i) first, as universal in principle, which is 
reflected in the universal character of the human rights principles that inform its substance;168 it 
means that it can manifest in different political, cultural or religious contexts.169 (ii) second, it is 
also said to be universally applicable and relevant, meaning that it applies across countries, 
irrespective of such contexts. 
3.3.4 Access to Remedies 
The UNGPs furthermore present an integrated set of redress methods that both States and 
business enterprises should apply to ensure that victims of human rights abuse have access to 
remedies. The need to provide access to effective remedy epitomizes how ‘the most concerted 
efforts cannot prevent all abuse’.170 The State obligation to provide effective remedy in case a 
human rights abuse has occurred is founded in International Human Rights Law. In the case 
where business-related human rights abuses have occurred within a State’s territory and/or 
jurisdiction, States must take appropriate steps ‘to investigate, punish and redress’ these abuses, 
through formal judicial mechanisms171 and complementary administrative, legislative and other 
State-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms.172 
States-based judicial complaint mechanisms are ‘at the core of ensuring access to remedy’. States 
must ensure that they are effective. Their effectiveness depends on their ‘impartiality, integrity 
and ability to accord due process’.173 Consequently, States must ensure, inter alia, that no legal, 
practical or procedural barriers prevent legitimate cases from being heard by courts, especially 
where judicial recourse is essential for accessing a remedy or an effective remedy is not available 
elsewhere. State-based non-judicial complaint mechanisms assume a complementary and 
supplementary role by providing a remedy where judicial remedy is not required or favoured.174 
States must raise public awareness of, and facilitate support and access to State-based complaint 
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mechanisms. They can assume a similar role with regard to non–State-based complaint 
mechanisms addressing business-related human rights harm. 
State-based complaint mechanisms are integral to and should found a wider system of remedies 
that also encompass non–State-based complaint mechanisms. The UN Guiding Principles 
distinguishes between different categories of non–State-based complaint mechanisms: 
operational complaint mechanisms that are administered by business enterprises alone, or in 
collaboration with stakeholders; industry association, multi-stakeholder or other collaborative 
initiatives, and; international or regional human rights mechanisms. While non-judicial, these 
mechanisms can discharge complementary and supplementary functions by providing remedies 
through ‘adjudicative, dialogue-based or other culturally appropriate and rights-compatible 
processes’.175 These mechanisms may provide access and remediation more speedily, at a lower 
cost or at greater transnational reach.176 
UN Guiding Principles 29 stipulates that business enterprises should ‘establish or participate in 
effective operational grievance mechanisms’ in order to make early and direct remediation of 
grievances possible.177 Apart from supporting business enterprises in meeting this responsibility 
and from ‘preventing harms from compounding and grievances from escalating,’ operational-
level grievance mechanisms can help business enterprises to identify and respond to adverse 
human rights impacts, trends and systemic problems.178 
 Conclusion 3.4
The PRR Framework and the UNGPs are a response to regulatory challenges that globalization, 
and its economic dimension in particular, had come to pose within the specific area of business 
and human rights. They premise on the understanding that the problem in the business and 
human rights domain relates to institutional misalignments resulting in governance gaps that 
allow business enterprises to engage in adverse human rights abuses without having to face 
consequences and victims to be left without protection and access to an effective remedy. 
The PRR Framework and the UNGPs are set out to provide a platform of guidance that 
stakeholders can rely on to overcome such misalignments. The UNGPs provide clarity on 
existing standards and practices related to business and human rights. They also reflect a re-
organisation of the expected contributions of the stakeholders and their respective governance 
systems in a holistic and coherent template for a better functioning system. The main structure 
and features of this template, which the PRR Framework presents and the UNGPs further 
elaborate on, allow for the UNGPs to function as a platform for action in support of enhanced 
standards and practice of both States and business enterprises. Their effective implementation is 
expected to have an impact on coherence between actions and to generate reinforcing effects that 
will cumulate in progress. The expectation is that once these actions reach a sufficient scale, they 
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may in time compound into systemic change and lead to the institutionalization of a new 
harmonized global business and human rights regime.179 
The PRR Framework and the UNGPs provide a template for an emerging global business and 
human rights regime. They advanced an institutional approach by focusing attention on the 
institutional misalignments that exist within and between the three governance systems in the 
business and human rights domain. The approach is systemic in that the strategic objective is to 
address all aspects that contribute to the problem of misalignments. This includes addressing the 
institutional in-capabilities of the key stakeholders and the misaligned incentive structures that 
are supportive of this problem. These misalignments call for systemic changes in the way that 
States and business enterprises operate. The solution lies in a process through which effective 
connectivity within and between governance systems is enhanced.180 
The PRR Framework and the UNGPs promote an approach that is integrative by appreciating the 
existence and working of three governance systems in the regulation of business conduct on their 
own terms. The approach is multi-faceted by acknowledging and simultaneously pursuing all 
institutions, processes and outcomes within the three governance systems, to the extent that these 
are of instrumental importance to achieving progress. The approach is interactive by drawing 
attention to the connections within and between the governance systems and to fostering these in 
order for actions to cohere and have mutually reinforcing effects. The UNGPs furthermore 
promote a regulatory dynamic that is aimed at fostering compliance by States and business 
enterprises through a smart mix of measures. The approach is flexible in that discretion is left for 
the adoption of measures that are appropriate to facts and circumstances. The approach is 
participatory by promoting stakeholder engagement that empowering individuals to give 
direction to the decision-making that affects them and to foster action that is appropriate from a 
right-holder perspective. 
 
                                                
 179 Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Ruggie, 2008 Report, supra note 16, § 6. 
 180 The SRSG elaborates on effective connectivity, noting the need for ‘more robust horizontal linkages’ within 
States (e.g. across governmental departments), within business enterprises (e.g., across business functions), 
between States and businesses (e.g., smart regulation), and between businesses and their external stakeholders 
(e.g., stakeholder engagement and grievance mechanisms). Ruggie, supra note 37. 
    
 The Evolution of the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: from a Soft 4
into a Hard Obligation for Companies under National and International Law? 
 
 Introduction 4.1
The UNGPs differ in nature and function from the previous initiative of the UN Norms.  Like the 
UN Norms, the UNGPs were conceived as soft-law.  However, unlike the UN Norms, which are 
de lege ferenda, the content of the UNGPs reflects a shared understanding of existing and 
emerging standards that govern the responsibility and accountability of business enterprises for 
human rights. The standards derive from a variety of sources including, inter alia, legal, social 
and moral rules.  In other words, the standards originate not only from the State / positive law 
system, but also from the (non-State based) social / civil system and the system of corporate 
governance.  The UNGPs, in short, articulate a responsibility for business enterprises to respect 
human rights. This responsibility is a global standard of conduct founded in social expectations 
rather than in legal obligations. The UNGPs are similar to the UN Norms in their lack of legally 
binding effects. Both initiatives were developed with the aim of triggering processes of 
institutional change. The initiatives nonetheless differ in that the UN Norms promote a top-down 
legal approach, whereas the UNGPs advance a bottom-up transformative approach involving 
multiple governance systems.   
The UNGPs aim at starting a process of advancing towards the emergence of a new governance 
system, one in which stakeholders and their respective existing governance systems become 
aligned in the pursuit of ‘the effective prevention of, and remedy for, business-related human 
rights harm’. This process is ongoing and meant to promote a gradual improvement in standards 
and practices, as States and business enterprises actively implement their rights and duties under 
the UNGPs. The UNGPs thus are set out to advance a dynamic regulatory approach that 
encourages transformative change and a continuous and progressive evolution of corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights. Consequently, while corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights may not be legally binding in its inception, this responsibility is expected to 
acquire: (i) normative force, through its recognition and acceptance by State and non-State 
actors; and (ii) effectiveness, through the actual implementation of the UNGPs. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the legal status of corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights and to set out a possible future framework in order to further develop this concept. This 
framework is based on an interpretation of the UNGPs on their own terms and thus remains 
within the scope of the SRSG’s original project. The second section (Section 4.2 below) will 
focus on the legal status of the UNGPs as soft law, because it is within this document, and with 
such character, that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights has been recognized. The 
third section (Section 4.3 below) will reflect on the SRSG’s choice of soft versus hard law 
through an examination of the rationales of the SRSG not to opt for the, arguably more 
conventional, route of negotiating a treaty. The fourth section (Section 4.4 below) considers the 
value of soft law as a technique to foster compliance, drawing upon literature highlighting the 
legal relevance of soft law despite its non-legally binding character. This section identifies 
various factors that can explain business compliance with (i.e., actual adherence to) corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights in practice. The fifth section (Section 4.5 below) will set 
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out a possible future framework for the normative evolution of corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights that seats well within the boundaries of the SRSG’s project. 
The sixth section (Section 4.6 below) considers the extent to which States have an international 
law obligation to adopt rules and regulations to ensure that business enterprises respect human 
rights. This entails an examination of authoritative opinions by international treaty monitoring 
bodies that clarify the State duty to protect human rights under international human rights 
treaties.  The seventh section (Section 4.7 below) will address the feasibility and desirability of a 
‘legalization’ of corporate responsibility to respect human rights at the national and international 
level. The eight section (Section 4.8 below) will examine the activities of the WG BH in relation 
to promoting the implementation and diffusion of the UNGPs. The ninth section (Section 4.9 
below) will briefly reflect on the creation, by the HRC, in 2013 of an inter-governmental 
working group, with a mandate to develop an internationally legally binding instrument on 
business and human rights. 
 The Legal Status of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights as Soft 4.2
Law 
An analysis of the legal status of corporate responsibility to respect human rights requires first an 
assessment of the legal status of the UNGPs within which this norm was adopted.  The text of 
the UNGPs does not address this point. A brief assessment of this status follows.  This 
assessment will be made by reference to:  (i) the sources of international law as set out in Article 
38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ and (ii) definitions of soft law in the literature. 
The UNGPs are not legally binding, in and of themselves, and thus clearly lack the legal effects 
of an international human rights treaty. States have expressed their approval of the UNGPs 
through their anonymous endorsement of the text in the HRC and oral statements delivered in the 
HRC. There is no indication, however, that States did so under the legal conviction that the 
UNGPs would be binding on them. By themselves, the UNGPs do not constitutive evidence of 
State practice or opinion iuris sive necessitates giving rise to new norms of customary 
international law.1 Consequently, the UNGPs do not constitute instant international treaty law2 or 
‘pressure-cooked’ instant customary international law3 within the meaning of Article 38(1)(a) 
and (b) of the Statute of the ICJ. Indeed, the UNGPs expressly provide that ‘nothing in these 
Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international law obligations, or as limiting or 
undermining any legal obligations a State may have undertaken or be subject to under 
                                                
 1 The unanimous ‘endorsement’ of the UNGPs by the HRC evidenced the support of State for the UNGPs. The 
exact legal significance of this act of ‘endorsement’ rather than ‘acceptance’ is not clear. As the SRSG has often 
indicated, it was a first time for the HRC to have given its official approval to an instrument that had not been 
negotiated by States. 
 2 This term ‘instant international law’ has been applied by Baade to characterize instruments which ‘do not rise to 
the level of customary international law by the mere fact of their adoption or even through being observed in 
practice by MNEs’. Hans W. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for MNEs: Commentary, in Legal 
Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 13 (Horn ed. 1980).   
 3 Eibe Riedel, Standards and Sources. Farewell to the Exclusivity of the Sources Triad in International Law?, 2 
European Journal of International Law, 62 (1991). 
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international law with regard to human rights’.4 To be noted is that, since the SRSG was acting 
under a special procedure of the HRC, the SRSG did not have the legal mandate to develop this 
type of law. 
The UNGPs provide instead pronouncements of existing and newly emerging States obligations 
under International Human Rights law as codified in international treaties and customary 
international law. To the extent that the UNGPs can be considered to re-state existing 
international law, at least with regards to the State duty to protect human rights and provide an 
effective remedy to breaches thereof, they might have ‘a certain pro memoria and declaratory 
effect’.5 However, given that the UNGPs merely reinforce6 such existing legal norms, the 
UNGPs have limited direct legal effect. With regards to these norms, the UNGPs could perhaps 
be regarded as auxiliary7 evidence of international human rights law in the sense of ‘the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations’.8 
Given that, for the aforementioned reasons, the UNGPs, do not fit into the traditional sources of 
international law as set out in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ,9 the question arises whether 
this instrument can be characterized as soft-law, and if so, how? There is no uncontested 
definition of soft-law. As described by Riedel, the origins of the more traditional concept of soft-
law can be traced back to the post World War II period, when the notion of soft-law was 
introduced to describe ‘legally relevant pronouncements formulated in international 
organizations and amongst States’.10 Amongst those sources characterised as soft-law were 
resolutions and declarations of international organizations11, quasi-legislative actions of the UN, 
and non-legally binding but persuasive codes of conduct from States.12 13 They emerged from 
                                                
 4 Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework. U.N.Doc. A/HRC/17/31, General Principles (March 21, 2011) [hereinafter 
UNGPs] (by John Ruggie). 
 5 Ian Brownlie, Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for MNEs: Commentary, in Legal Problems of Codes of 
Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, at 41 (Norbert Horn ed. 1980). 
 6 David Kinley & Rachel Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of 
Public International Law, 6 Human Rights Law Review, at 36 (2006). 
 7 Riedel, supra note 3, at 62. 
 8 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38(1)(d). 
 9 Riedel, supra note 3, at 63. 
 10 Id. at 59. 
 11 In the 1960s, developing countries undertook an unsuccessful attempt to upgrade resolutions of the UNGA into 
legally binding instruments. see UN Charter, articles 10-14. Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided 
World, 175 (1986). 
 12 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates in its Art. 53 that a treaty is void if it conflicts with 
peremptory norms of general international law, thereby providing a definition of a jus cogens norm:  ‘A treaty is 
void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the 
purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character’. See further, Art. 64 and 66(a). 
 13 Riedel, supra note 3, at 59. 
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within international organizations and emanated from the authority of States, hence their strong 
international and public character. 
According to Riedel, soft-law differs from more classic sources of international law in its 
intended non-legally binding effect, though this did not mean that the norms of this nature were 
without any effects. Non-compliance could potentially lead to ostracism at the UN. These norms 
were considered to have a discernible impact in the behavior of States.14 The means through 
which soft law led to normative effects - for example recognition, toleration or simple 
acceptance - differed from traditional international law making.15 Where soft-law gave rise to 
new norms of international law, its legal relevance extended beyond that of subsidiary sources of 
international law, i.e., judicial pronouncement and ‘the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations’. However, soft-law differed in its form, creation and intended 
effect from traditional sources of international law, i.e., treaties and custom.16 
More recent conceptions of soft-law which have been commonly applied in legal scholarship 
define ‘soft law’ as ‘voluntary’ by its very nature, and by its intrinsically international and public 
character. Zerk defines soft law as ‘principles and policies which have been negotiated and 
agreed upon between States, or promulgated by international institutions, yet which are not 
mandated by law or subject to any formal enforcement mechanisms’. 17  This definition 
characterizes instruments as soft-law by reference to their non-legally binding and non-
enforceable nature, from a strict legal perspective, and the legal authority of States.  According to 
this definition, soft-law depend on State action for its existence, and such action finds expression 
in the acceptance by States between themselves or through international organizations. 
According to Shelton, soft-law entails ‘any international instrument other than a treaty that 
contains principles, norms, standards, or other statement of expected behaviour’.18 It is not clear 
what gives a soft-law instrument its ‘international’ character, whether this may be the State’s 
consent to the instrument or the State’s involvement in the process of its development. The 
definition seems to attach greater importance to content, rather than the formality by which the 
instrument has been developed and adopted. The characterisation of an instrument as soft-law 
thus seems to depend, in part, on the instrument’s functionality in articulating statements of 
expected behaviour. 
Chinkin provides a broader definition of soft-law, and, more precisely, one which encompasses 
within its scope also statements by non-State actors that have not been negotiated or formally 
adopted by States, but which articulate international principles: 
                                                
 14 Id. at 62. 
 15 Id. at 64. 
 16 Id. at 64. 
 17 J.A. Zerk, Multinationals and corporate social responsibility: limitations and opportunities in international law, 
at 70 (Cambridge University Press. 2006). 
 18 Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy of International Law 100 The American Journal of International Law, at 
319 (2006).   
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Soft law instruments range from treaties, but which include only soft obligations (‘legal 
soft law’), to non-binding or voluntary resolutions and codes of conduct formulated and 
accepted by international and regional organisations (‘non-legal soft law’), to statements 
prepared by individuals in a non-governmental capacity, but which purport to lay down 
international principles.19 
According to this definition, an instrument depends on its content for its existence as soft law, 
which should reflects an attempt ‘to lay down international principles’. The form of the initiative, 
or the formality of the process by which it has been developed or adopted seems not to be of the 
essence. This definition also characterizes as soft law initiatives that have been developed at a 
micro-level,20 hence bringing within its scope a diversity and range of CSR mechanisms (e.g., 
codes of conduct, private-hybrid, self or multi-stakeholder governance initiatives). 
It seems that the SRSG adheres to a definition of soft-law that is similarly broad in scope.  The 
SRSG characterizes CSR mechanisms as soft law by virtue of their non-binding nature in a strict 
legal sense and their reflection of norms and social expectations that derive normative force from 
their recognition by State and other key actors.21 Instruments do not depend on any formal 
procedures for their development or acceptance in order to exist as soft law. A mechanism can be 
designated as soft law simply because the initiative carries within its content the potential to 
bind. 
The UNGPs may thus be characterized as soft law on various grounds.   
First, they have an ‘international’ character by reason of having been developed at the 
international level and having obtained the ‘endorsement’ of the HRC. While not having been 
negotiated by States,22 the UNGPs have obtained the anonymous ‘endorsement’ by the HRC, 
which testifies to State support for the UNGPs. However, the exact legal implications of such an 
act of ‘endorsement’ (as opposed to the ‘acceptance’) of the UNGPs are far from clear. 
Second, the UNGPs can be characterized as soft-law even more clearly by their content. The 
UNGPs recognize, clarify and elaborate existing and newly emerging standards and practices of 
States and business enterprises regarding the prevention and remediation of business’ harm to 
                                                
 19 C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law 38 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 850, at 851(1989). 
 20 Justin Nolan, The corporate responsibility to respect human rights: soft law or not law?, in Human Rights 
Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect?  (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 
2013). 
 21 The SRSG notes that ‘soft law is “soft” in the sense that it does not by itself create legally binding obligations 
[but] derives its normative force through recognition of social expectations by States and other key actors’.  
Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and 
Accountability for Corporate Acts, §45 A/HRC/4/35 (Febr. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Ruggie, 2007 Report] (by 
John Ruggie). See further, Nolan, Id, at 140. 
 22 According to the SRSG, ‘The GPs are the first authoritative guidance that the Council and its predecessor body, 
the Commission on Human Rights, have issued for States and business enterprises on their respective 
obligations in relation to business and human rights; and it marked the first time that either body “endorsed” a 
normative text on any subject that Governments did not negotiate themselves.’ 
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human rights. The UNGPs thus constitute soft law by reason of their ability to bind addressees to 
these international principles. In the words of the SRSG, ‘[t]hey are a soft-law instrument that 
prescribes minimum standards of conduct for all states and all business enterprises in relation to 
all human rights’.23 
 The Choice of Soft Law v. Hard Law: Why the SRSG decided not to Recommend the 4.3
Negotiation of an Overarching International Treaty 
The previous section established that the UNGPs can be characterized as soft-law. This section 
reflects on the SRSG’s choice for soft law over hard law. It seems that the SRSG opted for the 
adoption of the UNGPs as soft law because this constituted an effective method of progress 
towards the ultimate goal of achieving full respect for human rights by all enterprises. As set out 
in detail in the previous chapter, the realization of this goal depends on the actions of key 
stakeholders to enhance standards and practices on business and human rights in order to meet 
their obligations under the UNGPs. The UNGPs are the starting point for an ongoing process of 
enhancing standards and practices that contributes to a regulatory dynamic and global system 
that binds business enterprises to respect for human rights. The underlying assumption appears to 
be that such a system would generate similar effects as hard law does in terms of achieving 
business compliance with human rights. 
This section reflects on the SRSG’s rationale to propose the PRR Framework and the UNGPs as 
an alternative to starting negotiations of an overarching international treaty placing binding 
obligations on business enterprises under international law. The SRSG elaborated on some of 
these arguments in an essay published in Ethical Corporation, entitled ‘treaty road not 
travelled’.24 Therein the SRSG expressed the following three reservations against the treaty 
route: 
First, treaty-making can be painfully slow, while the challenges of business and 
human rights are immediate and urgent. Second, and worse, a treaty-making 
process now risks undermining effective shorter-term measures to raise business 
standards on human rights. And third, even if treaty obligations were imposed on 
companies, serious questions remain about how they would be enforced. 
The SRSG elaborated on some of these arguments in more recent debates on the negotiation of 
an UN business and human rights treaty, which will also be given consideration.25 
This section builds on the literature on the legal relevance of soft-law.26 The next sections thus 
consider the SRSG’s choice of soft-law in the light of this literature and concludes that this 
choice has been partially informed by expectations of compliance. The normative potential of the 
                                                
 23 John Ruggie, Regulating Multinationals: The UN Guiding Principles, Civil Society, and International 
Legalization, at 6 (Regulatory Policy Program, Working Paper RPP-2015-04, 2015). 
 24 John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: Treaty road not travelled, Ethical Corporation (2008). 
 25 Ruggie, supra note 23, at 6. For further details on the treaty initiative, see, for more detail, section 4.8.8. 
 26 Dinah Shelton, Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal 
System, at 2 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). 
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UNGPs to generate compliance by business enterprises with the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights will be examined in this section. 
The reflections that follow shed light on the SRSG’s rationale for creating the UNGPs as a soft-
law instrument, as well as the SRSG’s soft-law approach to corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights, which draws upon social expectations and moral obligations as a basis for the 
application of responsibilities to business enterprises. As noted by Nolan, ‘soft law has played a 
prominent role in the development of the SRSG’s concept of why and how a corporation might 
be responsible for human rights’.27 
One of the main rationales for the SRSG not to recommend treaty negotiations was a need for 
‘immediate solutions to the escalating challenge of corporate human rights abuses’.28 The 
process of negotiating a treaty would be lengthy and complicated, in part because of the 
complexity of the subject of business and human rights.  According to the SRSG, this complexity 
would be reflected in the many facets that would need to be considered when negotiating a 
comprehensive treaty, especially the broad range of issues that such a treaty would need to 
encompass.29 The SRSG elaborated on this point, in an issues-brief, as follows: 
It includes complex clusters of different bodies of national and international law—for 
starters, Human Rights law, Labour law, Anti-Discrimination law, Humanitarian law, 
Investment law, Trade law, Consumer Protection law, as well as Corporate law and 
Securities regulation.  The point is not that these are unrelated, but that they embody such 
extensive problem diversity, institutional variations, and conflicting interests across and 
within States that any attempt to aggregate them into a general business and human rights 
treaty would have to be pitched at such a high level of abstraction that it is hard to 
imagine it providing a basis for meaningful legal action. 
The subject of business and human rights is thus complex because of the complexity of the 
variety of bodies of law, the extensive problem diversity, the institutional variations and the 
conflicting interests of the various actors that the subject engages within and across States.  This 
complexity posed significant obstacles to negotiating a treaty, the SRSG argued:  ‘The crux of 
the challenges is that business and human rights is not so discrete an issue-area as to lend itself to 
a single set of detailed treaty obligations’.30 
In addition, the SRSG was of the view that negotiating an all-encompassing treaty would be 
inappropriate when the duration of such negotiations would be too long. This was the case for a 
comprehensive international human rights treaty. ‘[T]he broader the scope and the more 
controversial the subject, the longer the duration’, he noted.31 This consideration became 
particularly applicable to a treaty on the subject of business and human rights.32 33 
                                                
 27 Nolan, supra note 20, at 139. 
 28 Ruggie, supra note 25, at 42. 
 29 John Ruggie, Just Business Multinational Corporations and Human Rights, 57 (W.W. Norton & Company. 
2013).  
 30 Ruggie, supra note 23, at 10. 
 31 The SRSG referred to the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as an example, a soft-law instrument 
which took 26 years to negotiate, and was adopted only in 2007.  This was despite the relatively circumscribed 
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The SRSG went one step further and argued that a treaty-making process could risk 
‘undermining effective shorter-term measures’. In the light of the previously noted complexity, 
deriving from the subject of business and human rights and political dynamics, the SRSG was 
sceptic about pursuing at the same time both an all-encompassing treaty and practical measures 
for more urgent relief. A dual approach would be counterproductive, he argued, because States 
could derive justification from a treaty-making process not to act to raise standards on business 
and human rights in the meantime. The SRSG thus noted that ‘[States] may invoke the fact of 
treaty negotiation as a pretext for not taking other significant steps, including changing national 
laws – arguing that they would not want to ‘pre-empt’ the ultimate outcome’.34 Moreover, a 
treaty making process is resource intensive and can detract valuable attention and resources from 
stakeholders, resources which could be spent elsewhere, for instance on interim-innovations, the 
SRSG argued. By opting for soft-measures, the resources that would have been spent on lengthy 
negotiations could thus be redirected towards initiatives which could potentially deliver more 
immediate relief to victims of human rights abuses. 
Where treaties can take decades to negotiate, and soft-law can deliver quicker results, the choice 
for soft-law thus seems like a better alternative.35 Soft-law may have the advantage of a less 
complex negotiation process than a legally binding international standard, simply because soft-
law is ‘not constrained by a legal straight jacket’.36 Due to its non-legally binding nature, a soft 
instrument can recognize and apply norms facing less resistance because these norms do not 
generate immediate legal effects, in and of themselves. Consequently, by turning to soft-law, the 
time frame for setting standards and implementation procedures can be reduced. Soft norms can 
obtain the support by States and business enterprises with greater ease, due to their non-legally 
binding nature. Soft-law can be used to respond to the need for more immediate measures to 
address corporate-related human rights breaches and achieve practical results, thereby reducing 
the number of incidents of harm caused and hence deliver short-term benefits to victims.37 
                                                                                                                                                       
nature of the subject. Ruggie, supra note 29, xxii, 57. See further, John H. Knox, The Ruggie Rules: Applying 
Human Rights Law to Corporations, in The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Foundations and Implementation, at 64 (R. Mares ed. 2012). 
 32 This argument was elaborated upon by the SRSG in an issues-brief posted in January 2014 in contribution to 
discussions on the negotiation of a UN business and human rights treaty.  Ecuador and South Africa supported 
an initiative to start a new process of formulating a treaty to clarify the human rights obligations of business 
enterprises and to establish an effective mechanism for remedies.  This resulted in Human Rights Council Res 
26/9, Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights, 26th Sess., June 10 - 27, 2014, A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014). J. 
Ruggie, A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty? An Issues Brief by John G. Ruggie (2014), 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/UNBusinessandHumanRightsTreaty.pdf. 
 33 Id. at 3. 
 34 Ruggie, supra note 24, at 43.  
 35 John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 23 (John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 31, 2007).  
 36 Nicola Jägers, Will transnational private regulation close the governance gap?, in Human Rights Obligations of 
Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect?, 298 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013). 
 37 Ruggie, supra note 32. 
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The choice of soft over hard law can be explained by the political dynamics in the former 
Commission on Human Rights and the lack of agreement on an effective response. By the time 
the SRSG’s mandate was launched, there was no consensus among States on the existence of 
direct legal obligations for companies, or, for that matter, on the necessity or desirability of such 
obligations. According to the SRSG, there was no shared knowledge-base to build on, nor 
agreement on desirable international responses.38 Consensus did not go far beyond a ‘we need to 
consider doing something about the problem’ approach.39 An agreement on the existence or 
creation of human rights duties having hard-law effects did not seem forthcoming.  
The reminiscence of previous failed attempts to create a UN document on business and human 
rights played a part as well, especially the previous UN Norms, which did not obtain the backing 
of States.40 The political dynamics within the Commission on Human Rights (which was 
replaced by the HRC in 2006), which operated on a consensus basis, seemed hardly conducive to 
States negotiating, let alone signing and ratifying a treaty creating direct human rights 
obligations for companies.41 42 The political dynamics signalled constraints on the aspirations for 
an international legally binding treaty and the importance of proceeding with caution in a 
difficult political climate.43  The SRSG also noted that ‘greater shared understanding and 
consensus needed to be built from the bottom up’.44 
It seems that the use of soft-law, precisely because of its non-binding nature, allowed the SRSG 
to reach a consensus among States within the HRC on corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights where no such consensus would have been recognized in relation to hard-law. More 
progressive rules on corporate responsibility to respect human rights were thus adopted than 
those which were more likely to be possible had hard law been chosen.45 46 Moreover, the SRSG 
                                                
 38 This was reflected in the terms of his mandate that called upon the SRSG to ‘identify’ and ‘clarify’ and to 
provide recommendations. 
 39 Ruggie, supra note 29, at 58.  
 40 See, section 2.4.1. 
 41 The SRSG also discarded then the option of recommending a treaty of lesser complexity by stating that there 
was no foundation for any treaty negotiations at that time. Ruggie, supra note 29, at 56, 57. 
 42 The SRSG indicated that: ‘[t]reaties form the bedrock of the international human rights system.  Specific 
elements of the business and human rights agenda may become candidates for successful international legal 
instruments.  But it is my carefully considered view that negotiations on an overarching treaty now would be 
unlikely to get off the ground and, even if they did, the outcome could well leave us worse off than we are 
today.’ Ruggie, supra note 24, at 48. 
 43 According to Knox, ‘[i]f Ruggie had introduced another draft of a legally binding agreement, or even a non-
binding declaration, it seemed likely to meet the same fate [as the UN Norms].  Knox, supra note 31, at 64. 
 44 Ruggie, supra note 29, at 58. 
 45 Dinah Shelton, Introduction: Law, Non-Law and the Problem of ‘Soft Law’, in Commitment and Compliance: 
The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System,13 (Dinah Shelton ed. 2003). 
 46 The SRSG indicated that:  
 ‘[a]ll Council members in 2011 were able to endorse the corporate responsibility to respect all human rights 
because, within the GPs’ framework, that responsibility is based in a global social norm, not a legal 
obligation.  In contrast, if the corporate responsibility to respect human rights were turned into an 
international treaty obligation, its applicability and the range of human rights to which it would apply would 
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cautioned that treaty making could restrict innovation and experimentation47 and risked resulting 
in legal standards reflecting the lowest-common denominator. Treaty making could be 
counterproductive to raising human rights standards if it were to cement a lower standard in 
international law than the standards set by existing voluntary initiatives. The discretion of 
companies to adhere to the lower standard prescribed by international law risked undermining 
the social leverage of stakeholders pressuring companies to do better, the SRSG argued. 
The SRSG also raised the argument that a treaty may not alleviate the problem of inadequate 
enforcement.   
First, were States prepared to give their political consent to a treaty in the first place, such treaty 
would trigger few consequences for business enterprises if the treaty were to be left un-
implemented and un-enforced. A treaty would have too limited an effect in constraining 
corporations by law or in impressing upon companies the possibility or prospect of legal liability.  
In the view of the SRSG, much of the treaty’s legitimacy and effectiveness would thus be lost.   
Second, the SRSG dismissed the enforcement of treaty-obligations by host States as ‘redundant 
or irrelevant’.48 According to the SRSG, it also seemed unlikely that States previously reluctant 
to take on new human rights obligations would ratify a new treaty on business and human rights 
in the future.  It would also not be self-evident that those States previously unwilling or unable to 
discharge their obligations under human rights treaties would enforce a future treaty, he argued, 
although a State may feel more inclined to do so where a treaty resolves collective action 
problems.49 
Third, the SRSG further discarded the option of extraterritorial enforcement of an international 
treaty by States other than the host State.  While international law permits States to take action to 
regulate the human rights breaches of their corporations abroad, he argued, few have been 
willing to do so.  Both States and business enterprises are concerned that extraterritorial 
jurisdiction may compromise the competitive position of companies.  Developing States, on the 
other hand, feared extraterritorial jurisdiction impinging on their national sovereignty. In the 
absence of State support for new treaty obligations on extraterritorial enforcement, starting such 
an initiative ‘could backfire and reduce the scope of existing possibilities’, reasoned the SRSG. 
Fourth, the SRSG discarded the possibility of establishing an international court for companies 
any time soon as ‘unrealistic’.50 An alternative option was to establish a new treaty body to 
monitor corporate compliance. However, the SRSG was of the view that this would pose 
insurmountable difficulties in practice. Designing selection criteria and handling cases for 
                                                                                                                                                       
be determined by individual instances of state treaty ratification – not only involving the proposed new treaty, 
but also the variable human rights standards that individual states recognize as international legal 
obligations’.   
  Ruggie, supra note 23, at 9. 
 47 Ruggie, supra note 29, at 59. 
 48 Id. at 63. 
 49 Id. at 62.  
 50 Id. at 43.   
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millions of companies, in relation to all human rights of all persons adversely affected by 
business enterprises and their activities would be a daunting task, the SRSG argued. In the words 
of the SRSG: 
There are 77,000 transnational corporations, with about 800,000 subsidiaries and millions 
of suppliers – Wal-Mart alone has 62,000. Then there are millions of other national 
companies. The existing treaty bodies have difficulty keeping up with 192 member 
States, and each deals with only a specific set of rights or affected group. How would one 
such committee handle millions of millions of companies, while addressing all rights of 
all persons? 
These arguments are consistent with the idea that compliance might often make soft-law 
preferable to hard law. According to Shelton, the choice may fall on soft-law in case a reasonable 
possibility exists that States will be unable or unwilling to comply with hard law obligations and, 
therefore, unwilling to agree to an instrument creating such obligations.51 Concerns about the 
possibility of non-compliance can be triggered by a number of factors, including ‘domestic 
political opposition, lack of ability or capacity to comply, uncertainty about whether compliance 
can be measured, or disagreement with aspects of the proposed norms’.52 The SRSG refers to all 
these factors in support of his argument that a treaty would not constitute the most effective path 
to address the problem of inadequate enforcement in the business and human rights context. 
Another argument supporting the choice of soft over hard-law relates to the opportunities that 
soft-law creates for non-State actors to participate in the law-making processes.53 As set out in 
more detail above, the multi-stakeholder consultative approach was of essential importance to 
the development of the UNGPs. The participation of stakeholders in this process can be viewed 
as intrinsically important, but also had an instrumental value to ensure both the normative quality 
of the UNGPs and support for their effective implementation. As highlighted by Nolan, the 
SRSG may have opted for the development of corporate responsibility to respect through a soft 
law approach because ‘the informal nature of soft law allows for a broader group of participants 
(including non-State actors) in both its development and enforcement’. 54  55  The ‘thick 
stakeholder consensus’ that the SRSG strived for in the process of developing the UNGPs 
supports the claim that resorting to such a soft-law approach is not necessarily undesirable from 
                                                
 51 Shelton, supra note 45, at 12. 
 52 Id. at 12. 
 53 Shelton, supra note 45, at 13. 
 54 Nolan, supra note 20, at 142. 
 55 The SRSG notes that this multi-stakeholder approach endowed the UNGPs with ‘what Joost Pauselyn, Ramses 
A Wessel, and Jan Wouters term “thick stakeholder consensus” – which , they suggest, can be normatively 
superior in securing compliance to the “thin state consent” validation requirement associated with traditional 
International law. Indeed, in this particular instance, thick stakeholder consensus helped pave the way for 
unanimous Human Rights Council endorsement’. John Ruggie, Global Governance and “New Governance 
Theory”: Lessons from Business and Human Rights 20 Global Governance, 10 (2014). 
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the perspective of accountability or legitimacy, and may furthermore enhance the flexibility and 
quality of the resulting standards.56 
The SRSG’s decision not to recommend recourse to a classic international treaty reflected the 
expectation that adopting such a treaty would be difficult.57 The SRSG examined in detail the 
likelihood that States would reach an agreement on an overarching treaty that would be 
enforceable and effective in providing an immediate response to pressing business and human 
rights challenges.  The SRSG pointed to a variety of factors, which, at the time, supported the 
choice of soft-law over an overarching treaty on business and human rights.  Most important 
among these factors were the complexity of the area of business and human rights and need for 
an immediate response, and the likely possibility of non-acceptance and/or non-enforcement of 
an international treaty and securing the acceptance of (and commitment to), by non-State actors,  
the implementation of the UNGPs.  The political dynamics at the international level, including 
within the HRC, did not seem conducive to a successful negotiation of such an international 
treaty.  It should be noted that these factors are primarily of a political and practical, rather than 
of a legal nature.   
The SRSG’s choice of the SRSG also relates to the normative and strategic objectives that the 
SRSG set for his mandate and constituted an exercise of retrospective principled pragmatism.  
The creation of an authoritative framework was cast as an alternative to the treaty route and the 
best hope to starting a process of enhancing standards and practices and the constitution of a 
system that will affect business behaviour in practice. The fact that the UNGPs were conceived 
as soft law enabled an approach of principled pragmatism. The extensive multi-stakeholder 
processes involving State and non-State actors that characterised the adoption of the UNGPs, for 
example, might have not been possible in the framework of treaty negotiations. The choice of 
soft-law may also reflect the expectation that soft-law would be a more suitable method for the 
operation of the governance system that the UNGPs intended to advance. It may be precisely 
because of the UNGP’s nature as soft law and, thus, without direct legal effect, that the UNGPs 
may be applied and interpreted as a (self-referential) framework across governance systems 
without directly affecting or being affected by existing law and authority structures.58 
                                                
 56 ‘[T]he expertise of a large pool of regulators and other actors can lead to more dynamic regulation, sensitive to 
global and regional changes and evolution’. Joost Pauwelyn, et al., When structures become shackles: 
stagnation and dynamics in International law making, 25 The European Journal of International Law (2014). 
 57 These arguments correspond with findings in the literature on the legal relevance of soft-law, which point to 
soft-law as a method to foster acceptance and compliance by States with international norms.  As articulated by 
Shelton, the underlying assumption is that States adopt, accept and comply with international norms when it is 
in their interest to do so. The assumption is that soft-law can accomplish compliance in a different way from 
hard-law. More precisely, soft law can achieve compliance by way of managing incentives, rather than by 
coercion.  Shelton notes that ‘soft law may be used precisely because compliance is expected to be difficult:  it 
begins a dynamic process over time that may lead to hard law or the norm may remain soft at the international 
level but become hard law internally’. Shelton, supra note 26, at 17. 
 58 See a similar argument by Backer in the context of the NCPs, noting that, precisely because the proceedings of 
NCPs are not binding, the flexibility of these NCPs allows the application of  procedures that are detached from 
municipal law. Backer suggests that the OECD Guidelines on MNEs ‘serve as something like an autonomous 
transnational system, subject principally to its own substantive rules that incidentally draw on an aggregated and 
generalized municipal and International law as a basis for the application of its norms’. Larry Catá Backer, 
Rights and Accountability in Development (‘Raid’) v DAS AIR and Global Witness v Afrimex: Small Steps 
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In conclusion, the resort to soft law by the SRSG appears to have been informed by 
considerations of compliance.  The assumption underpinning the UNGPs is thus that soft-law can 
be a method that is as useful as hard law in generate legal effects in terms of fostering 
compliance by business enterprises and the effective application of human rights. The section 
will reflect on the normative potential of the UNGPs to generate compliance and affect the 
evolution of corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which may acquire normative force 
or binding effect through the exposure to and restatement in, of the UNGPs, soft and hard law 
provisions. The underlying assumption is, in short, that the dynamic interaction between soft and 
hard law obligations in the emerging governance system and their cumulative binding effects 
will foster business efforts to respecting human rights. 
 A Soft-Law Approach to Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights and 4.4
Expectations of Compliance 
This section reflects on (i) the UNGP’s soft-law approach to formulating the duty of corporate 
respect for human rights and (ii) the expectation that the UNGPs will affect compliance (i.e., 
actual adherence) by business enterprises to the rules the UNGPs contain. The UNGPs recognize 
that business enterprises have a responsibility to respect human rights. This responsibility is a 
social / moral norm founded in global social expectations rather than a legal obligation founded 
in international human rights obligations. Consequently, corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights, as soft law, does not generate, in and of itself, legally binding effects. Such 
responsibility nonetheless includes within its normative scope the capability to affect the 
behaviour of business enterprises by virtue of its potential acceptance and recognition by State 
and non-State actors alike.59 
The section draws from the literature on the social relevance of soft law more generally, in order 
to explore the factors that explain compliance by business enterprises with corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights in practice. The potential normative force or binding effect 
of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights and potential effect on business 
compliance, can be explained by the following three factors: (i) context (see Section 4.4.1 
below); (ii) content (see Section 4.4.2 below), and (iii) institutional setting (see Section 4.4.3 
below).60 
The assumption is that the UNGPs intend to promote a system that affects and coordinates the 
regulation of corporate responsibility to respect human rights through the factors that explain 
compliance by business enterprises with this norm in practice. While the aim is to consider these 
factors that explain business compliance in certain detail, the following sections will also 
elaborate on how the UNGPs echo these factors. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Towards an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 10 
Melbourne Journal of International Law (2009). 
 59 Nolan, supra note 20, at 144.   
 60 These factors are not entirely dissimilar from those explaining potential compliance by States with international 
norms, and relate to ‘the form or process of adoption, the content of the instrument, the institutional setting, and 
the follow-up procedures envisaged’. Shelton, supra note 26, at 17. 
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4.4.1 Context 
The legal relevance of corporate responsibility to respect human rights as soft law may first be 
appraised by reference to its context. This context relates to the mandate of the SRSG and the 
HRC, within which the UNGPs were developed and adopted.61 The normative force of such 
responsibility can be assessed in relation to the authoritativeness of the UNGPs within which the 
responsibility has been recognized. This authoritativeness, which may be related to the norm’s 
perceived legitimacy,62 can result from the SRSG’s official UN mandate, his independent nature, 
and his stature as a renowned expert in the field of business and human rights.63 Also, the 
consensus that exists around the UNGPs and their formal endorsement by the HRC can affect the 
normative potential of the UNGPs. Finally, the multi-stakeholder approach to developing the 
UNGPs as relevant factors that potentially foster compliance by business enterprises is also to be 
considered. 
The normative force of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights can also be 
appreciated in terms of the broader context, that is the newly emerging global business and 
human rights regime, and the combination and dynamic interplay between hard and soft norms 
within this regime.64 65 Attention may be paid to soft and hard law instruments that create 
corresponding norms of different types of obligations, which complement and interact with one 
another in a joint effort to advance towards the overall goal of a reduction of business harm to 
human rights. 
Shelton has noted how ‘soft law rarely stands in isolation; instead; it is used most frequently 
either as a precursor to hard law or as a supplement to hard-law instruments’.66 The SRSG’s 
recourse to soft law approach to corporate responsibility to respect human rights, as was 
indicated in certain detail above, can be viewed as a method to address gaps and generating 
normative effects where the adoption of hard law was difficult. States were unlikely to reach a 
consensus on the existence or need to create hard law international legal obligations for 
companies. The soft-law approach was thus preferred as a timely alternative that was more likely 
to receive agreement from States. 
                                                
 61 Nolan, supra note 20, at 158.  
 62 Legitimacy is here understood in descriptive terms, that is, the belief of having the right to rule. Daniel 
Bodansky, The legitimacy and international governance: a coming challenge for international environmental 
law?, 93 The American Journal of International Law (1999). Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The 
Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 Ethics & International Affairs (2006). 
 63 Stéphanie Bijlmakers, Business and human rights governance and democratic legitimacy: the UN “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework, 26 Innovation: the European Journal of Social Sciences 288, (2013). 
 64 The SRSG has noted that States may turn to soft law for several reasons:  (i) to chart possible future directions 
for, and fill gaps in, the international legal order when they are not yet able or willing to take firmer measures; 
where they (ii) conclude that legally binding mechanisms are not the best tool to address a particular issue; or 
(iii) in certain instances, to avoid having more binding measures gain political momentum. 
 65 Shelton notes how ‘soft law instruments often serve as an authoritative way to allow treaty parties to resolve 
ambiguities in a binding text or fill in gaps.  This function is part of an increasingly complex international 
system with variations in forms of instruments, means, and standards of measurement that interact intensely and 
frequently, with the common purpose of regulating behavior within a rule-of-law framework’. Shelton, supra 
note 18, at 320. 
 66 Id. at 320. 
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The SRSG casts the corporate responsibility to respect as soft law having its sources in social 
expectations rather than international law and being founded on social/moral, rather than legal 
obligation. As a consequence of the SRSG’s avoidance of hard law, Nolan argues, the 
responsibility was decoupled from binding law, in terms of both its source of obligation and 
enforcements mechanisms, which had the effect of ‘reducing its normative value and making it 
softer and more inchoate than might be required’. 67  As a consequence, the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights primarily derives normative force from the expectation 
that companies may be exposed to the ‘court of public opinion’ and ‘occasionally to charges in 
actual courts’.68 
The binding force and normative effects of a rule of soft law are not static, however, but can 
change and fluctuate over time. The rule can thus acquire or lose in normative force. Corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights may take on binding force for example, when exposed to 
enforcement processes, restated into soft law rules of other type and, ultimately, when transposed 
into ‘hard’ law.69 As will be set out in detail below, it is reasonable to assume that the 
governance system that the UNGPs are set out to promote, while not of a legally binding nature, 
may affect the evolution of corporate responsibility to respect human rights into more binding 
rules under various hard and soft law sources at a variety of levels. To be noted is that the 
prospect that corporate responsibility to respect human rights might or will harden into a binding 
obligation at the national and/or international level in time, in and of itself, may be relevant also 
for explaining compliance by business enterprises.70 
4.4.2 Content of the Norm 
The content of corporate responsibility to respect human rights can also affect compliance by 
business enterprises.  The level of detail with which corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights is formulated thus becomes of significance.  The normative force and binding effects of a 
rule of soft law become greater where the rule is articulated in more precise language.  There is a 
degree of open-endedness in corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which leaves 
discretion to companies on how to exercise it.  This flexibility may be viewed negatively as 
reducing the responsibility’s normative potential by allowing ‘for too much wiggle room [and 
including] too many “should” in place of “shalls”’71 According to Nolan, ‘looseness of the 
language is perhaps more likely to invite inaction and a business-as-usual approach from 
companies that remain hesitant about their responsibility to act’.72 
                                                
 67 Nolan, supra note 20, at 159. 
 68 Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶ 54, U.N. doc. 
A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2008) [hereinafter Ruggie, 2008 Report] (by John Ruggie). See section 4.4.3.6. 
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basis for an international treaty; and they can be included as binding clauses in private party contracts’.  Foley 
Hoag LLP & UNEP FI, Banks and Human Rights: A Legal Analysis (December 2015), 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/BanksandHumanRights.pdf. 
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 71 Nolan, supra note 20, at 159. 
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Others view the flexibility of the said responsibility as having a positive impact and increasing 
its normative potential by allowing room for responses tailored to the concrete circumstances of 
the company. Compliance with substantive requirements may require measures of a different 
complexity and scale. A degree of flexibility is built into the human rights due diligence concept, 
which allows companies to meet their responsibility by adopting measures that are appropriate to 
their circumstances. From this point of view, it could be argued that flexibility fosters greater 
compliance because the required standard is commensurate to the context and capabilities of the 
company.   
The content of corporate responsibility to respect may have a variety of implications for 
companies, depending on a number of different factors. These factors relate to the factual 
circumstances of the company, and include awareness (e.g., the company’s understanding of the 
UNGPs), the company’s capabilities (e.g., the resources the company has at its disposal), and 
country specific conditions creating an environment conducive to respect for human rights.  
Factors that relate to the characteristics of the company include its size (e.g., small or large) and 
ownership/nature (e.g., public or private). These factors relate to the opportunity and incentives 
of business enterprises to respect human rights and can be important when it comes to explaining 
compliance by business enterprises, both on their own and in combination with other factors. The 
importance of individual factors for explaining compliance may differ depending on the factual 
circumstances or type of business enterprises.73 Furthermore, the combination of these factors 
and their interaction is important for explaining actual business compliance.74 A brief analysis of 
factors explaining compliance follows. 
Deficient compliance by individual companies may reflect a lack of awareness of the company 
about the UNGPs and/or the corporate responsibility to respect, or a lack of understanding by the 
company of this responsibility, the manner in which this responsibility applies to the company 
and the consequences that the effective implementation of this responsibility has for the 
company. The assumption is that, the more the company has engaged with the work of the SRSG 
and is familiar with the UNGPs, the greater the degree of compliance will be. Greater 
compliance is expected, for example, from companies that have an understanding about how to 
acquire knowledge about their potential and actual impacts,75 the extent of human rights due 
diligence that is required from in relation to these impacts 76  and how to engage with 
stakeholders. 
Consideration should also be paid to the commercial rationales that create incentives for 
companies to comply, also referred to as the business case.  Such rationales may range from ‘it is 
                                                
 73 For example, the business case is contested and the different commercial rationales that drive business 
responses may not apply at all times.  The business case may not be sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure respect 
for human rights, IHBR, State of Play Human Rights in the Political Economy of States: Avenues for 
Application, 20-21 (2014). 
 74 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, Addendum: Uptake of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: findings from a 2013 
questionnaire for corporations, 14, figure 7, Human Rights Council, U.N. doc. A/HRC/26/25/Add.1 (Apr. 28, 
2014) [hereinafter UN Working Group, Corporate Survey 2013] . 
 75 IHBR, supra note 73, at 5. 
 76 Id. at. 5 
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the right thing to do’ to ‘human rights are part of effective risks management’, and ‘commitment 
to human rights our code of conduct’, ‘our employees expect it of us’, ‘it gives us a competitive 
advantage’ and ‘engagement with civil society organizations’.77 78 The corporate responsibility to 
respect varies in the impact that it is likely to have on the business case of a company. It is 
reasonable to assume that the norm will acquire enhanced normative force if consistent with the 
commercial incentives of the company. 
Compliance furthermore depends on the capacity of a company, meaning the capabilities that a 
company has to engage in the desired behaviour and the opportunity to use these capabilities for 
implementing its responsibility. The perceived costs of compliance are therefore a relevant 
factor. The corporate responsibility to respect human rights varies in the costs that it is expected 
to impose on companies.  Where capacity is an issue, the opportunities for companies to comply 
may expand as the company obtains access to resources and credible information79  and 
frameworks or methodologies in order to understand the company’s human rights impacts,80 and 
to good practice case studies and public guidance on how to implement the UNGPs.81 82 
The form of a company, i.e., the organizational and ownership-related characteristics of the 
company (e.g., whether it is structured as a corporation, partnership, joint venture, etc.) is 
relevant to expectations of compliance.  The corporate responsibility to respect human rights 
varies in its implications for companies of different legal natures.  The opportunities to comply 
may be affected by the business model (e.g., cooperative and partnerships), or whether a business 
enterprise is a publicly listed company or a private company.83  For private enterprises that do 
not face similar constraints, other factors may be more determinant of compliance, e.g., business 
opportunities or legal constraints.84 
The size of the company is also a relevant factor.  Research suggests that the awareness,85 the 
priorities,86 capabilities87 and opportunities to use its capabilities88 as well as the commercial 
incentives89 to implement the UNGPs may differ between companies depending on their sizes. 
                                                
 77 UN Working Group, Corporate Survey 2013, supra note 74, at 14, figure 5. 
 78 Also see Shift and Mazars, The UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework, 16 (2015). 
 79 Id. at 3-4, 5 
 80 Id. at 3-4 
 81 Id. at 3-4. 
 82 For instance, business enterprises have identified a lack of guidance on how to build leverage in operating 
context where human rights are not part of local law or applied in practice as a key obstacle in meeting their 
responsibility to respect human rights. 
 83 Id. at 20 
 84 Id. at 20 
 85 IHBR, supra note 73, at 20. 
 86 For instance, research points to a greater tendency among larger entities than among SMEs to focus on mapping 
high-risk operations as a priority .  Also, smaller entities tend to focus more on improving complaints/grievance 
mechanisms as a priority than large entities. UN Working Group, Corporate Survey 2013, supra note 74, at 12. 
 87 European Commission, An Analysis of Policy References made by large EU Companies to Internationally 
Recognised CSR Guidelines and Principles, 9 (2013). 
  124  
There are also country specific factors, i.e., the conditions in the company’s country of origin90 
and the country in which the company operates, should be considered.  The corporate 
responsibility to respect varies in its implications for companies that operate in different country 
contexts.  Compliance may be explained by the extent to which conditions in these countries 
favour such compliance.  For instance, compliance may be greater for companies that operate in 
contexts where local laws are enforced and multi-stakeholder initiatives are in place91 or whose 
country of origin enforces mandatory reporting requirements on companies in high-risk countries 
and imposes legal requirements to conduct human rights due diligence.92 
Sector specific factors are also relevant.  The challenges that corporate responsibility to respect 
pose may vary between companies that belong to different sectors.93 
4.4.3 The Institutional Setting 
The normative force of corporate responsibility to respect human rights may be appraised not 
only by reference to the substantive content of this norm, but also by the institutions that, through 
their standards and practices, bind business enterprises to implementing this responsibility.  The 
SRSG distinguishes five types of such standards and practices:  (i) the ‘State duty to Protect’; (ii) 
‘Corporate responsibility and accountability for international crimes’; (iii) ‘Corporate 
responsibility for other human rights violations under international law’; (iv) ‘Soft law 
mechanisms’; and (v) ‘self-regulation’. 94  The assumption holds that States and business 
enterprises will enhance their standards and practices in order to actively implement their rights 
and duties under the UNGPs.  Corporate responsibility to respect is expected take ground as a 
                                                                                                                                                       
 88 The corporate responsibility to respect human rights applies equally to SMEs.  SMEs facing severe risks that 
call for an elevated response and more dedicated resources may be constrained in their response by lack of 
resources.  However, resource constraints need not be issue, in and of themselves, because the human rights due 
diligence is a relative concept and responsive to inter alia the resource constraint of SMEs.  ‘Human rights due 
diligence is not an absolute, it is finite and limited by resources, time and context’.  Id. at 20. 
 89 Id. at 14, § 42. 
 90 European Commission, supra note 87, at 6, 10. 
 91 UN Working Group, Corporate Survey 2013, supra note 74, at 15. 
 92 Id. at 16, § 46-47. 
 93 A study suggests that disclosure on stakeholder engagement processes varied between companies active in 
different sectors.  More precisely, according to the study, companies belonging to the extractive sector – ‘where 
engagement centers on communities around their operations’ – tend to show stronger disclosure on stakeholder 
engagement in their human rights impact assessments process.  The study also suggests that companies in the 
apparel and the food, beverage, and agriculture sectors - ‘where many companies have long-established audit 
programs that incorporate interviews with local stakeholders’ – are more likely to disclose information on 
stakeholder engagement within their supply chains.  Shift, Evidence of Corporate Disclosure relevant to the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2014), 
http://shiftproject.org/sites/default/files/Evidence%20of%20Corporate%20Disclosure%20Relevant%20 
to%20the%20UN%20Guiding%20Principles%20on%20Business%20and%20Human%20Rights.pdf  
 94 The SRSG notes, ‘soft law is “soft” in the sense that it does not by itself create legally binding obligations [but] 
derives its normative force through recognition of social expectations by states and other key actors’.  Special 
Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
Ruggie, 2007 Report, supra note 21, §6. 
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result of the restatement and enactment of the UNGPs through soft and hard law instruments that 
affect business conduct. 
It should be noted that compliance by business enterprises can be explained not only by 
reference to laws and policies emanating from the State and law (national and International) 
system, but also to other governance systems that shape business conduct (i.e., the corporate 
governance system and civil governance systems).  Corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights may thus derive normative force, for example, from the standard setting activities of 
international multilateral institutions (e.g., the OECD, ISO 26000, FIFA), the authoritative 
opinions of treaty monitoring bodies that help to clarify expectations regarding business’ 
responsibility, the exposure of corporations to the monitoring activities of NGOs, the integration 
of corporate responsibility into self-regulatory practices of business enterprises, etc.  These 
standard and practices of the institutions can constitute the foundations of CSR and affect and 
may be affected by the effective implementation of the UNGPs. 
4.4.3.1 State Duty to Protect 
International Human Rights law imposes a generalized obligation on States to conduct human 
rights due diligence in order to ensure that the human rights of individuals within their 
jurisdiction are protected against infringements by third actors, including business enterprises.  
This obligation has extraterritorial effects.95 States may, for instance, decide to enact laws, 
regulations and foster judicial practices that legally encourage, permit or require business 
enterprises to respect human rights or to conduct human rights due diligence.96 States that fail to 
do so may risk acting in breach of their international human rights obligations in certain 
circumstances.97 Consequently, it may be appropriate for States to establish regulation through 
legislation that requires companies to respect human rights, including human rights due 
diligence, in order for States to fulfil their international obligations. Indeed, the SRSG has 
indicated that certain elements of corporate responsibility to respect human rights can be an 
object of legal regulation under domestic law, and create legal duties for corporations.98 
By adopting such measures, States can foster compliance by business enterprises through 
leveraging on the factors outlined above.  Examples of such measures that can induce companies 
to comply, which are also echoed in the UNGPs, are interpretations of directors’ duties of loyalty 
and care under Company law permitting or requiring directors to consider human rights when 
managing their business enterprise. 99  Public procurement legislation can create economic 
                                                
 95 See, for details, sections 3.3.2. and 4.6. 
 96 Michael Kerr, et al., Corporate Social Responsibility: A Legal Analysis (LexisNexis. 2009). Doreen McBarnet, 
et al., The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2009).   
 97 Ruggie, 2007 Report, supra note 21, §18. 
 98 Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Business and human rights: further steps toward the operationalization of the “protect, respect and 
remedy” framework, §66, A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Ruggie, 2008 Report] (by John Ruggie).   
 99 J. Lowry, The Duty of Loyalty of Company Directors: Bridging the Accountability Gap Through Efficient 
Disclosure 68 The Cambridge Law Journal (2009).  
  126  
incentives for companies to act responsibly where award criteria include social considerations.100  
Public reporting and disclosure obligations relating to social issues can require business 
enterprises to be transparent and hence enhance their accountability and responsiveness to the 
public.101 
4.4.3.2 Corporate Responsibility and Accountability for International Crimes 
There are certain rules that fall within the category of norms of jus cogens (e.g., the prohibition 
of slavery and forced labor, genocide, torture, and crimes against humanity), which by definition 
apply to all actors, including companies.102 Only the most serious crimes are covered by these 
norms. The International Criminal Court lacks jurisdiction over legal persons.  Partially because 
of the prevailing complementarity principle,103 the enforcement of these norms on companies is 
primarily a matter for domestic courts. States have the option to establish causes of action 
allowing individuals to bring civil or criminal proceedings against companies for violations of 
such international crimes. The US has been an important venue in this regard. Foreign nationals 
can rely on the US Alien Torts Claim Act (‘ATCA’)104 to sue companies for alleged violations of 
customary international law.105 Interpretations of corporate liability for international crimes have 
been drawn from standards on individual liability. Companies may incur liability for ‘aiding and 
abetting’ a crime, or for engaging in a ‘common purpose’ or ‘joint criminal enterprise’.106 
Adherence to the law, including International Human Rights law, is integral to corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights. Compliance with this norm may also be explained in 
relation to the efforts of business enterprises to avoid the involvement in such human rights 
violations. The possibility exists that appropriate due diligence may successfully be invoked as a 
defence against legal liability once violations have occurred, an expectation which can result in 
compliance. Courts may give weight in judicial proceedings to compliance with due diligence.  
Courts may, for instance, refer to due diligence in their consideration of the element of 
knowledge in a test for negligence complicity.107 The corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights can acquire normative force as a result of it being referred to as an authoritative standard 
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of conduct in judicial proceedings and interaction with existing legal standards for corporate 
liability for international crimes. 
4.4.3.3 Corporate Responsibility for other Human Rights Violations under International law 
There appears to be a consensus that international human rights law does not currently impose 
obligations on companies to abide by human rights more generally.108 Companies can bound 
indirectly by way of national laws. There is nothing that prevents States from imposing such 
obligations on companies, however. 
4.4.3.4 Soft Law Mechanisms 
Soft law mechanisms can also affect the normative force of the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights through their reflection and enactment of this norm. As indicated above, the 
SRSG characterizes arrangements as soft law by virtue of their non-binding nature in a strict 
legal sense and their reflection of international norms and social expectations that derive 
normative force from their recognition by state and other key actors. 109  The SRSG has 
recognized three types of such soft law arrangements, i.e., international standard setting bodies 
and the accountability mechanisms linked thereto and a multi-stakeholder forum. 110 
Consideration may also be paid to business involvement in these processes, which, by itself, can 
affect compliance. 
4.4.3.4.1 International Standard-Setting and Accountability Mechanisms 
International organizations can foster compliance by promulgating standards that reflect the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights. The OECD, for instance, has updated the OECD 
Guidelines for MNEs in 2011 by adding, inter alia, a chapter on human rights that sets out the 
recommendation that companies respect human rights and conduct human rights due 
diligence111, developments which, as the Commentary expressly notes, are in line with the 
UNGPs.112 The OECD has also adopted a number of other documents that provide guidance on 
the human rights due diligence principle consistently with the UNGPs.113 The SRSG notes that 
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the OECD Guidelines for MNEs and the ILO-Tripartite Declaration instruments are ‘widely 
referenced by governments and business enterprises and may, in due course, crystallize into 
harder forms’ and have thus become, ‘essential to elaborating and further developing standards 
of corporate responsibility’.114 
The accountability mechanisms that these international organizations have in place may create 
normative force.  While not legally binding, such mechanisms can foster compliance by business 
enterprises because they verify, reveal and attach consequences to non-compliance.  Compliance 
may relate to the effectiveness of these mechanisms in enforcing compliance more generally.  
Such effectiveness may be assessed on the basis of the UNGP’s eight effectiveness criteria for 
grievance mechanisms.115 Compliance may relate to the specificity and clarity that is added to 
the norm through their authoritative interpretations. Compliance may also relate to the 
enforcement actions by societal actors that a finding of non-compliance may give rise to (see 
Section 4.4.3.6). The OECD, for instance, have called adhering States to set up quasi-judicial 
mechanisms in the form of National Contact Points (‘NCPs’) through which compliance with the 
OECD Guidelines for MNEs can be enforced.116 
4.4.3.4.2 Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives 
Multi-stakeholder initiatives can affect compliance by committing companies to respect for 
human rights-related standards.117 These initiatives through their standard-setting function can 
help identify, elaborate and further specify expectations regarding the application of the UNGPs 
in specific operational contexts. Compliance may result from the recognition of a need to assume 
a shared responsibility and cooperate in order to reap specific opportunities or to provide 
solutions to specific regulatory challenges that actors may not be able to solve individually, often 
in specific operational contexts. Compliance may also relate to the level of credibility that is 
associated with governance structures of the soft-law initiatives.  This credibility is build-up of at 
least three factors: participation, transparency, and ongoing status reviews.118 Compliance can be 
explained by the effectiveness of such initiatives, which may be assessed on the basis of their 
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impact on the ground and potential to inspire efforts in related fields.119  Compliance also relates 
to the remediation mechanisms that multi-stakeholder initiatives have in place, at the level of 
individual members and/or the collaborative level, and their effectiveness.120 
States have the option to adopt regulatory measures that enforce soft-law arrangements 
(international standards and their accountability mechanisms or multi-stakeholder initiatives) that 
reflect and enact the corporate responsibility to respect, as part of their regulatory smart-mix.121 
The formal adoption of such soft-law standards or requirements by legislature or administrative 
agencies is one means. 122  Multi-stakeholder initiatives have been referenced in domestic 
legislation,123 in supply contracts,124 and loan agreements for project financing.125 Also the 
standards or requirements of soft law initiatives have been rendered mandatory under domestic 
legislation.126 These soft-law arrangements are not legally binding.  The regulatory dynamic that 
abounds can prompt companies to join soft-law arrangements and, once in, to comply therewith.  
Business enterprises may take their responsibilities more seriously, where State regulation and 
soft law combined may mobilize, influence and amplify social and economic forces and 
pressures that bear on companies to comply. 
4.4.3.5 Self-Regulatory Initiatives 
Business enterprises can foster compliance through self-regulation processes. Such self-
regulatory processes can elicit ‘normative force’ and bind companies by virtue of their standards 
reflecting business respect for human rights.127 Compliance may result from a commitment of the 
company to the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and the embedding by this norm 
within their policies and practices. The human rights due-diligence process serves as a means 
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and an object of governance. The corporate responsibility to respect imposes on companies the 
requirement to carry out human rights due diligence; thus whether business enterprises have a 
human rights due diligence process in place is an important measure of compliance. Compliance 
by business enterprises may depend on this human rights due diligence process. The minimum 
requirements that human rights due diligence imposes on companies may result in more effective 
self-regulatory processes that expand the capabilities of business enterprises to meet their 
responsibility to respect human rights. Compliance may also relate to the credibility of voluntary 
accountability mechanisms, which, similar to multi-stakeholder initiatives, relates to the factors 
of participation, transparency, and ongoing status reviews.128 
4.4.3.6 Courts of Public Opinion 
Compliance may also relate to actions by civil society that benchmark and monitor the conduct 
of companies.  Social actors, through their decision-making and activities, can foster compliance 
by exerting pressure on business enterprises.  Companies may be induced to comply as a result 
of the costs and benefits that these external forces may inflict on them for compliance or non-
compliance.129 130 These costs can range from consumer boycotts to divestment, expulsion, 
negative publicity, pressure on stock markets, and etc.  The repercussions for a company can be 
grave.131 The SRSG refers to such externally driven social pressures as enforcement by ‘the 
courts of public opinion’, and is comprise of ‘employees, communities, consumers, civil society, 
as well as investors’.132 Non-compliance may also lead to formal charges in actual courts.133  
Companies are induced to comply ‘in order to maintain what is sometimes called their social 
license to operate or suffer the consequences’.134 
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4.4.3.7 Idealist Institutionalism 
The presumption is that the UNGPs are set out to promote a system that can affect and 
coordinate the institutional factors that explain compliance by business enterprises with this 
corporate responsibility to respect in practice.  That what explains compliance by business 
enterprises in practice however, relates to the internalisation of business respect for human rights 
within corporate culture and practices.135 
Melish and Meidinger suggest that the SRSG’s thought-process can be traced back to his earlier 
writings on social constructivism and argue that the SRSG found inspiration in the theoretical 
perspective of ‘idealist institutionalism’.136  This perspective premises on the understanding that 
social norms emerge and crystalize, and that change in behavior occur through processes of 
socialization and acculturation.  Change in behavior is effectuated through ideational factors, i.e., 
‘intersubjective beliefs’ that are ‘widely shared across world cultures’, and acculturation 
processes. According to this theoretical perspective, normative, institutional and behavioral 
change cannot be attributed to the material self-interests of actors alone, or coercion and 
persuasion through formal legal regulations. 
The compliance by business enterprises, Melish and Meidinger point out, relates to the 
socialization processes and the internalization of shared norms in corporate cultures and state 
practices. The corporate responsibility to respect takes on binding force when interests and 
identities of these actors are reconstructed and brought into alignment with human rights.  
According to the authors, the UNGPs can be perceived as a global script for human rights 
compliance systems. Once this script is widely accepted by relevant parties and diffuses globally, 
the authors argue, a new set of constitutive rules can emerge that define and pre-structure 
socially acceptable corporate conduct. Such constitutive rules can emerge once the norms 
contained in the UNGPs have passed through stages of ‘persuasion, socialization and ultimately 
internationalization’ and have assumed a ‘[t]aken-for-granted quality’.137 
The presumption is that the UNGP’s as soft law thus potentially affects human rights-compliant 
behavior by promoting acculturation and socialization processes among State and non-state 
actors. Compliance results primarily from the internalization of respect for human rights within 
corporate cultures, rather than the coercion or persuasion through law. 
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4.4.4 Preliminary Considerations 
The UNGPs are thus an attempt at promoting an institutional approach to creating a system that 
affects and coordinates the regulation of the afore mentioned factors that explain business 
compliance with human rights in practice. These factors relate to the ‘the interests, capacities and 
engagement of states, market actors, civil society, and the intrinsic power of ideational and 
normative factors’.138 With regards to context, the UNGPs are set out to promote a regulatory 
dynamic within a global system that can progressively bind business enterprises to respect for 
human rights.  This dynamic can potentially affect the evolution of this responsibility from a soft 
into a ‘harder’ norm. The content of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights provides 
flexibility for companies to meet a minimum human rights due diligence standard by adopting 
measures that are commensurate to their capabilities and appropriate to their circumstances. The 
UNGPs furthermore promote a better organization of the regulatory contributions of different 
institutional actors and their governance systems in a systematic and comprehensive manner.  
The presumption is that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights will take on 
normative force and ‘binding-ness’ when States and business enterprises enhance their standards 
and practices in order to actively implement their duties and responsibilities as defined in the 
UNGPs. The role and responsibilities of States, business enterprises and NGOs correlates with, 
and is commensurate to the public role that these actors have in the human rights land-scape. 
Arguably, the UNGPs advance a system for the further crystallization of the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights into norms of different types of obligation, and their 
potential transition into ‘hard norms’ under national, sub-international (i.e., EU), and 
international law. The corporate responsibility to respect should take on normative effect if the 
duties and responsibilities of States and business enterprises are given full effect to the normative 
objective of ensuring human rights and fundamental freedoms. The realization of this objective 
affects and is affected by the extent to which the corporate responsibility to respect human rights 
is regulated through laws at national and international law. I argue that the transposition of the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights into a hard norm under national or international 
law as appropriate is a necessary consequence of the realization of the normative objective. 
 A Scenario for an Emerging Regulatory Regime on Business and Human Rights 4.5
The previous section reflects on the normative potential of the UNGPs to foster compliance by 
business enterprises with the corporate responsibility to respect human rights.  This section 
focuses on the presumption that the UNGP’s are expected to affect the evolution of the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights from a soft law norm into a more binding, and their 
potential transposion into a hard law norm at the national and international level.  The UNGPs in 
and of themselves may affect compliance by recognizing the existence of the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights as a consensus-based global standard of conduct for 
companies, and by clarifying and elaborating on the content of this norm and its implications.  
The UNGPs furthermore serve as a platform for the creation of a system that features a 
regulatory dynamic through which this social norm may acquire additional ‘binding-ness’ and 
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normative force.139 An expansion of such normative force should results from State and business 
enterprises enhancing their standards and practices and a better coordination of the regulation of 
all factors affecting such business conduct.  Compliance by business enterprises in practice can 
be explained in relation to the ‘socialization’ and ‘acculturation’ processes that abound, 
contributing to the internalization of the respect for human rights within corporate cultures and 
practices. 
I am of the view that the UNGPs thus serves as a platform for the operationalization of a system 
that is meant to serve as a crystallization point for the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights to evolve from a soft-norm into a more binding and possibly, its transposition into a ‘hard’ 
obligation over time. The presumption is that the norm can and should acquire additional 
normative force as existing duties and responsibilities of States and business enterprises, as 
defined in the UNGPs, are given full effect to the normative objective of ensuring human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. The UNGPs may by themselves be non-legally binding, however, 
they provide a platform for a system within which the corporate responsibility to respect should 
evolve and eventually be transposed into hard law at the national, sub-International (e.g., EU) or 
International level.140 
The UNGPs recognize that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights exists as a norm 
in and by itself independent from legal liability and enforcement.141 This does not mean that the 
norm exists independent of the law.  Compliance with all applicable laws wherever companies 
operate, is an integral part of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights.142 The standard 
does not operate in ‘a law-free zone’.143 The corporate responsibility to respect human rights can 
take on hardening effects where States expect compliance and codify the corporate responsibility 
to respect human rights into legally binding norms. States thus can harden the corporate 
responsibility to respect by transposing the norm into regulation at the domestic level.144 Certain 
elements of the corporate responsibility for human rights, as the SRSG has pointed out, can be 
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object of legal regulation under domestic law and create legal duties for corporations.145 146 The 
SRSG is said to have clearly envisioned a process through which the norm of human rights due 
diligence would make such a transition.147 
The UNGPs expressly recommend that States consider regulatory measures as part of a smart 
mix to promote business respect for human rights in practice.148 In doing so, the UNGPs 
recognise that States can and should rely on such regulatory measures to discharge their State 
duty to protect as appropriate.  The UNGPs provide that where States have laws in place that are 
intended or have the effect of requiring business to respect human rights, these laws should be 
enforced effectively, their adequacy assessed periodically, and any gaps should be addressed.149 
This entails that States must establish new laws and/or enforce existing laws that set out such 
requirements, including in the area of corporate law, and subject these laws to a review in order 
to ensure their adequacy to foster business respect for human rights in practice. States 
furthermore should provide effective guidance and, where appropriate, require communication 
from business enterprises on their respect for human rights.150 
The interaction between Pillar 1 and 2 of UNGPs suggests that conditions may require that States 
adopt such regulatory measures as appropriate. The State duty to protect human rights is founded 
on International Human Rights Law. States can, and where appropriate should, regulate the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights, or human rights due diligence elements, under 
domestic law. As will be addressed below, States already have obligations under International 
Human Rights law to protect against human rights violations by regulating business respect for 
human rights, and in requiring human rights due diligence in certain conditions, e.g., contexts of 
heightened risks to human rights. 
The State duty to protect thus requires States to legally enforce the corporate responsibility to 
respect, or relevant aspects of the human rights due diligence process where necessary and 
appropriate in order to ensure business respect for human rights in practice. Such reading also 
corresponds with the object and purpose of the UNGPs that elaborate on the State duty to 
protect, which the UNGPs define as ‘enhancing standards and practices with regard to business 
and human rights so as to achieve tangible results for affected individuals and communities, and 
thereby also contributing to a socially sustainable globalization’.151 
                                                
 145 Id. § 66. 
 146 This corresponds with the view by Eijsbouts that a substantive social norm can find its way in various types of 
regulation; ‘(individual or collective) self-regulation, soft law, civil law, administrative law and, finally, 
criminal law’. Eijsbouts also notes that ‘a substantive social norm can leave the territory of non-codified social 
norms and migrate back and forth among different forms of regulation and even return to the territory of non-
codified social norms’. Jan Eijsbouts, supra note 140, at 32.  
   
 147 R. Mares, supra note 122, at 256. 
 148 UNGPs, supra note 4, GP 3. 
 149 Id. GP 3. 
 150 Id. GP 3. 
 151 Id. General Principles. 
  135  
The concept of the corporate responsibility to respect has some unique qualities that lends itself 
for usage as a regulatory concept in different areas of law. As will be elaborated at a later point, 
there are a number of characteristics relating to their design that explain this. First, the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights is universally applicable and formulated in open-ended 
language.152 Second, the concept has legal pedigree in legal systems across the world.153 Third, 
the conduct of business enterprises is benchmarked against international human rights standards.  
And lastly, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is central to the emerging global 
business and human rights regime. 
The due diligence concept on which the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is 
anchored has legal pedigree in national laws in various areas. One study shows that the due 
diligence concept is widely used across legal systems in States around the world to ensure that 
businesses respect established standards. 154  While these standards often do not explicitly 
reference human rights, their use provides evidence that due diligence ‘is not a foreign legal or 
regulatory concept in most countries’ and that there is scope for States to ‘make far greater use of 
legal tools to ensure business respects human rights in general, and that companies implement 
due diligence for human rights in particular’.155 The same study illustrates that the human rights 
due diligence concept is suitable for enactment and enforcement in national laws should States 
decide to adopt measures to this effect.156 
International human rights law provides the benchmark that business enterprises and relevant 
stakeholders should assess corporate conduct against. As noted previously, the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights is divorced from hard law in terms of its source of 
obligation and consequences. The norm derives its obligation from social expectations, rather 
than international law, and primarily depends for its enforcement on civil society.  The content of 
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and the due diligence standards that applies 
to companies, however, directly relates to international human rights Law. The corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights requires that companies abide by their legal obligations, 
including national and international human rights obligations. Beyond compliance with the law, 
companies are required to be pro-active by undertaking human rights due diligence in order to 
meet their responsibility. The nature and extent of human rights due diligence that is required 
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from companies should be evaluated on the basis of principles of international human rights 
law.157 
It could be stated in this regard that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights derives 
normative authority and content from international human rights law, though it depends for its 
effectiveness on its enactment and enforcement through existing governance systems. The link 
with international human rights law furthermore seems to ensure that the corporate responsibility 
to respect is applied to companies in a manner that empowers victims and enables access to 
remedies. As indicated by Ramasastry, it is important that conduct is benchmarked against 
‘universally recognized human rights principles embodied in a key set of treaties’, because this 
allow right-holders to articulate their concerns in terms of international human rights law and 
providing a basis for remedies and justice.158  The human rights due diligence concept thus 
enables the assessment of business conduct against international human rights standards by 
victims of human rights abuse and civil society. 
The corporate responsibility to respect human rights requires that business enterprises are pro-
active and conduct a human rights due diligence process in order to ‘identify, prevent, mitigate 
and account for how they address their impacts on human rights’.  This responsibility and its 
human rights due diligence component may be viewed in two different manners. It may be 
viewed as a forward-looking management process that aims for the prevention of adverse 
impacts to human rights.  Another way to view the human rights due diligence requirement is as 
a standard of conduct that is expected from business enterprises in order to ‘know and show that 
they respect human rights’.159 In terms of the latter usage, companies would be expected to abide 
by this human rights due diligence standard, a breach of which runs counter to their 
responsibility. 
The SRSG appears to support the view that the human rights due diligence concept can be used 
in both the former and latter sense. The 2009 report of the SRSG notes the following: 
Due diligence is commonly defined as ‘diligence reasonably expected from, and 
ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to 
discharge an obligation’.
 
Some have viewed this in strictly transactional terms 
what an investor or buyer does to assess a target asset or venture. The Special 
Representative uses this term in its broader sense: a comprehensive, proactive 
attempt to uncover human rights risks, actual and potential, over the entire life 
                                                
 157 The concept of the corporate responsibility to respect already reflects certain well-established human rights 
principles in certain aspects.  The concept reflects that all business enterprises can breach all human rights, 
which corresponds with the principle in international human rights law that all human rights are indivisible and 
interdependent.  The requirement that corporate responsibility to respect human rights be implemented in a non-
discriminatory manner corresponds with the human rights principle of non-discrimination (General Principles).  
The UNGPs recognizes that business enterprises should involve meaning-full consultation with relevant 
stakeholders at different stages of the human rights due diligence process. The concept reflects how human 
rights imposes certain process demands on the due diligence process, in terms of meaningful stakeholder 
engagement and human rights expertise. UNGPs, supra note 4, GP 18(b), GP 20 (b). 
 158 A. Ramasastry, Corporate Social Responsibility Versus Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Gap Between 
Responsibility and Accountability, 238, 14 Journal of Human Rights (2015). 
 159 UNGPs, supra note 4, Commentary to GP 15. 
  137  
cycle of a project or business activity, with the aim of avoiding and mitigating 
those risks. 
According to this paragraph, human rights due diligence may be understood as a business 
practice aimed at identifying human rights risks that may be attached to a project or business 
activity in order to avoid or mitigate this risk. It may be used by business enterprises as a method 
to identify and avoid risks of acting in breach of national laws. Due diligence may also be a 
requirement or obligation under existing law however. In this context, abiding by the human 
rights due diligence standard is a matter of legal compliance for companies. 
Currently, the human rights due diligence standard in and by itself is not a legal standard of 
performance.160 Due to this norm having its source of obligation in social expectations, a breach 
of this norm will expose a company to condemnation by societal forces and occasionally, to 
charges in court.  As noted by the SRSG: 
[V]iolations of this social norm are routinely brought to public attention globally 
through mobilized local communities, networks of civil society, the media 
including blogs, complaints procedures such as the OECD NCPs, and if they 
involve alleged violations of the law, then possibly through the courts.  This 
transnational normative regime reaches not only Western multinationals, which 
have long experienced its effects, but also emerging economy companies 
operating abroad, and even large national firms.161 
The SRSG indicates that the norm ‘exists independently of State duties and variations in national 
law’.162 It is not inconceivable that in time States will restate and integrate the human rights due 
diligence standard into national laws, including corporate or civil law. In this regard, the 
relevance of human rights due diligence concept as a standard of conduct may vary according to 
whether this concept has been restated as a legal requirement or obligation under public laws 
(national and international). 
The human rights due diligence concept may be applied to assess business conduct in a way that 
is similar to how legal due diligence standard is used under national laws and International 
Human Rights law. The human rights due diligence standard entails a judgement and a test 
whether the company has exercised due diligence as appropriate. In this regard, the human rights 
due diligence requirement reflects a typical due diligence test, ‘which asks whether “a more 
active and more efficient course of procedure might have been pursued” to avoid a particular 
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type of harm’.163 It could be argued that the human rights due diligence concept can be used in a 
functionally similar way as international law and national law have used due diligence as a 
standard of behaviour.164 While thus distinct in character and source of obligation, the due 
diligence standard resembles existing due diligence principles. The due diligence requirement 
thus could potentially serve as a blue print for a future legal standard at national and international 
level, though more exacting language of its content is necessary before conduct can be assessed 
against this standard. 
The UNGPs promote the further evolution of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights 
and its normative force or ‘binding-ness’ by placing the concept at the heart of the emerging 
business and human rights regime.  As outlined above, while in itself a soft-norm with limited 
normative force, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights may take on normative 
force and be ‘hardened’ through the emerging governance system. ‘Soft-law increases in power: 
it is formally non-existent, yet can become a powerful and effective force of substantive 
behavioural regulation’.165 These assumptions are part of the SRSG’s overall project and relevant 
for understanding the scenario for future legal developments that the UNGPs set out and the role 
that the concept of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights has in it. 
The SRSG has noted that the UNGPs reflect an attempt at articulating ‘a more precise and 
commonly accepted definition of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, what 
specific measures it entails, and how it can be linked more effectively with the public-law 
construction of internationally recognized rights’. 166  This definition furthermore reflects a 
responsibility on the part of the company to abide by the requirements that are imposed on 
company by the two external governance systems that the company is subject to.  These systems 
are ‘the system of public law and authority, and a non-state-based social and civil system 
grounded in the relations between corporations and their external stakeholders’. 167  The 
requirements that originate from these systems may apply to companies in varying degrees, 
depending on circumstances. 
The definition of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is placed at the center of 
policies and practices within the different governance systems.  Taylor notes the following: 
The Ruggie Framework brings together social expectations and law into an 
emerging regulatory framework for business and government that in effect defines 
the nature of business compliance with human rights standards. In so doing, the 
Framework lays the foundation for the further development of business 
responsibility, as a coherent area of policy and regulation in its own right.  As an 
arena of activity and debate, CSR has contributed to this regulatory dynamic. The 
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challenge for the field of CSR will be to adapt to an emerging reality in which 
business responsibility for ‘the social’ is increasingly a question of both 
compliance and beyond. 
The UNGPs by promoting a new regulatory dynamic in the emerging business and human rights 
regime thus potentially affects the evolution of the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights as a soft norm. The implementation of the UNGPs should result in actions that contribute 
to the further clarification, shaping and crystallization of the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights through hard law and soft law. The normative force of the corporate respect for 
human rights is expanded by their increased recognition and acceptance by States and other non-
state actors through their respective governance systems. Progress can be evaluated in terms of 
greater acceptance and recognition of the norm by relevant actors.  Effectiveness can be assessed 
by the operational impact on the ground (i.e., the behaviour of business enterprises that reflect 
actual acceptance and compliance) and their uptake by other initiatives (i.e., inspiration to and 
recognition by other initiatives).168 
The integration of corporate respect for human rights in national laws and regulations can add 
legal clarity to the corporate responsibility to respect human rights in a particular country 
context. The interpretations by judicial bodies can contribute to the further development of the 
concept through national jurisprudence.169 The consistent integration of human rights due 
diligence may contribute to the re-configuration of the laws themselves. The concept may be 
understood as reformatory potential that can drives conceptual changes within existing laws in 
order to resolve tensions. The simultaneous integration of the human rights due diligence concept 
across different areas of law and policy could have the effect of strengthening the connections 
between these different areas of law and drive greater convergence between them. 
 The State Duty to Protect and Regulatory Action to Ensure Business Respect for Human 4.6
Rights 
As has been elaborated above and the UNGPs affirm, States have a positive duty to ensure that 
the human rights of individuals within their territory and/or jurisdiction are protected against 
infringements by business enterprises. The duty to protect imposes on States a positive obligation 
to take appropriate measures or exercise human rights due diligence ‘to prevent, investigate, 
punish or redress’ such abuses. A State may incur responsibility if it has failed to take the 
appropriate due diligence measures to prevent or respond to human rights abuse resulting from 
corporate activity. Non-compliance with this duty can arise by act or omission. International 
human rights law thus imposes a due diligence standard of performance on the State. However, 
there exists no exact definition of the conduct that is expected of States to meet this due diligence 
standard with regards to the activities of business enterprises. The nature and scope of this 
standard is amendable to facts and circumstances, hence it ‘can be restrictively or expansively 
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interpreted, as the particular facts and circumstances require’. 170  171  The standard’s 
indeterminacy means that a breach by a State of its due diligence obligation cannot be assessed 
easily.172 Conditions will determine whether a State’s act or omission amounts to a breach of the 
States’ due diligence obligations in the context of business and human rights. The standard of 
due diligence furthermore relates to the objects and purpose of the international treaties giving 
rise to this duty of human rights due diligence. 
UN treaty monitoring bodies through recent authoritative interpretations of the human rights 
treaty they supervise have shed further clarity on the due diligence standard of performance for 
States in the context of corporate related activities.  Of particular relevance are two documents, 
one statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CtESCR), adopted in 
May 2011, and the other is the General Comment No. 16 of the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child (CtRC), adopted in 2013.173 These interpretations articulate the State duty to protect 
human rights in more exacting language than the UNGPs, affirming that International Human 
Rights law has evolved and imposes a more demanding duty on States than before.  More 
specifically, the interpretations support the view that States may act in breach of their due 
diligence obligations under International Human Rights Law if they fail to ensure that the human 
rights of individuals are adequately protected from infringements by corporate activity by 
adopting regulatory measures that require, as appropriate, business enterprises to respect human 
rights, including by requiring human rights due diligence in certain operational contexts that pose 
heightened risks to human rights. 
The following three developments can be identified. 
First, the interpretations recognize that companies have a responsibility to respect human right 
and to undertake human rights due diligence. Second, the State duty to exercise due diligence is 
framed in terms of an obligation to adopt regulatory measures where ‘necessary, appropriate and 
reasonable’ to ensure compliance by companies with this societal norm in order to prevent 
infringements of human rights by corporate activity. Third, the standard of due diligence is 
adaptable to circumstances and the adoption of mandatory and prescriptive requirements for 
companies to exercise human rights due diligence is appropriate in contexts that pose heightened 
risks to human rights, which may be combined with other means that encourage and support 
business enterprises to respect human rights. A brief analysis of these authoritative 
interpretations follows. 
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4.6.1 The 2011 Statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
The CtESCR, in a statement adopted in May 2011, clarifies the State’s obligations under 
ICESCR in the context of the corporate activities.174  The Statement affirms the primary 
obligation of States under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR to respect, protect and fulfill the rights of 
all persons under their jurisdiction in this context. The CtESCR interprets the State duty to 
respect as placing a duty on States to ensure that the laws and policies regarding corporate 
activities conform with the rights set forth under the ICESCR, thus ensuring that companies 
‘demonstrate due diligence to make certain that they do not impede the enjoyment of the 
Covenant rights by those who depend on or are negatively affected by their activities’.175 This 
interpretation affirms the societal expectation that companies exercise due diligence in order to 
manage their negative impacts on human rights and frames the obligation of States to respect 
human rights in terms of ensuring that companies demonstrate their compliance with this societal 
standard of behaviour. 
The statement furthermore articulates a positive duty for States to take adequate measures or 
‘due diligence’ to ensure that rights holders are effectively safeguarded against infringements of 
their ESCR rights by corporate actors. States should discharge this duty by establishing 
regulatory measures, more specifically ‘appropriate law and regulations, together with 
monitoring, investigation and accountability procedures to set and enforce standards for the 
performance of corporations’. This State duty extends extraterritorially by imposing on States an 
obligation to take steps to prevent human rights violations abroad by companies that have their 
main offices under their jurisdiction ‘without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the 
obligations of the host States under the Covenant’.176 The scope of this duty is partly defined in 
relation to the ability of States to influence the company by legal or political means, in 
accordance with the UN Charter and applicable international law. The duty to protect 
furthermore entails that States should ‘ensure access to effective remedies to victims of corporate 
abuse of [ESCR] through judicial, administrative; legislative or other appropriate means’.177 
The CtESCR furthermore recognizes an obligation on the part of the States to fulfil human rights 
by undertaking to obtain the corporate sector’s support for the realization of the ESCR. This 
entails that the home States shall encourage companies to assist host states ‘as appropriate, 
including in situations of armed conflict and natural disaster, in building the capacities needed to 
address the corporate responsibility for the observance of [ESCR]’.178 
The statement of the ICESCR affirms that International Human Rights law imposes a positive 
duty on States to undertake ‘due diligence’ by adopting appropriate regulatory measures to 
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protect against, and to ensure access to effective remedies for, infringements of the rights set out 
under the ICESCR by corporate related activity. This duty has an extraterritorial dimension and 
imposes on States to adopt ‘adequate’ measures to regulate the conduct of companies in order to 
prevent adverse human rights abroad. The CtESCR also recognizes that business enterprises 
have a responsibility to respect and an obligation of the States to ensure that they do. The 
CtESCR does not define the substantive content of the responsibility to respect human rights or 
indicate that this responsibility should be construed in line with the expectations set out in the 
UNGPs. Nevertheless, the CtESCR affirms the relevance to the General Comment of the UNGPs 
and the ILO Tripartite Declaration and indicates that other instruments, inter alia the OECD 
Guidelines, the UNGC, the UN Study on Violence against Children and the Children’s Rights 
and Business Principles served as useful reference for the Committee. 
4.6.2 General Comment No. 16 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
The CtRC adopted General Comment No.16 in 2013, titled ‘State obligations regarding the 
impact of the business sector on children’s rights’.179 In this General Comment, the CtRC 
clarifies the obligation of States in relation to the impact of business activities and operations on 
children’s rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Operational 
Protocols thereto.180 The CtRC recognizes that ‘it is necessary for States to have adequate legal 
and institutional frameworks to respect, protect and fulfil children’s rights, and to provide 
remedies in case of violations in the context of business activities and operations’.181 The CtRC 
recognizes that States should: 
(a) Ensure that the activities and operations of business enterprises do not 
adversely impact on children’s rights; 
(b) Create an enabling and supportive environment for business enterprises to 
respect children’s rights, including across any business relationships linked to 
their operations, products or services and across their global operations;  
(c) Ensure access to effective remedy for children whose rights have been 
infringed by a business enterprise acting as a private party or as a State agent.182 
The CtRC expressly refers to the PRR Framework and the UNGPs, the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the Children’s 
Rights and Business Principles as relevant to the General Comment, amongst other ‘existing and 
evolving national and international norms, standards and policy guidance on business and human 
rights’.183 The CtRC recognizes that the responsibilities to respect the rights of ‘children extend 
in practice beyond the State and State-controlled services and institutions and apply to private 
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actors and business enterprises […] therefore, all business enterprises must meet their 
responsibilities regarding children’s rights and States must ensure that they do’.184 The General 
Comment thus frames the State’s obligations with regards to children’s rights and the business 
sector in terms of ensuring that business enterprises meet their responsibility to respect human 
rights. 
The CtRC re-affirm the obligation of States under Article 4 of the CRC: 
States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other 
measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present 
Convention.  With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties 
shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources 
and, where needed, within the framework of international co-operation. 
The provision gives rise to an obligation for State parties to respect, protect and fulfil children’s 
rights in relation to business activities and operations that impact children’s rights. The CtRC 
interprets the State duty to respect as imposing an obligation on States to ‘not directly or 
indirectly facilitate, aid and abet any infringement of children’s rights’ and ‘ensure that all actors 
respect children’s rights, including in the context of business activities and operations’.  This 
entails that a State should ‘not engage in; support or condone abuses of children’s rights when it 
has a business role itself or conducts business with private enterprises’.185 
The CtRC notes that States have an obligation to protect the rights of each child subject to the 
States’ jurisdiction from infringements by third parties. This duty extends to infringements 
caused by or contributed to by companies. A State can incur responsibility for such an 
infringements if the State failed to take ‘necessary, appropriate and reasonable measures to 
prevent and remedy such infringements or otherwise collaborated with or tolerated the 
infringements’.186 Appropriate measures can take the form of ‘the passing of law and regulation, 
their monitoring and enforcement, and policy adoption that frame how business enterprises can 
impact on children’s rights’.187The CtRC notes that it is appropriate to require business 
enterprises operating in conflict areas or other contexts that pose a heightened risk of rights 
abuses ‘to undertake stringent child-rights due diligence tailored to their size and activities’.188 
Additionally, home States should inform businesses that are operating or planning to operate in 
such areas about the local children’s rights context, emphasizing that companies have ‘identical 
responsibilities to respect children’s rights in such setting as they do elsewhere’.189 
The State duty to protect children’s rights extends extraterritorially to all children subject to the 
State’s jurisdiction. Home States have extraterritorial obligations to ensure children’s rights in 
the context of business’ extraterritorial activities and operations, including by enabling access to 
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remedies for children whose rights have been violated by such extraterritorial activities, provided 
there is ‘a reasonable link between the State and the conduct concerned’.190 The Optional 
Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography requires that State 
Parties establish liability for business enterprises for these offences (criminal, civil or 
administrative) no matter where such offences are committed. CtRC affirms the duty of States to 
engage in international cooperation for the realization of children’s rights beyond their territorial 
boundaries, 191  including through their membership in international organizations (e.g., 
international development, finance and trade institutions).192 
The CtRC furthermore interprets the duty of States to fulfil children’s rights as a positive 
obligation to implement ‘legislative, administrative; budgetary, judicial, promotional and other 
measures’ in order to ‘facilitate, promote and provide for the enjoyment of children’s rights’.193 
The duty to fulfil imposes an obligation on States to provide ‘stable and predictable legal and 
regulatory environments which enable business enterprises to respect children’s rights, [which] 
includes clear and well-enforced laws and standards on labour, employment, health and safety, 
environment, anti-corruption, land use and taxation’.194 
The CtRC affirms the obligation of States to provide effective remedies and reparations for 
violations of the rights of the child by business enterprises.  This obligation entails ‘having in 
place child-sensitive mechanisms – criminal, civil and administrative – that are known by 
children and their representatives, that are prompt, genuinely available and accessible and that 
provide adequate reparation for harm suffered’.195 
The interpretation of the treaty monitoring bodies affirm that international human rights law 
imposes obligations on States to establish, implement and enforce appropriate legislative and 
regulatory measures to ensure that companies abide by their responsibility to respect human 
rights and exercise due diligence, including when operating abroad. States can incur 
responsibility if they fail to regulate and enforce this responsibility as appropriate, including by 
requiring human rights due diligence where the operating context poses heightened risks to 
human rights. Further clarification of the application of this duty to protect human rights by 
exercising due diligence in requiring business enterprises to abide by their responsibility to 
respect in order to ensure that their activities do not have adverse human rights impacts at home 
or abroad is desirable. 
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4.6.3 The 2016 Recommendation by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 
Human Rights and Business 
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a Recommendation on human 
rights and business on 2 March 2016.196 The Recommendation is addressed to Member States of 
the Council of Europe (‘Member States’).  In it the Committee of Member States (‘Committee’) 
expresses ‘its commitment to contribute to the effective implementation of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights at the European level’.197 The Recommendation is not 
a legally binding document, and thus in and of itself, does not alter or create new legal 
obligations.  The instruments that the Member States of the Council of Europe have ratified 
determine the extent to which Members are bound.198 The Committee recommends Member 
States, inter alia, to ‘review their national legislation and practice to ensure that they comply 
with the recommendations, principles and further guidance set out in the appendix’.199 
An Appendix200 has been attached to the Recommendation, which clarifies the implications of 
the State duty to protect human rights (Pillar 1 and 3 of the UNGPs) in the European context.  
The ECHR as interpreted and applied by the European Court of Human Rights (the ‘ECtHR’) 
and the European Social Charter (revised) and corresponding conclusions and decisions by the 
European Committee on Social Rights, are referred to as of particular relevance.201 While 
recognizing that all three pillars of the UNGPs are of ‘equal value and importance’,202 the 
Recommendation addresses the second pillar of the UNGPs indirectly, by making 
recommendations about the measures that Members should implement to enable corporate 
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The Recommendation specifies that State duty to protect entails that (own emphasis added): 
13.  Member States should: 
• apply such measures as may be necessary to require business enterprises operating 
within their territorial jurisdiction to respect human rights; 
• apply such measures as may be necessary to require, as appropriate, business 
enterprises domiciled in their jurisdiction to respect human rights throughout their 
operations abroad; 
• encourage and support these business enterprises by other means so that they respect 
human rights throughout their operations. 
This paragraph specifies the duty of States to protect human rights against infringements by 
business enterprises by taking prescriptive or mandatory measures to require business enterprises 
as may be necessary.  The paragraph distinguishes between two scenarios.  The first bullet point 
concerns the regulation of business enterprises that operate in the territory of the State, but that 
may have their domicile204 elsewhere. States should adopt regulatory measures as may be 
necessary to require these business enterprises to respect human rights.  The second bullet point 
concerns the regulation of business enterprises that have their domicile in a Member State but 
operate outside of Europe. States should adopt regulatory measures as may be necessary to 
require these business enterprises ‘as appropriate’ (e.g., to the size, nature or context of the 
operations) to respect human rights throughout its operations abroad.  According to the third 
bullet point, States furthermore should encourage or support business enterprises to respect 
human rights through other means (e.g., incentive measures)205, which seems applicable to both 
afore-mentioned scenarios. 
The Recommendation furthermore indicates ‘that everyone within their jurisdiction may easily 
have access to information about existing human rights in the context of corporate responsibility 
in a language which they can understand’.206 As the commentary explains, this paragraph places 
emphasis on the right of individuals to have access to information. The underlying reason is that 
‘persons cannot claim their rights if they do not know about them’.207 
The Recommendation further specifies the actions that State should take to enable corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights: 
20.  Member States should apply such measures as may be necessary to encourage 
or, where appropriate, require that: 
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• business enterprises domiciled within their jurisdiction apply human rights due 
diligence throughout their operations; 
• business enterprises conducting substantial activities within their jurisdiction carry 
out human rights due diligence in respect of such activities; 
including project-specific human rights impact assessments, as appropriate to the 
size of the business enterprise and the nature and context of the operation. 
This paragraph indicates that States should apply regulatory measures as may be necessary, 
where appropriate, to require that business enterprises apply human rights due diligence, 
including human rights impact assessments as appropriate to the size of the business enterprise 
and the nature and context of the operation. The Commentary notes that introducing 
requirements would seem appropriate, for instance, where ‘the nature and context of a business 
enterprises relate to sectors with particular human rights risks, instances in which the human 
rights impacts of business activities can be severe, where companies operate in conflict-affected 
or high risk areas or other contexts which pose significant risks to human rights’.208 
The application of such requirements differ depending on whether the company is domiciled in 
the jurisdiction of a Member State, or whether the business merely conducts substantial activities 
within this jurisdiction. In case of the former, the requirements should apply throughout the 
operations of the company.  In case of the latter, the requirements only should apply in relation 
to activities within its jurisdiction.209 
Important to note is the caveat in the Commentary indicating that the Recommendation ‘neither 
seeks to define human rights due diligence, nor does it specify whether, in the event that member 
States take legislative measures to require human rights due diligence under certain 
circumstances, such measures should be specifically developed or integrated into corporate or 
civil law’.210 This provision most likely reflects the fact that the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights, and the human rights due diligence concept has not been recognized as a 
legally binding concept at the international level. 
The Recommendation further stipulates that States should ‘encourage, and where appropriate, 
require business enterprises referred to in paragraph 20 to display greater transparency’ and ‘to 
provide regularly, or as needed, information on their efforts on corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights’.211 
The Recommendation indicates that additional measures are required from Member States when 
a particular business nexus exists. As indicated by the Commentary, the fact that States have 
more means at their disposal to ensure respect for human rights in the presence of such a State-
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nexus may in and of itself be a sufficient justification for such additional measures.212 ‘States 
should apply additional measures to require business enterprises to respect human rights, 
including, where appropriate, by carrying out human rights due diligence’. 213  The 
Recommendation identifies in which situations a business nexus exists: ‘own or control business 
enterprises’; ‘grant substantial support or deliver services through agencies’; ‘grant export 
licenses to business enterprises’; ‘conduct commercial transactions with business enterprises, 
including through the conclusion of public procurement contracts’; ‘privatize the delivery of 
services’.214 The measures that a State has taken must be evaluated and findings must be met 
with a response, inter alia, consequences for non-compliance with respect for human rights (e.g., 
the termination of a public procurement contract).215 
The Recommendation thus specifies that the State should adopt legislative measures where 
necessary and appropriate to require business enterprises to apply human rights due diligence.  
The applicability of such requirements to companies may differ depending on whether business 
enterprise is domiciled within the jurisdiction of the Member State, or only conducts substantial 
activities within this jurisdiction.  More may be expected of States in the presence of a business 
nexus. There is discretion for Member States to define human rights due diligence and there is 
not obligation for Member States to develop or integrate human rights due diligence into 
corporate or civil law.216 
 The Feasibility and Desirability of a Legalization of the Corporate Responsibility to 4.7
Respect at National and International level 
These interpretations of the State duty to protect human rights in the context of corporate related 
activities affirm that the effective operationalization of the UNGPs entails that States should 
adopt regulatory measures as necessary and appropriate to require business enterprises to apply 
human rights due diligence standard, including project specific human rights impact 
assessments.217 There is a reasonable probability of further legalization of human rights due 
diligence under national law in the short term. I am of the view that the transposition of the 
human rights due diligence standard into a ‘hard’ legal obligation at the international level is also 
desirable and feasible in the longer term, as is the creation of an international monitoring 
mechanism to enforce compliance by business enterprises with this standard.  This proposition of 
a further legalization of human rights due diligence standard at national and international level 
keeps within the thrust of the UNGPs. 
The corporate responsibility to respect human rights may be transposed into legally binding form 
through conventional law-making processes at the national, regional and international level.  One 
may consider the possibility that the norm could be codified or progressively develop into a 
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legally binding norm, as part of international treaty law or customary law. Customary 
international law, which is one of the main sources of international law, requires State practice.  
This is not only as a result of a belief that there is an obligation to act (opinion juris), but also ‘as 
a constitutive, essential part of the process by which the law is formed’.218 Evidence of an 
emerging norm of customary international law can be derived from, inter alia, the consistent 
implementation and compliance with soft-law instrument or provisions thereof by and across 
States.219 
Where the UNGPs are implemented and States were to give full effect to their duty to protect 
human rights and consistently embed the human rights due diligence standard into national 
legislations, this could contribute to building State acceptance and consensus on the corporate 
responsibility to respect as a legal norm. This in itself would not provide evidence for State 
practice as far as direct human rights obligations for business enterprises under international law 
is concerned. As emphasized by Knox, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights after 
all would not be based on international law, but derive from the State duty to protect. Thus, the 
implementation of the UNGPs by States in itself ‘would be consistent with human rights law as it 
already is, and would not be evidence of a change in human rights law to make corporations 
directly obligated by it’.220 
The internalization of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights into standard practices 
of companies may nevertheless serve as a foundation for the creation of future customary 
international law or an international treaty on business and human rights. In the context of the 
OECD NCPs, Backer notes: 
behaviour thus naturalised within the community of multinational corporations 
might serve either as a basis for deriving the contours of customary international 
law or the basis for articulating a less controversial set of binding international 
laws.  Indeed, it might be possible to consider the NCP cases as important 
markers in the production of a stream of semi-public pronouncements that could 
lead to the discovery (or evolution) of what, as customary international law, might 
then be imposed on host and home states.  This is an ‘alternative mechanism for 
global legislation’, so that ‘custom may serve as a pathfinder for later established 
more specific treaty rules’.  These cases promote the substance of the project 
inherent in the UN Norms by institutionalizing soft power mechanisms that affect 
a governance regime different from that of the home or host state law. 
The presumption is that behavioural changes and the internalization of the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights into business standard practices could create conditions 
that are more conducive to the possibility of successfully establishing legally binding norms at 
international level, through customary international law or an international treaty. 
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The SRSG’s initial opposition against going to the treaty route was playing a role in 
retrospective principled pragmatism. The creation of international legal obligations was casted as 
a less feasible alternative and the creation of a consensus based authoritative framework in soft 
law as the best hope to start process of creating a better functioning governance system that binds 
companies to the implementation of their responsibility to respect human rights. One 
commentator argues that the SRSG’s motivations against negotiating an international treaty 
reinforced the practical and political objectives to imposing international legal obligations on 
private actors more generally, and that the SRSG proposed the PRR Framework and the UNGPs 
as ‘an alternative to, rather than a prototype for, direct corporate legal obligations’.221 I agree that 
the PRR Framework and the UNGPs were presented as an alternative to the regulatory approach 
of creating direct obligations for business enterprises, a choice that seemed dictated in part by the 
fact that obtaining the acceptance by States and legally enforcing such obligations would be 
difficult.222 
The argument that the SRSG’s decision to not go the treaty route was primarily informed by 
political, not legal imperatives finds support in a statement by the SRSG in his 2006 interim 
report. The report notes that ‘there are no inherent conceptual barriers to states deciding to hold 
corporations directly responsible, either by extraterritorial application of domestic law to the 
operations of their own firm, or by establishing some form of international jurisdiction’.223 The 
SRSG supported his claim by pointing to trends in national jurisdictions. Courts extend the 
responsibility for international crimes to corporations and thereby draw on interpretations of 
individual responsibility for international crimes, as developed by international ad hoc criminal 
tribunals and the ICC statute.224 The SRSG also noted how the ICC lacked jurisdiction over legal 
persons not because corporate responsibility for international crimes was inconceivable per se, 
but because there was significant divergence in national approaches at the time the Rome Statute 
was being negotiated. ‘[I]t does not preclude the emergence of corporate responsibility today’, 
the SRSG noted. 
The SRSG’s decision did not discredit future efforts at advancing towards the creation of direct 
legal obligation per se. The SRSG did not view direct corporate legal obligations as 
inconceivable, nor did he exclude the possibility that such direct obligations could be imposed on 
companies in the future.225 Indeed, the PPR Framework and the UNGPs appear not to preclude 
the possibility or desirability of creating direct human rights obligations for business 
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enterprises.226 The SRSG acknowledged that international law can have a role in the emerging 
regime on business and human rights. ‘Principled pragmatism views international law as a tool 
for collective problem solving, not an end in itself’.227 The SRSG seems to be of the opinion that 
the desirability of pursuing direct obligations for companies should be evaluated in terms of their 
instrumental importance to progressing towards enhancing the standards and practices regarding 
business and human rights and the realization of ‘the effective prevention of, and remedy for, 
business-related human rights harm’.228 
 The Implementation of the UNGPs: the UN Working Group on Business and Human 4.8
Rights 
The PRR Framework and the UNGPs are in themselves not the solution, but a platform for future 
action that can cumulate into systemic change over time.229 Since they are a voluntary document, 
their effectiveness depends on their effective implementation, which, as the UNGPs reflect, 
requires the involvement of all relevant actors, and States and business enterprises in 
particular.230 The SRSG had already begun an active engagement effort to foster convergence 
and around the UNGPs shortly after the HRC had accepted the PRR Framework in 2008.231 
Partially because of this effort, the UNGPs already found practical application in various 
instruments in 2011.232 Nonetheless, the unanimous endorsement of the UNGPs by the HRC on 
16 June 2011 created regulatory and political momentum for this implementation to take flight.  
The UNGPs received wide recognition and support across the different stakeholder groups.  The 
HRC by same Resolution 17/4 created the WG BH with a mandate ‘[t]o promote the effective 
and comprehensive dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles’.233 
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The purpose of present section is to assess through the activities of the WG BH’s approach to 
implementing the UNGPs, as well as the degree and intensity of such efforts. The following 
section will examine the WG BH’s mandate, strategic priorities, projects and activities.  The aim 
is to analyse how the WG BH seeks to promote the uptake and dissemination of the UNGPs, 
despite not having a mandate to monitor, verify or enforce implementation or compliance.  The 
mandate of the WG BH recognizes and builds on the thrust of the UNGPs. The WG BH’s efforts 
may be described as a variant of ‘orchestration’, which was at the heart of the GPs 
implementation strategy according to Ruggie.234 
4.8.1 Mandate 
The HRC created the WG BH by Resolution 17/4 on 16 June 2011 for an initial term of three 
years.235 Apart from promoting the dissemination and implementation of the UNGPs,236 the WG 
BH is encouraged by the HRC ‘to identify, exchange and promote good practices and lessons 
learned’ and ‘to assess and make recommendations thereon and, in that context, to seek and 
receive information from all relevant sources’.237 The Resolution tasks the WG BH to support 
capacity building efforts, affirming the importance of such efforts,238 as well as to provide advice 
and recommendations related to national legislation and policies upon request.239 In addition, the 
WG BH is mandated to explore options and make recommendations for improving access to 
remedies.240 The WG BH should embed a gender perspective throughout its work and ‘give 
special attention to persons living in vulnerable situations, in particular children’.241 
The WG BH is authorized ‘[t]o develop a regular dialogue and discuss possible areas of 
cooperation with Governments and all relevant actors’. A non-exhaustive list identifies business 
enterprises as relevant stakeholders the WG BH can interact with, as well as other actors that can 
take up key roles in the emerging business and human rights regime.242 Such dialogues allow the 
WG BH to retrieve input from stakeholders, and ‘solicit information, documentation, good 
practice, challenges and lessons learned’ related to business uptake on a regular basis.243 The 
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WG BH is also tasked to ‘work in close cooperation and coordination with other relevant special 
procedures of the HRC, relevant United Nations and other international bodies, the treaty bodies 
and regional human rights organisations’.244 
The WG BH is tasked ‘to undertake country visits’. 245 Official country visits provide 
opportunities to disseminate the UNGPs and to support their implementation at national level.246 
The country visits facilitate ‘promoting constructive dialogue’ and allow for direct engagement 
with relevant stakeholders, inter alia, business enterprises and associations.  Country visits are 
also conducted with the intention ‘to identify, exchange and promote good practices and lessons 
learned’.247 Evidence of practical and operational relations in the respective country may be 
obtained that can inform its decision-making. To obtain such information, the WG BH also 
undertakes next to official visits and visits to Member States, field visits.248 
The WG BH can receive information on specific cases of human right abuse or violation and, 
where appropriate, respond through a communication, i.e., an urgent appeal or an allegation 
letter, to make the State or business enterprises aware of the facts of the allegations and 
corresponding duties and responsibilities.249 While the communications are sent confidentially, 
summaries of the communications are made public through the ‘Communications Report of the 
Special Procedures’ three times per year.250 The WG BH is not allowed to ‘address individual 
cases of alleged business-related human rights abuse’, 251  however it can ‘raise specific 
allegations that it determines to be particularly emblematic with relevant State authorities and 
companies, and request clarification or additional information as appropriate’.252 
The WG BH reports annually to the HRC and the UN GA. In these reports, it can addresses 
questions that have been brought to its attention, provide clarification on salient issues regarding 
the application of the UNGPs in specific areas and contexts of actual practice and provide 
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recommendations for the effective operationalization of the UNGPs.253 Such clarity can support 
and facilitate the implementation of the UNGPs by States, business enterprises and other relevant 
actors in practical contexts. 
4.8.2 Strategic Considerations and Work Streams 
The WG BH defined its strategy, including strategic considerations and specific work-streams, in 
its first report to the HRC in 2012.  The WG BH indicates that it pursues three work streams: 
global dissemination, promoting implementation and embedding global governance 
frameworks’.254 The three strategic considerations underlying these work-streams are: (a) the 
UNGPs as a common reference point in a diverse and rapidly evolving field; (b) enhancing 
access by victims of business-related human rights abuse to effective remedies, and; (c) building 
an environment receptive for the UNGP.  The strategic focus of the WG BH has shifted over 
time in response to the changes in the continuously evolving business and human rights field.255 
The WG BH also picks up and builds on the pioneering work of the SRSG by committing itself 
to the key principles of work and engagement that founded the UNGP. The evidence-based, 
consultative and pragmatic approach of the SRSG is seen as key in instilling legitimacy in the 
mandate and enabling it to move forward. The WG BH indicates that it places the principle of 
multi-stakeholder consultation and input at the core of its philosophy. The underlying rational is 
that the success of the mandate depends on whether the UNGP become ‘business-as-usual’ for 
all stakeholders in business activities, ‘whether they influence, lead or participate in, or are 
affected by the same’.256 Apart from its recognized value and effectiveness, pursuing these 
principles is also consistent with the essence of a ‘right-based approach’, the WG BH notes.257 
4.8.3 National Action Plans 
The WG BH has itself initiated projects, inter alia, NAPs.  States to consider developing 
National Action Plans (‘NAPs’) on business and human rights.258 The WG BH describes NAPs 
as ‘evolving policy strategies developed by States to prevent and protect against human rights 
abuses by business enterprises in conformity with the Guiding Principles’, 259 ‘through an 
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inclusive process of identifying needs and gaps and practical and actionable policy measures and 
goals’. 260  NAPs can be of instrumental importance to assist States in advancing their 
implementation of the UNGP.261 NAPs can potentially accelerate and scale up implementation 
by both States and business enterprises,262 inter alia, by serving as a vehicle through which their 
disincentives and incentives affecting their performance can be aligned towards the goals of 
implementing the UNGPs.263 
The WG BH prioritized NAPs in its strategy after 7th session, and drew up a roadmap outlining it 
activities to promote the uptake of effective NAPs.264 Pursuant to this roadmap, the WG BH 
launched an online repository of NAPs and organized a State survey to solicit information on 
existing policies, legislation, initiatives and plans.265 Apart from reflecting on these activities in 
its annual reports to the HRC,266 it focused on the issue of NAPs in its thematic report to the UN 
GA in September 2014.267 The WG BH embarked on a process to create guidance for the 
development and effective implementation on NAPs, in support of which it solicited views 
through an Open Consultation on the strategic elements of NAPs268 and an expert workshop 
organized on 5 May 2014.269 The HRC through Resolution 26/22 expressed its political support 
for the WG BH’s activities, encouraged States to develop NAPs and States and all stakeholders 
to engage with the WG BH in the development of guidance on NAPs.270 
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By July 2015, the WG BH identified that 25 NAPs were on their way.271 This is a relatively low 
number. This is despite States having been repeatedly called upon to develop such NAPs.  There 
are no legal requirements obliging States to develop a map, or dictating the substance of these 
NAPs. There also are no legal requirements for States to monitor, verify or report on their 
progress on implementing the NAPs or outcomes achieved. The WG BH has developed a 
Guidance Document aimed at promoting effective NAP processes and encouraging stakeholders 
to develop and support such NAP processes.272 The guidance furthermore recommends that 
stakeholders consider using the National Baseline Assessment (NBA) template developed by the 
Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) and ICAR in cooperation with the WG BH.273 
4.8.4 Measurement 
The WG BH gave greater strategic importance to measuring of the implementation of the 
UNGPs in 2015.274 The impetus was the finding of a lack of systemic, comprehensive data to 
measure progress in the implementation of the UNGPs.  This was despite the many relevant 
measurement initiatives by States, companies and NGOs producing data.  The WG BH noted 
how the effective implementation of the UNGPs is impossible without this data- as the business 
adage says, ‘if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it’.275 276 
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The WG BH itself organized a pilot survey in 2012277 and a questionnaire in 2013278 in order to 
solicit information from business enterprises on their implementation of the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights under the UNGPs (pillar 2).279 280 The vision of the WG 
BH was ‘to gather a solid baseline of credible and complete data’ on business’ implementation of 
their responsibility to respect human rights.281 The information solicited could help the WG BH 
‘to track business awareness of and progress’ and ‘to identify the common obstacles’ in business’ 
implementation of the UNGPs,282 and in the longer term, ‘to track systemic progress’.283 More 
generally, the information was intended to inform and complement the activities of the WG 
BH,284 as well as those of other UN bodies and actors, as they progressed in their work ‘to 
disseminate, implement and embed the UNGP globally’.285 
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The 2012 and 2013 surveys were inspired by and picked up on the survey of Fortune 500 Global 
Firms that the former SRSG carried out in 2006/7.286 287 The WG BH noted that surveys were 
anchored in their ‘concepts, intent and wording’, and that the overlap in items covered by the 
surveys allowed for some comparison of results, although the purpose and context of the 2012 
and 2013 surveys differed now that the UNGP had been accepted.288 
The 2012 pilot study received a total of 117 responses from a diversity of business enterprises.  
The diversity in responses was said to point to ‘a new, more global and diverse dialogue on 
business and human rights in the private sector’.289 It quizzed business enterprises on their 
awareness of the UNGP, their human rights priorities, policy commitments, engagement, 
motivations, and challenges in implementing respect for human rights in practice.290 The follow-
up 2013 questionnaire aimed to obtain a better understanding of progress achieved, meaning the 
way business enterprises were approaching the UNGP, and where the WG BH could best assist 
implementation efforts.291 292 
Apart from assessing progress in business implementation, an important objective of the WG BH 
in undertaking the surveys was to establish the methodological foundation for a new tracking 
tool in the form of annual surveys. These surveys could add value by maximizing ‘the utility of 
comparative data gathered through longitudinal research’.293 It could be used ‘to identify global 
uptake, trends, enablers and challenges of implementation, as well as existing practices and 
innovations’.294 The annual surveys were meant ‘to inform the annual Forum discussions’; ‘to 
disseminate information about the UNGP globally’; ‘to raise awareness among States and 
business enterprises while signalling the Working Group’s expectations in regard to 
implementation of the Guiding Principles’.295 In 2014, the WG BH reported to the HRC that 
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enhancing the survey methodology was its medium-term goal. It also signalled its intention ‘to 
conduct a more extensive survey and build an authoritative repository of information that can 
help measure progress, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, in business implementation of 
the Guiding Principles’.296 
4.8.5 Support for External Initiatives 
The WG BH also engages with and supports a selection of external initiatives. A strategic 
consideration of the WG BH in its engagement with these initiatives is to seek consistency, 
convergence, coordination and clarity in the interpretations and understandings of the UNGPs 
advanced by different actors through different tools and initiatives in order to promote business 
uptake.297 The WG BH has recognized the significance of emerging reporting frameworks as a 
tool for assessing business performance. 298  It ‘firmly supports’ 299  the UNGPs Reporting 
Framework (UN Reporting Framework), and collaborated with the GRI, 300  a non-profit 
organization that has pioneered sustainability reporting.301 
The WG BH in its reports has referred to various initiatives that aligned their work with the 
UNGPs, including the Fair Labour Association and the Global Network Initiative.302 States are 
recommended to consider becoming party of the Montreux Document On Pertinent International 
Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and 
Security Companies During Armed Conflict (Montreux Document), and join the International 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC), including its Association (ICoCA).  
Other initiatives are the Thun Group of banks and the International Council on Mining and 
Metals, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative. 
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4.8.5.1 UN Reporting Framework 
The UN Reporting Framework is the first of a twin-set of guidance frameworks that the 
organisations Shift and Mazars have undertaken to develop through a joint project titled the 
‘Human Rights Reporting and Assurance Frameworks Initiative’ (‘RAFI’).  Launched in 2015, 
the UN Reporting Framework ‘provides clarity, for the first time, on how companies can report 
in a meaningful and coherent way on their progress in implementing their responsibility to 
respect human rights’.303 This framework is aligned with the UNGPs and guides business 
enterprises on how to best disclose on their human rights policies, processes and performance in 
a manner that is feasible and can help them improve management systems.304 To achieve this, it 
provides a set of overarching questions on how the company respects human rights and 
supporting guidance on how to answer the respective question.305 Business enterprises are guided 
towards providing a balanced representation of its performance, in which the most ‘salient’ 
issues that impact human rights most severely are prioritized.  They can rely on the UN 
Framework not only to improve their disclosure, but also to discharge and track progress 
regarding their responsibility (UNGP 20), as well as to review and improve their internal 
management (UNGP 19) and engage with stakeholders (essential to assessing risks and tracking 
progress). By setting a minimum benchmark, the UN Framework facilitates assessment and 
comparison of business’ disclosure and performance by relevant actors, including investors and 
States. 
The success of the UN Framework will depend on the support and uptake by relevant 
stakeholders.  Uptake should be encouraged by the transparent and participatory nature of the 
UN Reporting Framework, having been developed through a consultative process that engaged 
over 200 diverse stakeholders from all regions of the world.306 So far, at least five large 
companies - Unilever, Ericsson, H&M, Nestlé and Newmont – have adopted the UN Framework 
and have begun to apply it to their reporting, working in collaboration with Shift. A coalition of 
77 investor groups representing almost USD 4 trillion assets under management affirmed its 
relevance as a tool ‘to review companies understanding and management of human rights 
risks’.307 Civil society voices have expressed their support for the UN Framework, while States 
have indicated to be considering ways to integrate the UN Reporting Framework into their 
policies, including through their NAPs.308 
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4.8.6 The UN Human Rights System 
The WG BH seeks to promote an active role for the UN bodies as part of its efforts to embed the 
UNGPs into global governance frameworks, which it has recognised can play a significant role 
in encouraging or requiring business enterprises and States to implement the UNGPs.309 These 
activities can contribute to building key strategic building blocks of a global business and human 
rights regime.310 
4.8.6.1 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
The OHCHR serves as the focal point within the UN system for advancing the business and 
human rights agenda and for providing uniform guidance and clarification on issues relating the 
implementation of the UNGPs.311 The OHCHR furthermore has an important role in the building 
of capacity on the business and human rights agenda within the UN and stakeholders, including 
business enterprises, in support of the implementation of the UNGPs.312 In this role, it has 
engaged with business organisations and networks to enhance awareness and implementation of 
the UNGPs.313 
4.8.6.2 Accountability and Remedy Project 
In November 2014, the OHCHR launched the Accountability and Remedy Project. The project 
aims ‘to develop recommendations and guidance for States on how to achieve a fairer and more 
effective system of domestic law remedies in cases of business-related human rights abuses, 
particularly in cases of severe abuses’.314 The project is organised around six distinct, but 
interrelated components: domestic law tests for corporate accountability (good practices and 
guidance for States on assessing corporate legal liability for serious human rights abuses); the 
roles and responsibilities of interested States (good practices to guide States in managing cross-
border cases and exploring models of international and bilateral cooperation); overcoming 
financial obstacles to legal claims (minimum steps and good-practice option for States to ensure 
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that claimants are not prevented from bringing cases due to legal costs); criminal sanctions 
(‘good-practice models’ for States on criminal sanctioning of corporations for serious human 
rights abuses); civil law remedies (‘good-practice models’ for States in relation to civil law 
damages in cases of serious corporate human rights harm); practices and policies of domestic 
prosecution bodies (recommendations to States on addressing challenges faced by domestic 
prosecutors).315 
4.8.6.3 UN Fund 
The HRC mandated the WG BH to support the promotion of capacity building and usage of the 
UNGPs by businesses.316 Such capacity building of all stakeholders can help ‘to better prevent 
business-related human rights abuses, provide effective remedy and manage challenges in the 
area of business and human rights’.317 A feasibility study was conducted on the possibility of 
establishing a global fund to enhance the capacity of stakeholders to advance the implementation 
of the UNGPs.  The SRSG found that ‘stakeholders across categories expressed support’ for the 
fund, but that further consultation with stakeholders was still needed.  He proposed that the 
OHCHR should lead the consultation process.318 Based on the this process, the OHCHR 
recommended, inter alia, that the OHCHR should be mandated to undertake a pilot project to 
test the viability of a capacity-building fund in collaboration with the WG BH and other relevant 
UN system partners and then report to the HRC in three years.319 
4.8.6.4 Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council 
Special procedures mandates can address business-related human rights situations and topics, 
and apply the UNGPs in their analysis.320 Greater attention by the special procedures can 
contribute to the further exploration of challenges that business encounter in their 
implementation of the UNGPs, which may be issue-, group- or sector- specific.321 A significant 
number of special procedures mandates has responded to the call and has taken up the UNGPs in 
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their reports.322 For instance, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders 
urged non-State actors, inter alia business enterprises, ‘to respect, and ideally support, the 
activities of human rights defenders’ and noted that they should ‘refrain from infringing upon the 
rights of defenders and should use the UNGPs on Business and Human Rights to ensure their 
compliance with international human rights law and standards’.323 
4.8.6.5 UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies 
As noted above, UN treaty monitoring bodies (e.g. the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CtRC) and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (‘CEDAW’)) 
can address and clarify States’ obligations within the context of business-related human rights 
issues as they apply to States under the international human rights treaties they have ratified.324 
Clarification can be provided through, among other things, reporting procedures, individual 
complaints procedures, general comments, statements and concluding observations.325 General 
Comments inform and facilitate the efforts of treaty monitoring bodies in their monitoring and 
follow-up of State’s implementation of their duty to protect.  The reporting procedures present 
opportunities for advocacy and dialogue on State and business implementation of the UNGPs,326 
as well as for the systematic and comprehensive collection and analysis of information on 
business and human rights.327 
4.8.7 UN Forum on Business and Human Rights and Regional Forums 
Another important responsibility of the WG BH is to guide the UN Forum on Business and 
Human Rights, which the HRC created by the same Resolution 17/4.328 The UN Forum serves as 
a platform for multi-stakeholder dialogue and cooperation.  The main purpose of the Forum is ‘to 
discuss trends and challenges in the implementation of the UNGPs and promote dialogue and 
cooperation on issues linked to business and human rights, including challenges faced in 
particular sectors, operational environments or in relation to specific rights or groups, as well as 
identifying good practices’. 329 The UN Forum permits the WG BH as well as all other 
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stakeholders to solicit information and achieve a common understanding of progress achieved, 
trends, gaps and challenges in the implementation of the UNGPs.  The Forum contributes to 
building capacity and awareness through information sharing on lessons learned on 
implementation practices and challenges.  The UN Forum also serves as a catalyst for new 
initiatives.  The Forum has grown not only in coverage of issues and scope, but also in terms of 
the number of participants.  Approximately 2000 participants attended the Forum in 2014.  This 
number reflected a great diversity of stakeholder perspectives.330 Measurement was a priority 
theme at the fourth Forum on Business and Human Rights, in November 2015. 
The WG BH has sought collaboration with regional organisations, recognising their importance 
as multipliers in efforts to disseminate the UNGPs at regional level.  In 2012, the WG BH 
encouraged ‘increased cross-regional exchange and dialogue, and coherent messaging to 
business enterprises between regions, given the transnational nature of business operations and 
relationships’.331 It also recommended that ‘[i]nternational organizations, including regional 
bodies, should include business and human rights and the implementation of the UNGPs in the 
agenda of their institutions, and support dissemination, capacity-building and implementation 
efforts at the regional level, with all stakeholders’.332 
In support of its efforts to promote the UNGPs at regional level, the WG BH initiated the 
regional forums on business and human rights in 2012, which are aimed at enabling discussion 
on challenges and lessons learned from the implementation of the UNGPs with actors and 
relevant stakeholders in the regional context.333 The forums create transparency on the current 
situation, progress made and challenges and opportunities faced.334 In addition, they facilitate 
stakeholder engagement and the creation of knowledge on key business and human rights issues.  
The regional forums also provide capacity building opportunities through training on the UNGPs 
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and a venue for informing stakeholders about relevant tools, mechanisms, methodologies, 
initiatives and resources.335 Finally, the regional forums complement and inform discussions at 
the annual UN Forum on Business and Human Rights.336 
 The Treaty Initiative 4.9
On 26 June 2014, the HRC adopted Resolution 26/9, creating an ‘open-ended intergovernmental 
working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to 
human rights; whose mandate shall be to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to 
regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises’.337 This resolution had been tabled by Ecuador and South Africa.338 
The initiative received firm support by a coalition of 600+ civil society organization.  The HRC 
adopted the Resolution by a divided vote of 20 to 14, with 13 abstentions, however.339 An 
important concern of States opposing the Resolution was that the initiative might risk sucking the 
debate back into the polarized and divisive discussions that had prevailed when the UN Norms 
were under construction.340 The WG BH also had cautioned about ‘the risk of reversing or 
undermining the clarity and the regulatory and political momentum gained so far by the Protect 
Respect Remedy Framework and the UNGPs`.341 While there are real concerns that the treaty 
initiative may weaken the project of the UNGPs as a result of de-alignment by key stakeholder 
groups from the UNGPs, the support for the UNGPs remains solid. Countries expressed their 
continued commitment to the implementation of the UNGPs through a unanimous adoption of a 
counter resolution tabled by Norway, which also renewed the mandate of the WG BH.342 
It were the sentiments within the NGO community that sowed the seeds from which the initiative 
to create a legally binding treaty sprung. The NGO community expressed the view that the 
UNGPs did not provide an adequate response to governance gaps. They openly expressed their 
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opposition to the UNGP’s in statements issued at the time the UNGPs were adopted.343 The 
critique was founded on the conviction that the enhancement of the international legal 
framework, including international judicial remedies, is needed in order to address the ongoing 
corporate abuses and violation on the ground and to ensure access to justice and remedies for 
victims of such abuse. NGOs expressed their concerns about a draft of the UNGPs in a joint 
statement. The statement notes that the UNGPs are ‘not a statement of the law’ and in certain 
areas take a more ‘regressive approach’ than ‘authoritative interpretations of international human 
rights law and current practices’.344 
This critique relates to the SRSG’s interpretation of existing international human rights law and 
suggests the UNGPs do not reflect recent legal developments, most notably the increasing 
international recognition, including by international human rights treaty bodies, of the need for 
home States to take regulatory action to prevent abuse by their companies overseas.  In the same 
statement, NGOs call for the UNGPs to provide recommendations on how States should regulate 
and remediate corporate conduct causing or contributing to human rights abuses abroad, as well 
as more specific guidance on protecting and respecting the rights of particular vulnerable groups 
and more robust language on the access to remedies pillar.345 Subsequent revision of the draft 
UNGPs did not alleviate these concerns.  HRW noted that the UNGPs did not set a ‘global 
standard’, but represented ‘the status quo’ where corporate human rights obligations remain an 
anomaly.346 
NGOs called upon the HRC to not adopt the UNGPs because they were deemed unsuited for 
tackling global governance gaps effectively. A commentator notes that this critique reflects a 
rejection347 of the UNGPs’ foundational premises and the institutional approach that it promotes 
as a solution to resolving governance gaps.348 Ecuador, which had not voted against the 
Resolution 17/4 in which the HRC ‘endorsed’ the UNGPs, also expressed its reservations about 
how the resolution side-lined issues that were significant for the establishment of a binding legal 
framework, including the establishment of a complaint mechanism for affected people. 349 After 
Res 17/4 had been adopted and the implementation of the UNGPs was in motion, a large number 
NGOs, though not all the important ones, joined forces in a movement called the ‘Treaty 
                                                
 343 For an analysis of the critique by civil society actors of the UNGPs, see Lara Catá Backer, And a Treaty to Bind 
them All—On Prospects and Obstacles to Moving from the GPs to a Multilateral Treaty Framework, a 
Preliminary Assessment (Jul. 3, 2014, 10:33 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.nl/2014/07/and-treaty-to-bind-
them-allon-prospects.html. 
 344 Joint Civil Society Statement on the draft Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (May 8, 2011), 
https://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/1473602 
 345 Id. 
 346 Human Rights Watch. UN Human Rights Council: Weak Stance on Business Standards: Global Rules Needed, 
Not Just Guidance (June 16, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/16/un-human-rights-council-weak-
stance-business-standards. 
 347 Backer, supra note 343. 
 348 FIAN International. Statement to the Delegations on the Human Rights Council 2011; Final Report of the 
SRSG on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises` (2011), 
http://www.ibfan.org/art/Statement-to-UN-HRC-on-HR-TNC-and-other-business_2_.pdf. Backer, Id. 
 349 See Bijlmakers, supra note 230. 
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Alliance’ that further developed its views and demands through joint statements. These 
statements further built on the idea that international law should impose legal obligations on 
business enterprises, through an international treaty on corporate liability or extraterritorial 
obligations. 
Ecuador delivered a statement on behalf of a group of countries, expressing the commitment of 
these countries to work towards the elaboration of a legally binding instrument. While 
welcoming the work of the SRSG, the statement noted that endorsement by the HRC of the 
UNGPs was only viewed as a ‘first step’ and a need to ‘move beyond’ the UNGPs towards 
creating a legally binding framework.350 The countries viewed the creation of such framework as 
essential for resolving the legal accountability vacuum that leaves victims of human rights 
abuses by transnational corporations without an adequate legal remedy. The UNGPs as a soft-
law document was seen as only providing a partial solution, because the UNGPs in themselves 
do not provide a legal basis for commanding conformity or imposing consequences for non-
conformity. The value of the UNGPs as providing a basis for accountability is limited because of 
it a non-legally binding nature. 
The UN Resolution did not elaborate on the treaty that is to be developed, hence many options 
remain open.351 In July 2015, the open-ended intergovernmental working group held its first 
session. The purpose was ‘conducting constructive deliberations about the content, scope, nature 
and form of the future international instrument’.352 At the beginning of the session, the UN High 
Commissioner affirmed that the process of the UNGPs and the intergovernmental process are not 
mutually exclusive initiatives and can be pursued simultaneously, noting that it ‘welcomed the 
intergovernmental process as a complementary step, and stresses that there was no conflict 
between advocating for both measures as a means to enhance protection and accountability in the 
business context’.353 
A more critical perspective points to the ideological and practical agenda of those supportive of 
the Treaty initiative, and indicates that the Resolution appears to be embedded in a world view 
that is antagonistic to the UNGP’s key foundations.354 The most prominent aspect in the 
Resolution supporting this understanding is the applicable scope of the international treaty, 
which is narrowly defined in a footnote of the Resolution as encompassing only ‘transnational 
                                                
 350 Countries noted ‘the necessity of moving forward towards a legally binding framework to regulate the work of 
transnational corporations and to provide appropriate protection, justice and remedy to the victims of human 
rights abuses directly resulting from or related to the activities of some transnational corporations and other 
businesses enterprises.  Statement on behalf of a Group of Countries at the 24rd Session of the Human Rights 
Council, General Debate – Item 3 Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Sept. 2013), http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/statement-unhrc-legally-binding.pdf. 
 351 For an overview of illustrative options, see D. Cassel, A. Ramasastry, White Paper: Options for a Treaty on 
Business and Human Rights (2015). 
 352 Report on the first session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, with the mandate of elaborating an international 
legally binding instrument, § 1, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc A/HRC/31/50 (Feb. 5, 2016). 
 353 Id. § 3.  
354  John G. Ruggie, The Past as Prologue? A Moment of Truth for UN Business and Human Rights Treaty (July 8, 
2014), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/Treaty_Final.pdf. 
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corporations and other business enterprises’. The ‘other business enterprises’ is explained as ‘all 
business enterprises that have a transnational character in their operational activities’. It is also 
noted that this definition does not apply to ‘local businesses registered in terms of relevant 
domestic law’. The UNGPs make no such distinction and applies to all business enterprises, also 
those that do not operate transnationally. The SRSG has been critical of this applicability of the 
new treaty to transnational corporations only; ‘[t]hus, to illustrate, the language of the proposed 
treaty would have covered international brands sourcing garments from the factories housed in 
the collapsed Rana Plaza building, but not the local factory owners’.355 
The Treaty initiatives also raises practical concerns that are similar to those the SRSG identified 
at the beginning of his mandate when considering the possibility of recommending treaty-
negotiations. According to Backer: 
For the objective (mandate) is to establish an international legally binding 
instrument to regulate in international law the activities specified.  But consider 
the constraints inherent in that mandate: the treaty will produce international law, 
law that is binding on those states acceding to it to the extent not otherwise 
reserved.  But it will have no internal domestic effect, except and to the extent 
that states domesticate these international obligations, under the principles of 
legality and state sovereignty that provides the framework for this resolution.  
Thus while it might serve to harden domestic law in some states, it does not 
guarantee transposition into domestic law.  Yet this is precisely the condition one 
finds oneself with the GPs which point to a framework that might well be 
transposed to domestic law, at the instance of the state, but which otherwise 
remains ‘soft’ and binding only on the state (and not those resident or transient 
within it).  Thus the greatest irony of the Resolution is that it is geared to do little 
but create potential law (in the sense that it is binding on individuals) and 
otherwise will produce nothing more than a framework for soft law from which 
custom may develop from the bottom up; functionally the equivalent position as 
the GPs.  Here one vaunts symbolism and gesture over substance.356 
The international treaty initiative can be powerful instrument to address regulatory gaps at the 
international level. The prospect of such an international treaty in and of itself could serve as a 
stick that motivates States and business enterprises to keep their efforts to implement the UNGPs 
on track.  Some concrete options will be explored in the next chapters. 
 Conclusion 4.10
This chapter examines the legal status of the UNGPs as soft law.  No direct legal consequences 
flow from the UNGPs.  Nevertheless, the UNGPs in and by themselves can foster compliance by 
recognizing the existence of a global standard of conduct for companies to respect human rights 
and clarifying and elaborating on the content of this standard and their implications. The 
                                                
355  Ruggie, supra note 23, at 8. 
 356 Larry Cata Backer, Moving Forward the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights: Between 
Enterprise Social Norm, State Domestic Legal Orders, and the Treaty Law That Mind Bind Them All, 38 
Fordham International Law Journal (2015). 
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corporate responsibility to respect is a soft/moral norm founded in global social expectations, 
hence it is non-legally binding in a strict legal sense. The corporate responsibility to respect 
carries within its normative content the force to pull compliance. The UNGPs furthermore serves 
as a platform for further actions through which this social norm is potentially acquires additional 
normative force. The expectation is that this norm can and should acquire additional normative 
force as existing duties and responsibilities of States and business enterprises as set out in the 
UNGPs are given full effect to the normative objective of ensuring human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.  An expansion of such normative force can result from the increased 
recognition and clarification of this norm by States and non-state actors through collaborative 
engagement within the different governance systems. Progress can be assessed in relation to 
enhanced standards and practices on business and human rights reflecting such increased 
recognition. 
The corporate responsibility to respect human rights as a soft/moral norm lies at the heart of this 
emerging global regime on business and human rights.  Its nature and legal relevance should be 
understood within this context. The UNGPs by recognizing and clarifying this responsibility and 
by providing a platform of action, has the potential to affect the evolution of this concept soft 
norm into a harder obligation. The design of the corporate responsibility to respect is key in this 
respect, allowing for its transposition into legal form at the national level and usage across 
different areas of law. That this transposition is feasible is evidenced by the due diligence 
concept already having been incorporated into national laws as an applicable standard.  It is not 
inconceivable that the SRSG chose the concept of human rights due diligence in order to enable 
the incorporation of a generally applicable standard of conduct into different areas of national 
and international law. 
Recent interpretations by treaty monitoring bodies articulated the State duty to conduct human 
rights due diligence not only in more exacting language, but have also framed this duty in terms 
of ensuring that business enterprises abide by their responsibility to respect human rights.  These 
interpretation support the view that the duty of States to conduct due diligence in order to ensure 
the protection of human rights from infringements by business enterprises requires that States 
adopt regulatory measures to ensure business respect for human rights, including requirements of 
due diligence from companies that operate in context of heightened human rights risks. State 
practices that integrate the corporate responsibility to respect in laws and policies can be 
constitutive of an international legal regime on business and human rights.  Such regime would 
be integral to the emerging global business and human rights regime in which the three 
governance systems progress in a coordinated manner in the pursuit of reduced harm by business 
enterprises to human rights.357 
The UNGPs depends for their effectiveness on their actual implementation. The following 
section through an examination of the strategic priorities, projects and activities of the WG BH 
explored the degree and intensity of implementation efforts. The treaty initiative can serve as a 
powerfull instruments that, in the shorter term, motivates States and business enterprises to keep 
their implementation options on track, and in the longer term, can address regulatory gaps at the 
international level.   
 
                                                
 357 Taylor, supra note 156, at 27. 
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This chapter argues that the human rights due diligence concept should be assessed in its ability 
to drive conceptual improvements in, and facilitate convergence across, national laws that affect 
business behavior.  It is a reformatory concept that is bound to redefine fruitfully the standards of 
due diligence that different areas of the legal order currently set out for business enterprises.  The 
purpose is to construe an institutional framework that supports business respect for human rights. 
The human rights due diligence concept will be explained first (see Section 5.2) by comparison 
with existing approaches to due diligence in other areas of law.  More precisely, the substantive 
and procedural aspects of human rights due diligence will be explained in relation to due 
diligence under corporate law and securities law. The human rights due diligence concept can be 
understood as a forward-looking management process that is aimed at the prevention of adverse 
human rights impacts.1 The human rights due diligence concept as defined by the UNGPs in 
itself may not exist as a legal standard.2  However, as will be set out in detail below, the diligence 
concept can be used and, as I argue below, should be used as a legal standard of conduct.3 
The human rights due diligence will be explained second (see Section 5.3)  as a standard of 
conduct which entails a judgment about whether a company exercises or has exercised 
reasonable care and a balancing exercise. The nature of this balancing exercise is similar and can 
be understood in reference to the duty of care concept which currently exists under certain 
national (tort) laws of non-contractual obligations. This legal duty of care concept requires 
companies to exercise reasonable care, the legal definition of which is determined by reference 
to legal and non-legal standards. The human rights due diligence can inform the indicia that 
factor into a determination of whether a company has struck the right balance between risk and 
care in meeting its legal obligations under these laws.4 
The human rights due diligence concept will be explained third (see Section 5.4) from the 
perspective of international human rights law. The human rights concept will be compared to the 
due diligence concept to which international human rights law has resorted to in order to define 
                                                
 1 Sabine Michalowski, Due diligence and complicity: a relationship in need of clarification, in Human Rights 
Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect?, 218-242, 231 (Cambridge 
University Press ed. 2013). 
 2 Mark B. Taylor, The Ruggie Framework: Polycentric regulation and the implications for corporate social 
responsibility, 5 Etikk i praksis – Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 1, 25 (2011). 
 3 Jonathan Bonnitcha & Robert McCorquodale, Is the concept of `due diligence` in the Guiding Principles 
coherent? (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2208588. 
 4 See Cees van Dam, Tort Law and Human Rights: Brothers in Arms On the Role of Tort Law in the Area of 
Business and Human Rights, 2 Journal of European Tort Law 3, 221, 244 (2011). 
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the requirement that States ensure an adequate protection of human rights.5 6 The UNGPs’ 
premise on the understanding that the duties and responsibilities of States and business 
enterprises are differentiated and mutually reinforcing. The section will compare the balancing 
exercise that underpins the human rights due diligence concept to the one that courts apply in 
their assessment of qualified human rights under international human rights law. The section will 
reflect also on the open-ended character of the human rights due diligence concept. The concept 
is clearly defined in that it provides for concrete parameters as to how business enterprises 
should respect human rights, but it is also articulated at a certain level of abstraction. This open 
nature of the concept should not necessarily be problematic. In fact, such open-ended character 
may be intentional since it allows the details as to what human rights due diligence requires or 
entails within a particular contexts or issue area to be further tailored to that specific scenario.  
As the SRSG appears to agree, States should provide further details and clarity through guidance 
on how business enterprises should respect human rights.7 
The openness of the due diligence concept allows for flexibility in the application of the due 
diligence concept, and can therefore maximize the transformational potential of the human rights 
due diligence concept. The importance of the reformatory potential of the human rights due 
diligence concept can be explained in relation to legal norm-creation at the national and 
international level. The human rights due diligence concept lends itself to implementation in 
different areas of law (some of which will be studied in detail in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, which 
facilitates its further crystallisation into legal obligations at the national (or even supranational, 
i.e., EU) level. The further ‘hardening’ of the human rights due diligence concept into a legal 
obligation under different national laws is not only desirable to foster corporate cultures 
respectful of human rights. States have a legal obligation to adopt such regulatory measures in 
order to ensure that business enterprises meet their responsibility to respect human rights in 
practice.8 
                                                
 5 For an analysis of due diligence in human rights law, see Tineke Lambooij, Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Legal and Semi-Legal Frameworks Supporting CSR, 293-309 (2010) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leiden). 
 6 The concept of due diligence was not entirely new to the discourse of business and human rights.  For instance, 
the UN Norms recognized a due diligence responsibility for corporations ‘in ensuring that their activities do not 
contribute directly or indirectly to human rights abuses, and that they do not directly or indirectly benefit from 
abuses of which they were aware or out to have been aware’. Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (2003), at Commentary A. (b). 
 7 Tara van Ho, “Due Diligence” in “Transitional Justice States”: An Obligation for Greater Transparency?, in 
Human Rights and Business: Direct Corporate Accountability for Human Rights, 242 (Jernej Letnar Černič & 
Tara Van Ho eds., 2015).  Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N.Doc. A/HRC/17/31, UNGP 3(c), GP 7 (March 21, 
2011) [hereinafter UNGPs] (by John Ruggie). 
 8 Olivier de Schutter makes this argument: 
Potentially most important of all, however, is the fact that the ‘business case’ for CSR produces, at the 
rhetorical level, a powerful consequence: it serves to create the impression that the development of CSR 
will make natural progress, in a sort of evolutionary growth driven by market mechanisms, without such 
progress having to be encouraged or artificially produced by an intervention of public authorities. There is a 
very thin line between the idea that ‘CSR is profitable for business’ and the idea that ‘CSR may take care of 
itself’. This consequence should be avoided at all costs. There is a need, clearly identifiable, for a 
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 The Human Rights Due Diligence Concept 5.2
5.2.1 Preliminary Considerations 
The human rights due diligence concept as defined in the UNGPs can be understood in relation 
to the traditional due diligence concept under Corporate law, from which it originates.9 Indeed, 
when framing the human rights due diligence concept, the SRSG drew on heavily well-
established due diligence and risk assessments practices in the areas of mergers and acquisitions 
and securities.10 These practices respond, at least to some extent, to domestic laws that require 
companies to have information disclosure and control systems in place to assess and manage 
financial and related risks.11 The American ‘Securities Art of 1933’ is an early example of such 
laws. Sections 1112 and 1213 of this Act created a standard of due diligence and care that could 
give rise to civil liability in case the information disclosed in relation to a security is inaccurate 
or misleading. 
The construction of the human rights due diligence on the basis of the due diligence concept in 
corporate law aimed at establishing a relationship between Corporate law and International 
Human Rights law, two areas of law that hitherto were often considered disconnected.14 The 
establishment of a clear link between Corporate law and International Human Rights law through 
the human rights due diligence concept brings business approaches to risk management to a 
closer relation with internationally recognized human rights standards and principles. It 
                                                                                                                                                       
regulatory framework to be established, if CSR is to work. This is not in contradiction with the voluntary 
character of CSR.  On the contrary, it attaches its meaning to voluntary commitments. 
Olivier de Schutter, Corporate Social Responsibility: European Style, 14 European Law Journal, 219 (2008). 
 9 Lambooij, supra note 5, at 278. 
 10 John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business Multinational Corporations and Human Rights, 100-101 (W.W. Norton & 
Company. 2013). 
 11 Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. doc. 
A/HRC/8/5, ¶ 57 (April 7, 2008) [hereinafter Ruggie, 2008 Report] (by John Ruggie). 
 12 Section 11 provided that any person who had acquired a security could sue the defendant specified if the 
respective security ‘contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required 
to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading’.  There would, however, be no 
liability if the defendant had met a standard of care.  As stipulated in section 11 (b) (3), this standard of care 
required that the defendant had undertaken ‘reasonable investigation’ that provided ‘reasonable ground to 
believe and did believe’ that the registration statements ‘were true and that there was no omission’. Sect. 11.(a) 
of the Securities Act of 1933. 
 13 Section 12 provided that a person could sue the defendant who sold or offered a security by means of a 
prospectus or oral communication that contained ‘an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements […] not misleading’.  The section created a standard of 
reasonable care, stipulating that the defendant should not be held liable if ‘he did not know, and in the exercise 
of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission’.  Sect. 12.(a)(2)(a) of the Securities Act 
of 1933. 
 14 It has been highlighted, in this regard, that ‘traditional American corporate law speaks the language of 
economics and perhaps politics.  It generally does not speak the language of human rights’.  Lucien J.  Dhooge, 
Due Diligence as a defense to corporate liability pursuant to the alien tort statute, 22 Emory International Law 
Review 455, 437 (2009).  
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facilitates the acceptance of, and has the potential to incite, compliance by companies with their 
human rights responsibilities. Moreover, the concept of due diligence has the advantage of being 
readily understood by business enterprises: corporations could thus build on existing due 
diligence practices to integrate successfully human rights into their corporate practices. Doing so 
could also increase the capacity of business enterprises in risk management and incite 
compliance with the standards set by both systems. The nexus furthermore allowed for the 
integration of international human rights standards into risk management and related business 
practices, and for business enterprises to articulate their human rights concerns by reference to 
International Human Rights law. The human rights due diligence concept was a means to have 
companies accept a concept of corporate responsibility that is linked in substance to international 
human rights instruments.15 
In short, the concept of due diligence was considered more resonant to business enterprises than 
compliance with international human rights norms, the applicability of which to business 
activities was, moreover, uncertain.16 
5.2.2 Human Rights Due Diligence: Substantive Measures Required 
According to UNGP 17-24, an adequate human rights due diligence process requires the 
successful adoption of the following measures: (i) to investigate and take measures (see, for 
more detail, Section 5.2.2.1.); (ii) to communicate that the measures have been adopted (see, for 
more detail, Section  5.2.2.2); (iii) to enable inclusive decision-making and participation (see, for 
more detail, Section 5.2.2.2.1); and (iv) to gather relevant human rights expertise (see, for more 
detail, Section 5.2.2.2.2). 
5.2.2.1 To Investigate and Take Measures (to know). 
This requirement is threefold: (i) to carry out human rights impact assessments (see, for more 
detail, Section 5.2.2.1.1); (ii) to integrate the findings of these human rights assessments in the 
relevant process of the company (see, for more detail, Section 5.2.2.1.2); and (iii) to track 
responses (see, for more detail, Section 5.2.2.1.3). 
5.2.2.1.1 Human rights impact assessments 
One of the elements of the human rights due diligence process is to undertake human rights risk 
assessments.17 The main purpose of human rights impact assessments is to ascertain the nature of 
the impact the activities of a company have in human rights. Unlike the traditional approaches to 
risk assessments in corporations, these assessments have an external, rather than an internal, 
focus.18 They are not only (or, for that matter, mainly) aimed at identifying the material risks to 
and liabilities of the corporation from a financial viewpoint. The purpose is to identify the human 
rights risks of a company to right-holders, and from a right-holder perspective. 
                                                
 15 Ruggie, supra note 10, at 101.  
 16 Dhooge, supra note 14, at 473. 
 17 UNGPs, supra note 7, GP 8. 
 18 Van Ho, supra note 7, at 243. 
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The UNGPs note that human rights impact assessment may be included within broader enterprise 
risk management systems; however, these assessments must extend beyond ‘simply identifying 
and managing material risks to the company itself, to include risks to right-holders’.19 
The human rights assessments thus differ in purpose from traditional approaches to risk 
management in that they aim at analysing the risks that a company’ operations pose to human 
rights, rather than the reverse.20  These assessments must be undertaken in the interest of the 
right-holders whose risks might be adversely affected by the operations of the company, rather 
than in the interest of shareholders and investors. 
The aim of human rights impacts assessments is for companies and stakeholders to gain an 
understanding of the specific adverse human rights impacts on people, within the specific 
contexts of an operation.  Special attention should be paid to ‘particular human rights impacts on 
individuals from groups or populations that may be at heightened risk of vulnerability or 
marginalization, and bear in mind the risk that may be faced by women and men’.21 
In order to obtain an understanding of the human rights risk from a stakeholder perspective, the 
process should involve meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups and relevant 
stakeholders. This understanding serves to guide a company’s decision-making on what due 
diligence steps are appropriate to manage these risks in the interest of right-holders. 
The scope of the assessments mirrors that of corporate responsibility to respect more generally.  
The assessments are aimed at identifying both actual and potential human rights impacts that the 
company’s activities and business relationships may lead to. 
This process can be integrated into other risk assessments, provided that these assessments are 
undertaken by reference to international human rights. Human rights impact assessments must 
‘include all internationally recognized human rights as a reference point, since enterprises may 
potentially impact virtually any of these rights’.22 
For human rights impact assessments to conform to the human rights due diligence concept, such 
assessments should include references to international human rights. The UNGPs refer to the 
International Bill of Human Rights and the fundamental principles set out in the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work as authoritative enumerations of human rights 
and a global minimum benchmark against which to assess performance.23 These instruments 
provide a list of ‘core internationally recognized human rights’ standards.24 While business 
                                                
 19 UNGPs, supra note 7, Commentary to GP 17. 
 20 Van Ho, supra note 7, at 246. 
 21 UNGPs, supra note 7, Commentary to GP 18. 
 22 UNGPs, supra note 7, Commentary to GP 18. 
 23 Id, GP 12. 
 24 Id. Commentary to GP 12. 
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enterprises must always consider the list of core rights25, they may also need to consider 
additional international human rights standards in certain specific scenarios.26 
The human rights due diligence concept requires that business enterprises assess the actual and 
potential adverse human rights impacts under all internationally recognized human rights. The 
reason is that business enterprises can potentially impact virtually any of these rights.27 Business 
enterprises should consequently opt for a comprehensive and non-selective approach to human 
rights and systematically identify relevant policies and practices accordingly. 
This challenges certain practices of business enterprises of identifying and addressing adverse 
human rights impacts in a targeted partial manner, focusing only on those human rights impacts 
that are of direct importance to the company from a financial perspective. By contrast, human 
rights due diligence requires companies to take into consideration all human rights, including 
those human rights they previously did not deal with, or even avoided:  these are often those at 
greatest risk of being adversely affected. ‘Cherry-picking’ and selectively choosing at 
convenience a particular international framework and then focusing on the subset of human 
rights contained therein is, therefore, no longer acceptable. 
Human rights impact assessment must be undertaken at ‘regular intervals’ in order to be 
responsive to the changes in human rights situations that are ‘dynamic’. The UNGPs identify 
three intervals: (i) ‘prior to a new activity or relationship; priori to major decisions or changes in 
the operation (e.g., market entry, product launch, policy change, or wider changes to the 
business)’; (ii) ‘in response to or anticipation of changes in the operating environment (e.g., 
rising social tensions)’; and (iii) ‘periodically throughout the life of an activity or relationship’.28 
This requirement that business enterprises consider human rights in a comprehensive manner is 
consistent with the requirement of ‘objectivity and non-selectivity of the consideration of human 
rights issues’ as recognised by the Vienna Plan of Action.29 The Program of Action indicated that 
human rights globally must be treated ‘in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with 
the same emphasis’. 30 The Preamble to the Universal Declaration for Development also 
recognises that the promotion of development requires equal attention and urgent consideration 
                                                
 25 Id. Commentary to GP 12. 
 26 Id. Commentary to GP 12 reflects this: 
Depending on circumstances, business enterprises may need to consider additional standards.  For instance, 
enterprises should respect the human rights of individuals belonging to specific groups or populations that 
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 27 Id. Commentary to GP 18. 
 28 Id. Commentary to GP 18. 
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to all human rights and that, accordingly, ‘the promotion of, respect for and enjoyment of certain 
human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot justify the denial of other human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’.31 
5.2.2.1.2 Integrating the Findings 
The finding of the human rights impacts assessments must be horizontally integrated across 
relevant internal functions and processes of the company, and the company must take appropriate 
action.32 The aim is for companies to ensure that the findings of the assessment ‘are properly 
understood, given due weight, and acted upon’ in order to prevent and mitigate potential human 
rights impacts.33 Since human rights considerations are often isolated throughout the company, 
this element may constitute the biggest challenge for companies according to the SRSG.34 
The UNGPs note the responsibility of companies to embed policy commitments into all relevant 
business functions.35 This embedding is aimed at ‘ensuring that all personnel are aware of the 
enterprise’s human rights policy commitment, understand its implications for how they conduct 
their work, are trained, empowered and incentivized to act in ways that support the commitment, 
and regard it as intrinsic to the core values of the work place’.36 This embedding is ‘a macro 
process’ that can enable the ‘successful integration of findings and timely and sustainable 
responses’.37 
The ‘integration’ of findings entails a ‘micro process of taking the findings about a potential 
impact, identifying who in the enterprise needs to be involved in addressing it and ensuring 
effective action’.38 All those who are relevant for the identification and implementation of 
solutions should be identified and engaged. This includes those responsible for assessing adverse 
human rights impacts and those in control of decision-making and action to manage these 
impacts.39 The responsibility for effectively addressing human rights impact should be allocated 
to the appropriate level and function within the company.40 
The UNGPs note that internal decision-making, budget allocations and oversight processes 
should be in place to enable effective responses.41 Companies should adopt measures that are 
                                                
 31 The Declaration on the Right to Development, Annex to U.N. G.A. Res 41/128, 97th Sess. Preambule (Dec. 4, 
1986). 
 32 UNGPs, supra note 7, GP 19. 
 33 Id. GP 19. 
 34 Ruggie, 2008 Report, supra note 11, ¶ 62.  
 35 UNGPs, supra note 7, Commentary to GP 19. 
 36 OHCHR, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide (2012).  
 37 Id. at 46-47. 
 38 Id. at 46-47 (emphasis added). 
 39 Id. at 19. 
 40 UNGPs, supra note 7, GP 19(a)(i). 
 41 Id. GP 19(a)(ii). 
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appropriate and proportionate to its capabilities. Large companies thus will likely be required to 
adopt a more systematized approach to ensure that findings are integrated effectively. A 
systemized approach may also be expected of smaller entities in the presence of potentially 
severe human rights impacts or a high probability of particular human rights impacts.42 
In the case of a need to prioritise action, which might be due to resource constraints, the 
company should focus on preventing and mitigating those potential human rights impacts that 
are most severe43 or likely to occur. Severity should be assessed in terms of the risks posed to 
human rights rather than to the company. 
The UNGPs make a distinction in this context to the way the company is involved in the adverse 
human rights impact (i.e., causation, contribution or direct linkage) and the extent of leverage by 
the company over the entity causing the harm. The conduct that is required from companies 
varies accordingly. 
In the case a company ‘causes or may cause’ an adverse human rights impact, a responsibility 
applies to the company to ‘take the necessary steps to cease or prevent the impact’.44 
In the alternative scenario where a company ‘contributes or may contribute’ to an adverse impact 
that are caused by another entity, the nature and extent of measures that a company should take 
to effectively integrate human rights can be determined less easily. A similar responsibility 
applies in that companies should adopt appropriate measures ‘to cease or prevent its 
contribution’. Where the company does not control the other entity that causes the impact, the 
company should ‘use its leverage to mitigate any remaining impact to the greatest extent 
possible’.45 The UNGPs define leverage as ‘the ability to effect change in the wrongful practices 
of an entity that causes a harm’.46 
In the presence of potential adverse human rights impacts that are ‘directly linked’ to the 
operations, products or services of the company, and because the business relationship with 
another entity connects the company to the adverse human rights impact, a responsibility arises 
for the company to take appropriate action. In this scenario of ‘direct linkage’, appropriate action 
should be determined in relation to the following factors: ‘the enterprise’s leverage over the 
entity concerned, how crucial the relationship is to the enterprise, the severity of the abuse, and 
whether terminating the relationship with the entity itself would have adverse human rights 
impacts’.47 
                                                
 42 Appropriate action might require that large companies create cross-functional decision-making groups that 
engage experts and staff from relevant functions or departments.  Companies may combine these with internal 
reporting requirement.  Senior management may need to be involved in decision-making and oversight in the 
presence of high-risk context or severe impacts.  European Commission, Employment & Recruitment Agencies 
Sector Guide on Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,45 (2013), 
http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/eu-sector-guidance/EC-Guides/E&RA/EC-Guide_E&RA.pdf. 
 43 UNGPs, supra note 7, GP 24. 
 44 Id. Commentary to GP 19. 
 45 Id. Commentary to GP 19. 
 46 Id. Commentary to GP 19. 
 47 Id. Commentary to GP 19. 
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The nature and extent of conduct that is expected from companies to exercise leverage in 
situations where the company is involved in adverse human rights impacts through causation or 
direct linkage is not exactly defined.  The UNGPs note that the company should exercise the 
leverage that it has to prevent or mitigate the adverse human rights impact.  In the case the 
company lacks leverage, it should find ways to increase it (e.g., by ‘offering capacity building or 
other incentives to the related entity, or collaborating with other actors’).48  The company should 
consider ending the relationship, where increasing the leverage is not possible.  The potential 
human rights impacts of such withdrawal should be taken into account.  Where the company 
decides to maintain the relationship and the abuse continues, the company ‘should be able to 
demonstrate its own ongoing efforts to mitigate the impact and be prepared to accept any 
consequences – reputational, financial or legal- of the continuing connection’.49 
Figure 1:50 
 
5.2.2.1.3 Tracking Responses 
Another important element of the human rights due diligence process is the tracking of the 
effectiveness of businesses’ responses. The purpose of tracking is aimed at verifying the 
                                                
 48 Id. Commentary to GP 19. 
 49 Id. Commentary to GP 19. 
 50 OHCHR, supra note 36, at 50. 
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effectiveness of companies’ responses in addressing their human rights impacts. More 
specifically, the commentary to UNGP 20 notes that tracking ‘is necessary to know if its human 
rights policies are being implemented optimally, whether it has responded effectively to the 
identified human rights impacts, and to drive continuous improvement’.51 
The information that companies acquire through tracking can enable companies to improve the 
accountability for their human rights performance, both internally to management and 
communicating externally to shareholders and stakeholders. 52  Indicators can further assist 
companies in communicating more effectively.53 
Tracking can be of instrumental importance for companies to drive continued improvements in 
their human rights performance. The information that is acquired through tracking can be used 
‘to identify trends and patterns’ and to highlight ‘repeated problems that may require more 
systemic changes to policies and process’ and ‘it brings out best practices that can be 
disseminated across the enterprise to further reduce risk and improve performance’.54 
The UNGP notes that special efforts should go out to tracking the effectiveness of responses ‘to 
impacts on individuals from groups or populations that may be at heightened risk of vulnerability 
and marginalization’.55 
Processes for tracking responses may be integrated within other tracking systems; however, these 
systems should allow for qualitative feedback, including from right-holders.56 Such integration 
can contribute to ‘normalizing’ attention to human rights.57 
Companies are advised to undertake a root cause analysis, which can ‘help pinpoint what actions 
by which parts of the enterprise, or by which other parties related to the enterprise, played a role 
in generating the impact, and how’.58 
Business enterprises are required to rely on appropriate indicators59 in tracking the effectiveness 
of its responses.60 61 Both quantitative and qualitative indictors should be used. Qualitative 
                                                
 51 Id. Commentary to GP 20. 
 52 OHCHR, supra note 36, at 52. 
 53 UNGPs, supra note 7, GP 20. 
 54 OHCHR, supra note 36, at 53. 
 55 UNGPs, supra note 7, Commentary to GP 20. 
 56 OHCHR, supra note 36, at 53. 
 57 Id. at 53. 
 58 Id. at 54. 
 59 There is no uncontested definition of indicators.  De Felice has defined a business and human rights indicator as 
‘a “named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past or projected [human rights] 
performance” of a corporation and whose results are conveyed through a self-contained verbal or numerical 
expression, such as a count (257), a percentage (15 percent), or a verb (agree/not agree)’. Damiano De Felice, 
Business and Human Rights Indicators to Measure the Corporate Responsibility to Respect: Challenges and 
Opportunities, 37 Human rights Quarterly, 518 (2015). One of the defining features of indicators is that they 
can be used ‘to evaluate’ the performance of, inter alia, corporations ‘by reference to one or more standards’.  
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indicators can be important to verify that a company’s own assessment about its human rights 
performance is accurate from the perspective of affected stakeholder groups. Companies may 
have arrived at this assessment on the basis of quantitative indicators.62 
Businesses draw on relevant internal and external perspectives, in particular the perspectives of 
potentially affected stakeholders.63 Such engagement is important to verify the accuracy of 
companies’ responses to human rights. The process also creates opportunities for affected 
individuals to have a voice in the process and to contribute the formation of an understanding 
based on the assessment of the performance of the company from a right-holder perspective.64 
The UNGPs affirm that operational-level grievance mechanisms can be relevant for tracking 
business responses, for at least two reasons. First, they can support business enterprises in the 
identification of their adverse human rights impacts as part of their ongoing human rights due 
diligence, and in addressing systemic problems that trends and patterns in complaints may 
reveal. Second, they can enable the early and direct handling and remediation of adverse 
impacts, thereby ‘preventing harms from compounding and grievances from escalating’.65 
5.2.2.2 To Communicate (to Show) 
One of the steps that business enterprises must undertake as part of the human rights due 
diligence process is communication. As stipulated by UNGP 17, business enterprises must 
‘account for’ how the company goes about managing its human rights by ‘communicating’ this 
externally.66 The purpose of such disclosure is for companies to ‘show’ their respect for human 
rights in practice.  Companies should have reporting policies and processes in place by which 
they can provide transparency and accountability for their human rights due diligence. This 
responsibility to disclose is further elaborated in UNGP 21. 
For companies to disclose in conformity to the UNGPs, certain modifications to current 
approaches to company disclosure should be undertaken. These changes relate to the type of 
information that should be disclosed, the nature and form of disclosure, and the audience 
companies should address their disclosure to and who is entitled to the information. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Kevin E. Davis, et al, Introduction, in Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Quantification and 
Rankings, 6 (Kevin E. Davis, et al. eds., 2012). 
 60 UNGPs, supra note 7, GP 20(a). 
 61 Indicators have the potential to serve as measurement tools.  For a detailed assessment of existing human rights 
indicator systems, see Starl, K. et al., Human Rights Indicators in the Context of the European Union,  FRAME 
Deliverable 13.1, (Dec. 24, 2014), available at http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-content/materiale/reports/12-
Deliverable-13.1.pdf. 
 62 OHCHR, supra note 36, at 55. 
 63 UNGPs, supra note 7, Commentary to GP 20. 
 64 OHCHR, supra note 36, at 55. 
 65 Id. Commentary to GP 29. See Bijlmakers, et al., Report on tracking CSR responses FRAME Deliverable 7.4 
(Nov. 2015, 2014), Bijlmakers, et al., Report on tracking CSR responses FRAME Deliverable 7.4 (Nov. 2015, 
2014), http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Deliverable-7.4.pdf. 
 66 UNGPs, supra note 7, GP 17. 
  181 
Communications should meet a minimum standard in all instances.  This minimum standard 
relates to both the content and process of disclosure.  As previously indicated, unlike traditional 
disclosure under corporate law, the focus should be on both external and internal disclosure.67 68  
The purpose of disclosure is to improve business respect for human rights.  The focus of 
disclosure should therefore not only ‘be the corporation’s risk and liability, but the risks towards 
third parties’.69 
The responsibility to disclose is based on human rights risks.  The scope for disclosure mirrors 
the scope of the corporate responsibility to respect more generally.  Business enterprises must 
disclose on their potential and actual adverse human rights impacts.  The disclosure should 
reflect the human rights risks that a company causes by its own activities, contributes to or is 
directly linked to through the business relationships it enters into. 
The occurrence of adverse human rights impacts that a company is involved in gives rise to the 
responsibility to communicate.  When stakeholders bring human rights issues to the attention of 
business enterprises, the need to communicate becomes apparent. 
Disclosure must include anything relevant for human rights.  Since human rights impacts involve 
right-holders and affected stakeholders, disclosure must provide an adequate depiction of these 
impacts and a company’s response thereto, and one focusing on the perspective of the right-
holder. 
Unlike in traditional disclosure, this information is not primarily owed to shareholders70 or 
investors71 but to all affected stakeholders, and most importantly, to individuals and groups 
whose human rights may be adversely impacted by the activities of the company. 
                                                
 67 Van Ho, supra note 7, at 246. 
 68 It is true that companies already disclose externally under securities legislation; however, this disclosure is of a 
somewhat different character and serves a different function.  The purpose of mandatory disclosure at a stage of 
the public offering of shares is to address the information asymmetry between inside and outside investors and 
to ensure that investors are protected when purchasing securities from an issuer.  The purpose of mandatory 
disclosure on the secondary market is to maximise the information efficiency of the market.  Louise Gullifer & 
Jennifer Payne, Corporate Finance Law: Principles and Policy, 524 (2nd ed., Hart Publishing.  2015). 
 69 Van Ho, supra note 7, at 247. 
 70 For instance, the requirements as to annual reports and accounts set out in the UK 2006 Company Act are 
primarily oriented towards the disclosure of information to shareholders. (see Section 7.9.1) Gullifer & Payne, 
supra note 68, 547-548. 
 71 For instance, Art. 5 of Directive 2004/109/EC (Transparency Directive) notes that issuers of shares or debt 
securities shall make public a half yearly financial report that covers a condensed set of financial statements and 
an interim report.  This disclosure requirement has been implemented by EU Member States through securities 
legislation and aims primarily at the disclosure of information to the market. Directive 2004/109/EC, of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements 
in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and 
amending Directive 2001/34/EC, art. 5(1) 2004 O.J.  (L 390) 38, Art.  5(1).  Directive 2013/50/EU, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Directive 2004/109/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the harmonsiation of transparency requirements in relation to information 
about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market. Directive 2003/71/EC, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the 
public or admitted to trading and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC laying down detailed rules for the 
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Since disclosure is owed to affected stakeholders, and, in particular, to right-holders, the 
responsibility to communicate requires that business enterprises disclose the type of information 
that is useful for these right-holders.  Consequently, companies must be transparent and account 
for their human rights due diligence in a manner that is meaningful to these stakeholders. 
The purpose of disclosure is not only to inform the company’s own conduct, but also to inform 
the conduct of these stakeholders (and, in particular, right-holders), in relation to business 
conduct.72 This requires that disclosure must be of a type and form that allows right-holders to 
obtain an accurate depiction of a company’s human rights due diligence. 
Partly also for this reason, business enterprises must be responsive to the concerns raised by or 
on behalf of these stakeholders.  Disclosure must be timely in order to be responsive to changes 
in human rights situations, which are often dynamic and evolving. 
For right-holders to fully understand the impact and responses of a company, the latter may need 
to establish a dialogue with the former.73 74  It has been argued that communication must be 
useful for right-holders in order to meaningfully participate and respond in consultations and to 
serve as a basis for an exchange of information between stakeholders. 
The UNGP 21 further elaborates on the implications of the responsibility to communicate 
information from a right-holder perspective for business enterprises, noting that communications 
should: 
(a) Be of a form and frequency that reflect an enterprise’s human rights impacts 
and that are accessible to its intended audiences; 
(b) Provide information that is sufficient to evaluate the adequacy of an 
enterprise’s response to the particular human rights impact involved. 
This principle indicates that disclosure must be of a form that is accessible to its intended 
audiences.  Since the responsibility to disclose is also owed to right-holders, companies must 
ensure that right-holders can access the information on their human rights risks and responses.  
Doing so would give effect to the right to information, which is itself, of course, a human right.75 
                                                                                                                                                       
implementation of certain provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC, art. 1(4) amending art.  5(1), 2013 O.J. (L 294) 
13. Gullifer & Payne, supra note 68, 547-548.  
 72 Van Ho, supra note 7, at 246. 
 73 Id. at 248.  
 74 For instance, Van Ho notes that, in transitional justice States that face a higher likelihood of recidivism to 
conflict, there is a need for a heightened level of transparency in order ‘to assess unusual impacts on the 
economic, political and social inequalities between identified ethnic and social groups’.  See Van Ho, supra 
note 7, at 248. 
 75 See, e.g., Article 19(2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 
23 March 1976. 
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As is the case for the human rights due diligence process more generally, the responsibility is 
pragmatic in that discretion is left to companies to communicate through means that are 
appropriate to the circumstances of the company. These means can take on various forms, 
including ‘in-person’ meetings, online dialogues, consultation with affected stakeholders, and 
formal public reports’.76 
The responsibility to disclose shifts from pragmatic means of disclosure to more technical means 
when the adverse human rights impacts reach a certain threshold of severity. Severe human 
rights impacts prompt a responsibility to report formally on how companies address these 
adverse human rights impacts.77 Such formal reporting can range from ‘traditional annual reports 
and corporate responsibility/sustainability reports, to include on-line updates and integrated 
financial and non-financial reports’.78 
The responsibility to disclose under the UNGPs is often more demanding than the transparency 
that is commonly expected under a Corporate law / Financial regulation regime.79 The UNGPs 
suggest that companies should disclose information on human rights risks and responses, even 
when such disclosure goes beyond what is perceived as materially relevant for the company from 
a financial viewpoint. 
A restriction is built into the responsibility to disclose in the sense that disclosure should not pose 
‘risks to affected stakeholders, personnel or to legitimate requirements of commercial 
confidentiality’.80 Thus the responsibility to disclose entails in practice a balancing exercise, 
between disclosing information in a manner that provides the most optimal representation of a 
business’ respect for human rights while minimizing the potential adverse impacts that such 
disclosure may have on the human rights of individuals. 
In short, the communications of business enterprises must be frequent,81 accessible,82 sufficient,83 
balanced and informed in order to provide an adequate measure of transparency and 
accountability for respect for human rights.84 
 
                                                
 76 UNGPs, supra note 7, Commentary to GP 21. 
 77 Absent an element of severity, the form of disclosure is discretionary and business enterprises may 
communicate through alternative, informal forms of communications.  Examples of informal forms of 
disclosure are ‘in-person meetings, online dialogues, consultation with affected stakeholders’. Id. Commentary 
to GP 21. 
 78 Id. Commentary to GP 21. 
 79 Van Ho, supra note 7, at 247. 
 80 UNGPs, supra note 7, Commentary to GP 21. 
 81 Id. GP 21 (a). 
 82 Id. GP 21 (a). 
 83 Id. GP 21 (b). 
 84 Id. Commentary to GP 21. 
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5.2.2.2.1 To Enable Inclusive Decision-Making and Participation 
Human rights due diligence requires that business enterprises involve in meaningful 
consultations with relevant stakeholders, at different stages of the due diligence process. The 
decision of business enterprises should be made in an inclusive and participatory manner that 
allows for the evaluation of potential risks to human rights. 
The reason is that human rights due diligence does not relate only to the risks to a company’s 
economic interests85, but to the interests of stakeholders more generally, and right-holders in 
particular. In this regard, the human rights due diligence challenges the presumption under 
corporate law that business enterprises should manage only those risks that are material to the 
company. Human rights due diligence entails that companies should manage the risks that their 
activities and relationships may pose to the rights of affected individuals and communities.86  
Understanding these risks and the appropriate care that a company should take from a right-
holder perspective requires engagement with these right-holders or those who may legitimately 
represent them. 
The meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups and other relevant stakeholders is 
expected at various stages of the human rights due diligence process. A company should ‘involve 
in meaningful consultation’ when undertaking a human rights impact assessment in order to 
identify and assess the nature of human rights impacts. The assessment is aimed at obtaining an 
accurate account of the ‘specific impacts on specific people, given a specific context of 
operations’.87 This entails that companies should consult affected stakeholders directly for the 
purpose of understanding their concerns.88 Special attention must be paid to the human rights 
impacts on individuals from groups or populations at heightened risk of vulnerability and 
marginalization, and gender-sensitive human risks. 
Companies should furthermore draw on feedback from affected stakeholders when tracking the 
effectiveness of their responses to verify whether their adverse human rights impacts are 
addressed.89 The purpose is for business enterprises to develop an understanding of the nature of 
the human rights impacts to inform their human rights due diligence processes and policies and 
to consider the stakeholder experiences. 
                                                
 85 It should be noted, however, that the failure to identify and manage and human rights risks can result in 
significant financial costs, including ‘opportunity costs, financial costs, legal costs and reputational costs’.  
[Interview with Ruggie.]  Also see a study by Davis and Franks re: the potential costs that arise for extractive 
companies due to company-community conflicts.  Rachel Davis & Daniel M. Franks, The costs of conflict with 
local communities in the extractive industry, SRMining2011 (Oct. 21, 2011), available at: 
http://shiftproject.org/sites/default/files/ Davis%20&%20Franks_Costs%20of%20Conflict_SRM.pdf.  
 86 Commentary to GP 17.  Ruggie, supra note 10, at 99. Peter Muchlinski, Implementing the New UN Corporate 
Human Rights Framework: Implications for Corporate Law, Governance, and Regulation, 22 Business Ethics 
Quarterly 145, 145-177, 149 (2012). 
 87 UNGPs, supra note 7, Commentary to GP 18. 
 88 Id. GP 18 and Commentary. 
 89 Id. GP 20. 
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Whether stakeholders can meaningfully participate in consultations with business enterprises and 
respond to the assessments of risks and care by a company will depend on the information that is 
available to them. The UNGPs have been criticized in relation thereto. More specifically, it has 
been rightly argued that the UNGPs recognize as the main function of corporate disclosure 
providing information that demonstrates human rights due diligence and that limits liability for 
the company. The disclosure of information that is useful for right-holders in order to 
meaningfully participate and respond in consultations and can serve as a basis for an exchange of 
information between stakeholders appears to be of less importance to the UNGP. The UNGPs do 
not expressly note that business enterprises should have such an information exchange with 
stakeholders. Only in relation to ‘severe’ risks do the UNGPs recognize a responsibility for 
business enterprises to report formally. In the absence of mandatory disclosure obligations, there 
is no guarantee that companies will provide the necessary degree of transparency, and in a timely 
manner for right-holders to be able to meaningfully participate in consultations.90 
The introduction of meaningful stakeholder consultation as an integral part of the human rights 
due diligence process aligns due diligence by companies with the considerations that underlie the 
human rights principles of participation and democracy. The enjoyment of human rights is tied to 
the requirements that individuals can participate in decision-making that affects their lives. The 
right to participate is in itself a human right, and stakeholder consultations are an important 
means to realize this right. Participation is also an important foundational element of democracy, 
and a means to achieve it.91 Promoting participation in decision-making through consultations 
can potentially empower individuals, which is particularly relevant for persons from groups or 
populations at heightened risk of vulnerability or marginalization, or facing gender-specific 
risks.92 
                                                
 90 Van Ho, supra note 7, at 244. 
 91 Democracy is widely considered as one of the general principles of human rights governance that sustains its 
legitimacy, see  J. O.  McGinnis & I.  Somin, Democracy and International Human Rights Law 84 Notre Dame 
Law Review (2009). It is founded on ‘the freely expressed will of people to determine their own political, 
economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives’. Human Rights 
Council Res. 19/36, Human rights, democracy and the rule of law, 19th Sess., April 19, 2012, U.N. 
A/HRC/RES/19/36 (Apr. 19, 2012). The consent of the people is recognised as a writ for the legitimate right to 
govern. Article 23(1) of the UDHR states, ‘[T]he will of the people shall be the basis of authority of 
government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret voting or by equivalent free voting procedures.’ Article 25 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) furthermore enunciates the democratic values of 
political equality and control as anchors of democratic governance, outlining equal rights, opportunities for 
citizens to participate in public affairs ‘directly or through freely chosen representatives’, to vote and to be 
elected and to have access to public service without discrimination. Scholarship has advanced the view that 
democracy is not only a prerequisite for legitimate governance, but it may in fact be a legal entitlement.  T. M. 
Frank, The emerging right to democratic governance, 86 The American Journal of International Law, 46-91 
(1992).  
 92 The UNDRIP recognizes that indigenous people have the right to participate in decision-making in matters that 
would affect their human rights. This entails that States must consult with indigenous peoples in order to obtain 
their free and informed consent prior to the adoption and implementation of legislative and administrative 
measures that may affect them, or the approval of any project affecting their lands, territories or other resources.  
Free, prior and informed consent is an expression of indigenous peoples right to self-determination, by virtue of 
which they ‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’.  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A.  Res.  61/295, U.N. Doc. 
61/295, Art.3,18, 19, 32.2.  (Sept.  13, 2007).  Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational 
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Business enterprises are invited to exercise discretion to right-holders when interpreting their 
human rights due diligence.93 Since business enterprises must consult with relevant stakeholders, 
there is less room for companies to avoid critical views. Stakeholder consultations can enhance 
the credibility of interpretations of due diligence. Such consultations constitute a method to clear 
up ambiguities, identify and address potentially conflicting understandings of how business 
enterprises ought to satisfy their human rights due diligence requirements and to arrive at a 
common understanding. Dialogue can facilitate relationships of trust that are essential for the 
effectiveness of the measures. Consultations thus provide incentives for companies to comply. 
Business performance will be subject to review, hence companies will seek to avoid being 
identified by stakeholders as non-compliant. Involvement of stakeholders in the tracking and 
measurement of compliance makes non-compliance more difficult to conceal. In this regard, 
stakeholder consultations can serve to distinguish genuine implementation of human rights 
responsibility from public relations exercises. 
5.2.2.2.2 To Consult Human Rights Expertise 
Business enterprises should be adequately informed by relevant human rights expertise.  
Business enterprises are expected to draw from internal and/or external expertise in formulating 
their human rights policy.94 As a company’s operations become more complex, the reliance on 
such expertise becomes more important to an assessment of how to best respond.95 When 
operating in intricate countries or local contexts that complicate efforts to respect for human 
rights, business enterprises should also rely on expertise to determine how best to meet their 
responsibility. Business enterprises should draw on human rights expertise as part of their human 
rights impact assessment process.96 Sources of expertise may be written or non-written, internal 
or external to the company. When facing complex operating environments, companies are 
advised to consult not only expertise internal to the enterprises, but also ‘to consult externally 
with credible, independent experts, including from governments, civil society, national human 
rights institutions (‘NHRIs’) and relevant multi-stakeholder initiatives’.97 
The decision of business enterprises should be made in a manner that is objective and credible 
and that allows for optimal responses to the corporate responsibility to respect.98 The concept 
challenges the practices of business enterprises of practically self-re-defined existing standards 
by applying an interpretation of human rights of their own, one that is most convenient for 
                                                                                                                                                       
corporations and other business enterprises, Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises in Accordance with Human Rights Council 
resolution 17/4, transmitted by note of the Secretary General, U.N. doc. A/68/279, ¶ 10 (Aug.  6, 2013).  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art.  4.1, Dec.  16, 1966, G.A.  Res.  2200A (XXI).  The 
Declaration on the Right to Development, Annex to U.N. G.A.  Res 41/128, 97th Sess.  (Dec.  4, 1986), 
Preambule. 
 93 Ruggie, supra note 10, at 99. 
 94 UNGPs, supra note 7, at GP 16. 
 95 Id. Commentary to GP 16. 
 96 Id. GP 18 (a). 
 97 Id. Commentary to GP 23. 
 98 Id. GP 16. 
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corporate interests. Business enterprises have sometimes referenced international human rights 
instruments, extracted certain provisions, and then interpreted the standards codified therein in a 
manner that altered their meaning and protection as intended by the respective instrument.99  
Reliance on relevant expertise can result in a more objective assessment of appropriate business 
responses in complex environments. It can promote greater consistency and coherence in 
interpretations of human rights standards across business enterprises.100 
 Human Rights Due Diligence as a Standard of Conduct: a Balancing Exercise 5.3
The human rights due diligence concept entails a judgment as to whether the policies and 
processes that business enterprises must have in place to meet their responsibility to respect are 
sufficient and appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the company.101 This entails a 
balancing act in practice. 
The balancing exercise that is integral to human rights due diligence differs from the one that is 
characteristic to the due diligence concept under corporate law. The concept as it has been 
applied to define the scope of director’s duties of care in corporate law is traditionally oriented 
towards finding a balance between the company’s economic risks and opportunities.102 In many 
jurisdictions, corporate law adopts a ‘shareholder approach’, in the case of which the balancing 
act centers around the impact of decision-making on the best interest of the company, which is 
equivalent to the maximization of shareholder’s value as owners. The factors that are determinate 
for striking this balance are often private interests that are of concern to the corporation only. 
Corporate law may opt for ‘enlightened shareholder value approach’. This approach permits or, 
in limited cases, requires directors to have regard to a wider range of stakeholder interests. Then 
human rights may be among the non-shareholder interests that inform the balancing act, provided 
doing so keeps within the director’s duty to act in the company’s best interest.103 Depending on 
the jurisdiction, the company’s best interest may be understood in a broader sense as 
encapsulating the combined interests of society at large. This seems to be a recent trend, 
however, and in the most common scenario the directors may have regard for these broader 
interests, but ultimately owe their duty of care to the company’s shareholders.104 
                                                
 99 Bob Hepple, A race to the top? International Investment Guidelines and Corporate Codes of Conduct 20 
Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, 358 (1999). 
 100 The importance of consistency was signaled by the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Program of Action that 
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The balancing exercise that is at the core of the human rights due diligence concept more closely 
resembles the balancing act that courts undertake under civil tort law, more specifically in their 
normative judgement as to whether a company has committed a tort of negligence by having 
failed to meet a legal duty of care under national tort law.105 Before arriving at a verdict as to 
whether a company is liable for having acted negligently, the court undertakes a balancing act in 
order to determine whether the company has taken the measures that it was reasonably expected 
to take in order to prevent foreseeable harm to legal interest from materializing. More exactly, 
the court’s balancing act ‘boils down to an assessment of whether the parent company has 
exercised due care towards the foreseeable and legally protected interests of the host country 
plaintiffs, in light of the potential risks inherent in the multinational corporation’s host country 
activities’.106 This balancing act centers around the impact of corporate decision-making on 
human rights, rather than the company. 
It is similar to the balancing act related to the human rights due diligence concept in that it seeks 
to find a balance between care of the company and risks to human rights. The human rights due 
diligence concept as set out in the UNGPs reflects that a balance should be struck between taking 
sufficient due diligence measures and the actual and potential human rights impacts that a 
company is involved through its own activities and business relationships. The nature of this 
balancing exercise is pragmatic in that it revolves around the aim of avoiding and mitigating the 
adverse human rights impacts and the means by which this is achieved. These must 
commensurate to the capabilities of the company in terms of their scale and complexity.107 
The following factors are determinant for striking the right balance: the severity of the adverse 
human rights impacts, the likelihoods of adverse human rights impacts occurring (operating 
context and sector) and the ability of the company (size, ownership and structure).108 These 
resemble the four factors that are balanced by a court in a tort liability case under civil tort law, 
namely; ‘the probability that the risk will materialize; the seriousness of the expected damage; 
the character and benefit of the activities in question; and the burden of taking precautionary 
measures’.109 
The UNGPs suggest that a proportionality test applies, in that the company acts in accordance 
with its due diligence responsibility if it adopts measures that are sufficient to manage human 
rights risks that it is involved in. These measures should be suitable to their objective and, 
provided they are indeed sufficient, should be commensurate to the capabilities of the company. 
As small and medium size enterprises have lesser capacity and more informal processes and 
management structures, their responsibility might be limited to measures of lesser complexity 
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and scale.110  The means by which a company can discharge its responsibility can also vary 
according to whether a company conducts its business through a corporate group or 
individually.111 In case of the presence of a more significant probability of adverse human rights 
occurring, which may be explained in relation to the particular industry or operational contexts 
of the company, business enterprises may need to take measures of greater scale and 
complexity.112 
The responsibility of companies requires more of companies if the operations of a company or 
the operating context give rise to human rights risks of a more serious nature. If the human rights 
risks reach a threshold of severity, which is judged in relation to ‘scale, scope and irremediable 
character of the impact’, the responsibility to respect requires corresponding measures.113 The 
responsibility will be less contingent on practical considerations of what means suit the 
economic interests of the company and more on technical considerations of what measures are 
needed to effectively mitigate or avoid the adverse human rights impacts.114 The due diligence 
concept would require companies to adopt technical measures, thereby removing the scope of 
discretion of companies by imposing a requirement on companies to act in a certain manner.  
Since certain measures would be required regardless of economic considerations, the 
responsibility to respect would be more oriented towards achieving the desired result of 
effectively avoiding or prioritizing adverse human rights impact.115 
Upon identification of human rights situations and risks, a company must begin to take action to 
address those human rights impacts that are ‘most severe’ or ‘where delayed response would 
make them irremediable’. It is further stipulated that ‘[s]everity is not an absolute concept in this 
context, but is relative to the other human rights impacts the business enterprise has identified’.116 
A company must also prioritize those areas where the risks of adverse human rights impacts 
occurring are greatest.117 
 The Human Rights Due Diligence Concept from an International Human Rights 5.4
Perspective 
International Human Rights law prescribes certain limitations to the exercise of human rights, 
which are premised on the understanding that the realization of human rights is not only an 
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individual rights, but also a community interest and commitment. Courts have commonly applied 
the method of a balancing exercise in their interpretation of ‘qualified’ human rights.118 States are 
required to strike a balance between securing the rights and freedoms of individuals and the 
interests of a community, e.g., national security, public safety, or public order.119 In their 
evaluation of this balancing act, courts often apply the principle of proportionality, meaning that 
‘the objective of the communal aim or interest has to be sufficiently important to limit the right; 
the measure of the limitation has to be suitable and no more than necessary to defend the 
communal interest in question’.120 
Overall, these provisions of international human rights treaties or international instruments that 
contain such ‘qualified’ human rights have to be interpreted strictly.121 122 For instance, the 
ICCPR under Art.  18 (3) stipulates that the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs ‘may be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others’.123 The Human 
UN Rights Committee in its General Comment 22 states that this provision must be interpreted 
strictly, meaning that restrictions are not allowed on grounds not specified in the provision, may 
only be applied for the purpose prescribed, must be ‘directly related and proportionate to the 
specific need on which they are predicated’, must not be ‘imposed for discriminatory purposes or 
applied in a discriminatory manner’ and if based for the purpose of protecting morals, the 
restriction ‘must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition’.124 125 
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This means that ‘the objective of the communal aim or interest has to be sufficiently important to 
limit the right; the measure of the limitation has to be suitable and no more than necessary to 
defend the communal interest in question’.126 
The balancing exercise that is integral to International Human Rights law differs in several 
aspects from the one that underpins the human rights due diligence concept under the UNGPs.  
The due diligence concept in international human rights law attempts to strike a balance between 
the communal interest and the human right of the individual. The balancing exercise that relates 
to the human rights due diligence concept is aimed at finding a balance between the private 
interests of the company and individual and/or community interests. The factors that are 
determinate for finding this balance are private interest factors related to risk to human rights and 
care by the company. 
The balancing of economic interests against individual/communal interests may not be 
controversial from a human rights perspective.  One could argue that the realization of human 
rights is not only the prerogative of the human rights of individuals, but also that of the 
community in promoting economic development. The relation between international peace and 
security, the creation of conditions of economic and social progress and development, and the 
promotion and protection of human rights is recognized in Art. 55 of the UN Charter. The 
positive impacts that business enterprises and markets can have on the realization of human 
rights are well known. These can entail achieving concrete outcomes for the realization of human 
rights, for instance by providing access to credit, education, food and water through private 
service delivery. Business enterprises can also contribute to improvement of social conditions or 
economic development. 
The significance of the positive contribution of business enterprises to human rights was 
acknowledged in HRC Resolution 17/4. The Resolution signaled next to the importance of 
effectively mitigating the negative, also the significance of fully realizing the positive impacts of 
globalization and of deriving maximally the benefits of the activities of business enterprises.127 
The HRC also recognized that proper regulation, including through national legislation, of 
business enterprises can assist in channeling the benefits of business towards contributing to the 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.128 129 
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The balancing exercise that underpins the human rights due diligence concept as set out in the 
UNGPs thus could be justified from a human rights perspective. The due diligence concept 
seems to require companies to adopt measures that are sufficient to prevent and mitigate their 
potential and actual adverse human rights impacts without interrupting companies in their pursuit 
of economic objectives more than necessary, with the aim of achieving the most optimal 
outcome for human rights. This seems to align with the objective of the UNGPs, which is 
‘enhancing standards and practices with regard to business and human rights so as to achieve 
tangible results for affected individuals and communities, and thereby also contributing to a 
socially sustainable globalization’. 
When comparing the human rights due diligence concept as defined by the UNGPs with the due 
diligence concept as it exists in international human rights law, however, several concerns arise.  
These can be explained in relation to the fact that the human rights due diligence concept builds 
on the language of corporate law and is not human rights-based. 
The balancing exercise is oriented towards the business enterprise and whether it acted to the 
best of its abilities, in view of its capabilities and circumstances. The interests of individuals are 
balanced against the economic/business interests of a company to take action that is sufficient 
and commensurate to the capabilities of the company. Depending on one’s viewpoint, the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights may encourage a ‘good enough’ due diligence130 
or does not allow companies to get away lightly. The former viewpoint suggests that the focus is 
not on achieving the maximum level of outcome in its objective of managing the adverse human 
rights risk, but on achieving the minimal constraints possible on business enterprises while 
managing adverse human rights impacts. The human rights due diligence that is sufficient and 
the least burdensome on the company ought to be chosen. The corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights may also be understood as an assessment of whether all measures that are within 
the companies’ capabilities have been taken to manage risk to human rights. The human rights 
due diligence concept appears to supply arguments that point into the direction of business 
enterprises and their interests. Both interpretations reflect that the due diligence concept 
originates from corporate law and the human rights due diligence concept is business-oriented. 
Consequently, business interests in managing adverse human rights impacts seem to be at the 
center of the balance act.  If human rights risks had been at the center, the balancing exercise 
would have been oriented towards strengthening and reinforcing the processes and policies of 
companies to achieve full respect for human rights, rather than finding the most practical and 
economically efficient solution for business enterprises.131  Only when the risk of adverse human 
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rights impacts meets a threshold of severity, the focus of responsibility shifts towards the 
technical measures that are necessary to achieve the objective of effectively avoiding and 
mitigating adverse human rights impacts, and the practical economic/business interests of the 
company become of lesser importance. 
The balancing exercise is also corporate-centric in that the company is the broker, and will 
ultimately be responsible for finding the appropriate balance.132  This is in part because the 
balancing exercise evolves around what constitutes ‘appropriate’ policies and processes.  To the 
extent that what constitutes as ‘appropriate’ depends on the circumstances of the company, 
which the company is in the best position to assess, the company seems best positioned to 
determine what policies and policies are ‘appropriate’ to discharge its responsibility.  This is 
more so because the balancing exercise is determined by factors that are not only related to 
human rights but also to the economic/business interests (e.g., size and structure of the 
company).  The requirement for meaningful engagement and consultation of expertise in order to 
obtain a proper understanding of the adverse human rights risks from a right-holder perspective 
may expose the decision-making of the company to external scrutiny and influence, the ultimate 
decision falls to the company. 
Business enterprises thus seem to be in the driver seat.  Insofar that human rights due diligence 
allows for discretion to companies to determine by what policies and practices to manage 
adverse human rights risks, companies may want to influence the balancing act to their 
advantage, as a function of the company’s pursuit of economic objectives.  Business enterprises 
may exercise influence over this balancing act not only to safeguard their own commercial 
interests within particular situations, but also to ensure that interpretations of human rights due 
diligence keep within their convenience. This is in part because the activities of business 
enterprises are conditioned by their legal and incentive structures that are coupled to economic 
normative frameworks. While the human rights due diligence concept is intended to 
revolutionize existing approaches to due diligence in the interest of human rights, the question 
arises whether this can be achieved in practice.  Can these economic legal and incentive 
structures be reconciled with the human rights due diligence concept? 
One may also consider the complexities involved in the balancing exercise where human rights 
interests are concerned.133  The balancing exercise is complicated by the different and possibly 
conflicting interests that decision-making by the company can give rise to and the possible 
conflicting priorities that call for choices and trade-offs between human rights interests.  The 
prerogative to conduct a balancing exercise between human rights interests commonly falls to 
the State and within the public national and international state/law system.  The human rights due 
diligence concept entails that business enterprises may also need to consider and make difficult 
trade-offs in relation to conflicting human rights interests, which is something that business 
enterprises are commonly not familiar with.  This raises the question whether undemocratic 
private corporations should exercise the ample discretion that comes with such policy decisions 
and balancing acts.134 
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Depending on the situation, resolving conflicting interests can involve complexity in terms of the 
diversity and range of interest that need to be considered, and competing priorities and trade-offs.  
Conflicting interests may arise over competing human rights risks or issues, competing human 
rights claims of different social groups or communities, long-term v. short-term interests in 
considering human rights impacts, human rights that are enjoyed in the community (e.g., 
freedom of association, rights of members of minorities, the freedom to manifest one’s religion 
or belief) and those enjoyed by individuals, the human rights interests of a more disadvantaged 
group and a more advantaged group, and the community interests of long-term economic success 
of business enterprises and short-term human rights interests. 
 Human Rights Due Diligence as an Open-Ended and Adaptable Concept 5.5
The human right due diligence concept as formulated in the UNGPs is undefined to a certain 
degree.  The fact that it is articulated at a level of abstraction can be explained by its nature as a 
principle. The concept is a baseline normative standard that reflects an interpretation of existing 
international social expectations. The SRSG derived this concept by a process of interpretation of 
existing standards and practices, which involved fact-based research projects and extensive 
consultations. The corporate responsibility to respect and the human rights due diligence concept 
enjoy acceptance by business enterprises. As a result of the anonymous consensus reached on the 
UNGPs within the HRC, the concept also enjoys certain recognition among States. The corporate 
responsibility to respect reflects a core concept, the elements and parameters of which, as 
outlined above, are not supposed to be challenged.135 
Beyond this core however, there is discretion to business enterprises and other actors to translate 
the human rights due diligence concept to practice.  There is discretion for companies to decide 
the type and scope of the measures business enterprises seek to meet their responsibility.  Its 
effective implementation may require means of different scale and complexity depending on the 
circumstances of the company, in terms of the size of a company, its nature and operational 
context, and the severity of its adverse human rights impacts.136  The human rights due diligence 
concept supplies arguments that point to the direction of striking an appropriate balance between 
risks and care, without prescribing a particular outcome. 
The ambiguity and openness of the human rights due diligence concept may not be desirable to 
the extent that it reduces the clarity that the UNGPs in themselves were set out to provide.  It can 
lead to uncertainty about what conduct is required from companies for the effective 
implementation of their responsibilities.  Uncertainty can incite non-compliance or diverging 
compliance between companies.  It can also complicate efforts to monitor compliance and to 
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holding business enterprises to account.  The vague language of the UNGPs was a major point of 
critique by civil society organizations.137 
Where the State duty to protect is concerned, the lack of specificity seems less of an issue. The 
State duty to protect reflects the existing legal standards established in international human rights 
law.  If the State duty to protect had been specified in greater detail, this may have introduced a 
standard that would go beyond the existing standard. The normative contribution of the UNGPs 
was not to create any new legal obligations or to affect the human rights obligations of States as 
existed. 
Nothing in these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international law obligations, 
or as limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State may have undertaken or be subject to 
under international law with regard to human rights.138 
While raising legal standards for States is desirable and morally justifiable from a human rights 
viewpoint, doing so would have undermined the SRSG’s claim that the UNGPs did not create 
new legal obligations. To the extent that the UNGPs were intended to reflect international human 
rights law as it exists, rather than, as it should be, openness in language can be considered on 
point. 
International human rights law does not prescribe how States should legislate in order to prevent 
and remedy human rights abuses within their jurisdictions. The SRSG acknowledged that 
‘[w]ithin these parameters, States have discretion as to how to fulfill their duty’, while noting 
that ‘[t]he human rights treaties generally contemplate legislative, administrative and judicial 
measures’.139 The discretion left to States is intended and justified by various considerations. 
First, if international human rights were to prescribe State action, this may result in States being 
obligated to adopt measures that are inappropriate to conditions and situations in a respective 
State. Discretion is left to State to identify and design the measures that best correspond to the 
conditions and factors in domestic jurisdictions, in order to deliver the most optimal results in 
protecting human rights in practice. It is not uncommon, as Kinley and Chambers have pointed 
out, that international human rights instruments are formulated in open-ended language and 
accommodate for flexibility in their interpretation.140 141 While more detailed language can reduce 
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ambiguity, some level of abstraction seems necessary to facilitate interpretations of substantive 
treaty provisions that are in conformity with the object and purpose of international human rights 
law and evolving circumstances. International human rights treaties are ‘living instruments’ that 
must be interpreted in light of present-day conditions.142 Since the object and purpose of 
international human rights law is to protect individual human beings, its provisions must ‘be 
interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective’.143 
Second, discretion also gives States a degree of flexibility to adopt measures in proportion to 
their capacities. The ICESCR appreciates this when considering that States enjoy certain 
discretion when adopting measures to discharge their international legal duties under the 
ICESCR. The economic, social and cultural rights in this convention are to be achieved 
progressively. It follows that States have an obligation to take appropriate measures towards the 
full realization of these human rights, to the maximum of their available resources.144 That what 
constitutes ‘appropriate’ measures is relative to the resources that a State has at its disposal.  
States are free to decide what means are most appropriate in light of circumstances with respect 
to each right.145  Means can include, but are not limited to administrative, financial, educational 
and social measures.146 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has held that 
legal measures may be indispensable in certain purposes.147 The discretion of States to choose 
‘appropriate’ measures allows States to adopt legislation, or other measures, that are right for 
achieving the most optimal protection of human rights under prevailing circumstances. 
The jurisprudence of the ECHR shows that courts generally exercise restraint in reviewing 
State’s practices in implementing their international human rights obligations under domestic 
legislation.148 In cases where the ECHR was asked to review the necessity of restrictive measures 
                                                                                                                                                       
differences and disparities among legal situations of Member States make it difficult to identify a uniform 
human rights standard.  It rests on the understanding that in certain contexts, States are considered to be in a 
better position than judges to assess their national circumstances.  Social conditions and developments must be 
taken into account in function of the special object and purpose of human rights treaties, which call for an 
objective and dynamic reading. Clare Ovey & Robin C.A. White, Jacobs And White: European Convention on 
Human Rights, 52-55 (2006). 
 142 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 15-16 (1978). Lozidou v. Turkey, App. 
No. 15318/89, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, ¶ 71, (1995). 
 143 Lozidou v. Turkey, Id. ¶ 72. Soering v The United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, at 34 
(1989). Artico v. Italy, App. 6694/74, Eur. H.R. Rep. 4, at 16 (1980). 
 144 The ICESCR states in Art. 2: ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.’ 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2, Dec.  16, 1966, General Assembly 
resolution 2200A (XXI). 
 145 U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No.3: The Nature of States 
Parties’ Obligations (Art.  2, Para.  1, of the Covenant), E/1991/23, 5th Sess. (Dec.14, 1990). 
 146 Id. ¶ 7. 
 147 Id. ¶ 3.  
 148 Christian Tomuschat, Democracy and the Rule of Law, in Oxford Handbooks of International Human Rights 
Law, 14 (Dinah Shelton ed. 2013). 
  197 
State adopted in protection of the public interest, the court upheld the doctrine of the ‘margin of 
appreciation’.  The ECHR has left a margin to the State and its legislative and judicial bodies 
charged with interpreting and applying the laws.149  The difficulty of discerning the existence of 
uniform human rights standards in the case of disparities among legal situations in Member 
States due to the rapid evolution of opinions on a subject has served as a justification for 
upholding this doctrine.  States are better positioned than judges to assess the national 
circumstances in this context, because they are in more direct and continuous contact with the 
vital forces in their country, the argument holds.150  The Court also has pointed to its subsidiary 
role in safeguarding human rights, hence showing deference to States whose authority derives 
from its democratic mandate and who is first in line to secure the protection of rights of the 
ECHR.151 
What could explain the openness in the language of the UNGPs in relation to corporate 
responsibility to respect?  The openness seems to provide companies with a measure of 
discretion to design their human rights policy and human rights due diligence processes in a 
manner that is mindful of the contextual factors external and internal to the business, while 
keeping within the parameters set by the UNGPs.  The UNGPs thus do not prescribe means that 
would be inappropriate or ineffective in factual situations.152  Rather than assuming that certain 
means are appropriate a priori, the suitability of measures is to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.  The UNGPs suggest that business responses are to be determined inductively and in 
consultation with stakeholders and expertise. 
The lack of specificity allows for responsiveness to contextual changes and for business 
enterprises to adjust their means over time.  This is important, for instance, where evolving 
operations and operating contexts of a company create changes in human rights risks and calls 
for different responses.153  The UNGPs emphasis that human rights due diligence should be 
‘ongoing’ testifies to the importance of being responsive to changing business challenges.154  
Arguably, if human rights due diligence would have been formulated in more strict terms, this 
may have impeded companies from responding most optimally to such changing challenges 
posed by changing context.  If more specific language had inhibited an optimal response, this 
may have incentivized non-compliance by companies. 
                                                
 149 Handyside v The United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, ¶ 48 (1976). 
 150 Id. ¶ 48. 
 151 Id. ¶ 48. 
 152 Hence, the UN Guiding Prinicples reference to ‘one size does not fit all’. See UNGPs, introduction, para. 15.  
The leeway left by the UNGPs can be seen as a deliberate step by the SRSG to respond to critique of the 
business community about a ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ not being able to accommodate for the diversity in 
factors that affect the capacity of a company to impact on human rights.  David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, 
Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to 
human rights  97 The American Journal of International Law 901, 911(2003). 
 153 UNGPs, supra note 7, GP 17 (c). 
 154 Id. GP 17 (c). 
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To the extent that it cannot be determined a priori what measures will be most appropriate in 
light of diverging contexts, distinct challenges, evolving social expectations and conditions,155 
openness in language seems suited.  Openness serves the function of achieving the objective of 
the UNGPs in a most optimal manner, which may require different conduct and combination of 
measures by States and companies.156  The introduction to the UNGPs stipulates; 
While the Principles themselves are universally applicable, the means by which they are 
realized will reflect the fact that we live in a world of 192 United Nations Member States, 
80,000 transnational enterprises, 10 times as many subsidiaries and countless millions of 
national firms, most of which are small- and medium-sized enterprises.  When it comes to 
means for implementation, therefore, one size does not fit all.157 
Greater specificity in the UNGPs could have undermined the global and universal applicability 
of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights.  The SRSG noted, ‘situational variations 
will always exist, but they cannot and should not become the basis for general and universally 
applicable principles’.158  The corporate responsibility to respect human rights was intended to 
reflect a globally applicable social norm.  Specifying this norm in further detail may have been 
premature, in part because of the complexity involved.159 
The vague wording of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights can be said to reflect 
the indeterminate nature of international social expectations, and the extent to which a more 
detailed norm may not grasp acceptance of these social expectations globally.  This does not 
negate the in-principle universal nature of a more detailed social norm, or the justification of 
such a norm from a moral viewpoint.160  The social expectations of business enterprises may be 
difficult to discern where they are unwritten, and in the process of formation. 
If the UNGPs had been drafted in greater detail, global support and acceptance for the UNGPs 
furthermore may not have been forthcoming.  Founding the corporate responsibility to respect on 
social expectations rather than legal obligations lifted certain legal and political constraints from 
the development of norms.  The political and legal constraints that applied to the mandate were 
                                                
 155 The SRSG seems to deliberately frame this responsibility in vague wording to accommodate business concerns 
about a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach that would not provide companies with the flexibility they deemed 
necessary to address unique human rights challenges faced in their operations and operating contexts. 
 156 UNGPs, supra note 7, at 1. 
 157 Id. Introduction, ¶ 15. 
 158 J. Ruggie, Note on ISO 26000 Guidance Draft Document, 3 (Nov. 2009), 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/bhr/files/Ruggie-note-re-ISO-26000-Nov-2009.PDF 
 159 A company survey by the German Global Compact Network and ecosense on the usage of tools to implement 
the UNGPs found that a high degree of abstraction of the UNGPs was illustrative of the complexity of the topic 
of business and human rights. 
160 From a moral viewpoint, there is widespread support for argument that the need to protect human dignity 
demands that both states and non-state actors observe fundamental rights.  Business enterprises are no 
exception. Peter Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility, in The Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law, 655 (Peter Muchlinski, et al.  eds., 2008). See Philip Alston, Non-State Actors and Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press. 2005) and A.  Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 
(Oxford University Press.  2006). 
  199 
hardly conducive to opting for a progressive interpretation on the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights.  Knox notes that the SRSG felt the need to underspecify some aspects of 
the corporate responsibility to avert criticism and build political support for his project.161 
According to some who adopt a more critical stance, stakeholders were prepared to support the 
UNGPs because they lacked detail. This was despite the different agendas of these stakeholders.  
Openness in the language of the UNGPs thus seemed to have facilitated consensus building.  
Kinley and Chambers make a similar observation in relation to the vague wording of the UN 
Norms; ‘the fact that they are open-ended is not only unexceptional, it is also necessary to 
achieve international consensus on the subject and to enable all parties to relate to the 
initiative’.162  Mares goes further by pointing to the human rights due diligence as an instrumental 
concept that, because of its match to business operations, was uniquely able to facilitate this 
process of securing convergence between stakeholders and to set in motion a governance regime 
evolution.163 
 Conclusion 5.6
This chapter focused on human rights due diligence as a standard of performance. The UNGPs 
define the corporate responsibility as a negative obligation that business enterprises ‘should 
avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts 
with which they are involved’.164 165 This responsibility imposes on companies a requirement to 
be pro-active in order to avoid and address human rights impacts.  Companies are responsible for 
undertaking a human rights due diligence process to ‘identify, prevent, mitigate and account for 
how they address their impacts on human rights’. This process should, at a minimum, encompass 
the following elements; ‘assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and 
acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed’.166  
This chapter reflected on the implications of the effective operationalization of this human rights 
due diligence requirement by comparison with existing approaches to due diligence in corporate 
law. 
The SRSG articulates the human rights due diligence concept in open-ended language, hence the 
exact conduct that is expected from business enterprises is not exactly clear.  This quality allows 
for flexibility of facts and circumstances in the application of the human rights due diligence 
                                                
 161 John H. Knox, The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations, in The UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation, 66 (R. Mares ed.  2012).  
 162 David Kinley & Rachel Chambers, supra note 140, at 20.  
 163 R.  Mares, “Respect” Human Rights: Concept and Convergence, p. 53-4 (forthcoming in Law, Business and 
Human Rights: Bridging the Gap (Robert C.  Bird, Daniel R. Cahoy, & Jamie Darin Prenkert, eds., Elgar 
Publishing Ltd., forthcoming 2014). 
 164 UNGPs, supra note 7, at 11. 
 165 The linkage of the responsibility to respect human rights to the human rights due diligence concept is a 
departure from the ‘sphere of influence’ concept that had been adhered to until then to apply human rights 
responsibilities to business enterprises.  The scope of this obligation is delineated on the basis of the potential 
and actual impacts that a company’s operations or business relationships have on internationally recognized 
human rights and that the company is involved in by way of causation, contribution or direct linkage. 
 166 UNGPs, supra note 7, GP 17. 
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concept to companies. The due diligence standard entails a judgement of whether the policies 
and processes that a company has in place are sufficient and appropriate to avoid and address 
adverse human rights impacts. This test and corresponding balancing exercise resembles the duty 
of care standard that exists under national (tort) law of non-contractual obligations. 
This flexibility furthermore makes the human rights due diligence concept adaptable, capable of 
transcending different areas of law and lends the concept for effective implementation and 
enforcement in different areas of national law. This openness allows for further clarification, 
which should be provided by States through the integration of the human rights due diligence 
concept into law. The legitimacy and authority that derives from their democratic mandate 
entails that the clarifications by States carry authoritative weight, and more weight than those 
provided by private voluntary initiatives, for instance. While the UNGPs view a role for 
private/hybrid voluntary initiatives in the further crystallization of the human rights due diligence 
concept, their interpretations cannot be treated as equivalent or be given the same recognition as 
the definition of public institutions, mainly for this reason. The human rights due diligence 
concept would furthermore need to be defined in line with constitutional and human rights 
provisions that bind the State under national and international law. States may contribute to the 
clarification of the due diligence concept through the implementation of the concept in domestic 
legislation and regulation, or as a result of domestic adjudication.167 
National authorities can refer to the human rights due diligence concept to address gaps in 
human rights protection. This concept can give direction to national authorities when revisiting 
rules and regulations for the purpose of realigning them with the expectation that business 
enterprises ensure the respect for human rights by reference to universally recognized human 
rights standards and principles. It provides minimum substantive content and parameters around 
which conflicting concepts in these law can be resolved and convergence created. At the same 
time, the exact definition and implications of the concept may be further defined by reference to 
the respective objectives of these laws and regulations. The exact definition of human rights due 
diligence would thus be the result of the interaction between the International Human Rights law 
that provides the benchmark that business conduct should be assessed against, the national laws 
and regulations that give rise to the human rights due diligence obligation and their object and 
purpose, and the conditions identified in the UNGPs and their strategic objective. 
                                                
 167 Humberto Fernando Cantú Rivera, Business & Human Rights: From a “Responsibility to Respect” to Legal 
Obligations and Enforcement, in Human Rights and Business: Direct Corporate Accountability for Human 
Rights, 320 (Jernej Letnar Černič & Tara Van Ho eds., 2015). 
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 The Role of Tort Law and Private International Law in Operationalizing the Human 6
Rights Due Diligence Concept: Towards a Presumption of a Legal Duty of Human 
Rights Due Diligence  
 
 Introduction 6.1
This chapter will examine the legal implications of effectively operationalizing the human rights 
due diligence as defined in the UNGPs through tort law and EU and national private 
international law. The chapter is structured according to the following four sections: 
The first section (Section 6.2.) will examine the intertwinement of private international law with 
human rights in general and, more specifically, with human rights due diligence. Connections 
will also be explored in relation to jurisdiction and the applicable law in the context of tort 
liability cases. The section finds that the human rights due diligence concept can have a role in 
court’s decisions on jurisdiction and which country’s substantive law to apply to the underlying 
dispute. 
The second section (Section 6.3) explores in detail the three main approaches to establishing 
civil liability of a parent entity for human rights breaches that are the result of the activities of its 
subsidiary when the latter, as it is often the case, enters into a business relationship outside the 
EU. These three approaches are: (i) negligence; (ii) complicity; and (iii) piercing the corporate 
veil. The purpose is to determine which role, if any, human rights due diligence has in courts’ 
consideration of the liability issue. It is concluded that the human rights due diligence concept 
can and, arguably, should have a role in court’s decisions on how to construe a legal duty of care 
standard and when to attribute liability to a parent company. 
This section (Section 6.3.5.) also examines the extent to which the three approaches to parent 
liability referred to in the preceding paragraph are challenged by and can be reconciled with the 
concept of human rights due diligence. It is found that these approaches are grounded in the 
underlying notion of ‘sphere of influence’. This concept is not the most adequate basis for 
assigning responsibility to a company.1 It will be argued that, if the human rights due diligence 
concept is to be operationalized in an optimal manner, a rebuttable presumption of a legal duty of 
care as the standard for liability should be established. Such presumption should be construed on 
the basis of the human rights due diligence as defined by the UNGPs.  
The third Section (Section 6.4) will set out how the human rights due diligence concept can (and 
should) define the elements of substantive liability. Inherent to this concept are actors, factors 
and relationships that companies should consider in order to prevent adverse human rights 
impacts. The possibility of creating a legal duty of care through statute will be discussed next. 
Finally, a reference will be made to the proposed French law creating a legal duty of vigilance, 
since it constitutes a particularly illustrative example of how such duty of care can work in 
practice. Amendments to EU private international law will also be suggested. These would allow 
                                                
 1  Human Rights Council, Clarifying the Concepts of "Sphere of influence" and "Complicity", ¶ 30 U.N.Doc. 
A/HRC/8/16 (May 15, 2008). 
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individuals seeking justice to proceed to the substantive liability stage more expediently and to 
ensure that the legal duty of care is defined by the highest standard. 
The conclusion is that, if existing doctrines and approaches were to be revisited and applied in 
order to accommodate the human rights due diligence concept, some of the barriers that victims 
currently face, in order to obtain redress from human rights violations would be lifted and the 
feasibility of direct foreign liability claims enhanced. Moreover, the connexions between the 
current approaches and the human rights due diligence concept are sufficient to support the view 
that these approaches can be reconciled with human rights due diligence. 
 Private International Law, Human Rights and Human Rights Due Diligence 6.2
This section will set out the key considerations governing the intertwinement between (mainly, 
but not exclusively, EU) private international law and human rights, and human rights due 
diligence. As it is customary in the domain of private international law, I will separately analyse 
jurisdiction (see Section 6.2.1) from choice of law (see Section 6.2.2).  
6.2.1 Jurisdiction: the Brussels I Regulation / Brussels Recast 
6.2.1.1 Preliminary Considerations 
One of the first hurdles that victims face when starting civil proceedings before certain Western 
jurisdictions in tort liability cases is finding access to courts. In this section I will set out how, 
while access to courts for tort liability cases deriving from human right breaches is relatively 
straightforward if the human rights violation has been committed by an EU domiciled entity, that 
is far from being the case in relation to non EU domiciled entities (even if, as it is often the case 
these are the subsidiaries of EU domiciled entities). Given that the latter scenario is often the 
most common in foreign direct liability cases related to human rights, one cannot but wonder 
which has been the influence in this field of the Union being founded on the respect of human 
rights, as required by Article 2 Treaty on the European Union (TEU).2 
6.2.1.2 Brussels I Regulation and Brussels Recast and Human Rights: Main Provisions 
Accessing courts for tort-liability claims brought against a parent company domiciled in the EU 
has not posed a major obstacle in European civil law countries and countries that belong to the 
so-called Brussels I Regime. Victims have been able to rely on the 2001 Brussels I Regulation, 
Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil 
and commercial matters (Brussels I Regulation) that governs the jurisdiction and enforcement of 
judgments in the main civil and commercial matters3, including foreign direct liability cases 
related to human rights. The Brussels I Regulation4 is directly applicable5 and, under the doctrine 
                                                
 2  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, 13-46, October 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1 
[hereinafter TEU]. 
 3  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), Recital 
10, 2012 O.J. (L351) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Recast]. 
 4  The Brussels I Regulation replaced the Brussels Convention of 1968. ‘The Convention continues to apply with 
respect to those territories of EU countries that fall within its territorial scope and that are excluded from the 
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of Primacy of EU law,6 takes precedence over national law in the EU Member States. Changes to 
this text were adopted in the form of a re-cast version of this Regulation (‘Brussels Recast’) in 
2012, which entered into force and superseded the 2001 Brussels I Regulation in January 2015. 
Brussels Recast applies ‘to legal proceedings instituted, to authentic instruments formally drawn 
up or registered and to court settlements approved or concluded on or after 10 January 2015’.7  
Both Brussels I Regulation / Brussels Recast facilitate access to courts for individuals in a 
limited and well defined number of tort liability cases. A court in an EU Member States cannot 
decline jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if this defendant is domiciled in that EU Member 
State. Pursuant to Article 4 Brussels Recast, ‘persons domiciled in a Member State shall, 
whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State’.8 The jurisdiction of the 
national courts of an EU Member State is thus determined on the basis of the domicile of the 
defendant, which constitutes the necessary connection between the case and the territory of the 
EU Member State. Consequently, criteria other than domicile, e.g., the nationality of the plaintiff 
or the locus of the alleged tort, do not pre-empt the application of the Brussels I Regulation to 
foreign direct liability claims brought against a parent company domiciled in the EU.9  
Brussels Recast identifies three factors on the basis of which the domicile of a company can be 
established for the purpose of this Regulation.10 Article 63 Brussels Recast provides that a 
company is domiciled at the place where it has its: (a) a statutory seat; (b) central administration 
or; (c) principal place of business.11 12 Brussels Recast upholds a broad definition of domicile, 
which enables courts to assert jurisdiction over suits against a wide range of companies, provided 
that there is a ‘real connection’ between the defendant and the Member State.13 This includes 
companies that have their statutory seat elsewhere, but whose ‘principal place of business’ is 
located in an EU Member State.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Regulation pursuant to Article 299 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (now Article 355 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).` Commission Staff Working Document on Implementing 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights - State of Play, SWD(2015) 144 final, 24-25 (Jul. 14, 
2015) [hereinafter Commission Staff Working Document].  
 5  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 288, October 26, 2012, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 1 [hereinafter TFEU]. According to Article 288 TFEU, ‘A regulation shall have general 
application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.’ 
 6  Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585, 593. 
 7  Brussels Recast, supra note 3, art. 66. 
 8  Id. art 4. 
 9  Jan Wouters & Cedric Ryngaerts, Litigation for Overseas Corporate Human Rights Abuses in the European 
Union: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, 40 The George Washington International Law Review 939, 7 (2009). 
Case C-412/98, Societe Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v Compagnie d’ Assurances Universal General 
Insurance Company, 2000 E.C.R. I-5925, ¶¶ 57, 59.  
 10  Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 4, at 24.  
 11  Brussels Recast, supra note 3, art. 63. 
 12  The court applies its rules of Private International Law to determine the seat of the company. Id. art. 24(2). 
 13  Young v Anglo American South Africa Limited & Ors [2014] EWCA Civ 1130. [39] 
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The UK Court of Appeal clarified in Young v Anglo American South Africa Limited & Ors the 
interpretation of then Article 60(1) Brussels 1 Regulation (now Article 63 Brussels Recast) in 
relation to where a company has its domicile for the purpose of the Brussels I Regulation, and 
more specifically where it has its ‘central administration’. The court indicated that the ‘central 
administration’ is the place ‘where the company concerned, through its relevant organs 
according to its own constitutional provisions, takes the decisions that are essential for that 
company’s operations’, that is ‘the place where the company, through its relevant organs, 
conducts its entrepreneurial management’.14 The court distinguished ‘central administration’ 
from ‘the place of incorporation’ and ‘the principal place of business’, noting that: 
the first is the domicile for the purpose of the internal laws of the state where the 
company is incorporated. It will usually be identified in its Memorandum and Articles of 
Association or equivalent. The third is the place where the company does its principal 
‘business’. Where that is must be a question of fact in each case.15 
While the rules provided for by the Brussels I Regulation apply not only to EU Member States, 
but also to the EFTA countries that acceded to the 2007 Lugano Convention,16 this is not the case 
for Brussels Recast. The 2007 Lugano Convention has not yet been adapted to Brussels Recast. 
As a result, the rules governing jurisdiction in the EFTA countries may be similar to those in EU 
Member States, however, they are not exactly identical to those provided under Brussels Recast.  
Brussels Recast does not contain a sweeping rule governing jurisdiction in relation to defendants 
that are not domiciled in an EU Member State, along the lines of the rules on jurisdiction 
described in the preceding paragraphs. Consequently, that Regulation does not ensure that the 
courts of EU Member States will have jurisdiction in tort liability cases over third-country 
(parent) companies or business relationships (e.g., subsidiaries, contractors or suppliers) that do 
not qualify as ‘domiciled’ pursuant to Articles 4 and 63 Brussels Recast.  
The existence of jurisdiction in relation to these defendants will be determined by the domestic 
rules of the EU Member State in which the court seized is located. The rules on whether a court 
may assert jurisdiction over a defendant or not, and the role of human right considerations play 
in these scenarios, if any, may vary according to these domestic laws.17  
However jurisdiction in direct tort-liability cases involving such defendants may still be asserted 
under Brussels Recast. More specifically, the provisions that may be relevant in tort-liability 
cases relate to the prorogation of jurisdiction (Article 25), and consumer contracts (Article 17-
                                                
 14  Id. at 45. 
 15  Id. at 39. Also see Geert van Calster, Anglo American: The Court of Appeal on ‘Central Administration’ in 
Brussels-I, GAVC LAW (Sept. 16, 2014, 7:07 AM), http://gavclaw.com/2014/09/16/anglo-american-the-court-
of-appeal-on-central-administration-in-brussels-i/. 
 16  Recital 9 of the recast Regulation notes that ‘the 1968 Brussels Convention continues to apply to the territories 
of the Member States which fall within the territorial scope of that Convention and which are excluded from 
this Regulation pursuant to Article 355 of the TFEU’. Brussels Recast, supra note 3, Recital 9. 
 17  Geert van Calster, L`EEX nouveau (ofte: Brussel Ibis) est arrivé. De hervorming van de moeder van het 
Europees Internationaal Privaatrecht, Rechtskundig Weekblad, 1443, 1450 (2015). 
  205 
18) or employment contracts (Article 21). It should be stressed that these rules have remained 
largely unchanged from the original Brussels I Regulation. 
The court in an EU Member State has jurisdiction over a third-country defendant if the parties to 
the dispute have agreed to confer jurisdiction on the court over the legal relationship involved in 
the dispute, provided that such agreement is valid under the law of the EU Member State of the 
court seized.18 In the context of foreign tort liabilities, it seems unlikely that the defendant will 
agree to confer jurisdiction to the court of an EU Member State since doing so is often 
unfavourable to its interests. 
Brussels Recast contains rules that provide alternative grounds of jurisdiction for courts in 
disputes to which such defendant may be a party and the subject matter is a consumer or 
employment contracts. These rules also require a nexus between the proceedings and the territory 
of an EU Member State.19 The existence of these requirements underpins the problematic 
application of the EU rules on jurisdiction in relation to foreign direct liability cases.  
Article 18(1) Brussels Recast establishes jurisdiction over a defendant that is not domiciled in the 
EU where the party instigating the proceedings is a consumer bringing a suit before a court in the 
EU Member State where the consumer is domiciled.20 The requirement that the claimant is a 
consumer and domiciled in an EU Member State is usually not satisfied in tort liability cases 
deriving from breaches of human rights. Indeed, these cases are typically brought by an 
individual that is not domiciled in an EU Member State.  
Article 17(2) Brussels Recast treats a defendant that has its domicile outside the EU as domiciled 
in an EU Member State if it has entered into a consumer contract and its branch, agency or other 
establishment that gives rise to the dispute is situated in this EU Member State. The connecting 
factor, that is the location of the establishment that gives rise to the dispute on the territory of the 
EU Member State, is usually not there in a typical foreign tort liability case.   
Pursuant to Articles 21(1) an (2) Brussels Recast, a court in an EU Member State may not reject 
jurisdiction over a defendant that is not domiciled in the EU if the defendant is an employer and 
the employee habitually carries out or last carried out work in or from the EU Member State 
where the employee brings the proceedings.21 The connecting factors are the activities of the 
employee, or alternatively the presence of the business engaging the employee in these activities, 
on the territory of an EU Member State.  
A court may thus find a legal basis for jurisdiction under this rule in tort liability cases where the 
claimant is an employee of a subsidiary entity that does not have its domicile in the EU but 
where the employee habitually carries or carried out work in one or more EU Member States. 
However, this scenario is not common in tort liability cases. 
                                                
 18  Brussels Recast, supra note 3, art. 25. 
 19  In order for a court to accept jurisdiction over a third-country party to the claim, there must be a connecting 
factor. Id. art.13. 
 20  Id. art. 18(1). 
 21  Id. art. 21(2). 
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The rules in Brussels Recast that provide alternative grounds for jurisdiction do not typically 
apply in tort liability cases involving human rights: as set out in the preceding paragraphs, the 
necessary connection for the Court of a EU Member State to be in a position to assert jurisdiction 
is simply not there. An explanation for the inability of these EU rules on jurisdiction to 
meaningfully enhance access to justice in direct tort liability cases deriving from human rights 
breaches may be that human rights considerations did not figure prominently among the 
objectives of the original 1968 Brussels Convention, the Brussels 1 Regulation and the review 
process which resulted in the adoption of the Brussels Recast in 2012.  
Indeed, the aim of the European Commission with Brussels Recast was to facilitate equal access 
to court for claimants and defendants domiciled in the EU. The main rationale for the rules under 
Brussels Recast creating jurisdiction regardless of the defendant’s domicile was to ‘ensure the 
protection of consumers and employees, to safeguard the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
Member States in situations where they have exclusive jurisdiction and to respect the autonomy 
of the parties’.22 The amendments were partly aimed to guarantee through jurisdictional rules the 
enforcement of the rights of ‘weaker parties’ guaranteed by EU law.23 Recital 15 notes that 
exceptions to the general rule of jurisdiction are justified in ‘a few well-defined situations’.24 
Additional protection may be afforded to weaker parties depending on the subject matter of the 
dispute and the autonomy of the parties.25 The weaker parties to which the rules in Brussels 
Recast afford enhanced protection do not include victims of human rights abuse, but only those 
who are party to an insurance, consumer or employment contract.26 Neither does Brussels Recast 
expressly refer to human rights as a subject area that warrants additional protections to the 
parties in the disputes.  
6.2.1.3 The Forum Necessitatis Doctrine  
Human rights consideration did underpin an alternative proposal by the EU Commission to 
integrate the forum necessitatis doctrine into the Brussels I Regime. The forum necessitatis 
doctrine enables a court to accept jurisdiction in a dispute if there is no other forum available to 
the plaintiffs. The doctrine is commonly used to ensure the right of an EU claimant to a fair trial 
or access to justice. The EU Commission explored the possibility of introducing a forum 
necessitatis rule in Brussels Recast in its 2009 Green Paper on Jurisdiction in Civil and 
Commercial Matters. This suggestion made it into in the legislative proposal that was issued in 
2010, which included the following Article 26:  
 
                                                
 22  Brussels Recast, supra note 3, Recital 14. 
  23  Commission Staff Working Paper, Summary of the Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), at 10, SEC(2010) 1548 final (Dec. 14, 
2010). 
 24  Brussels Recast, supra note 3, Recital 15. 
 25  Id. Recital 15. 
 26  Id. Recital 18. 
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Article 26 
Where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction under this Regulation, the courts of a 
Member State may, on an exceptional basis, hear the case if the right to a fair trial or the 
right to access to justice so requires, in particular: 
(a) if proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or conducted or would be impossible in a 
third State with which the dispute is closely connected; or 
(b) if a judgment given on the claim in a third State would not be entitled to recognition 
and enforcement in the Member State of the court seized under the law of that State and 
such recognition and enforcement is necessary to ensure that the rights of the claimant 
are satisfied;  
and the dispute has a sufficient connection with the Member State of the court seized. 
The provision set out two requirements for a court in an EU Member State to be able accept 
jurisdiction on the basis of the forum necessitatis doctrine. First, jurisdiction would need to be 
necessary to ensure the right of the plaintiff to access to justice or to a fair trial. Second, there 
would need to be a sufficient connection between the dispute and the Member State of the forum 
seized.27  
The forum necessitatis rule is not controversial. The majority of jurisdictions in the EU permits a 
court to hear a case against a third-party defendant on the basis the forum necessitatis doctrine.28 
The doctrine has also been established under another EC Regulation.29 However, the forum 
necessitatis doctrine never made it to the final text of Brussels Recast.30 31  
6.2.1.4 The Forum Connexitatis Doctrine 
Article 8(1) Brussels Recast recognizes the doctrine of forum connexitatis. A court in an EU 
Member State may assume jurisdiction over a defendant that is involved in a dispute brought 
before it, provided that this defendant has a domicile in another EU Member State and there is a 
sufficiently close connection between the two claims. Article 8(1) stipulates: 
                                                
 27  The purpose of the forum necessitatis rule was to create incentives for investing in countries with legal system 
affording insufficient protections. Van Calster, supra note 17, at 1450. 
 28  The forum necessitatis doctrine has been implemented, in amongst other countries, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Poland, Romania, Spain, Estonia, 
Finland, Iceland, Lithuania, Luxembourg and the UK. Stephanie Redfield, Searching for Justice: The Use of 
Forum Necessitatis 45 Georgetown Journal of International Law 893 (2014). 
 29  Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, art. 7, 2009 O.J. (L7)1. 
 30  Geert van Calster, Private International Law, Corporate Social Responsibility and Extraterritoriality, 238 (Hart 
Publishing  2013). Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 4, at 25. 
  31  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, ¶ 3.1.2, COM(2010) 748 final (Dec 14, 2010). 
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A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: 
(1) where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where 
any one of them is domiciled provided the claims are so closely connected that it 
is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgements resulting from separate proceedings 
The rule applies only to situations where the defendant has its domicile in an EU Member State. 
This reduces the rule’s relevance in foreign direct liability cases related to human rights in 
which, as discussed, one of the defendants is usually an entity that is not domiciled in the EU.   
A national equivalent to the forum connexitatis rule can be found in Dutch law, more specifically 
under Article 7(1) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (DCCP). Article 7(1) DCCP reads as 
follows:  
In the event that the Dutch court has jurisdiction over one of the defendants in matters 
that must be initiated by a writ of summons, the Dutch court also has jurisdiction over 
other defendants involved in the same proceedings, provided the claims against the 
various defendants are connected to such an extent that reasons of efficiency justify a 
joint hearing.32   
This provision permits a court to accept jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if this defendant 
has jurisdiction over another defendant and there is a connection between the claims that is 
sufficient to justify a joint hearing for reasons of efficiency. Unlike its EU equivalent, Article 
7(1) DCCP does not require that one or both of the defendants is domiciled in an EU Member 
State, hence its scope of applicability in tort liability cases is broader.  
Article 7(1) DCCP became the focus of contention after a Dutch court (more precisely, a District 
Court of The Hague) recognized in Milieudefensie v Shell the existence of a legal basis for it to 
assert jurisdiction over the claims against an entity not domiciled in an EU Member State. Three 
Nigerian farmers and the international NGO Milieudefensie had sued the parent company Royal 
Dutch Shell (RDS) and its Nigerian subsidiary company Shell Petroleum Development Company 
of Nigeria LTD (SPDC) for environmental damages resulting from oil-spills in three villages in 
the Niger Delta. The court allowed the case to proceed since the two requirements under Article 
7(1) DCCP were met, namely: (i) international jurisdiction over the parent company RDS, which 
the The Hague court derived from Articles 2 and 60(1) of the Brussels 1 Regulation,33 and (ii) a 
sufficient connection between the cases justifying a joint hearing of the claims for reason of 
efficiency. The Dutch court held that there was a sufficient connection between the claims 
against RDS and SPDC because both defendants were allegedly liable for the same damage.34 
Finally, the court was of the view that treating the claims jointly was expedient since addressing 
                                                
 32  Court of the Hague, 30 December 2009, 2009, 330891/ HA ZA 09-579, (Vereniging Milieudefensie/Royal 
Dutch Shell PLC and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria LTD) (Neth.), § 3.4. 
 33  Id. § 3.1. 
 34  Id. § 3.6.  
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these claims separately would have required an assessment of the same complex facts in 
Nigeria.35  
The claimants thus successfully relied on Article 7(1) DCCP to initiate joint proceedings against 
RDS and SPDC and to have a court assert jurisdiction over the claims against SPDC, despite the 
fact that SPDC did not have its domicile in an EU Member State. The defendant Shell claimed 
that this move by Milieudefensie amounted to an abuse of Dutch procedural law. According to 
the Shell, Milieudefensie had instigated proceedings against RDS for the sole purpose of 
facilitating jurisdiction against the subsidiary entity SPDC. Shell relied on the argument that it 
was evident beforehand that, under Nigerian law, it was impossible to hold RDS liable for a tort 
of negligence in relation to harm deriving from the activities of a subsidiary entity. According to 
Shell, the claims against RDS could not provide a legal basis for jurisdiction in relation to the 
claims against SPDC. The Dutch district court disagreed, noting that previous legal practice 
showed that it was not impossible, under Nigerian law, for a parent company to incur liability for 
harm resulting from the activities of a subsidiary. Consequently, there had been no abuse of 
process. The court referred to the ruling in Chandler v. Cape as an illustrative example for these 
purposes.36  
On appeal before the The Hague Court of Appeals, the defendant Shell expressed strong 
objection to the court’s decision to recognize international jurisdiction in relation to SPDC on the 
basis of Article 7(1) DCCP. Shell argued that it would be ‘inefficient’ (‘ondoelmatig’) for a 
Dutch court to accept jurisdiction in relation to SPDC, inter alia because it would be too difficult 
for this court to determine the facts and evidence related to activities that occurred exclusively in 
Nigeria. Shell also argued that Nigerian law applied to the case and that the claims against SPDC 
relied on legal rules that had never been accepted before under Nigerian tort law. According to 
Shell there was no precedent under Nigerian law establishing liability of a company for failing to 
take measures to prevent sabotage. According to Shell, the Nigerian case SPDC v Otoko did not 
constitute an authority for these purposes.37 In addition, Shell argued that the Dutch court was not 
suited to develop Nigerian law. This was the more so because this court was unfamiliar with 
Nigerian law and there was no possibility for judicial review of points of dispute by the highest 
court in the Netherlands or the Nigerian Supreme Court.  
The court rejected this argument, as well as certain arguments that Shell advanced in support of 
the view that asserting jurisdiction over the claims against SPDC would amount to an abuse of 
process. Shell noted that the rule of forum connexitatis under Article 7(1) DCCP should be 
applied by analogy to Article 6(1) Brussels 1 Regulation (now Article 8(1) Brussels Recast) and 
that the jurisprudence relating this Article 6(1) was decisive for the case. More specifically, Shell 
argued that the requirements related to Article 6(1) Brussels Regulation as developed through the 
                                                
 35  Id. 
  36  Court of the Hague, 30 January 2013, 2013, C/09/337058 / HA ZA 09-1581 (Barizaa Manson Tete Dooh/ Royal 
Dutch Shell PLC and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria LTD) (Neth.), § 4.3. Also see, 
Liesbeth Enneking, et al., Zorgplichten van Nederlandse ondernemingen inzake international maatschappelijk 
verantwoord ondernemen: Een rechtsvergelijkend and empirisch onderzoek naar de stand van het Nederlandse 
recht in licht van de UN Guiding Principles, 613-614 (Boom Juridisch, 2016). 
 37  Memorie van fase 1 (in zaak F) tevens memorie van grieven in incidenteel appel fase 1(In Zaken A tot en met 
E), De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, Gerechtshof Den Haag, ¶ 24 (Oct. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Memorie].   
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jurisprudence, set a minimum benchmark for the application of Article 7(1) DCCP.38 According 
to Shell, given that Article 7(1) DCCP was more broadly applicable than Article 6(1) Brussels 1 
Regulation, for the reason mentioned above, and a defendant may be drawn into the proceedings 
if the court established anchor jurisdiction over another defendant on any legal basis and the 
requirement of a sufficient connection is satisfied, greater precaution against abuse was 
warranted under the Article 7(1) DCCP.39  
In its appeal judgment, the Dutch court held that legislative history indeed supported the 
existence of a connection between Article 7(1) DCCP and its European equivalent, and noted 
that interpretations of Article 7(1) DCCP should not depart from Article 6 Brussels 1 Regulation, 
at least when it came to the joint treatment for reasons of efficiency. The court thus held that the 
relevant jurisprudence under the equivalent European provision should be considered when 
deciding on the jurisdictional issue under Article 7(1) DCCP. The decision of the court was that 
the requirements of a sufficient connection under Article 7(1) DCCP were met in the 
circumstances of the case. The Court considered the business relationship between the parent and 
the subsidiary and the importance of the activities of the latter in any assessment of parental 
liability. The court also held that the claims against the defendants where similar and shared the 
same factual basis, i.e., the damages that occurred in Nigeria, and gave rise to similar questions 
relating the origin, prevention and remedy of the damages. There was a possibility that these 
questions required further research, which may be best assessed by one judge in order to avoid 
contradictory findings and rulings, the court noted.40  The court also ruled that additional 
precaution against abuse of process in the application of Article 7(1) of the DCCP was not 
warranted given that anchor jurisdiction was established on the basis of the domicile of RDS in 
the Netherlands.41  
Shell argued that there was abuse of process because it was evident beforehand that the claims 
against RDS were impossible and for this reason could not serve as a legal anchor for the court to 
take jurisdiction over SPDC. If the court had assessed the possibility of creating parent liability 
of RDS in the circumstances of the case, according to Shell, it would have arrived at the 
conclusion that the claims against RDS had no chance of success. Under Nigerian law, the legal 
principles of separate legal personality and limited liability shield RDS from liability. The 
conditions under which the veil between the RDS and SPDC may be pierced (fraud, illegality, 
façade, agency) were not applicable in the situation of the case. Shell also argued that tort law 
may recognize a legal duty of care in UK and the US, however there was no legal basis in 
Nigerian tort law for the claim that a legal duty of care attached to a parent company, while 
Nigerian law was the law governing the liability issue in the case. If the Dutch court had 
                                                
 38  The requirements are that the provisions should be interpreted strictly because it entails an exception to the rule 
of forum rei. All circumstances in the case must be considered. The defendant must have reasonably foreseen 
that it would be sued before the Dutch court. A close connection between the cases requires sufficient factual 
and legal coherence between the claims. The burden to demonstrate this connection falls on the claimant. Also, 
the aim of the provision is to avoid irreconcilable judgments on the same issue. Id. ¶ 28.  
 39  Memorie, supra note 37, ¶ 32. Also see, blog post by GVC, http://gavclaw.com/2015/12/03/royal-dutch-shell-
watch-those-stockings-nigeria-rds-judgment-on-appeal-expected-end-december/.  
 40  See Gerechtshof Den Haag, 18 December 2015, 2015, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3587, (Friday Alfred Akpan / 
Royal Dutch Shell PLC en Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria LTD.) (Neth.), § 2.4. 
 41  Id. § 2.7. 
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recognized that a legal duty of care attached to RDS in the circumstances of the case, which 
differed from those recognized in Chandler v Cape, it would have created a legal duty of care in 
a novel situation.42  The court on appeal disagreed, noting that it was not per definition 
inconceivable that there were approaches (“aanknopingspunten”) in Nigerian law allowing for 
the imposition of a legal duty of care on the parent company in the circumstances of the case. 
Such approaches may be found in the jurisprudence of UK common law that serves as an 
important source of reference for the Nigerian legal system.43   
Shell also argued that the claims against RDS and SPDC had a different legal basis and that 
SPDC could not have reasonably foreseen that it would be sued together with RDS before a 
Dutch court in relation to the oil leakages in Nigeria specifically. Shell referred to the Painer-
arrest in which the CJEU had ruled that a sufficiently close connection between the claims can 
exist if the claims are based on different causes of actions, provided that there is a high degree of 
predictability that the defendant would be sued before the court seized. According to 
jurisprudence, this requirement should always be met under Article 7(1) of the DCCP in relation 
to both factual and legal coherence between the claims.44 According to Shell, the fact that SPDC 
and RDS were both alleged liable for the same damage was in itself not sufficient to establish 
predictability.45 SPDC furthermore acted independently from RDS, and RDS was not familiar 
with relevant operational activities of SPDC, hence SPDC could not have reasonably foreseen 
that it would be sued together with RDS before a Dutch court specifically in relation to the oil 
leakages in Nigeria.46  
The court rejected these arguments, noting that in light of the developments in relation to direct 
liability claims, the many oil spills in Nigeria, the legal proceedings relating these spills, the 
problems these spills caused to people and the environment, as well as the increased attention for 
these problems, it was reasonable foreseeable that the subsidiary entity SPDC might be sued 
before a court with jurisdiction over RDS.47 The court on appeal held that for the reasons 
mentioned the requirement of sufficient connection under Article 7(1) was satisfied, also in so 
far the requirement for alignment with Article 6(1) Brussels Recast was concerned. The court 
furthermore rejected the argument by Shell that Article 7(1) of the DCCP would cease to create a 
jurisdictional basis for the proceedings against SPDC if the claims against RDS would be 
rejected.48 
 
                                                
 42  Memorie, supra note 37, ¶ 32. 
 43  See Gerechtshof Den Haag, supra note 40, § 2.2. 
  44  Memorie, supra note 37, ¶ 67. 
 45  Id. ¶ 70 
 46  Id. ¶ 89. 
 47  See Gerechtshof Den Haag, supra note 40, § 2.6. 
 48  Akpan did not file for an appeal against the rejection by the court of the claims against RDS, which meant that 
this issue has been decided. Shell argued that for this reason any connections between the claims against RDS 
and SPDC ceased to exist. The case is between two Nigerian parties, concerning events that occurred in Nigeria 
only, and that will be determined according to Nigerian law. Memorie, supra note 37, ¶ 56.  
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6.2.1.5 The Forum non Conveniens Doctrine 
The courts in the US and the UK have relied on the common law doctrine of forum non 
conveniens to move cases to another forum that is considered more appropriate to hear the case. 
The doctrine has come to pose greater obstacles to and affect the feasibility of tort liability 
claims in the US than in the EU. Indeed, in the EU, it clearly follows from the Brussels 1 
Regulation that, if a company is domiciled in the EU Member State in which it is being sued, a 
claim based on the forum non conveniens doctrine cannot be upheld.49 The doctrine of forum rei 
is said to apply, meaning that the court of the State in which the company is domiciled has 
jurisdiction.  
There was uncertainty for some time as to whether Article 2 Brussels I Regulation (now Article 4 
Brussels Recast) was all pervading and precluded a stay in all cases where this was not expressly 
required or permitted by the convention.50 More specifically, the UK had applied the doctrine 
despite it being a member of the Brussels I Regime.51 The CJEU provided clarity in its ruling in 
Owosu v. Jackson, 52 confirming that courts may not apply the forum non conveniens doctrine 
under the Brussels 1 Regime.53 The CJEU noted in subsequent cases that a court may not decline 
jurisdiction, even if the harm occurred outside the EU and the claimant was not an EU resident or 
national.54 The ruling by the CJEU in Owosu v Jackson suggests that, under the Brussels I 
Regulation, defendants that are domiciled in the EU Member State in which they are sued can no 
longer rely on the forum non conveniens doctrine to have their case moved to another forum.  
This may no longer be the case under Brussels Recast, however. Indeed, Article 33 Brussels 
Recast codifies a modification of this doctrine.55 The new provision sets out a forum non 
                                                
 49  Article 2 of the Brussels 1 Regulation (now Article 4 of the Brussels Recast) stipulated that ‘subject to this 
Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that 
Member State’. Brussels Recast, supra note 3, art 4.  
 50  Lubbe & Ors v Cape Plc, [1998], CLC 1559,[1998] EWCA Civ 1351. [35].  
 51  Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) [1992] Ch. 72. 
 52  Owosu v. Jackson, 2005 E. C.R. I-3481, ¶ 46. The CJEU held that the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction 
and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters  “precludes a court of a Contracting State 
from declining the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 2 of that convention on the ground that a court of a 
non-Contracting State would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action even if the jurisdiction of no 
other Contracting State is in issue or the proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Contracting 
State.” Muzaffer Eroglu, Multinational Enterprises and Tort Liabilities: An Interdisciplinary and Comparative 
Examination 98 (Edward Elgar, 2008).  
 53   The rationale put forth by the court was that the doctrine of forum non conveniens undermined the principle of 
legal certainty because it left a too wide discretion to the court with regard to the question of what would be the 
more appropriate forum. Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the Environment applicable to 
European Enterprises operating Outside the European Union, 214, (October 2010), available at 
http://www.corporatejustice.org/study-of-the-legal-framework-on.html. [hereinafter EU Study of the Legal 
Framework on Human Rights] 
 54   International Commission of Jurists, Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability - Volume 3: Civil 
Remedies, 51 (2008), http://icj2.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Vol.3-Corporate-legal-
accountability-thematic-report-2008.pdf.  
 55   Van Calster, supra note 17, at 1453. 
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conveniens rule allowing a court to stay proceedings provided certain requirements are met. The 
scope of applicability of Article 33 Brussels Recast is restrictive in that the provision requires 
that the court has jurisdiction on the basis of Article 4 or 7, 8, 9 of the Brussels Recast. At the 
time when the court in an EU Member State has been seized, proceedings between the same 
parties must be pending before a court in a third-state and involve the same cause of action. 
Then, a court may stay proceedings, provided the following criteria apply:  
(a)  it is expected that the court of the third State will give a judgment capable of 
recognition and, where applicable, of enforcement in that Member State; and  
(b)  the court of the Member State is satisfied that a stay is necessary for the proper 
administration of justice.  
The stay may be granted when the judgment of the court in the third state can be recognized and, 
where applicable, enforced in the EU Member State, and if the proper administration of justice 
requires such a stay.  
It is not clear whether human rights considerations will play a role in the application of the forum 
non conveniens rule under this provision. They probably should, in the light of the role which the 
Treaties recognise to fundamental rights (see Articles 2 and 6 TEU, which will be discussed in 
more detail below). If they do, this will most likely be in relation to a court’s assessment of the 
necessity of granting a stay in the interest of the proper administration of justice. Recital 24 
Brussels Recast stipulates that the proper administration of justice will be determined on the 
factual circumstances of the case, which may include ‘connections between the facts of the case 
and the parties and the third State concerned, the stage to which the proceedings in the third State 
have progressed by the time proceedings are initiated in the court of the Member State and 
whether or not the court of the third State can be expected to give a judgment within a reasonable 
time’.56  
In any event, the doctrine of forum non conveniens has not lost its relevance. A court in an EU 
Member State may stay proceedings on the basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine in 
disputes that are not governed by the rules of Brussels Recast (i.e., under domestic law). The 
doctrine is also applied in common law jurisdictions outside the EU, e.g., Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the US. The following section focuses on the common law system of the UK 
and examines to what extent human rights due diligence has a role to play in the application of 
the forum non conveniens doctrine.    
In the common law system of the UK, the forum non conveniens doctrine was considered in 
Lubbe v Cape Industries, an asbestos case brought by 3000 plaintiffs against a parent company, 
Cape PLC, for damages resulting from harm caused by asbestos related activities in South 
Africa. The central issues in the proceedings were (i) whether Cape PLC owed a duty of care to 
the employees of its overseas subsidiary and other persons living in the area to protect them from 
foreseeable risks to health by reason of the de facto control exercised by Cape PLC over and the 
advise given to the subsidiary company; and (ii) if so, whether Cape PLC had breached this duty 
by not taking the proper steps to ensure proper working practices and safety precautions 
                                                
 56  Brussels Recast, supra note 3, Recital 24. 
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throughout the group.57 The UK court had personal jurisdiction over the Cape PLC by reason of 
its incorporation and domicile in the UK.58 The case hinged on whether the foreign forum (South 
Africa) was the more appropriate forum to hear the case, and if so whether the court should stay 
proceedings on the ground of the forum non conveniens doctrine.  
The High Court identified that the relevant test to be applied to the question was set out in 
Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd: 
The basic principle is that a stay will only be granted on the ground of forum non 
conveniens where the court is satisfied that there is some other available forum, having 
competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, i.e., in 
which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all parties and the ends of 
justice. 59  
The Spiliada test consists of two steps. The first entails an assessment of whether there is another 
forum available to the claimants that is prima facie more appropriate to entertain the case, by 
reason of this forum being more suited for the private interest of the parties and the end of 
justice.60 The burden falls on the defendant to prove that an appropriate forum is available to the 
plaintiffs, which have sued the defendant as of right before the court in the UK. The second stage 
entails an assessment of the factors that connect the proceedings to one forum or the other and 
whether plaintiffs can obtain substantive justice in the foreign forum. The court must stay 
proceedings, except if in the particular circumstances of the case no substantial justice can be 
done in the foreign forum. The burden of demonstrating this element falls on the plaintiff.61   
The High Court’s ruling in Lubbe v Cape Industries, which was the leading decision in the case, 
focused on the substantial justice aspect of Spiliada, and considered whether the trial should 
proceed in the UK because no substantial justice could be attained in South Africa. The court 
focused on the lack of both funding and legal representation in the forum of South Africa and 
held that these factual circumstances provided sufficient support for the conclusion that justice 
could not be done in the foreign jurisdiction of South Africa if the trial were to proceed there.62 63 
                                                
 57  The first Court of Appeal phrased the issue as follows: "Whether a parent company which is proved to exercise 
de facto control over the operations of a (foreign) subsidiary and which knows, through its directors, that those 
operations involve risks to the health of workers employed by the subsidiary and/or persons in the vicinity of its 
factory or other business premises, owes a duty of care to those workers and/or other persons in relation to the 
control which it exercises over and the advice which it gives to the subsidiary company?" Lubbe and Others and 
Cape Plc. and Related Appeals [2000], UKHL 41[6], [2000] 1 WLR 1545. 
 58  Lubbe & Ors v Cape Plc, [1998], CLC 1559,[1998] EWCA Civ 1351. [1].  
 59  Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1986] UKHL 10 (19 November 1986). 
 60  Lubbe and Others and Cape Plc. and Related Appeals [2000], UKHL 41[16], [2000] 1 WLR 1545. 
 61  Lubbe & Ors v Cape Plc, [1998], CLC 1559,[1998] EWCA Civ 1351. [17].  
 62  Id. at 32. 
 63  Factors that weighted into the decision-making were the large scale of funding needed for the litigation, given 
the huge complexity and magnitude of the factual and legal issues needed to be addressed. Also it was 
considered that the absence of developed procedures for funding could create dis-incentives for the South 
African legal system to make funds available to the plaintiffs. Unless related to the private interests or the ends 
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The court held that the case should not be stayed in favour of proceedings in the South African 
forum.  
The High Court also indicated that international or domestic policy considerations other than 
those expressly mentioned had no role to play in the Spiliada test. It held that ‘public interests 
considerations not related to the private interests of the parties and the ends of justice have no 
bearing on the decision which the court has to make’. The court also recalled the statement of 
Lord Kinnear: ‘in applying this principle questions of judicial armour proper and political 
interest or responsibility have no part to play’. 64 The High Court thus did not give consideration 
to human rights due diligence in its determination of the forum non conveniens issue.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals in same case of Lubbe v Cape Industries is more relevant 
for our hypothesis. The court recognized that the liability issue of a duty of care can be a relevant 
fact in the application of the Spiliada test. The court accepted the plaintiffs’ submission that the 
defendant Cape was alleged liable for a direct duty of care that it owed to the individuals, rather 
than a breach of a duty by the South African companies in the form of vicarious liability, as a 
lower court’s judgment had suggested. It noted the importance of this difference because ‘the 
alleged breaches of an independent duty of care owed by the defendant took place in England 
rather than in South Africa’.65  
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the factual allegations connected the case more closely 
to the jurisdiction of the UK than to that of South Africa. The court noted that ‘it is an issue of 
law which can be decided in either South Africa or England, although prima facie the allegation 
of a common law duty of care owed by an English defendant, albeit to a class of persons situated 
overseas, should more appropriately be decided by English Courts’.66  
The court thus affirmed that the factual allegations of liability based on a duty of care standard 
against the parent company Cape was a relevant private interest factor for the Spiliada test and 
that the location of the alleged breach of the duty of care pointed to the UK as the more 
appropriate forum. The High Court in the leading judgment did not provide a definite answer as 
to whether the balance of private interests tipped in favor of trying personal injury issues in the 
South African forum or the parent responsibility issue in the forum of the UK.67 Since it did not 
overrule the decision of the Court of Appeals on this issue however, the authority still stands. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
of justice, public interest factors do not weigh into the decision-making of the court, and neither did questions of 
political interest or responsibility.  
 64  Lubbe and Others and Cape Plc. and Related Appeals [2000], UKHL 41[33], [2000] 1 WLR 1545. 
 65  The plaintiffs thus had successfully argued that the ‘duty arose under English law and in England, and the 
breaches of it for which the defendant is responsible, whether by its directors or senior personnel, occurred for 
the most part in England, where board meetings were held, policy decisions made and instructions given’. 
 66  Lubbe & Ors v Cape Plc, [1998], CLC 1559,[1998] EWCA Civ 1351.  
 67  Peter Muchlinski, Corporations in International Litigation: Problems of Jurisdiction and the United Kingdom 
Asbestos Cases, 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 15 (2001).  
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6.2.1.6 The Loci Delicti Rule  
Courts have asserted jurisdiction over a third-party defendant on the basis of the so-called loci 
delicti rule. Like other approaches, this rule requires a territorial nexus with the EU Member 
State where the court is seized. The relevant connecting factor is not the domicile of the 
company however, but the locus of the act or omission causing the alleged harm. The rule 
implies that victims can bring a claim against a non-EU domiciled company in an EU Member 
State if the event causing the harm occurred or may occur in the EU Member State. Article 7(2) 
of the Brussels Recast recognizes this rule, noting that: 
A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State 
(2) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place 
where the harmful event occurred or may occur.  
In the case Bier, the Court considered that the term ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ was 
to be understood as intended to cover both ‘the place where the damage occurred and the place 
of the event giving rise to it’.68 
It should be noted, however, that the rule applies to the intra-EU context only: the domicile of 
the defendant in an EU Member State is a necessary condition. This condition is typically not 
satisfied in these direct-tort liability cases in which the defendant is domiciled outside the EU.69  
6.2.2 Applicable law: the Rome II Regulation 
6.2.2.1 Preliminary Considerations: Lex Loci Damni v Lex Loci Delicti 
Once jurisdiction over the defendant is established, the hurdle that victims have to overcome 
next in their pursuit of civil liability is the choice of law point, that is the court’s determination of 
the substantive law that will be applied to the claims in the dispute and, thus, to determine the 
existence of liability. In tort liability cases brought in the EU context and on the basis of general 
tort laws, the choice is usually one between the laws of national legal systems.70 The applicable 
law question is decided on the basis of the EU and domestic private international law (‘conflict 
of laws’) rules that apply in the country in which the court was seized. The Rome II Regulation 
on non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters unifies certain national rules 
governing conflict of laws in the EU.71  
                                                
 68   Case 21/76 Bier v Mines de Potasse d' Alsace, 1976, E.C.R. 1735. 
 69   Brussels Recast, supra note 3, art. 7(2). 
 70   Liesbeth H. Enneking, Foreign Direct Liability and Beyond: Exploring the role of tort law in promoting 
international corporate social responsibility and accountability, 225 (Eleven International Publishing. 2012).  
 71   The Rome II Regulation applies to events that occurred since 11 January 2009, which is the date that the 
Regulation entered into force. Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), art 31, 32, Recital 17, O.J. (L 199) 
40 [hereinafter Rome II Regulation]. 
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Pursuant to the Rome II Regulation, the general rule that determines non-contractual obligations 
in the dispute is the lex loci damni rule, i.e., the law of the country in which the damage occurred 
applies. Article 4(1) describes this rule as follows: 
Unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage 
occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred 
and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that 
event occur.72  
In tort-liability cases, the lex locus damni usually corresponds with the law of the third country, 
and not the law of the EU forum in which the court was seized. This is often also the place where 
the victim has its residence.73  
The rationale of the EU Commission to opt for the application of the lex loci damni as the 
general rule, instead of the lex loci delicti, (i.e., the law of the place where the tort was 
committed) is that the lex locus damni is more favourable to the victim.74 It should be stressed, 
however, that lex loci delicti, was the general conflict-of-law principle in most domestic systems 
before the Rome II Regulation.75 To apply the law that is more favorable to the victim 
corresponds with the view of the European Commission to redirect the objective of tort law away 
from regulating the conduct (fault liability) towards compensating those residents affected by the 
conduct of others.76 77 To note is that the lex locus damni rule benefits the EU Member States’ 
own residents that enjoy the increased protection that the law of the EU Member States affords to 
them as the injured party. The general rule is not ideal in tort-liability cases for victims that 
reside in a third country, however, who might shy away from pursuing a case on the basis of the 
law of a country that is not an EU Member State.78  
The interests of victims that reside outside the EU in tort liability cases would be better served by 
a rule creating an option for plaintiffs to choose the lex loci delicti similar to that which exists in 
relation to jurisdiction under the Bier case-law referred to in the preceding section. The lex loci 
                                                
 72   See Article 4(1) Rome II Regulation: ‘Unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to a 
non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs 
irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country 
or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur’. Id. art. 4(1), Recital 17. 
 73   Andrew Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, 308 (Oxford 
University Press. 2008). 
 74   Id. at 310. 
 75   Liesbeth F.H. Enneking, The Common Denominator of the Trafigura Case, Foreign Direct Liability Cases and 
The Rome Regulation. An Essay on the Consequences of Private International Law for the Feasibility of 
Regulating Multinational Corporations through Tort Law, 2 European Review of Private Law, 283, 296 (2008). 
 76   Dickinson, supra note 73, at 7. Enneking, id. at 296. 
 77   The rule of lex loci damni was also considered to strike a fair balance between the interests of person claimed to 
be liable and the person sustaining the damage. Rome II Regulation, supra note 71, Recital 16. 
 78   Geert Van Calster, The Role of Private International Law in Corporate Social Responsibility, 3 Erasmus Law 
Review, 30 (2014). Van Calster, supra note 30, at 239.  
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delicti rule would strengthen the protection of the rights of the victims outside the EU. The EU 
Commission did not opt for applying the lex loci delicti rule more generally. The arguments of 
the EU Commission were that this ‘would go beyond the victim’s legitimate expectations and 
would reintroduce uncertainty in the law’.79 The EU Commission also held the view that the rule 
would run counter to advancing one of the main objectives for unifying the choice of law rules, 
which is to enhance the foreseeability of court decisions.80 However, by way of exception, 
Article 7 Rome II Regulation awards the option for the claimant to choose to base their claim on 
the lex loci delicti, where obligations arise out of environmental damages.  
6.2.2.2 Escape Clauses 
Currently, the Rome II Regulation allows a court to displace the general rule under Article 4(1) 
and apply the so-called ‘escape clause’ under Article 4(3), allowing a court to apply the lex locus 
delicti and apply the law of another country when it is clear from the circumstances of the case 
that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with another EU Member State. Art. 4(3) 
stipulates the following:  
where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly 
more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the 
law of that other country shall apply. A manifestly closer connection with another 
country might be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, 
such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question. 
The court may apply the lex locus delicti provided that this law is ‘manifestly more closely 
connected’ with the case.81 There is limited guidance as to what constitutes a manifestly closer 
connection pursuant to Article 4(3), however,82 apart from that this connection may be based on 
the existence of a ‘pre-existing relationship between the parties’. In foreign direct liability cases, 
however, the victims usually do not have a contractual relationship with the defendant, nor is the 
victim in any other way linked to the defendant other than by the damage suffered.83 
In a tort liability case, a connection between the tort and the EU Member State can exist in 
situations where the alleged tort amounts to a breach of a legal duty of care, elements of which 
occurred on the territory of the EU Member State. The issue is whether the occurrence of 
elements of the tort on the territory of the EU Member State would be sufficient, in and of itself, 
to meet the threshold requirement of a manifestly closer connection in accordance with Article 
4(3).84 It follows from the nature of the Rome II Regulation as an EU Regulation85 that its 
                                                
 79   Enneking, supra note 75, at 297.  
 80   Another objective is to ensure ‘a reasonable balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and 
the person who has sustained damage’. Rome II Regulation, supra note 71, art. 31-32, Recital 16. 
 81  Dickinson, supra note 73, at 310. 
 82   Enneking, supra note 70, at 215. 
 83   Enneking, supra note 75, at 300.  
 84   This is the more so because the decision of the court as to whether the general rule under Article 4.1 can be 
displaced depends in part on the nexus between the facts of the case and the lex loci damni. The court may 
apply the escape clause only if the country of the lex loci delicti is manifestly more closely connected to the case 
than the country of the lex loci damni.  
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provisions should be interpreted in accordance with the general principles of EU law and, more 
specifically, EU-protected fundamental rights. An interpretation of this provision in light of the 
general principles of EU law, and, more specifically, EU-protected fundamental rights should 
arguably provide justification for a court to invoke the ‘escape clause’ and to apply the law of the 
EU Member State in a tort liability case.  
EU law thus arguably supports a progressive interpretation of Art. 4(3), one which would allow 
individuals to invoke this escape clause in more typical tort liability scenarios. The argument 
underlying such progressive interpretation of Art. 4(3) is that Community legislation must 
ensure, inter alia, respect for the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, which is an EU 
fundamental right recognized by Art. 47 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(the ‘CFREU’).86 It should be highlighted, in this regard, that according to Article 6(1) TEU, 
‘[t]he Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the [CFREU] of 7 
December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same 
legal value as the Treaties’. 
6.2.2.3 Overriding Mandatory Provisions 
Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation establishes the ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ 
reservation. This provision creates an exception to the general rule that may be triggered in cases 
where the application of the lex loci damni would constitute a breach of mandatory provisions of 
the domestic law in the EU Member State where the court was seized. 87 The article reads as 
follows: 
Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the provisions of the law of the 
forum in a situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise 
applicable to the non-contractual obligation. 
The mandatory rules of the lex fori apply automatically, irrespective of the content of the law 
otherwise applicable to the dispute. 88  According to Recital 32 Rome II Regulation, 
‘considerations of public interest justify giving the courts of the Member States the possibility, in 
exceptional circumstances, of applying exceptions based on public policy and overriding 
mandatory provisions’. Since these are public law regulations, their scope of applicability is 
usually confined to the territory of a EU Member State, however.89 A mandatory rule may 
override the application of the law of the third country, provided that there is a factor connecting 
                                                                                                                                                       
 85  Cf. Article 288 TFEU. 
 86  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012,  O.J. (C  326), 391–407. 
 87  The CJEU has explained mandatory provisions of domestic law as ‘national provisions compliance with which 
has been deemed to be so crucial for the protection of the political, social or economic order in the Member 
State concerned as to require compliance therewith by all persons present on the national territory of that 
Member State and all legal relationships within that State’. CJEU, Arblade Joint Cases C/369/96 and C-376/96 
(23 November 1999), ¶ 30. EU Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights, supra note 53, ¶ 223. 
 88  Enneking, supra note 75, at 304.  
 89  Id. at 283, 304. 
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the victim to the forum state. In foreign direct liability cases, given that the claimant is usually a 
foreign national, this requirement is rarely satisfied.90  
In the case of mandatory rules in an EU Member State aiming to regulate the conduct of a 
company in the public interest of human rights, the exception under Article 16 may be evoked 
more easily in tort liability cases. Then the domicile of the defendant in the EU Member State 
may provide for the necessary link with the territory of the EU Member State.  
6.2.2.4 Ordre Public 
The public policy exception under Article 26 Rome II Regulation allows for the application of 
the lex fori rule if the application of the foreign law would be contrary to the public order. The 
Article 26 stipulates the following: 
The application of a provision of the law of any country specified by this Regulation may 
be refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy 
(ordre public) of the forum. 
This provision sets a threshold requirement in that it allows a court to refuse the application of a 
law if this would be ‘manifestly incompatible’ with the public policy of the forum in which the 
court was seized. Pursuant to Recital 32 of the Rome II Regulation, this reservation of ordre 
public may be applied in exceptional circumstances only.91 92 It is not entirely clear what amounts 
to ‘manifestly incompatible’ and therefore is sufficient to invoke this Article 26 in direct tort 
liability cases.93 Case law suggests that the rule may be applied if the law of the third country 
would undermine human rights, for example, if it were to allow child labour.94 
6.2.2.5 Environmental damage 
A court may determine the choice of law issue under Article 7, entitled ‘Environmental damage’, 
which applies to cases in which the non-contractual obligations arise out of environmental 
damage, or damage sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage. Where the 
damage results from human rights violations, the article may usually not be invoked. A court 
                                                
 90  EU Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights, supra note 53, ¶ 223. 
 91  The Recital 32 indicates that ‘the application of a provision of the law designated by this Regulation which 
would have the effect of causing non-compensatory exemplary or punitive damages of an excessive nature to be 
awarded may, depending on the circumstances of the case and the legal order of the Member State of the court 
seized, be regarded as being contrary to the public policy (ordre public) of the forum’. Rome II Regulation, 
supra note 71, Recital 32. 
 92  The CJEU has furthermore held that States may apply this reservation and refuse the enforcement of a judgment 
in ‘exceptional cases’ of a ‘manifest breach’ of human rights. EU Study of the Legal Framework on Human 
Rights, supra note 53, at 224. 
 93  Enneking notes that under Dutch law, ‘there has to be a conflict with fundamental legal principles for the court 
seized of the matter to be allowed to refuse to apply a host country regulation on the basis of the public policy 
exception, and apply its own law instead’. Enneking, supra note 70, at 223. 
 94  Cees Van Dam, Human Rights Obligations of Transnational Corporations in Domestic Tort Law, in Human 
Rights and Business: Direct Corporate Accountability for Human Rights, 489 (Jernej Letnar Černič & Tara Van 
Ho eds., 2015). 
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may apply the lex loci delicti rule to disputes that fall within the scope of Article 7, that is the 
law of the place where the delict/tort was committed, if the claimant so chooses. Article 7 
stipulates that: 
The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of environmental damage 
or damage sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage shall be the law 
determined pursuant to Article 4(1), unless the person seeking compensation for damage 
chooses to base his or her claim on the law of the country in which the event giving rise 
to the damage occurred. 
The considerations underlying this provision of the Rome II Regulations are to ensure the 
legitimate interest of victims to enjoy the higher level of protection that may be available in other 
countries.95  The provision also contributes to the public interest of greater environmental 
protection.96 It is somewhat surprising that the Rome II Regulation provides greater protection to 
victims of environmental damage than to victims of human rights breaches. The disparity of 
treatment is hard to reconcile with Article 2 TEU, according to which, ‘[t]he Union is founded on 
the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights’. 
6.2.3 Human Rights, EU law and EU Private International law 
As can be gathered from the preceding two sections, EU private international law arguably 
allows little room to human rights considerations. This situation contrasts with the clear 
preeminence EU law awards to human rights. Indeed, according to Article 2 TEU: ‘[t]he Union 
is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights’. Moreover, according to Article 6(1) TEU: 
‘The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at 
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties’. 
In addition, according to Article 6(3) TEU: 
‘Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the 
Union's law’. 
Article 6(3) TEU codifies the status that EU law has awarded to fundamental rights as general 
principles of EU law since the CJEU’s seminal judgements Stauder v City of Ulm97 and 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft.98 According to Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, ‘the recognition of 
                                                
 95  Enneking, supra note 70, at 302-303. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Case 29/69, Stander v City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419. 
 98  Case 11/77, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1970,  E.C.R. 1125. 
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“the law” as a source of [EU] law (see Article 19(1) TEU) has enabled the Court of Justice to 
have recourse to general principles when interpreting and applying [EU] law’.99  
EU-guaranteed human rights thus have binding force, with the consequences that EU secondary 
legislation, such as the Rome and Brussels Regulations, should be interpreted in the light of 
general principles of EU law, including EU-protected human rights.100 In the words of Tridimas, 
‘where a Community measure falls to be interpreted, reference must be given as far as possible, 
to the interpretation which renders it compatible with the [Treaties] and the general principles of 
law’.101 To the extent that provisions in the Brussels I Regulation / Brussels Recast or the Rome I 
Regulation are incompatible with these general principles of EU law (and, in particular, EU- 
protected human rights) the Regulations should be set aside. These principles form part of the 
EU legal order and hence, their infringement by EU secondary legislation (including the Rome 
and Brussels Regulations) constitutes an ‘infringement of the Treaties or any rule of law relating 
to their application’ within the meaning of the second paragraph article 263 TFEU (action on 
annulment of EU secondary legislation).102 According to Hartley ‘the phrase ‘any rule of law 
relating to their application’ must refer to something other than the Treaties themselves and it has 
been used by the Court as the basis for the doctrine that an EU act may be quashed for the 
infringement of a general principle of EU law’.103 
Consequently, it could be argued that the provisions of the Rome II Regulation that establish the 
escape clause (Art. 4(3)), and ‘the mandatory rule of the lex fori’ (Art. 16) and the public policy 
exception (Art. 26) should be interpreted in accordance with the general principles of EU law, 
including EU guaranteed human rights. An interpretation of these provisions in line with human 
rights, supports an interpretation of ‘a manifestly close connection’ under the escape clause (Art. 
4(3)), of the mandatory rule of the lex fori (Art. 16) and public policy exception (Art. 26) that is 
most favourable to giving effect to the rights of victims to an effective remedy. Until and if the 
CJEU draws these consequences from the status of fundamental rights under general EU law, the 
current state of EU private international law in this field sits uneasily with Article 2 of the Treaty 
on the European Union, according to which ‘the Union is founded on the values of respect for 
[…] human rights’. 
 Substantive Liability 6.3
6.3.1 Preliminary Considerations  
The law of torts and non-contractual obligations can create liability for parent companies in 
situations where harm has been caused to legally protected interests. This section sets out the 
different legal bases for establishing civil liability of a parent entity for adverse human rights 
impacts that are the result of the activities of a subsidiary or business relationship outside the EU. 
                                                
 99  K Lenaerts & P Van Nuffel, European Union Law, at ¶ 22-036 (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed. 2011). 
 100   See Case 218/82, Commission v Council, 1983 E.C.R. 4063, ¶ 15 and, in relation to fundamental rights, Joined 
Cases 46/87 and 227/8, Hoechst v Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 2859, ¶ 12. 
 101   Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, at 29 (Oxford University Press 2nd ed. 2006).  
 102   See, for an example, Case 112/7 Töpfer v Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 1010, ¶ 19. 
 103   T. Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law, at 146 (Oxford University Press 8th ed. 2014). 
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The purpose is to determine whether human rights due diligence has a role to play, if any, in 
courts consideration of the substantive liability issue.  
The following three grounds of liability will be discussed in detail: 
i. Direct parent liability on the basis of general principles of tort of negligence (legal duty 
of care)(see Section 6.3.2).  
ii. Complicity liability (see Section 6.3.3). 
iii. Piercing the corporate veil (see Section 6.3.4). 
The sections referred to above will analyze each concept separately.  
The most common legal grounds on which victims have sought to establish parent liability are 
direct parent liability on the basis of general principles of tort of negligence, i.e., liability 
resulting from conduct in the form of a breach of a duty of care that causes harm to a third 
person, and complicity liability, i.e., liability for ‘aiding and abetting’ in wrongdoing causing 
harm to a third person. These grounds provide distinct legal bases that can give rise to liability 
for harm resulting from different types of conduct and in different situations, and will therefore 
be discussed separately. 
Certain common characteristics can be discerned between the two, however.104 First, they 
provide liability in situations where the parent entity is involved in the human rights abuses that 
are committed by another State or non-State actor. Second, the liability of the parent company 
that can arise in these situations is direct in that the company is liable for its own wrong-full 
conduct. In this respect, these legal grounds can be distinguished from the piercing the corporate 
veil doctrine, which is an example of indirect or secondary liability; a company is held liable for 
the wrongful conduct of another entity to which it is affiliated.105  
Third, direct parent liability is commonly based on fault liability. In order for victims to succeed 
in establishing liability, they would typically have to demonstrate, apart from harm and 
causation, an act of fault on the part of the company, in terms of intentional or negligence 
conduct.106 Parent liability is typically not based on strict liability, although this form of liability 
may apply in exceptional situations. Strict liability differs from fault liability in that, under strict 
liability, there is no requirement to prove fault, negligence or intention. Since these requirements 
are not necessary for a finding of liability, strict liability is usually easier to establish than fault 
liability. However, strict liability is unlikely to arise in typical tort liability cases however, in 
                                                
 104   International Commission of Jurists, supra note 54, at 10. 
 105   Three types of secondary parent liability have been identified: ‘vicarious’ liability (the liability of a party for the 
conduct of those deemed to have been acting on its behalf), ‘secondary’ liability (the liability of a party for its 
participation in, or a contribution towards, a tort committed by another, and finally (and most controversially), 
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 106   International Commission of Jurists, supra note 54, at 10. 
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which the link between the parent and the activities or damage is more indirect and carried out 
by subsidiary entities having a legal personality of their own.107  
Fourth, the test that is applied to determine liability share certain elements. This section will 
highlight two of these elements that are especially relevant to our hypothesis: knowledge (see 
Section 6.3.3.1) and precautionary measures (see Section 6.3.3.2).  
6.3.2 Primary Liability for Negligence and the Legal Duty of Care: Chandler v. Cape 
The primary basis on which tort liability claims have been brought is direct parent company 
liability or primary liability. Direct parent liability claims are based on the general tort principle 
of negligence and a legal duty of care. Direct parent liability requires a legal duty of care to 
attach to the parent company, which the law creates in particular situations. The company stands 
accused of fault through negligence by not having taken the reasonable care that was required by 
law to prevent foreseeable harm to third parties.108 The claims arise out of harm resulting from 
the activities of a subsidiary entity. The parent company is not held liable for the wrongful acts 
of a subsidiary entity, but rather for negligent conduct of its own that can be reasonably 
attributed to it. Parent liability can arise irrespective of any liability on the part of the subsidiary 
entity.109  
Claims based on direct parent liability in tort liability cases have been brought in both common 
law and civil law systems. As explained by Enneking, even though the tort law systems may 
differ in their analytical approaches to foreign direct liability cases, they nonetheless operate 
similarly in practice. In common law systems, victims have been able to rely on a limited number 
of specific causes of action that have been created through case-law and that relate to particular 
factual situations. The alleged tortious behavior and required elements for these torts vary 
according to these specific causes of action. In European civil law systems, causes of actions find 
their legal basis in the statutory provisions on Tort law.110 The allegations can relate to any type 
of tortious behavior that is contrary to that what is generally considered as proper societal 
conduct and that causes damages. This approach is said to be informed by Grotius’ natural law 
concept ‘that every act that is contrary to that which people in general, or considering their 
special qualities, ought to do or ought to not do, and that causes damage, potentially gives rise to 
an obligation under civil law to compensate such damage’.111  
In the common law system of the UK, direct parent liability may arise on the basis of general tort 
principles and the ‘imposition or assumption’ of responsibility. The assumption of a legal duty 
involves an exception to the general rules of Tort law, which holds that companies in general 
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 109   Chandler v Cape PLC, [2012] PIQR P17, [2012] 3 All ER 640, [2012] 1 WLR 3111, [2012] ICR 1293, [2012] 
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have no legal duty to prevent parties from causing harm to another.112 The court may recognize in 
specific situations that the law imposes on a parent company a legal duty of care that is owed to 
the employees of a subsidiary entity. This was first accepted in Connely v Rio Tinto Zinc 
Corporation113 and Ngcobo v Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd v others.114 The case law suggests 
that the following four requirements must be satisfied for a company to be held liable for 
negligence, that is: ‘(i) he/she owes a duty of care to the victim, (ii) he/she has breached that 
duty, (iii) the victim’s damage is not so unforeseeable as to be too remote, and (iv) there is a 
causal link between the negligent conduct and the damage’.115  
The UK Court of Appeals in Chandler v Cape was the first to establish liability on the basis of a 
breach of a legal duty of care in a direct tort liability case. In its ruling, the Court of Appeals 
addressed a claim brought by Mr. Chandler against Cape plc, the parent company of his former 
employer, Cape Building Products Ltd after having caught asbestosis as a result of his 
employment at Cape Building Product Ltd around 50 years earlier.116 The central question was 
‘whether Cape owed a direct duty of care to the employees of its subsidiary to advise on, or 
ensure, a safe system of work for them’.117 More specifically, the court examined whether: (i) the 
circumstances in Cape were such that Cape had assumed responsibility for the safety of Cape 
Building Product Ltd’s employees; (ii) whether, consequently, Cape owed a duty of care to Mr. 
Chandler to prevent his exposure to asbestos; and (iii) if such duty were to exist whether Cape 
had breached it.  
The Court answered affirmatively to the three questions. The Court reached its conclusion on the 
basis of the application of the three-stage test developed in Caparo industries plc v Dickman. 
This test involves an assessment of: (a) the foreseeability of the harm; (b) the existence of a 
relationship characterized by law as one of ‘proximity’ or ‘neighborhood’ between the party 
owing the duty and the party to whom the duty is owed; and (c) whether the situation is one in 
which it is fair, just or reasonable that the law should impose a duty of care.118  
The first part of the Capo test, the foreseeability for the purpose of determining whether a duty of 
care attached to the parent company involved ascertaining whether harm to the plaintiff could 
have been foreseen. The Court established this element without difficulty. Facts pointed to Cape 
plc. being fully aware of the existence of a ‘systemic failure’ at Cape Building Products resulting 
from the escape of dust from the factory with no sides into the atmosphere. Cape plc. had 
furthermore issued a statement in which it conceded that it was aware of the risk of asbestosis 
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caused by asbestos exposure.119 On the basis of the facts and this statement by Cape plc., the 
Court established that Cape plc. knew that the operations at Cape Building Products created risks 
to the health and safety of others working at Uxbridge Cape.120   
The Court focused then on the second and third limbs of the Caparo test, which it addressed 
jointly. The Court considered whether the relevant facts pointed to circumstances in which there 
was a sufficient degree of ‘proximity’ that gave rise to a legal duty of care that Cape owed to the 
employees of Cape products to protect them from harm from the asbestos atmosphere and 
whether it was fair, just and reasonable to impose liability in these circumstances.  
The Court considered, based on the evidence, the fact that Cape plc was involved in the asbestos 
business and had superior knowledge about aspects of health and safety in this industry. There 
was a ‘systemic failure’ at Cape Products, the occurrence and risk of which for the health and 
safety of others working at Uxbridge, Cape plc was fully aware. Cape plc exercised a certain 
level of control over the asbestos business carried on at Uxbridge, which was evidenced by 
Cape’s direction and practice of intervening in relation to various matters, for instance product 
development. The research conducted by Dr. Smither, who was employed as the group’s medical 
advisor, on the link between asbestos-production and asbestosis evidenced the involvement by 
Cape plc. in questions relevant to health and safety policy at Cape Products. In order to 
demonstrate a certain level of control, it sufficed for the parent entity to have a practice of 
intervening in the trading operations of the subsidiary, for instance in relation to production and 
funding issues. There was no need to demonstrate that the company actually intervened in the 
health and safety policies of the subsidiary, however. 
On the basis of these facts, the court established that there was a sufficient degree of ‘proximity’ 
between Cape plc. and Mr. Chandler, and that it was appropriate to find that Cape had assumed a 
legal duty of care. This duty entailed that Cape was required by law ‘to advise Cape Products on 
what steps it had to take in the light of knowledge then available to provide those employees 
with a safe system of work or to ensure that those steps were taken’.121 The judge found that Cape 
had breached this duty of care by omission to take precautionary measures. The court indicated 
that ‘what Cape accepted was that Cape Products had breached its duty to its employee and that 
if it, Cape, had assumed a duty to Cape Products’ employees to advise on, or to ensure, that they 
had a safe system of work, that system of work was in fact rendered an unsafe one in a way 
which triggered its liability by reason of the migration of asbestos dust’.122 Cape thus was held 
liable for not having taken the duty of care required of it by law to give advise and ensure a safe 
system of work.   
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The court gave a description of the set of circumstances in which there is sufficient proximity 
and the law attaches a legal duty of care on a parent company for the health and safety of a 
subsidiary’s employees: 
(1) the businesses of the parent and subsidiary are in a relevant respect the same; (2) the 
parent has, or ought to have, superior knowledge on some relevant aspect of health and 
safety in the particular industry; (3) the subsidiary's system of work is unsafe as the 
parent company knew, or ought to have known; and (4) the parent knew or ought to have 
foreseen that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on its using that superior 
knowledge for the employees' protection. For the purposes of (4) it is not necessary to 
show that the parent is in the practice of intervening in the health and safety policies of 
the subsidiary. The court will look at the relationship between the companies more 
widely. The court may find that element (4) is established where the evidence shows that 
the parent has a practice of intervening in the trading operations of the subsidiary, for 
example production and funding. 
The UK Court of Appeal applied this test in Thompson v The Renwick Group.123 The case had 
been brought by Mr. Thomson against The Renwick Group plc, a holding company, for injuries 
suffered as a result of exposure to asbestos during Mr. Thomson’s employment at a subsidiary 
company where he was engaged in `hand baling` of raw asbestos. The central issue was whether 
there was sufficient evidence ‘to justify the imposition of a duty of care on the parent company 
to protect the subsidiary company’s employees from the risk of injury arising out of exposure to 
asbestos at work’.124 The court clarified that the circumstances identified by the court in Chandler 
v Cape were not exhaustive of the possibilities in which a duty may be imposed. The court also 
noted:  
the balance of Arden LJ’s indicia indicate, what one is looking for is ‘a situation in which 
the parent company is better placed, because of its superior knowledge or expertise, to 
protect the employees of subsidiary companies against the risk of injury and moreover 
where, because of that feature, it is fair to infer that the subsidiary will rely upon the 
parent deploying its superior knowledge in order to protect its employees from risk of 
injury. 
Upon application of the Caparo test, however, the court conceded that the facts of the case were 
too far removed from those in Chandler v. Cape.125 It held that no duty of care could be imposed 
on the parent company in the case because the business it carried out, if any apart from holding 
shares, was not in relevant aspects the same as that of its subsidiary. The parent company was 
not involved in haulage, warehousing or handling asbestos; hence (not all) the indicia were 
satisfied.126  
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This ruling affirmed that the chances a court will recognize that the circumstances of the case are 
sufficiently similar to those prevalent in Chandler v Cape to support the conclusion that the law 
imposes a legal duty of care to the parent company, in accordance with Chandler v Cape, are 
unlikely. Illustrative is also the Dutch court’s ruling in Milieudefensie v. Shell. The court applied 
Nigerian law to the case and considered whether the common law of Nigeria recognized a legal 
duty of care to attach to the parent company RDS.127 The court answered in the negative. The 
facts of the case did not engage all of the circumstances described in Chandler v Cape. A critical 
point was that RDS and SPDC were not in the same business. The RDS’s business was policy, 
strategy and risk-management, whereas the SPDC was involved in oil-production. The court held 
that RDS was aware about the health risks involved in SPCD’s operations, however it was not 
clear whether RDS had superior knowledge over the subsidiary about these risks and whether the 
people living in the vicinity relied on the RDS to use this superior knowledge to protect them 
against these risks. The court concluded that ‘the special circumstances based on which the 
parent company was held liable in Chandler v Cape are not so similar to those in the subject case 
that on this ground alone it may be assumed that RDS had a duty of care in respect of 
Milieudefensie and Akpan’ and that ‘Chandler v Cape does not create any precedent in the 
subject case’.128 
6.3.3 Complicity Liability129  
An alternative legal basis for establishing corporate civil liability for human rights abuses is 
complicity liability. The SRSG issued a report in 2008 in which he clarified this concept of 
complicity and made several observations.130   
The SRSG acknowledges that there is no ‘uniform’ or ‘static’ definition of complicity, 131 hence it 
is ‘not possible to specify definitive tests for what constitutes complicity in any given context’.132 
The SRSG distilled his legal definition of complicity from the complicity liability under 
international criminal law that prohibits aiding and abetting international crimes. This 
international criminal law standard has been referred to and applied in the jurisprudence under 
the ATCA. Although this jurisprudence relates specifically to the ATCA, the SRSG notes that 
the principles may have relevance outside the context of the ATCA context as well, in that courts 
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draw inspiration from international criminal law to define domestic standards of civil and 
criminal liability.133 
The SRSG explains legal complicity as ‘aiding and abetting’, the relevant standard of which is 
‘knowingly providing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the 
commission of a crime`. Complicity liability can arise if companies are involved in human rights 
abuses that are committed by other actors, including State and non-State actor, for instance 
paramilitaries.134 Legal complicity can be triggered by way of an act or an omission. In order to 
meet the minimum threshold of substantial assistance for the purpose of complicity liability, the 
company should have facilitated the crime in a significant way, for instance by legitimizing or 
encouraging it.  
Complicity also requires knowledge. The court would be looking at whether the company had 
actual knowledge, more specifically knowledge about the criminal intentions of the principle 
perpetrator.135 The knowledge standard is less demanding on companies than the knowledge 
element of negligence, in that the standard of complicity does not impose a requirement on 
companies to be proactive and to investigate and acquire the knowledge that it should have. As 
noted by one commentator, the knowledge standard sets a low threshold of liability, however, in 
that it does not require exact knowledge of the crime, but only of the probability that a number of 
crimes would be committed, including the one perpetrated. 136  In the application of this 
knowledge test, the court would be looking for the subjective mental state of the accused in the 
particular circumstances of the case, which can be inferred from direct or indirect factual 
circumstantial evidence.137  
Legal definitions of complicity vary according to international and national law, common law 
and civil law systems and between national jurisdictions. The SRSG also notes that the legal 
inquiry for complicity liability under domestic civil law on the basis of general tort principles 
can differ from that applied under international criminal law, in that the elements of knowledge 
and assistance requirements may be applied.138 An example is the element of knowledge that, in 
the context of negligence, also imposes a requirement that the company ‘should have known that 
it was taking a foreseeable risk of contributing to an abuse as opposed to needing to prove that 
there was actual knowledge’.139  
The SRSG also clarified some of the confusion about legal and non-legal definitions of 
complicity. In doing so, the SRSG drew from the distinction often made in the literature between 
the following three categories of complicity: ‘direct, indirect (beneficial) and silent 
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complicity’.140 According to the SRSG, legal liability is likely to arise in situations of direct 
complicity, but not in situations of indirect or silent complicity. Direct complicity entails that a 
company knowingly provides substantial contributions to the crime. Beneficial liability, which 
arises in situations where a company benefitted from human rights abuses, is in itself unlikely 
sufficient in order to trigger legal liability.141 Also a company’s presence in the country where the 
abuses occurred is in itself generally not a sufficient or necessary condition that can give rise to 
complicity liability. Beneficial or silent complicity is generally grounded in moral obligations 
and can provide a benchmark for societal actors to judge companies against.142 Non-compliance 
can result in these actors inflicting costs on the company, for instance shareholder disapproval, 
reputational damage or divestment.143 
The SRSG furthermore shed clarity on the relationship between complicity and due diligence. As 
the UNGPs affirm, the corporate responsibility to respect encapsulates a responsibility to avoid 
complicity. The SRSG notes that ‘complicity is part and parcel of the responsibility to respect 
human rights, and entails acting with due diligence to avoid knowingly contributing to human 
rights abuses, whether or not there is a risk of legal liability’.144 The UNGPs indicate that 
business enterprises should treat the risk of being complicit through causation or contribution in 
gross human rights abuses committed by others as a legal compliance issue wherever they 
operate. Some operating environments, such as conflict-affected areas, may increase the risks of 
enterprises being complicit in gross human rights abuses committed by other actors (security 
forces, for example).145 Business enterprises thus have a responsibility to act with due diligence 
in order to avoid being complicit in human rights abuses. The UNGPs support an understanding 
of complicity that is much wider than the concept of direct complicity that can give rise to legal 
liability. Michalowski explains:146 
Thus, due diligence responsibilities are based on the assumption that mere business 
relationships can have an adverse human rights impact which needs to be avoided, even 
though it would not give rise to legal complicity liability. Due diligence responsibilities 
consequently not only include forms of complicity, such as silent and beneficial 
complicity, that are widely outside the scope of legal complicity, but moreover apply a 
broader approach to the definition of direct complicity than is covered by legal 
obligations. 
                                                
 140   Mares, supra note 136, at 1170. 
 141   Human Rights Council, supra note 1, ¶ 58. 
 142   Id. ¶ 53. 
 143   Id. ¶ 56. 
 144   Id. ¶ 71. 
 145   Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework. U.N.Doc. A/HRC/17/31, GP 23 and commentary (March 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter UNGPs] (by John Ruggie). 
 146  Sabine Michalowski, Due diligence and complicity: a relationship in need of clarification, in Human Rights 
Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect?, 230 (Cambridge University Press 
ed. 2013).  
  231 
6.3.3.1 The Element of Foreseeability and Human Rights Due Diligence 
The tests for the tort of negligence/ legal duty of care and complicity liability in tort law involve 
the element of knowledge. While the foreseeability in complicity liability generally requires 
‘actual knowledge’, negligence liability requires an assessment of whether the parent company 
knew or should have known the risk of the company’s conduct causing harm. The requirements 
that companies should have known entails ‘a reasonableness test’, meaning an assessment of 
whether a reasonable person would have appreciated ‘that there was a risk of contributing to 
abuse and have changed their behavior to avoid the risk’? A company thus might incur 
negligence liability if it should have known of the risks. 147  
An analysis of these tests suggests that the UNGPs, and the human rights due diligence concept 
in particular, can be of relevance in establishing knowledge in the application of these tests.148   
In order to establish that a company knew, the court may consider the information that was 
available to the company or information that was generally available at the time.149 As the court 
in Chandler v Cape plc illustrated, it may not be difficult to establish such actual knowledge, as 
foreseeability was established on the basis of factual evidence of awareness and a general 
statement of knowledge by Cape plc. about the risk of asbestosis caused by exposure to asbestos. 
The court may also refer to relevant voluntary initiatives that operationalize the human rights due 
diligence concept in relation to particular sectors, operational contexts or activities as evidence of 
general knowledge of human rights risks. The ICJ notes that the mere adoption or introduction of 
these voluntary initiatives can signal the general foreseeability of human rights risks in the 
circumstances of the case.150 
The court may also give consideration to the human rights due diligence practices of a company 
in its consideration of whether the company should have known the probability of its acts or 
omission having adverse human rights impacts. This aspect of foreseeability entails a positive 
prescription in that it requires companies that lack a level of knowledge, to diligently investigate 
and to acquiring the information that is necessary to understand the existence of potential adverse 
human rights impact resulting from the activities of a third person and the likelihood of these 
impacts actually occurring.151 A company unknowledgeable of its human rights risks thus may 
still incur liability, unless the company undertook a due diligence inquiry about the risks, which 
entails ‘an investigation and inventory of the potential risks to third parties that could be 
connected with its activities’.152 
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This aspect of foreseeability and the human rights due diligence are linked at least in the 
following ways. First, adherence to human rights due diligence could help companies foresee 
and manage involvement in human rights risks. As the SRSG has recognized, the human rights 
due diligence process can serve as a means ex ante for companies to apprehend complicity risks 
and through better risk-management avoid complicity.153 The reason is that companies by 
undertaking human rights due diligence ‘can become aware of, prevent and address risks of 
complicity by integrating the common features of legal and societal benchmarks into their due 
diligence processes’.154 Companies furthermore may turn to voluntary initiatives that are aimed at 
operationalizing the human rights due diligence concept for guidance and good practice on the 
types of assessments that company should take to meet the element of knowledge. These 
initiatives serve as useful references for identifying and investigating foreseeable risks.155  
Second, human rights due diligence could ex post human rights abuses serve as a defense against 
complicity charges by demonstrating that the company did not stay willfully ignorant of its 
complicity risks.156 Whether a company has a due diligence process in place and undertook 
human rights impact assessments could weigh into a courts determination of foreseeability and 
serve as evidence that the company did not and could not have foreseen the human rights risk.157 
Human rights due diligence thus can help companies to avoid complicity liability if human rights 
abuses have taken place, however this is not automatic.158 Due diligence is not seen as ‘providing 
a full legal defense against complicity charges’. 159 This is what the commentary to the UNGP 17 
suggests:  
Conducting appropriate human rights due diligence should help business enterprises 
address the risk of legal claims against them by showing that they took every reasonable 
step to avoid involvement with an alleged human rights abuse. However, business 
enterprises conducting such due diligence should not assume that, by itself, this will 
automatically and fully absolve them from liability for causing or contributing to human 
rights abuses.  
The likelihood of human rights due diligence serving as a legal defense and the extent to which 
adherence to human rights due diligence may shield a company from liability will depend on the 
legal standard of knowledge that the court applies and to what degree this standard corresponds 
with the human rights due diligence concept. To determine whether human rights due diligence 
will effectively shield a company from civil liability is complicated. Partially this is because 
legal definitions of complicity vary between legal systems, which are furthermore applied in 
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light of the factual circumstances of the case.160 The lack of precision by which the UNGPs 
define the scope of human rights due diligence adds to the unpredictability.  
Third, the human rights due diligence may be the standard of knowledge that a company is 
reasonably expected to seek. As the SRSG notes, the reasonableness test for the purpose of 
establishing knowledge in fact ‘may not be posed as a knowledge test but rather a question as to 
whether the company acted in accordance with the requisite standard of care’.161  
6.3.3.2 Precautionary Measures and Human Rights Due Diligence  
The tort of negligence involves an assessment of the measures a company is reasonably expected 
to take in order to prevent the foreseeable harm from materializing. A determination of whether a 
company has taken necessary measures will most commonly amount to an assessment of 
whether a company exercised due care as expected by law. A company may incur negligence 
liability if it failed to take diligence measures it was required to take under this standard. Several 
links can be discerned with the human rights due diligence concept. 
The human rights due diligence can define the standard of a legal duty of care in negligence 
cases. In certain jurisdictions, a court may resort to international standards, inter alia the UNGPs, 
to construct this standard of care.162 For instance, in the Netherlands a court may draw from 
existing legal and social norms and practices relating the behavior of companies in order to 
define the appropriate standard of care in a case brought on the basis of the Dutch general 
provision on tort/delict. As explained by Enneking, this is by reason of the nature of this standard 
of care as an open norm of a violation of unwritten norms pertaining to proper social conduct. 
These norms may be binding or non-binding, written or unwritten, and can be discerned from 
various sources. Enneking notes ‘existing treaty or statutory provisions pertaining to behavior 
that is related to the behavior in dispute, general legal principles and convictions, existing norms 
of (self-regulatory) practices in the societal sector, industry or branch involved, and existing case 
law in related disputes’.163  
The UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are recognized as 
international instruments that a court may refer to in order to construe a legal standard of care.164 
A commentator notes that there is increasing recognition for the human rights due diligence as an 
international standard of conduct for dispute resolution, as demonstrated by the jurisprudence of 
the OECD NCP. Hence, more generally, there is a reasonable probability that the human rights 
due diligence concept may inform the legal standard of due care in future negligence cases.165 
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Enneking furthermore notes that corporate negligence entails a normative judgment by a court as 
to whether a company had appropriate and sufficient measures to prevent harm from 
materializing and therefore acted in accordance with the applicable standard of a duty of care. 
This normative judgment of whether the company acted reasonably is determined on the basis of 
a judicial balancing act between care and risk. The elements that weigh into this balancing act 
signal that the essence of this balancing act is to determine whether ‘the parent company has 
taken sufficient care in light of the potential risks inherent in the multinational corporation’s host 
country activities’.166  
Enneking notes the pragmatic nature of this balancing exercise, which ‘revolves around the aim 
of avoiding or mitigating the risk of harm on the one hand and the means (time, money, effort) 
by which to achieve this on the other’.167 Enneking also indicates that:168  
 As the risk becomes more serious, the duty on the parent company to take precautionary 
 measures shifts from best practicable means to best technical means, in the sense that 
 business-economic considerations will become less and less important in view of the aim 
 of avoiding widespread and/or serious people- and planet-related harm. Slowly but 
 surely, the obligation on the parent company to perform to the best of its ability in view 
 of the costs involved shifts in the direction of an obligation to perform to the best of its 
 ability regardless of the costs and possibly even beyond, in the direction of an obligation 
 to achieve (or, in this sense, rather avoid) a particular result and stricter forms of liability. 
6.3.4 Piercing the Corporate Veil  
An alternative legal basis that victims could rely on in order to establish parent liability is the 
corporate law notion of piercing of the corporate veil.169 The doctrine entails a true exception170 to 
the general principle of separate legal personality established in Salomon v A Salomon and Co 
Ltd. Piercing the corporate veil entails that the court disregards this principle. Upon 
incorporation, a company incurs a legal personality that is separate from its members, which 
entails that it has rights and liabilities on its own, including the right to sue and to be sued, to 
enter into contract and to own property. The principle of limited liability principle shields a 
shareholder from liability beyond the obligations on the part of its value share. This principle 
extends to the corporate group. While a parent company may create and own its subsidiary 
entities, the limited liability principle shields the parent and the group from liability risks with 
regards to the operations of its subsidiaries, which general law treats as separate legal persons.171  
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil may be relied on to establish the liability of a parent 
company. There are important differences between the piercing of the corporate veil and direct 
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parent liability in tort liability cases, however.172 Enneking notes that the piercing of the 
corporate veil doctrine has a different starting point, applies a different test, has different 
outcomes and may entail the application of different rules of private international law.173 Unlike 
is the case for direct parent liability, a parent company is not held liable for its own acts or 
omissions, but for those of a subsidiary entity in the group.174 The law attributes the acts and 
liability of the subsidiary entity to the parent company in situations where the law views these 
companies as having one identity by virtue of the parent company’s control and ownership of the 
subsidiary entity.175 The doctrine is usually evoked in situations where a creditor turns to a 
shareholder, the parent company in order to recover compensation that a subsidiary entity owes 
to this creditor by reason of its wrongful conduct having caused him or her damage. The creditor 
brings a suit against the parent company because it is unable to retrieve compensation from the 
subsidiary entity, because of the subsidiary’s insolvency or lack of liability insurance.176 The 
proceedings may result in the parent company having to settle the debt of the subsidiary entity.177  
The legal ground and applicable test for piercing of the corporate veil doctrine varies depending 
on the law that is applied to the case. Where the common law of the UK is applied to the case, 
the relevant authorities on the piercing of the corporate veil doctrine are Adams v Cape 
Industries plc178, Trustor AB v Smallbone179, A v A, Ben Hashem v Al Shayif180, VTB Capital plc v 
Nutritek International Corpn181 and Prest v Petrodel Resources. The UK Supreme Court in Prest 
v Petrodel Resources Limited and others shed clarity on the relevant principles and critical 
features of situations in which the corporate veil has been pierced, which was subsequently 
referenced in the more recent ruling by the Chancery Division of the High Court in Wood v 
Baker.182 A short review follows.  
 
The court in Adams v Cape Industries plc recognized that subsidiary entities may have been 
created by parent companies, however this does not alter the fact that general law treats these 
entities as separate legal persons with their own rights and liabilities.183 The court also affirmed 
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that a corporate group is legally permitted to organize itself through legal form in order to evade 
legal liability for the activities of one member of the group.184 The court adopted the dictum in 
Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council recognized that ‘the corporate veil could be 
disregarded only in cases where it was being used for a deliberately dishonest purpose’.185 By 
stating that piercing the corporate veil is only allowed in situations where the corporate structure 
amounts to a ‘mere façade conceiling the true facts’, the alternative ground for piercing the 
corporate veil, that is the agency theory and the economic entity doctrine, came to occupy a 
lesser relevant position for the purpose of veil piercing. 
A court may invoke the agency theory and hold a company vicariously liable in situations where 
a subsidiary acts or was acting as a mere agent of the principle, the parent company. In the 
common law system of the UK, vicarious liability on the basis of agency can arise in exceptional 
circumstances only.186 The court in Adams v Cape held that piercing the corporate veil on the 
basis of the agency theory not only requires a close relationship of control between the principle 
and the agent and authority within the agent, but also an agreement of consent between the 
principle and the agent, which can be either express or implied. The requirement of consent is 
problematic in that usually there is no such agreement of consent, hence a parent-agency 
relationship will not typically be assumed to exist.187    
The single economic entity doctrine applies to cases in which the parent company exercises close 
control and dictates the corporate policy of a subsidiary entity to a sufficient extent to establish 
that the law treats the parent-subsidiary relation as a single economic unit. Like the agency 
doctrine, the single economic entity doctrine requires a relationship of excessive control by the 
parent company over the subsidiary entity.188 What this comes down to ‘in practical terms, is that 
a parent company would be held strictly liable for the activities of a foreign subsidiary by virtue 
of the ‘control relationship’ that exists between parent and subsidiary’.189 The court in Adams v 
Cape Industries held that control over the policies of another entity was, in itself, not sufficient 
to pierce the corporate veil, however. It also indicated that a court may not threat a group of 
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companies as a single unit unless this is expressly permitted by specific statutes and contractual 
provisions.190  
The court in Prest v. Petrodel Resources Limited and others recalled the ruling of the Vice 
Chancellor in Trustor AB v Smallbone (No 2). This ruling identified three situations in which 
piercing the corporate veil was considered justified: ‘(1) the company was shown to be a face or 
sham with no unconnected third party involved, (2) where the company was involved in some 
impropriety and (3) where it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice and no unconnected 
third party is involved’.191 The court applied the first and second proposition and held that it was 
entitled to pierce the corporate veil. The judgment was important because it noted that the court 
is ‘entitled to “pierce the corporate veil” and recognise the receipt of the company as that of the 
individuals(s) control of it if the company was used as a device or façade to conceal the true facts 
thereby avoiding or concealing any liability of those individual(s)’.192 
The Court in Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others also considered the decision in Ben 
Hashem v Alshayif,193 in which Munby J identified six principles that apply to piercing the 
corporate veil: 
(i) ownership and control of a company were not enough to justify piercing the corporate 
veil; (ii) the court cannot pierce the corporate veil, even in the absence of third party 
interests in the company, merely because it is thought to be necessary in the interests of 
justice; (iii) the corporate veil can be pierced only if there is some impropriety; (iv) the 
impropriety in question must, as Sir Andrew Morritt had said in Trustor, be ‘linked to the 
use of the company structure to avoid or conceal liability’; (v) to justify piercing the 
corporate veil, there must be ‘both control of the company by the wrongdoer(s) and 
impropriety, that is (mis)use of the company by them as a device or facade to conceal 
their wrongdoing’; and (vi) the company may be a ‘façade’ even though it was not 
originally incorporated with any deceptive intent, provided that it is being used for the 
purpose of deception at the time of the relevant transactions. The court would, however, 
pierce the corporate veil only so far as it was necessary in order to provide a remedy for 
the particular wrong which those controlling the company had done.194 
This judgment indicates that a court may pierce the corporate veil and attach liability to a parent 
company in the circumstances where there is ownership and control, some impropriety that 
involves a deliberate abuse of the corporate structure in order to evade the law or its enforcement 
and piercing the corporate veil is necessary to provide remedy for the wrong done. The case law 
indicates that the criteria are not in themselves regarded as sufficient to justify the piercing of the 
corporate veil, all criteria have to be satisfied.  
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The respective authorities indicate that piercing the corporate veil requires control over the 
subsidiary. As the court in Adams v Cape plc. expressly mentioned, control in itself does not 
provide a sufficient ground for piercing the corporate veil, however. There must be impropriety 
on the part of the parent company. As the court in Trustor AB v Smallbone indicated, not just any 
impropriety would qualify; the impropriety must be ‘linked to the use of the company structure 
to avoid or conceal liability for that impropriety’. 195  There must be a link between the 
impropriety and the abuse of a company’s separate legal personality in order to avoid or conceal 
liability. The 2012 ruling in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corpn recognized that 
wrongdoing ‘must be in the nature of an independent wrong that involves the fraudulent or 
dishonest misuse of the corporate personality of the company for the purpose of concealing the 
true facts’.196 The court in Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others noted ‘the principle that 
the court may be justified in piercing the corporate veil if a company’s separate legal personality 
is being abused for the purpose of some relevant wrongdoing is well established in the 
authorities’.197  
The court in Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others clarified the meaning of relevant 
wrongdoing for the purpose of the piercing of the corporate veil doctrine. The court 
distinguished between two principles, the concealment principle and the evasion principle, in 
order to determine whether there is question of piercing the corporate veil in particular 
circumstances:  
28. The difficulty is to identify what is a relevant wrongdoing. References to a ‘façade’ 
or ‘sham’ beg too many questions to provide a satisfactory answer. It seems to me that 
two distinct principles lie behind these protean terms, and that much confusion has been 
caused by failing to distinguish between them. They can conveniently be called the 
concealment principle and the evasion principle. The concealment principle is legally 
banal and does not involve piercing the corporate veil at all. It is that the interposition of 
a company or perhaps several companies so as to conceal the identity of the real actors 
will not deter the courts from identifying them, assuming that their identity is legally 
relevant. In these cases the court is not disregarding the “facade”, but only looking 
behind it to discover the facts which the corporate structure is concealing. The evasion 
principle is different. It is that the court may disregard the corporate veil if there is a legal 
right against the person in control of it which exists independently of the company’s 
involvement, and a company is interposed so that the separate legal personality of the 
company will defeat the right or frustrate its enforcement. Many cases will fall into both 
categories, but in some circumstances the difference between them may be critical. 
The court adopted the view that the ‘evasion principle’ engages the piercing of the corporate veil 
doctrine, while the ‘concealment principle’ does not. The evasion principle involves situations in 
which a company is interposed in order to enable the individual that is in control of this company 
to evade its legal obligation or to frustrate the enforcement of these obligation against him. There 
is question of abuse of the separate legal personality of the company in order to evade liability, 
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and the courts may pierce the corporate veil in these situations so as to prevent this abuse. The 
concealment principle is engaged in situations where the corporate structure is concealing the 
identity of an actor and the court looks behind the façade in order to discover relevant facts that 
ascertain the actor’s true identity. There may be a link to the use of the corporate structure so as 
to conceal liability, however the court does not pierce the corporate veil in order to attribute 
liability, hence the doctrine does not apply in these situations.198  
Once the wrongful conduct has been established, public policy imperatives come into play to 
determine whether applying the corporate veil doctrine is justified in the circumstances of the 
case. The case law appears to indicate that piercing the corporate veil for a wrongful conduct 
amounting to abuse of the separate legal personality is only justified on the basis of a public 
policy objective. The court expressly noted that applying the doctrine is inappropriate if it is not 
necessary to do so, because there would be no public policy imperative justifying that course.199 
This public policy imperative is for the law ‘not to be disarmed in face of abuse’. The Court also 
held that, provided the limits are recognized and respected, the application of the doctrine is 
consistent with the general approach of English law in dealing with problems raised by ‘the use 
of legal concepts to defeat mandatory rules of law’.200 The court in Prest v Petrodel Resources 
Limited and others stated: 
But the consensus that there are circumstances in which the court may pierce the 
corporate veil is impressive. I would not for my part be willing to explain that consensus 
out of existence. This is because I think that the recognition of a limited power to pierce 
the corporate veil in carefully defined circumstances is necessary if the law is not to be 
disarmed in the face of abuse. I also think that provided the limits are recognised and 
respected, it is consistent with the general approach of English law to the problems raised 
by the use of legal concepts to defeat mandatory rules of law’. 201 
 
The Chancellor Division of the High Court in Wood v Baker held that the joint trustees in 
bankruptcy had presented a good arguable case for interim injunctive relief on the basis of a 
corporate veil analysis, and the evasion principle, which it summarizes as follows:202 
 
 In summary, the bankrupt was, and remains, subject to an existing obligation to disclose 
 after-acquired assets to his trustees. He has evaded that obligation by interposing some, 
 or all of the corporate respondents. His motivation is said to be clear, namely to evade the 
 consequences of disclosure under section 333, and thus the expropriation of those assets 
 under section 307. This is said to be an exercise in evasion by the bankrupt of his 
 statutory obligations under section 333. 
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The case law indicates that the corporate veil doctrine generally does not create liability for a 
parent company for the adverse human rights impacts resulting from the activities of a subsidiary 
undertaking. The doctrine only allows for the liability of parent undertaking in certain cases 
where there is abuse of the corporate structure. The case law suggests that there is abuse where a 
parent undertaking interposes a company that it is in control of, in order to defeat a legal right of, 
or to frustrate the enforcement of this right against it. Thus, the doctrine commonly cannot give 
rise to liability unless there is abuse of the corporate structure for the purpose of avoiding legal 
obligations or liability for human rights breaches, or for other rights or obligations that amongst 
other impacts have adverse human rights impacts. The public policy imperative delimits liability, 
in that a court may not pierce the corporate veil on the basis of public policy objectives other 
than to ensure that the law is not disarmed in face of abuse. It appears that the veil piercing 
doctrine creates liability and provides a remedy for the abuse of the corporate structure by a 
parent for the sole purpose of avoiding abuse of the law. Liability is limited in that it only applies 
to the extent necessary to exempt the defendant from the advantages obtained from this abuse.  
6.3.5 Preliminary Considerations 
6.3.5.1 Sphere of Influence Concept v Human Rights Due Diligence  
In the UK common law system, direct parent liability is delimited by an assessment of whether a 
duty of care does or does not exist.203 The elements of ‘proximity’, ‘control’ and ‘the nature of 
the relationship’ ‘causality’ are integral to, and serve as the delimiting factors for the test of the 
legal duty of care. These factors mirror and operationalize the sphere of influence concept.204 
Partially because they are expressions of the sphere of influence concept, their application as 
delimiting concepts are unsuited. Such application has the effect of excluding from the scope of 
responsibility and liability a broad range of situations in which business enterprises are involved 
in human rights abuses. The narrow range of situations in which liability may arise and the 
difficulty of demonstrating the circumstances in which connections of ‘proximity’ or ‘control’ 
exist illustrate the limits of current approaches in ensuring that business involvement in human 
rights abuses meets with legal consequences. As will be elaborated below, these approaches 
furthermore contribute little in terms of fostering human rights due diligence practices by 
companies. A revision of current approaches to parent liability in order to bring these into 
alignment with the human rights due diligence concept would be in line with current social 
expectations. 
The following sections will explain the link between the current approaches to parent liability 
outlined above and the ‘human rights due diligence’ concept. 
6.3.5.2 Proximity 
The element of ‘proximity’ that serves as a requirement of the Caparo test of a duty of care 
operationalizes the ‘sphere of influence’ concept. The sphere of influences concept includes 
within the sphere of the responsibility of a company for human rights those actors with whom the 
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company has ‘a certain political, contractual, economic or geographic proximity’.205 The concept 
of ‘sphere of influence’ determines corporate responsibility in relation to the ‘leverage’ that a 
company has over actors that cause or prevent the harm. The concept of human rights due 
diligence determines responsibility in relation to the ‘impacts’ that result from the activities or 
relationships of the entity.206 The SRSG furthermore notes that ‘proximity’ understood in a 
geographical sense can be misleading in suggesting that companies are not responsible for the 
activities that affect human rights far away from the source, which is not the case. For this reason 
‘it is not proximity that determines whether or not a human rights impact falls within the 
responsibility to respect, but rather the company’s web of activities and relationships’.207  
A court can impose a legal duty of care and liability on a company in accordance with the test in 
Caparo only if the business of the parent and that of the subsidiary entity are in relevant aspects 
the same, which is also a necessary indicia for establishing ‘proximity’. As explained in 
Thompson v Renwick Group plc, this requirement is important because the court is looking for a 
situation in which the parent company has ‘superior knowledge or expertise’ and for this reason 
is ‘better placed’ to protect the employees of subsidiary companies against adverse human rights 
impacts and expected to employ its knowledge to do so.208 The court noted: 
This is no mere formalism, for as the balance of Arden LJ’s indicia indicate, what one is 
looking for is ‘a situation in which the parent company is better placed, because of its 
superior knowledge or expertise, to protect the employees of subsidiary companies 
against the risk of injury and moreover where, because of that feature, it is fair to infer 
that the subsidiary will rely upon the parent deploying its superior knowledge in order to 
protect its employees from risk of injury’. 
The human rights due diligence concept does not require similarity between the business of the 
parent company and the subsidiary entity, or ‘superior knowledge’ for that matter. Whether the 
parent and a subsidiary entity are in the same business is not a determinant factor for the 
attribution of responsibility.  
The legal duty of care corresponds with the human rights due diligence concept as defined by the 
UNGPs in that, unlike is the case of vicarious responsibility, the parent company is not deemed 
responsible for the actions of its subsidiary entity, but for a duty of care that the law imposed on 
the parent company itself. This duty arises through the company’s own behavior. The law creates 
a legal duty of care if the parent company has de facto taken a role upon itself to protect the 
employees from harm. It is separate from, and arises independent of any civil liability on the part 
of the subsidiary entity. This is in alignment with the UNGPs, which recognizes that the parent 
company and the subsidiary entity each have their own responsibility to undertake human rights 
due diligence and that these responsibilities are ‘differentiated’ and ‘mutually-reinforcing’.209  
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The assessment of whether a duty of care attaches to the company in a specific situation serves 
as a limitation mechanism. As illustrated in the case of Chandler v. Cape, the element of 
‘sufficient proximity’ turned out to be decisive for whether a legal duty of care attached to the 
parent company. The element of proximity serves as a delimitation concept for responsibility and 
legal liability, because no legal duty of care exists in the absence of proximity between the parent 
undertaking and the harm. A minimum threshold requirement furthermore applies in that 
proximity must be ‘sufficient’ in order to trigger legal responsibility. The court considered 
‘sufficient proximity’ between the parent and the victim in reference to indicia related to, inter 
alia, control, foreseeability and superior knowledge. A high threshold was established in that all 
indicia had to be satisfied; the required circumstances were not in themselves decisive for 
establishing a relationship of sufficient proximity.  
The principle of ‘sufficient proximity’ delimits the scope of applicability of the legal duty of care 
standard and excludes liability in situations where the relationship between the parent and the 
harm is too remote. The closer or more proximate the plaintiff is to the parent company, the more 
likely the court will recognize that the parent company has a legal duty to take positive action in 
order to prevent harm to employees of the subsidiary entity. Also the closer this relationship, the 
more may be legally required of a parent company with regards the precautionary steps it should 
take for protecting the plaintiffs from harm. Sufficient proximity has been established on the 
basis of factual evidence of the business and acts of the parent company. The court held that the 
parent company had some control over the operations of the subsidiary as apparent by its 
practice of intervening in these operations. The parent company was by reason of its superior 
knowledge on safety and health matters in the asbestos business expected to intervene in order to 
protect the employees of the subsidiary from foreseeable harm.210 
6.3.5.3 Control 
Also the requirement of control suggests that the ‘sphere of influence’ concept underpins the 
existing approach to parent liability under UK common law. The Caparo test of a duty of care 
requires that a parent company exercises some de facto control over relevant aspects of the 
operations of the subsidiary entity in order to establish a relationship of sufficient proximity. 
Evidence of some control by a parent company over relevant operations of a subsidiary entity 
serves as a precondition for establishing a relationship of proximity between the parent company 
and the plaintiff that is sufficient to trigger a legal obligation and liability. The element of control 
is determined on a case-by-case basis and on the basis of factual evidence of how the company 
has acted, rather than formal relationships. The SRSG has noted, however, that the responsibility 
of business enterprises should not be determined on the basis of ‘control’, or ‘causation’ for that 
matter. The reason is that these concepts ‘wrongly limit the baseline responsibility of companies 
to respect rights’ and ‘could imply, for example, that companies were not required to consider 
the human rights impacts of suppliers they do not legally control, or situations where their own 
actions might not directly cause harm but indirectly contribute to abuse’.211  
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There are several reasons why it is unjust to apply control as a delimiting principle. One reason is 
that this ex ante excludes certain parents from liability for human rights impacts resulting from 
the activities of another entity in the corporate group. A relationship of sufficient control 
between the parent and other companies within a corporate group exists in most212 but not in all 
circumstances. The control theory may be applied to companies in which there is a controlling 
entity, for instance ‘franchise chains, consortia or joint venture companies’.213 This theory may be 
inapplicable to companies that display a more horizontal organizational structure. As Eroglu 
notes: 
All the basics of the veil-piercing doctrine have been built on excessive control by parent 
corporations over subsidiaries. However, under the modern complicated horizontally 
structured corporate groups, the control has been spread over subsidiaries, which appears 
in two ways. There are more self-dependent and self-operated subsidiaries and there are 
changing components of control and influence over others operating in the group. 
Consequently, in this new and complicated structure, it is almost impossible to establish 
a simplified method of control under which excessive control of one entity over another 
is established.214    
Control or agency theories are not applicable to the horizontally organized structured entities 
whose subsidiary entities have greater autonomy and shifting control structures do not point to 
one entity as the ‘controlling’ entity that exercises excessive control over another entity in the 
group.  
The absence of an agency or control relationship in practice should not serve as an apology for 
denying recourse to victims. It seems unjust that the corporate veil cannot be pierced in situations 
where the parent and its subsidiary entities operate as an economic entity in practice, but the 
organizational links between them do not reach the high threshold of control that the piercing the 
corporate veil doctrine requires. Similarly, it seems unjust that some de facto control by a parent 
company over the operations of a subsidiary entity is necessary in order to establish a 
relationship based on an assumption of a duty of care in accordance with the test in Caparo, if it 
would be too difficult or impossible for plaintiffs to demonstrate that such de facto control by a 
parent entity exists. In these situations, there is a mismatch between the legal doctrines for 
attributing liability and the organizational reality of corporate groups.  
To shield certain companies from legal liability by reason of the absence of a relationship of 
control does not correspond with the human rights due diligence concept. According to the 
UNGPs, business enterprises have a responsibility for the adverse human rights impacts that 
arise in affiliate operations and a parent company has a responsibility to act with due diligence in 
order to prevent and mitigate these risks. This responsibility applies to all business enterprises, 
irrespective of their ownership or organizational structure. This responsibility also exists 
irrespective of whether the company actually has control or leverage over these operations or 
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risks. For instance, a parent of a loosely integrated enterprise may have a responsibility for the 
adverse human rights impacts of a subsidiary entity that belongs to the group, but that the parent 
has no strategic or operational control over by reason of this entity operating autonomously and 
being an organizationally separate entity.215  
Current doctrines to parent liability have the effect of discouraging compliance by business 
enterprises with their human rights responsibilities. As the court in Adams v Cape Industries 
affirmed, a corporate group is legally permitted to organize itself through legal form so that the 
legal liability for the activities of one member of the group does not fall on another member of 
the group. By reason of the limited liability principle, it is not illegal for a parent company to rely 
its limited liability privilege to shield itself from liability for harm caused to human rights abroad 
resulting from the operations of subsidiary entities abroad.  
Companies are known to rely on the principle of limited liability and separate legal personality in 
order to attribute legal responsibility throughout the group and escape accountability if human 
rights abuses have occurred.216 Various liability avoiding means are employed for this purpose, 
e.g., artificially configuring a corporate structure, undercapitalizing subsidiary entities, 
withdrawing personal assets from a company or liquidating it prematurely in face of tort 
liabilities. One of the benefits of limited liability is ‘lowering [of the] risk of legal liability by 
confining high liability risks, including environmental and consumer liability, to particular group 
companies, with a view to isolating the remaining group assets from this potential liability’.217 
Only in specific circumstances can this general rule of UK common law be disregarded and the 
corporate veil that separates the subsidiary and a parent company be pierced.218 In the absence of 
these requirements, a court may not pierce the corporate veil on the basis of justice 
considerations, which in themselves do not provide sufficient legal ground for corporate veil 
piercing.219 220 The piercing of the corporate veil doctrine applies in the particular context of 
involuntary creditors seeking to access the assets of a parent to obtain compensation for the 
wrongful acts of a subsidiary entity that has become insolvent. In most tort liability cases, the 
main issue is not that the affiliate has insufficient assets, but the lack of access to remedies in the 
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domestic legal system.221 Moreover, if insufficient assets were the problem, meaning that a tort 
victim cannot retrieve assets from a subsidiary company because the subsidiary company lacks 
liability insurance or went insolvent, this fact is in itself not a sufficient reason for corporate veil 
piercing. The standard scenario of foreign direct liability cases thus commonly does not satisfy 
the conditions required by the doctrine.  
Consequently, in typical direct tort liability scenarios, business enterprises can effectively rely on 
the limited liability principle and liability evading practices to avoid liability for human rights 
abuses by subsidiary entities. In these circumstances, tort law creates few incentives for 
companies to take their responsibility for human rights seriously and to act on their responsibility 
to prevent the occurrence of human rights abuses. The principle of limited liability encourages 
business enterprises to invest in liability avoiding measures in order to insulate themselves from 
liability instead.  
Many view the possibility that the limited liability principle creates for business enterprises to 
absolve themselves from liability for harm to human rights as unjust. Upholding the limited 
liability principle in these situations allows for the risk of loss to be externalized and allocated 
from the company to tort victims (i.e., involuntary tort creditors), while these victims have not 
agreed to bear these risk, unlike is the case for voluntary creditors that have entered into an 
agreement with the company.222 Victims are in a worse position that these creditors to ex ante 
protect themselves against these risks,223 as well as to bear and avoid these risks in relation to the 
parent company that is professionally, legally and economically superior.224 The limited liability 
principle furthermore not only permits,225 but also encourages irresponsibility of the parent 
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company by way of increasing moral hazard.226 Anderson notes that ‘the moral hazard created by 
limited liability may encourage excessive risk-taking, causing personal injury to a small or large 
number of victims (irrespective of company size)’.227  
A parent company may be encouraged to undertake human rights due diligence if doing 
decreases its exposure to potential liability risks. Current approaches to parent liability and 
corporate veil piercing appear to create limited legal incentives for parent undertakings in this 
regard, however. In fact, they can have the opposite effect of discouraging companies to take 
their human rights due diligence responsibility seriously. The human rights due diligence 
activities of companies may be ‘counterproductive’ for companies if evidencing knowledge and 
control that exposes companies to greater potential legal liability risks.228 In the context of 
complicity charges, for instance, Michalowski notes that companies may be more prudent in 
acquiring information to become aware of complicity risks where this action could evidence 
‘knowledge’ for the purpose of legal complicity.229 Whether this prudence is warranted depends 
on the national standard of complicity. A lack of knowledge of complicity risks does not 
automatically serve as a defense against liability charges 230 if the law also looks at what 
companies ought to have known for the purpose of establishing complicity liability.231  
There are real concerns about an emerging tension between company’s objective of mitigating 
legal liability risks and undertaking due diligence to manage risks to human rights instilling 
companies with a sense of caution. A recent update by a law firm states: 
While lawmakers may be motivated to help bring about positive social change, 
unfortunately the increase in supply-chain litigation and the passage of these disclosure 
laws likely means that companies may dial back on certain programs to mitigate risk of 
potential liability; companies will be incentivized to put as much risk as possible on third 
party auditors, and will have to rethink their relationships with suppliers. The unfortunate 
end result may be that less happens to address these global social challenges. And, in the 
short-term, companies will need to think carefully about what they say in their 
disclosures and other public facing statements.232  
This gap could be filled by revisiting these approaches by reference to the human rights due 
diligence concept as stipulated in the UNGPs. If the legal liability standard and the standard of 
human rights due diligence would be aligned, non-compliance with the human rights due 
diligence responsibility would expose companies to greater potential liability risks. Human rights 
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due diligence would also be a more useful tool to assist companies in avoiding such risks. I argue 
that current legal barriers to accessing justice will not be overcome unless there exists a 
rebuttable presumption of a legal duty of care construed on the human rights due diligence 
concept, a so-called ‘legal duty of human rights due diligence’. The limiting factors that 
determine whether a company should be held liable for a breach of this duty, should align with 
the human rights due diligence concept and the factors integral to this concept. The test for 
liability should hinge on companies human rights due diligence and whether the company has 
taken reasonable due diligence to rebut the presumption of a legal duty of care.   
 A Presumption of a Legal Duty of Care Based on the Human Rights Due Diligence 6.4
Concept 
Arguably, there should be a presumption in tort law that companies have a legal duty of care that 
is construed in accordance with the human rights due diligence concept as set out in the 
UNGPs.233 The assumption would be that the human rights due diligence is a standard of 
conduct,234 that a company is expected to meet in order to discharge its legal duty of care. Non-
compliance with this standard gives rise to liability under a tort of negligence.  
Introducing a legal duty of human rights due diligence would entail a minor adjustment to the 
legal duty of care standard as it is currently applied under certain common law and civil law 
jurisdictions. In common law countries, this would entail recognizing a cause of action for a 
breach of a legal duty of care that aligns with the UNGPs amounting to a tort of negligence that 
could give rise to liability not only in specific factual situations, but generally. The existence of 
this standard would be presumed. In civil law countries, this would entail introducing a statutory 
provision in tort law that would serve as a legal basis for a liability in the form of a breach of a 
legal duty of care construed in accordance with the human rights due diligence concept as 
defined by the UNGPs. The limiting principles in both common law and civil law systems would 
be aligned with the human rights due diligence concept.  
6.4.1 Human Rights Due Diligence as a Standard of Fault  
The standard of conduct for the legal duty of care would align with the human rights due 
diligence concept, in terms of both content and scope. The presumption holds that if human 
rights abuses occurred, and the company was involved in the harm to human rights, the company 
acted negligently by fault for having omitted to take the appropriate due diligence steps to 
prevent the adverse human rights impacts from occurring.235 The human rights due diligence 
would serves as a standard of fault, which Bonnitcha and McCorquodale explain as follows:236  
                                                
 233  A related argument by Anderson is that ‘directors’ duties to act with care and diligence and in good faith be the 
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[due diligence] provides a benchmark to determine whether an actor should be held 
responsible for the results of its conduct. As a standard of fault, due diligence is a legal 
concept that sits somewhere in the middle of a spectrum that runs from intent – a 
standard which holds and actor responsible for the results of its conduct only if that 
conduct is committed willfully – to strict liability – a standard that holds an actor 
responsible for the results of its conduct without any inquiry into whether the conduct 
was blame worthy.  
The presumption of a legal duty of human rights due diligence would not be absolute, however, 
and rebuttable if the defendant could provide sufficient evidence of having acted as a ‘diligent 
person’ by having taken all reasonable measures in attempting to prevent the adverse human 
rights impacts from occurring. The negligence would be inversely proportional to the due 
diligence steps taken by the company, in that the more due diligence steps a company takes the 
less serious the negligence will be. When a company has taken reasonable due diligence, the 
negligence would be negligible and the presumption may be rebutted.  
The standard of human rights due diligence would derive from the UNGPs. This standard 
attaches to the business enterprise at all times, irrespective of prevailing circumstances. Business 
enterprises would be expected to carry out risk-based human rights due diligence to manage the 
potential adverse human rights impacts that it causes or contributes to, or that it may be directly 
linked to through its operations, products or services. Human rights due diligence entails 
‘assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, 
tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed’.237 
While human rights due diligence is an objective standard that applies to companies irrespective 
of circumstances, it is fact specific in that the due diligence expected of a company depends on 
prevailing circumstances. The standard is also indeterminate to a degree in that the expectations 
are not pre-defined and entail a contextual judgment of what is reasonable in the circumstances, 
which may furthermore evolve over time.238 This normative judgment of whether business 
enterprises have acted reasonably entails a balancing act, which is further elaborated below.  
The scope of the legal duty of human rights due diligence would be defined and qualified by the 
human rights due diligence concept. The presumption of a legal duty of care would entail that 
liability for a breach would be limited to a failure to act diligently to prevent the human rights 
impacts that a company is involved in. The UNGP 13 distinguishes between three types of 
involvement in adverse human rights impacts: causation, contribution and direct linkage:  
13.  The responsibility to respect human rights requires that business enterprises:  
(a)  Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their 
own activities, and address such impacts when they occur;  
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(b)  Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly 
linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, 
even if they have not contributed to those impacts.  
A breach of a legal duty of care could give rise to fault liability in situations where a business 
enterprise is involved in human rights impacts by way of causation, contribution or direct 
linkage. That what is expected of companies in terms of due diligence may vary according to 
these types of involvement. The measures that a company is expected to take may differ in scope 
and complexity depending on whether the company contributed to the harm, or whether the 
company’s operations, products and services are linked to the adverse impact through its 
business relationships.239  
First, a company can have adverse impacts on human rights through causation, when a company 
by action or omission may cause an adverse human rights impact. Causation entails that there is 
‘causality between the operations, products or services of the enterprise and the adverse impact’. 
Factors that enter into the determination of appropriate action in situations where the company 
has caused an adverse human rights impact, the court would look at the steps that a company has 
taken to ease or prevent the impact. 
A company may have adverse impact on human rights through contribution. A company may 
contribute to adverse human rights impacts through its relationships. The factors, relationships 
and actors that a company would need to consider and that delimit the scope of due diligence in 
situations where the company contributes to human rights impacts are linked to the concept of 
complicity. A company can be said to contribute to adverse human rights impacts when it makes 
a substantial contributions to an adverse impact, i.e., ‘an activity that causes, facilitates or 
incentivizes another entity to cause an adverse impact’, or contributes to an adverse impact ‘if 
the combination of its activities and that of another entity result in an adverse impact’. In 
situations where a company has contributed to adverse human rights impacts, the court would 
consider whether the company has taken the necessary steps to cease or prevent its contribution 
and whether the company used its leverage to mitigate any remaining impact to the greatest 
extent possible.240   
A company may also have adverse impacts on human rights by its products, services or 
operations. The adverse human rights impacts are connected to the parent company through 
direct linkage. A relationship of direct linkage is one in which adverse human rights impacts are 
‘directly linked’ to a company’s operations, products and services through its business 
relationships.241 In situations of where a company is directly linked to a human rights impacts, the 
court would assess the action a company has taken in relation to several factors: ‘the enterprise’s 
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leverage over the entity concerned, how crucial the relationship is to the enterprise, the severity 
of the abuse, and whether terminating the relationship with the entity itself would have adverse 
human rights consequences’.242 
6.4.2 The Rationale for Introducing a Legal Duty of Human Rights Due Diligence  
A presumption of a legal duty of care construed on the human rights due diligence concept 
entails that business enterprises could rely on human rights due diligence as a defense against 
liability charges.243 The understanding that human rights due diligence can serve as a means to 
avoid liability ex ante is not new.244 The SRSG has affirmed that human rights due diligence can 
serve as a tool245 for business enterprises to avoid liability for complicity in human rights 
violations, allowing the company to identify and act upon risks of having adverse human rights 
impacts through their business relationships.246 247 Consequently, conducting human rights due 
diligence can be of use to companies in addressing the risk of legal claim against them. By 
undertaking human rights due diligence, ‘companies can become aware of, prevent and address 
risks of complicity by integrating the common features of legal and societal benchmarks into 
their due diligence processes’.248 There is no guarantee that compliance with due diligence would 
fully exempt business enterprises from liability, however.249  
If a presumption of a legal duty of care were to be introduced, the human rights due diligence 
may be understood as the expected standard of conduct, and the fault element of a breach of a 
legal duty of care amounting to a tort of negligence. The human rights due diligence would still 
serve as an ex ante means to manage liability risk, and in fact may be a more effective tool, 
because the expected legal standard of care and the human rights due diligence concept would 
align. It would take on greater importance ex post, however, because business enterprises would 
be able to present a reliable defense on the basis of evidence of human rights due diligence that, 
if successful, could insulate a company from liability.250 The rebuttable presumption would not 
be aimed at insulating business enterprises from liability, but to increase the protection of victim 
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and community’s right to an effective remedy and justice and to strengthen the legal 
underpinnings of the corporate respect for human rights.  
Another objective is the deterrence of irresponsible behavior by companies by increasing liability 
exposure to business enterprises that do not undertake human rights due diligence. The scope and 
substance of the legal duty of care and the human rights due diligence concept as defined in the 
UNGPs would correspond. In the case human rights abuses occurred, evidence of human rights 
due diligence would serve to reduce the seriousness of negligence by demonstrating that the 
company took all the reasonable steps in its attempt to prevent the harm from occurring. If the 
company acted with sufficient due diligence, the presumption of a legal duty of care would be 
rebutted and no liability would be imposed on the company. The rebuttable presumption could 
have a deterrent effect by reason of the liability that is presumed to fall on companies in case of 
non-compliance and the possibility for companies to lower exposure to liability by undertaking 
human rights due diligence.251  
The rebuttable presumption thus entails that the company is presumed to be at fault when human 
rights abuses have occurred. The company can rely on human rights due diligence as a defense 
against liability charges.252  The burden should be on business enterprises to demonstrate that it 
took all the reasonable steps for rebutting the presumption of a legal duty of care and liability. 
This may be irrespective of the fact that a lack of due diligence constitutes the fault conduct. 
Placing the burden on companies to provide the evidence of due diligence is in line with UNGP 
21, which recognizes that disclosure on human rights due diligence is an integral part of a 
company’s human rights due diligence responsibility. According to this principle, business 
enterprises ‘should account for how they address their human rights impacts’ and ‘should be 
prepared to communicate this externally, particularly when concerns are raised by or on behalf of 
affected stakeholders'. The information should ‘be sufficient to evaluate the adequacy of an 
enterprise’s response to the particular human rights impact involved’.253 A reversed burden of 
proof would benefit plaintiffs that currently carry the burden of having to provide evidence that 
material criteria have been satisfied, e.g. for instance a relationship of control and proximity.  
Often the plaintiffs depend on the defendant parent company to provide them with the necessary 
information. A lack of evidence in situations where the company is unwilling to provide access 
to essential information can result in a dismissal of the case. The plaintiffs in Milieudefensie v 
Shell were denied access to internal documents that were crucial to proving that the parent 
company RDS determined the daily affairs of its Nigerian subsidiary. The plaintiffs had filed 
ancillary claims on the basis of Article 843a of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure requesting the 
production of documents, arguing that these documents were essential to the plaintiffs for 
substantiating a list of arguments. The court dismissed the claims on the ground of a lack of 
legitimate interest by the plaintiffs in these documents,254 which according to Milieudefensie, 
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caused the court to conclude that no legal duty and liability attached to the parent company 
RDS.255 The court reversed this decision on appeal and ordered RDS to give access to almost all 
these documents nonetheless, because of the potential relevance of this information in relation to 
the alleged breach of a duty of care by RDS. Due to the company confidentiality of the 
documents, access was to be granted to lawyers, judges and experts only, however.256  
6.4.3 A Human Rights Due Diligence Defense: Too Much Protection for Companies? 
There are diverging views as to the desirability of creating a legal defense in negligence law that 
exempts business enterprises that exercise human rights due diligence from liability for 
involvement in human rights impacts. I agree that a due diligence standard of conduct is less 
suited and should not be applicable to companies in so far they themselves cause the averse 
human rights impact. A reading of the UNGPs supports the argument that enterprises have a 
strict responsibility for their own adverse human rights impacts. Commentators have failed to 
recognize a qualification or fault element in UNGP 13a, which merely states that business 
enterprises should ‘avoid’ causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts.257 The 
UNGPs are understood to apply fault liability only to companies for their involvement in adverse 
human rights impacts by third parties. This is derived from the wording of UNGP 13 b) 
recognizing that business enterprises have a responsibility to ‘seek to prevent’ adverse impacts 
that companies are directly linked to through their business relationships. 258  
The proposition to impose strict liability (independent of fault) on companies for their own 
adverse human rights impacts, while imposing negligence liability (based on fault) for the 
adverse human rights impacts resulting from the operations of a third party relies on an existing 
approach of general international law. General international law relies on the due diligence 
standard to limit an actor's responsibility for third parties: it is only when a State failed to protect 
human rights against infringements by a third party that it can limit its legal responsibility by 
conducting due diligence.259 The same rationale is said to underpin the due diligence standard for 
the responsibility to respect, namely that it would be ‘both impractical and unfair to hold one 
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entity strictly responsible for the conduct of another entity that it does not control, and whose 
every action it could never realistically monitor’.260   
Analogizing to the rebuttable presumption of a legal duty of care, this would entail that the 
presumption would apply to companies but that this presumption would not be rebuttable by 
evidence of reasonable due diligence in situations where the company causes the adverse human 
rights impacts. Strict liability would entail that no fault element applied in these scenarios and 
that business enterprises would be liable for their adverse human rights, full stop. It has been 
rightly argued that this would establish a clear line of accountability and avoid discussion as to 
whether a company acted in breach of its responsibility, which companies may have otherwise 
used to their strategic advance.261  
Some call for restraint in terms of the degree of protection that should be afforded to business 
enterprises in foreign direct liability claims in which human rights are at issue. Sherman and 
Lehr raise this point in the context of the ATS, and in response to a proposal by a commentator 
to create a due diligence defense under this Statute tailored to the business judgment rule, the 
effect of which would be to render a business enterprise immune to ATS liability, provided that 
it conducted human rights due diligence in good faith.262 The authors rightly consider this 
proposal as ‘problematic’, noting the seriousness of the human rights violations that give rise to 
the claims under ATS. They underscore the universal condemnation under the law of nations of 
these crimes and the serious damage these inflict on individuals that are more vulnerable to such 
damage than companies. The authors note that ‘when human rights are at issue, a company 
should not be entitled to the same broad degree of protection that the business judgment rule 
grants to directors in financially managing a company’.263  
The human rights abuses that give rise to tort liability claims equally warrant consideration of 
whether a due diligence defense would give too much protection to business enterprises that 
stand accused of involvement in severe human rights abuses. These concerns are alleviated to a 
certain extent by the proportionality test that is built into human rights due diligence concept. In 
situations where the adverse human rights impacts giving rise to the claims are of a severe 
nature, the proportionality principle shifts and certain discretion is removed from the company. 
In order to rebut the presumption of a legal duty of care, the company would have to demonstrate 
greater caution and measures of a more technical nature, in order to demonstrate that its 
negligence was insufficient to uphold the presumption of the legal duty of care.264 In other words, 
the presumption of a legal duty of care would be far less easily rebuttable in the presence of 
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severe human rights impacts.265 Similarly, a more stringent rebuttable presumption would also 
apply in the presence of a greater probability of these human risks materializing. The rationale 
for a more stringent rebuttable presumption is that the severe nature of the adverse human rights 
impacts and the greater probability of human rights risks indicates the seriousness of the 
company’s fault committed by its negligence conduct.  
6.4.4 A ‘three stage’ test  
What should be the test for determining whether a legal duty of care based on the human rights 
due diligence concept can be disregarded and what factors should weigh into a court’s decision 
as to whether the conditions of this test are met? Arguably, the court should look for a situation 
in which the company has acted as a ‘due diligent’ person by taking the appropriate measures to 
prevent the occurrence of foreseeable harm and that for this reason it would be unjust to impose 
liability on the company. A three-stage test for rebutting a presumption of a legal duty of care 
may be considered. 
The first stage of the test is foreseeability. The underlying premise is that the presumption of a 
legal duty of care is not rebutted, unless the human rights risks were foreseen by the company. 
This elements requires an assessment of whether the company foresaw or should have foreseen 
the adverse human rights impacts of its conduct. There is a positive prescription to the element of 
foreseeability, in that in order to know its human rights risks, the company should take diligent 
steps to investigate and acquire the information that it should seek in the circumstances.266 The 
responsibility to undertake human rights assessments in order to identify potential and actual 
human rights risks is an essential part of conducting a human rights due diligence process. 
Companies should ‘identify and assess’ their potential and actual human rights impacts through a 
process that involves independent expertise and meaningful consultations with relevant 
stakeholders.267 Michalowski observes that ‘due diligence determines the standard of knowledge 
a corporation is expected to have and, to the extent that no such knowledge exists, imposes a 
responsibility to collect the necessary information’.268  
A company thus would be negligent if it failed to act in order obtain the necessary information 
that human rights due diligence requires companies to seek under the circumstances. The 
element of foreseeability would entail an assessment of whether the company took sufficient 
steps to identify, become aware and act upon the potential and actual human rights impacts in its 
business relationships. In other words, the presumption of liability would not be rebuttable and 
the company would be charged with negligence if it failed to know what it should have known 
and failed to act on the existence of potential or actual human rights risk where it should have 
acted in the prevailing circumstances, as required by human rights due diligence.269  
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The second stage of the test involves a normative assessment of whether the company acted with 
the appropriate and sufficient care that is reasonably expected in order to prevent the adverse 
human rights impacts from occurring. This normative judgment would entail a fact-based 
analysis of the circumstances of the company and a balancing exercise in which the factors will 
be weighed. The court would need to consider the same actors and relationships that determine 
human rights due diligence, that is the types of involvement of the company in the adverse 
impact (i.e. whether contributed or was directly linked to the human rights impact). The court 
would need to undertake a balancing exercise in which the factors that determine human rights 
due diligence are weighed in light of the circumstances of the case. Relevant factors are the 
complexities involved in effectively managing human rights risks, which can be specific to the 
context or sector in which the company operates, or result from the nature of human rights risks, 
the unpredictability of human rights risks from materializing, and the need for companies to 
make choices in faced of resource constrains and priorities etc.270   
The third stage of the test is that rebutting the presumption would be just, fair and reasonable in 
the circumstances of the case. This phase invokes policy considerations that may vary according 
to the circumstances of the case. The courts findings in relation to the second stage of the test 
and its conclusion as to whether the due diligence responses of the business were appropriate and 
sufficient to prevent the harm from occurring in light of the prevailing circumstances, could 
weigh into the court’s decision in this phase of the test. There are various factors that can weigh 
into these judicial policy considerations for whether it is ‘just, fair and reasonable’ to rebut a 
presumption of a legal duty of care. For instance, a court may consider whether rebutting the 
presumption may lead to business enterprises taking their human rights due diligence more 
seriously, provide victims of human rights abuses with similar protection of their legal interests 
as those that have entered into a contractual obligation with the company, leave a victims without 
an effective remedy, create inconsistencies with other areas of law, increase litigation and place 
an undue burden on certain types of defendants, allocate losses to the company that is in a better 
position bear these them than individuals, and the extent to which the threat of liability might 
affect the economic interests of companies.271   
6.4.5 Setting a Penalty through a Balancing Act: The Case of Trafigura  
Once liability has been established, a court could apply a similar balancing act to determinate the 
level of penalties. In 2011, the district court of Amsterdam sentenced Trafigura to pay a fine of € 
1 million for transporting waste from Amsterdam to the Ivory Coast, thereby acting in breach 
with art 18(1) EU regulation on the shipment of waste, and for concealing the hazardous nature 
of this waste.272 The court applied a balancing act to determine the level of this fine.273 The court 
struck a balance between the risks and care of the company. The court considered that the 
committed fact met a level of seriousness, which affected the applicable proportionality 
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principle. The Court noted that the seriousness of the committed facts underscored the 
importance of international conventions regulating the transportation, handling and disposal of 
waste, and also explained why high standards applied to companies in the disposal of this waste. 
The court held that Trafigura should know about the risks involved and the applicable standards, 
this being an important integral part of CSR. The court also recognized the responsibility of 
Trafigura to be proactive in order to acquire this knowledge by inquiring about the applicable 
rules and regulations before undertaking a special production process, especially when problems 
arise. There was no indication of Trafigura having acted to this effect, despite having the 
collective knowledge about the (deviating) chemical composition of the waste and how this 
waste should be handled. The court also affirmed that, by reason of this knowledge, Trafigura 
had a responsibility to ensure that the recipient(s) of the waste and all undertakings involved had 
a sufficient understanding about the hazardous nature of the waste in order for this waste to be 
processed responsibly.274       
The court also argued that the high costs involved in the processing of the waste were not an 
issue. These costs should not serve as an apology for not abiding by the applicable standards, 
but, on the contrary, should be factored in, the Court noted. The court takes a peculiar turn by 
also giving weight to the negative publicity and the damage to the image of Trafigura, which it 
incurred after the harmful events. In addition, the court gave consideration to the positive 
contribution of Trafigura to the global welfare through the Trafigura Foundation, which had been 
created in November 2007.275 The balancing act differs from the one the human rights due 
diligence concept supports in that this act also gives consideration to the positive attributions of 
Trafigura. These positive attributions are not part of human rights due diligence if not involved 
in the managing of negative human rights impacts. Also, to consider the costs inflicted on the 
company ex post the harmful events is unusual. The appropriate balance to strike is to accept 
only the care taken by the company ex ante in order to prevent the harm, and, once the harm 
occurred, the remedial measures that the company has taken.  
Apart from these two factors, the balancing act seems to be keeping with the appropriate 
balancing act under the rebuttable presumption of a legal duty of care for human rights due 
diligence proposed by this chapter. The rational for applying the balancing act to determine the 
penalty is the effect that it could have of further strengthening the function of tort law in 
deterring business involvement in human rights abuses. The prospect of having to pay high 
penalties could create incentives for business enterprises to undertake human rights due 
diligence. This deterrent effect would be greater if liability would not only fall on the company 
but also on the directors and/or those responsible for human rights due diligence processes and 
policies. Personal liability of directors for carrying out human rights due diligence seems needed 
to encourage responsible conduct by these directors and other persons, while company liability is 
needed ensure corporate cultures of compliance.276   
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6.4.6 A Legal Duty of Care for Human Rights Due Diligence Through Statute 
One may consider that in civil law systems, a legal standard of human rights due diligence be 
created through statute under national law, that is construed in conformity with the UNGPs, and 
on which liability can be based.277  
There are various policy reasons supporting the creation of a statutory presumption of a legal 
duty of care and liability construed on the human rights due diligence concept. One is that this 
legal presumption would contribute to strengthening the protection of the legal rights of 
individuals to redress and remedy. States have an obligation to ensure this right under 
international human rights law. The State would fulfill this obligation by creating a new avenue 
through tort law for individuals to pursue the legal accountability of a parent company. This 
could provide access to remedies for victims of human rights abuse in situations where an a 
company contributes to, or directly linked to adverse human rights impacts but where currently 
no meaning full redress can be obtained, for instance because a subsidiary entity went insolvent 
and the principle of limited liability. Victims would no longer have to rely on companies to 
provide remediation in these types of scenarios.278  
Certain legal barriers to accessing judicial remedies that victims are currently struggling to 
overcome may be lifted as a result of the rebuttable presumption. The existence of a legal duty of 
care is presumed, and thus would not need to be established first. Individuals would not have the 
burden of evidencing high thresholds of ‘proximity’ or some or excessive ‘control’, which can 
exist in theory but may not be provable in practice. The burden would be on business enterprises 
to demonstrate foreseeability and human rights due diligence that is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption. The legal duty of care would encapsulate the human rights due diligence duties for 
involvement in the adverse human rights impacts by third parties through contribution and direct 
linkage. The legal duty of care would extend beyond existing legal duties to refrain from 
complicit behavior. Complicity would be defined more widely, including also silent and 
beneficial complicity within its applicable scope.  
A duty may have the result of changing the behavior of companies. It would create greater legal 
certainty and predictability of the outcomes of judicial decisions, in part because the legal duty of 
care would be defined in alignment with the human rights due diligence as described by the 
UNGPs.279 280 There is an increased likelihood of corporate liability in case a company does not 
comply with its human rights due diligence obligation. The statute would send out a clear signal 
to companies that omitting to exercise human rights due diligence to prevent adverse human 
rights impacts can attract legal liability, not only in specific circumstances, but generally in 
direct-tort liability scenarios. The legal duty of care would be applicable to all companies, 
                                                
 277  Anderson has similarly argued that ‘in the same way that legislatures and courts pierce the veil to render 
directors liable for their wrongful conduct, it is proposed that legislation be enacted to impose upon parent 
companies (rather than upon their directors) the equivalent of current directors’ duties – in particular, the duties 
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 278   Michalowski, supra note 146, at 231. 
 279  UNGPs, supra note 145, Commentary to GP 2.   
 280  With greater certainty also come reduced costs of litigation. Id. at 359. 
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irrespective of their organizational structure, including to horizontally organized undertakings. 
This duty may counterbalance the incentives of parents to off-load, through out-contracting and 
subsidiarization, its risk management responsibility to affiliates for organizational efficiency 
reasons. The implementation of the human rights due diligence on which this legal duty is build 
entails that in practice, the parent of loosely integrated companies may need to re-assume the 
burden to manage the risks that it has off-loaded to affiliates.281 A legal duty of care would 
incentivize parent entities to take their human rights due diligence responsibility seriously and 
propel changes not only in the practices of the parent itself, but also to foster corporate cultures 
respect full of human rights throughout the corporate group as a whole.  
A statutory legal duty of care would not create inconsistencies with other areas of law, and in 
particular the principles of separate legal personality and limited liability as recognized in 
Salomon v Salamon & Co. The reason is that the parent company would be liable for its own 
conduct and separately from any liability on the part of the subsidiary entity. This would be no 
different from the existing standard of direct parent liability. The Court in Chandler v Cape held 
that a duty of care attached to a parent company over and above the principles of limited liability 
and separate legal personality and that the law can create a duty of care without disregarding the 
separate legal personality of company, i.e., piercing the corporate veil.282 Concerns about liability 
unduly intruding into these principles have often been raised in relation to theories of indirect 
corporate liability, e.g., vicarious or agency liability, and are an important reason for why claims 
are most often based on direct/primary parent liability.283 The statutory duty of human rights due 
diligence as proposed in this chapter would alleviate these concerns.284  
A statutory legal duty of care would drive convergence across other areas of law. It would 
respond to UNGP 2 that encourages States to set out clear expectations that businesses respect 
human rights abroad. Human rights due diligence replaced the sphere of influence concept is the 
standard of expected conduct.285 Creating a legal duty would set out clearly the expectation that 
business enterprises should respect human rights and that human rights due diligence is the 
applicable standard of expected conduct. Such expectations create predictability for business 
enterprises. A legal duty of care would align with existing efforts by States to encourage business 
enterprises to respect human rights at home and abroad. It would contribute to the 
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implementation of policy commitments that some EU Member States have expressly set out in 
their NAPs on business and human rights. There already is alignment between the expectation of 
governments on corporate human rights due diligence in countries that are contracting parties to 
the OECD Guidelines.  
A legal presumption of a duty of care would give courts a role in effectively operationalizing the 
human rights due diligence concept. The argument that the legislator has not intervened on the 
matter would no longer be a valid ground for the courts to act with caution on the issue, because 
the legal duty would no longer be controversial.286 The court would have less discretion to 
consider that no legal duty of care and liability attaches to a company in a particular situation. 
Jurisprudence could contribute to the further clarification of what is (legally) expected of 
companies in terms of meeting their responsibility to respect, and specify with greater precision 
the scope of human rights due diligence. The application of the test for the duty of care with the 
UNGPs and by reference to international human rights standards would give these interpretations 
meaning with the context of the further development of international law.  
The judicial interpretations of the human rights due diligence concept could serve to put the 
human rights due diligence to the test. A presumption of a legal duty of care would also rest on 
an assumption that the human rights due diligence concept is a reliable method through which 
adverse human rights impact can be effectively avoided. Thus, the assumption is that if 
companies had taken the appropriate human rights due diligence measures, no adverse human 
rights impacts would have occurred.287 It logically follows that civil liability may not only expose 
non-compliance with human rights due diligence by companies in the factual circumstances of 
the case, however it may also serve as a mechanisms through which the reliability of the human 
rights due diligence concept itself may be put to the test.  
If a court would acquit a company from liability in situations where it took all the appropriate 
measures that it was reasonably expected to take in given circumstances, there is a reasonable 
possibility that the human rights due diligence is not reliable. This may raise red flags that can 
lead to further clarification and drive improvements in the human rights concept. Alternatively, it 
may well result in its abandonment as a proper standard of conduct for human rights 
responsibility. Another question that arises is the role of courts in testing the reliability of multi-
stakeholder initiatives that companies may claim adherence to in their defense against the 
application of a legal presumption of liability.  
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6.4.7 The French Proposal to Create a Legal Duty of Vigilance  
On 23 March 2016, the French General Assembly adopted a draft law introducing a duty for 
certain companies to establish and effectively implement a so-called ‘plan de vigilance’ for 
identifying and preventing risks, inter alia, to human rights and the environment. 288 The 
following section examines this draft law in further detail.  
To be noted is that an earlier version of this draft law was passed by the French General 
Assembly on 31 March 2015, but was then been rejected by the French Senate and send back for 
a second reading. The French Senate adopted a different version of the proposed bill in October 
2016, which did not feature a duty of vigilance. A special parliamentary committee was created 
to settle the disagreement between both chambers and to reach a compromise. 289  
The draft law that was adopted on 23 March 2016 applies to French-domiciled companies with 
5000 or more employees in France and with 10.000 employees or more in France and abroad. 
The law creates a legal duty for companies to develop and implement a vigilance plan for 
identifying and preventing risks of harm to human rights and fundamental freedoms, severe 
bodily or environmental damage and health risks resulting from the activities of the company and 
those which it controls, directly or indirectly, and the activities of its sub-contractors or suppliers 
with whom the company has an established commercial relationship. The plan should also cover 
measures to prevent active and passive corruption by the company itself and the companies it 
controls.  
A decree by the Council d’Etat would further specify the modalities of the plan of vigilance, as 
well as the conditions for monitoring their effective implementation, and if appropriate, in the 
context of multi-stakeholder initiatives at industry or national level.  
There are various aspects in the proposed law and therein obligation set out for companies to 
develop and implement a program of due diligence that are aligned with the expectations of 
human rights due diligence set out in the UNGPs. First, the proposed law models the duty of 
vigilance on the concept of due diligence, and relies on the risks of harm to human rights and the 
company’s relation to these risks to determine how this duty of vigilance applies to companies. 
Companies are required to include in their `plan de vigilance` measures to prevent not only the 
human rights risks that result from the company’s own activities, but also those resulting from 
the activities of certain subsidiary entities, sub-contractors and suppliers. These elements reflect 
the expectation set out in the UNGPs, and is also consistent with the proposal set out in this 
chapter to create a legal duty of human rights due diligence that aligns with the expectations set 
out in the UNGPs.  
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The proposed duty to develop and implement a vigilance plan is matched with certain 
enforcement mechanisms.  
First, companies are required to communicate their vigilance plan to the public and to include 
this plan in their annual account. The mandatory disclosure of the plan in itself could have the 
positive effect of increasing the level of transparency and accountability of companies in respect 
to their due diligence. The exposure of companies to greater external pressures by market forces 
and States and non-state actors can enforce due diligence. Costs or rewards may be inflicted on 
companies for their performance. Such pressures may drive companies to be more proactive in 
order to become aware of the risks that its own activities or those of its subsidiary entities pose to 
human rights in their supply chain.290 Incentives to do so may be great where such disclosure 
might increase the exposure of companies not only to external condemnation, but also to risks of 
legal liability. Such information could be used as evidence in courts that companies have acted in 
breach of not only their obligations under this law, but also other laws.  
Second, a company that is non-compliant with the law may be ordered by a French court upon 
request by an interested party to adopt a vigilance plan and to communicate this plan to the 
public, thereby giving account to the obligation of the company to effectively implement this 
plan of vigilance. A company that is not compliant with its duty of vigilance may be imposed a 
fine by a French court up to an amount of 10 million euro’s. 
The company may also incur legal liability under national tort law where non-compliance by the 
company with its duty of vigilance caused damage to another person. Any person with an 
established interest may bring an action for damages. The company may be held liable to pay 
compensation for the damage caused and in addition may be imposed a fine.  
The proposal to create a duty of vigilance is an important step forward, yet in certain aspects also 
less ambitious than the presumption of a legal duty of care that this chapter proposes.  
First, a great many entities are excluded from its scope of application, including entities that 
operate in high-risk sectors or operational contexts.291  
Second, the proposed law endorses the concept of control to determine whether a duty of due 
diligence applies to a company in respect of the human rights risks resulting from the activities 
of a subsidiary entity. The proposed law recognizes that a duty of vigilance applies to a company 
in respect to only those subsidiaries that the company has direct or indirect control over. For the 
purpose of the proposed law, a relationship of control exists in respect of subsidiaries that it 
solely or jointly controls, or over which it exerts significant influence. Indicative of a relationship 
of control is the company holding a majority of the voting rights, an agreement with partners, 
members and shareholders on shared decision-making or certain circumstances in which the 
company owns a fraction of the voting rights.292  
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The proposed law thus excludes subsidiary entities with whom the company does not have a 
relationship of control in the sense described above. This chapter supports the view that the 
concept of control is not the right concept to delimit the scope of obligation. Responsibility or 
liability of companies should be delimited by the adverse human rights impacts by a commercial 
relationship that the company is involved in, by way of causation, contribution or direct linkage.  
The burden to demonstrate that a link of control exists furthermore falls on the victims,293 while 
in my hypothesis the burden of proof should be reversed and fall on the defendant. 
Third, a related point is that the duty of vigilance applies to a company only in respect of certain 
types of business relationships, that is subcontractors or suppliers.294 In my hypothesis, business 
relationships should be defined in broader terms, encompassing any entity with whom the 
company has a commercial relationship.295  
If the bill were to be adopted upon review by the Senate, this would constitute an important 
achievement. France would be the first to adopt a mandatory human rights due diligence 
requirement for companies. The proposed bill may set a precedent for future laws creating a legal 
duty of care, also at EU level.296  
Outside the EU, a popular initiative was launched in Switzerland in April 2015, entitled the 
‘Swiss Responsible Business Initiative’. The aim of this initiative is the introduction of an Art. 
101a in the Swiss Federal Constitution that would create a legal obligation for Swiss-based 
multinational companies to carry out appropriate human rights due diligence in their activities 
abroad in alignment with the UNGPs. The scope of this due diligence would be broader 
however, encompassing also the protection of the environment. Non-compliance with this 
obligation could result in legal liability before a Swiss court.297  
The French proposal has served as inspiration298 for a Resolution adopted by the European 
Parliament (‘EP’) on 29 April 2015 at the occasion of the second anniversary of the Rana Plaza 
building collapse. This Resolution calls ‘on the Commission, EU Governments and others to 
consider proposals for mandatory frameworks that will ensure that access to remedy and 
compensation is based on need and responsibility and not just on the ability of campaign groups 
to name and shame or on the voluntary efforts of companies’.299 The Resolution furthermore 
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notes that it ‘considers that new EU legislation is necessary to create a legal obligation of due 
diligence for EU companies outsourcing production to third countries, including measures to 
secure traceability and transparency, in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights and the OECD MNE Guidelines’.300  
On 18 May 2016, eight national parliaments expressed their support to the ‘green card’ initiative, 
jointly calling for ‘a duty of care towards individuals and communities from EU-based 
companies whose human rights and local environments are affected by their activities’.301   
6.4.8 What should be the Law Governing the Conduct? 
In relation to the applicable law question, courts generally apply the lex loci damni rule in cases 
that fall within the scope of the Rome II Regulation. Consequently, the law of the third country 
commonly will determine the substantive liability issue in foreign direct liability cases were 
damages typically arise out of events that occurred in a third country, provided that this was after 
11 January 2009.  
It has been argued from an international law perspective that the application of the general rule 
of lex loci damni may ease concerns related to extraterritoriality and about the EU imposing its 
laws on foreign conduct or actors.302 Others argue that applying the lex loci damni rule is not 
desirable if this impacts negatively on the protection afforded to victims. If foreign countries 
uphold a lower standard of human rights protection and remedy than the EU Member States, 
victims will be worse off.303 This gives rise to the question to what extent a court can and should 
weigh into its decision on the choice of law question the differences in the substantive laws of 
the domestic private law regime that can apply to a case and how these substantive laws define 
the duty of care of a company?  
Divergence between the substantive rules that private law systems may apply and the protection 
these laws afford to victims may be less of an issue in the inter-EU context. The relevant 
substantive laws of EU Member States are harmonized to a significant degree and uphold 
international human rights standards that will not differ greatly in substance.304 In the context of 
foreign tort-liabilities however, in which the choice of law is one between the law applicable in 
the EU Member State and the law of the third-country in which the damages occurred, the 
divergence between these laws is usually greater. Especially where this third-country is a 
developing country, there is commonly wide variation according to the domestic laws that are 
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applicable to the case, in terms of the protection accorded and the level of damage awarded.305 
Since the behavioral standard for similar activities and damages awards may be lower in third-
country jurisdictions than in Western home jurisdictions,306 the choice of law issue can have a 
discernable impact on the outcome and effects of the proceedings.307  
Currently, there is no rule that by general or specific exception to the generally applicable rule of 
lex loci damni determines that the court must apply the law of the country that affords the highest 
standard of protection to human rights. The content of the law otherwise applicable to the case 
and the standard of human rights protection it affords to the victim are, in themselves, not 
sufficient reasons for a court to displace the application of the general rule of lex loci damni rule. 
A court may give consideration to the content of the applicable laws by exception under the 
provisions pertaining to overriding mandatory rules (Article 16) or environmental damage 
(Article 7) and apply the lex fori only in cases where the necessary conditions are satisfied. 
In case a (statutory) presumption of a legal duty of care were to be introduced, the court may be 
required to apply more often the law of the EU Member State in cases that fall within the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation.   
A court may interpret the statutory presumption of a legal duty of care as an overriding 
mandatory rule under Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation. The statutory presumption would 
have the regulating of the conduct of the business enterprise as its main objective. There would 
be a greater likelihood of this presumption overriding the law of the third-country than when 
mandatory rules have the protection of human rights as their main objective. While the latter 
usually requires a nexus between the victim and the EU forum, in the case of the former, a nexus 
between the defendant and the EU Member State may be sufficient. The domicile of the 
defendant in the EU Member State may be sufficient for the court to enforce the presumption of 
a legal duty of care on companies on the basis of the mandatory provision. Enforcing this 
mandatory rule on companies also may be less controversial from an extraterritorial viewpoint 
where the main objective is regulating the conduct of EU companies rather than protecting the 
human rights of victims of third countries.    
A company expresses its commitment to human rights due diligence and the UNGPs may be 
more prepared to sign an agreement under Article 14 stating that the law of the EU Member 
State is the applicable law to the dispute. If there were a (statutory) presumption of a legal duty 
that aligns with the human rights due diligence concept as defined by the UNGPs, the incentives 
of a company to sign such an agreement may be greater. The company would lose credibility if it 
were to accept that a court assesses its conduct on the basis of a standard of protection that is 
much lower than the one it has committed itself to. The choice of entering the agreement or not 
would be the company’s, however. The agreement is to be reached after the events giving rise to 
the damage occurred. By that time, the cost/benefit of signing the agreement may be more 
apparent and where it is clearly less favourable for the company to sign the agreement, it may 
decide not to sign.  
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Currently, a court may apply the law of an EU Member State under the ‘escape clause’ under 
Article 4(3), provided that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely linked with the EU Member 
State. One may consider that there is a stronger case for the application of the lex loci delicti rule 
under Article 4.3. of the Rome II Regulation in foreign direct liability case where the tort/delict 
amounted to a breach of a legal duty of care that aligns with the human rights due diligence 
concept, and the elements occurred on the territory of the EU Member State. The nexus to this 
forum may still be in sufficient to satisfy the criterion of a ‘manifestly closer connection’ 
however, and the court may still require that the law of the third country is applied to the case. 
Arguably, the substantive liability issue should have a greater role to play in the choice of law 
question as it applies in tort liability cases. The human rights due diligence concept would be 
operationalized most effectively if there were a provision in the Rome II Regulation that would 
give victims a choice to base their legal claim on the law of the country that affords the highest 
standard of human rights protection to victims residing outside the EU. Ideally, by rule or 
implication the Rome II Regulation should allow a court to accept this choice and to apply the 
law of the country that defines the scope and nature of the legal duty of care in accordance with 
international human rights standards and the UNGPs.308 Attention should be paid to how the 
domestic tort system construes the legal standard of care. The UNGPs provide that the scope of 
human rights due diligence should be defined at a minimum by reference to ‘the International 
Bill of Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the 
International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work’.309  
Alternatively, one may consider creating new or revisiting existing provisions under the Rome II 
Regulation in order to create a general or specific exception to the general rule that the lex loci 
damni applies for cases that fall within the scope of this regulation, and that have the effect that 
the court must apply the law of the EU Member State in tort-liability cases.   
Different factors can link the occurrences and the parties to the territory of an EU Member 
State.310 The analysis suggests that the rule connecting tort liability cases most closely to the 
territory of the EU Member State is the lex locus delicti rule. One may consider introducing a 
specific rule to the Rome II Regulation applying the lex locus delicti in cases where the non-
contractual obligations arise out of damages resulting from human rights violations. The 
occurrence of the alleged tort/delict on the territory of the EU Member State would point to the 
law of the EU Member State as the applicable law for the dispute, hence applying this rule in tort 
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liability cases could be beneficial for victims. The application of this rule may be less desirable if 
one considers the degree of uncertainty it adds with regards to the outcome of court decisions.311 
The decision of the court on the applicable law question may differ in similar situations 
depending on the place where the tort has its centre of gravity.  
The lex loci delicti rule may complicate the choice of law question where elements of the tort are 
scattered across several countries. Illustrative is jurisprudence in the UK common law system 
where the lex loci delicti was the law generally applicable before the Rome II Regulation came 
into force.  
The Court of Appeals in Lubbe v Cape Industries examined the choice of law question in the 
context of the jurisdiction issue, more specifically as a relevant factor in the application of the 
forum non conveniens rule.312 The court reviewed relevant authorities on how the municipal law 
governs the tort liability question in relation to acts that occurred abroad. The conclusion was 
that in case a tort is constituted of composite acts taking place in different jurisdictions,313 the 
court should consider the complete series of events constituting the tort and apply the law of the 
country in which the tort in substance arose. The Court noted that ‘the issue whether a duty of 
care was owed by the defendant, in England, may be governed by English law, even if the other 
factors making up the alleged tort of negligence are governed by South African law’. This 
entailed the kind of hybrid situation envisaged by Dicey and Morris’ Rule 203(2), the court 
noted, which entails that ‘a particular issue between the parties may be governed by the law of 
the country which, with respect to that issue has the most significant relationship with the 
occurrences and the parties’. 314   
Analogizing this case law to the question of applicable law and the presumption of a legal duty 
of care construed on the human rights due diligence concept, similar complications may arise. 
The applicable law question can be complicated not only because different bodies of law may 
govern the factors constituting a tort of negligence, but also because the place in which the tort in 
substance arose may not be identified easily. Factual allegations of a breach of a legal duty of 
care construed on the human rights due diligence concept may point to the law of the EU 
Member State as the applicable, because the company has its main seat and relevant decision 
making took place on the territory of this EU Member State. It cannot be presumed that this will 
be the outcome always, however. The companies’ decision making related to human rights due 
diligence policies may be decentralized and the locus of where the duty of care was breached 
may be located elsewhere. For this reason the applying the lex loci delicti rule can create 
uncertainty as to what law will apply to the dispute. This was one of the considerations of the EU 
Commission for deciding not to opt for the lex loci delicti rule as the general rule, but only allow 
for the application of this rule under an ‘escape clause’.315  
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 315   Rome II Regulation, supra note 71, Recital 16. Enneking, supra note 75, at 297.  
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Apart from considerations related to the un-certainty of the outcome, applying the lex loci delicti 
rule in tort liability cases would be not ideal from the perspective of the victim. The rule would 
not ensure that the law of the EU Member State applied to the dispute in all cases. One may 
consider introducing a European equivalent to the rule under Article 7 of the Rome II 
Regulation, allowing victims to choose for the application of the law of the country where the 
event giving rise to the damage occurred. Such a rule creating a specific exception in tort liability 
cases in the context of human rights abuses would not ameliorate these concerns, however. The 
circumstances of the case may not clearly point to the EU Member State as the place where the 
breach of the legal duty of care occurred.  
One may consider introducing a rule that would give individuals the choice to base their claim on 
the lex fori, meaning that the law of the country where the case was brought applies. Recourse to 
the lex fori rule would simplify the applicable law question. This rule has been applied to 
determine the choice of law issue in piercing of the corporate veil for the same reason.316 Where 
tort liability claims are framed on the basis of the piercing of the corporate veil doctrine, the 
applicable law question can be complex, in part because there is no uncontested rule under 
international or national rules of private law as to what national law to apply to cases involving 
veil-piercing issues. The question is further complicated by the fact that issues in the same case 
may be governed by different domestic laws, depending on whether a case is characterized in 
view of the claim against the subsidiary or as a veil piercing issue. Both characterizations are 
possible.317 Courts have sought to simplify the applicable law question by applying the lex fori to 
the entire case.318 Giving victims a choice to have the lex fori rule applied to the case could have 
similar positive effect in the context of direct tort liability claim. The law of the EU Member 
State in which the case was brought would govern the substantive liability issue in situations 
where this would be in the victim’s best interest.  
Recourse to the lex fori rule would entail breaking with the principle of neutrality.319 The Rome II 
Regime applies in light of the EU objective of enhancing the proper functioning of the internal 
market. In order to advance this objective, the EU seeks to enhance the predictability, certainty 
and free movement of judgements through harmonization of national PIL rules. Some may argue 
that applying the lex fori rule would entail a departure from enhancing the predictability of 
judgements. Ensuring that the same national law governs the dispute, irrespective of where the 
court was seized, is one of the main objectives behind creating uniformity of decisions under EU 
private international law.320 As a consequence of applying the lex fori rule, there could be 
                                                
 316  Demeyere, supra note 115, at 388. 
 317  Id. at 388. 
 318  Id. at 388. 
 319  The dogma refers to the neutrality and apolitical nature of the Private International Law as a reference system 
and implies that, ‘independent of any legal political consideration or political objective, the law applied to an 
international legal relationship is the law most closely connected to that legal relationship’. Veerle Van Den 
Eeckhout, The Instrumentalisation of Private International Law by the European Institutions: Quo Vadis? 
Rethinking the 'Neutrality' of Private International Law in an Era of Europeanisation of Private International 
Law and Globalisation, 3 (Jul. 1, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2485779 and 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2485779. 
 320  Rome II Regulation, supra note 71, Recital 6. 
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increased diversity in the national laws governing the substantive liability issue in tort liability 
cases according to the court seized. In other words, the national courts of the EU Member States 
would not apply the same lex fori to similar disputes.  
The lex fori rule should not have a discernable effect on the predictability of the outcome of 
litigation in practice, however, at least not in the EU context. The substantive laws of EU 
Member States do not differ greatly in relevant aspects, because they uphold international human 
rights standards. In so far that the lex fori will result in the application of the law of one of the 
EU Member States, the outcome of proceedings should be predictable to a sufficient degree. 
Another reason is that the lex fori is often the law of the country in which the parent company is 
domiciled. There is no uncertainty in being subject to the law of the country in which a parent 
company is domiciled.  
The specific rule set out under Article 7 on environmental damage already indicates a departure 
from the neutrality principle. This provision creates an exception to the general rule in the public 
interest of greater environmental protection. A revision of the Rome II Regulation to allow for 
the application of the lex fori rule in cases where the liability issue arises from damages resulting 
from human rights abuses is not problematic and justifiable by the public interest objective of 
human rights protection.  
The application of the general rule of lex loci damni in direct tort liability cases frustrate the right 
of the victim to have access remedies for human rights abuses. Introducing the lex fori rule 
would be in line with Art. 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the principle of 
effectiveness, which has been recognized as a general principle in EU law. The principle requires 
that the exercise of rights is not made virtually impossible or excessively difficult.321  
The argument that applying the lex fori to the case would redirect focus on regulating the 
conduct of business enterprises and affect the competiveness of companies that would have to 
abide by higher standards than their non-EU competitors would not uphold, because human 
rights have a basis in EU law.  
6.4.9 What Implications for Jurisdiction?  
The Brussels Regime has made it easier for courts to assume jurisdiction over a defendant in tort 
liability claims on the ground of it being domiciled in the EU Member State in which the court 
was seized. The domicile principle creates legal certainty and foreseeability of the possibility that 
a civil suit may be brought against a parent company in an EU Member State.322 Other 
advantages are that it simplifies the jurisdiction issue, and allows the parties to move to the 
substantive question of liability more quickly.323 The Brussels Recast extends these advantages to 
claimants starting procedures against a defendant not domiciled in the EU, but only if the subject 
matter of the claim is insurance, consumer or employment contracts. There is no rule in the 
Brussels Recast that allows a court to assume jurisdiction over a defendant that is not domiciled 
in the EU in a direct tort liability case in which the subject matter is human rights. 
                                                
 321  See Case C-199/82 Administrazione delle Fianze dello Stato v. SpA San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, ¶ 14.  
 322  Muchlinski, supra note 67, at 11. 
 323  Id. at 12. 
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One may consider various scenarios for the further harmonization of the national jurisdictional 
rules governing tort liability cases in which at least one of the defendants is a third-country 
subsidiary entity not domiciled in an EU Member State.  
There are various policy reasons supporting amendments to the Brussels I Regulation in order to 
facilitate access to courts for victims in foreign direct liability cases. Individuals are in a less 
advantageous position than business enterprises to protect themselves from harm and to vindicate 
their rights. Since they are the weaker party in tort liability suits, greater protection of their rights 
by rules of jurisdiction is warranted. 
Revisions to the Brussels I Regime in line with the duty of State to ensure and provide remedies, 
which is recognized in all international and key regional human rights treaties and integral to the 
more general duty of States to protect individuals from human rights abuses committed by third 
parties.324 325 An equivalent duty to protect this human right applies to States that are party to the 
same international human rights treaty guaranteeing this right. The argument that the exercise of 
adjudicative extraterritorial jurisdiction could compromise good relations with third countries, or 
amount to ‘an offence against international courtesy’ is not applicable in such contexts.326 
Amendments to the Brussels I Regulation to this effect would be in line with Article 47 of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and consistent with Articles 81 and 82 of the TFEU.327  
One possible scenario is to widen the applicable scope of the forum connexitatis rule under 
article 8(1) of the Brussels I Regulation in order to allow a court to assume jurisdiction over a 
third-party defendant in a direct tort liability case related to human rights protection. In the case a 
(statutory) presumption of a legal duty of care were to exist, the likelihood of this European rule 
creating a legal basis for jurisdiction over a defendant that is not domiciled in the EU would be 
greater. Arguments against its application could be rebutted more easily. Presuming that in the 
scenario described above that the court must apply the law of the EU Member State to the 
dispute, and this law recognizes a legal duty of care, it would be possible that a parent company 
and/or the subsidiary entity could be held liable for a breach of a legal duty of care. This would 
render void the argument that assuming jurisdiction over the parent company would amount to 
an abuse of process because establishing corporate liability on the basis of a duty of care would 
evidently be impossible. Also the argument that a court in the EU forum state cannot develop 
foreign law in order to create a novel duty of care where previously there was none would no 
longer be applicable as this law would not govern the liability issue in the dispute.  
The fact that the law of the EU Member State is the applicable law lifts policy objections that the 
EU Member State may not be the most suitable forum to hear the case. The law in the EU 
Member State would provide for a legal basis for liability of both the subsidiary and the parent 
company. There should therefore be sufficient foreseeability that both entities can be sued jointly 
before a court in the EU Member State. The legal duty of care may be applied to both. The 
                                                
 324  Amnesty International, Injustice Incorporated: Corporate Abuses and the Human Rights To Remedy, 16 (2014) 
 325  The UNGPs indicate that in order to discharge this duty, State should protect individuals through ‘effective 
policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication’. UNGPs, supra note 145, GP 1.   
 326  Redfield, supra note 28, at 911.  
 327  Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 4, at 23.  
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factual allegations against both companies may be different, but this should not be an issue, since 
the due diligence concept recognizes differentiated responsibilities of a parent and subsidiary 
entity and different forms of involvement in human rights abuses. The fact that the factual 
damages as a result of adverse human rights impacts giving rise to the claims against the parent 
and the subsidiary entity are the same, should provide for a connection between the claims that is 
sufficient to treat the cases jointly for reasons of expediency.  
Arguably, it would be desirable as a matter of public policy that individuals have access to 
remedies for harm suffered as a result of a breach of human rights due diligence that occurred on 
the territory of an EU Member State. The court should be able to assume jurisdiction over all 
defendants that are alleged liable for the same harm, provided that the court has personal 
jurisdiction over one the defendants by reason of this defendant being domicile in an EU 
Member State. The connection between the third-country company not domiciled in the EU and 
the forum of the EU Member State would be indirect however, because it is established via a 
court’s jurisdiction over another defendant.  
There should be a jurisdictional basis in national or European rules for courts to assume 
exclusive jurisdiction over defendants in a tort-liability case where the subject matter is human 
rights protection and factual allegations of a breach of a legal duty of care occurred on the 
territory of an EU Member State. Where factual allegations against a company are based on a 
duty of care that premises on the human rights due diligence concept, and alleged facts point to 
this duty having been breached in the jurisdiction of an EU Member State because relevant 
decision making occurred there, there is a tenuous link between the proceedings and the territory 
of the EU Member State. The location of the delict/tort would constitute the connection and 
should be sufficient for the court to assume jurisdiction over all parties in the case. Whether the 
case has been brought against an EU or non-EU defendant should not be a factor in deciding 
jurisdiction on this basis. 
If the locus of the factual allegations were to be a determinant for jurisdiction, this would 
discourage a court from using its discretion to dismiss a case on the basis of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine. An individual can seize a court in an EU Member State as of right. 
Arguably, the court first seized by the victim should be the designated court to assume 
jurisdiction over the defendant. Following the authority of the court in Lubbe v Cape in its 
application of the test in Spiliada, the balance of private interests factors would tip in favor of the 
jurisdiction of the EU Member State as the natural forum to hear the case. The factual allegations 
of a breach to human rights due diligence most likely will point to the forum of the EU Member 
State in which the company is incorporated, because its seat of central management is most 
likely to be based there. In our hypothesis this is the EU Member State in which the court was 
seized. If so, this forum has a stronger connection to the issues of the case and appears to be 
prima facie the natural forum to hear the case.  
The place where the relevant decisions were made may not be easily identified. At best, 
upholding the locus of the factual allegations as the determinant key criteria would render the 
forum non conveniens doctrine in-applicable. This may be the case where claims are brought 
against a company that belongs to a horizontally structured network enterprise in which 
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management functions are distributed throughout the group.328 Eroglu has argued that due to this 
horizontal structure, it has become practically impossible for a defendant to prove that one forum 
is more appropriate that an alternative forum on the basis of conventional public and private 
interest factors. The argument holds that the forum non conveniens doctrine as it has been 
applied in the jurisdiction of the UK and the US is therefore practically irrelevant.329 At least, in 
situations where some relevant decision-making occurred on the territory of an EU Member 
State, it would be more difficult for a defendant to meet the burden of demonstrating that a 
foreign jurisdiction is available and is clearly a more natural forum to hear the case.  
In addition, courts should be able to apply of the forum necessitates principle in cases where 
individuals do not have access to courts elsewhere. Individuals may not be able to recover funds 
from a subsidiary entity, or have no forum available to them in host countries, and Western 
jurisdictions may provide the only avenue for obtaining redress. Then both EU nationals and 
non-nationals should be able to rely on the forum necessitates in order to bring a claim and 
benefit from access to the forum of an EU country. The doctrine could complement the 
jurisdictional grounds outlined above because it guarantees access to courts in the specific 
situations where no alternative forum is available.  
 Conclusion 6.5
This section suggests that human rights due diligence can have a role in a courts consideration of 
the elements that a court commonly looks for in order to establish parent liability in tort liability 
cases. The following considerations come to the fore. The connexions between current 
approaches and the human rights due diligence concept are sufficient to support the view that 
these approaches can be reconciled with the human rights due diligence concept. Current 
approaches to parent liability are oriented towards operationalizing the wrong concept of CSR, 
more precisely, that of ‘sphere of influence’ instead of the human rights due diligence concept. 
The proposed solution is to create a rebuttable presumption of a legal duty of care that is 
construed according to the human rights due diligence concept. A number of policy 
considerations support the creation of such a rebuttable presumption. For reasons of consistency 
throughout all stages of the proceedings and enhancing access to justice, also approaches to 
applicable law and jurisdiction should be revisited to align with the human rights due diligence 
concept. 
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 The Role of Mandatory Disclosure in Operationalizing Human Rights Due Diligence: 7
the Case of the EU Directive on Non-financial Disclosure and Board Diversity  
 
 Introduction 7.1
Recent years have seen the adoption and revision of mandatory disclosure rules in the EU and 
beyond. These rules set out requirements for companies to disclose externally information that is 
necessary not only to obtain an understanding of the economic performance of companies, but 
also the impact of business enterprises on non-financial points that are of public interest, 
including human rights. There is an increasing number of mandatory disclosure rules that require 
companies to disclose on human rights risks, policies and due diligence. The impetus for the 
adoption (or revision) of such instruments comes from regulators and increasing stakeholder 
expectations that business enterprises release such information. In order to enhance regulatory 
coherence and legal certainty, the more recent instruments adopted in this domain also include 
among their objectives to foster greater convergence between the existing disclosure 
requirements. The focus of this chapter is on Directive 2014/95/EU, of 22 October 2014, as 
regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and 
groups (hereinafter the ‘Non-Financial Reporting Directive’ or the ‘Directive’).1 This Directive 
amended Directive 2013/34/EU, of 26 June 2013, on the annual financial statements, 
consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings.2 These 
EU Directives provide a minimum harmonisation of the EU regime for non-financial disclosure 
by requiring EU Member States to enforce on certain business entities (‘undertakings’ in the 
Directive’s jargon) and groups minimum disclosure requirements on certain non-financial 
matters including, inter alia, human rights.  
The chapter departs from conventional wisdom, according to which the national and EU 
mandatory disclosure legislation are a method for indirectly regulating business respect for 
human rights. As will be gathered from the following pages, the reporting on human rights issues 
by corporations has the potential to result in improved human rights performance.3 Mandatory 
reporting requirements, alongside other multi-stakeholder and self-regulatory reporting 
initiatives, contribute to the regulatory dynamics affecting business conduct, which the UNGPs 
                                                
  1  Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 
2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and 
groups, 2014/95/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1 [hereinafter Non-Financial Reporting Directive].  
 2  Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial 
statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending 
Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 
78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, 2013 O.J. (L 182) 19 [hereinafter Accounting Directive] 
   3  ‘Ultimately, if reporting is refocused to address a number of key criteria, it can lead to improved human rights 
performance, thereby creating both internal systems and the accountability mechanisms needed to anticipate and 
address human rights harms and to communicate these efforts effectively’. Amol Mehra & Sara Blackwell, The 
rise of non-financial disclosure: reporting on respect  for human rights, in Business and Human Rights: From 
Principles to Practice, 276 (Dorothée Baumann-Pauly & Justine Nolan eds., 2016). 
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set out to promote. This chapter will examine the legal implications of ensuring the effective 
operationalising of the responsibility to communicate in particular (as an integral part of human 
rights due diligence, in conformity with the expectations set out in the UNGPs) through national 
and EU mandatory disclosure legislation.  
The chapter examines the effect of the Directive on consolidating the State duty to protect human 
rights by imposing an obligation on EU Member States to require certain large undertakings and 
groups to disclose on human rights. This reinforces State responses to UNGP 3, which articulates 
that, in meeting their duty to protect, States should ‘encourage, and where appropriate require 
business enterprises to communicate how they address their human rights impacts’.4 Special 
attention will be paid to factors that might limit or enhance the effectiveness of the Directive in 
shaping human rights compliance conduct by business enterprises across the EU. 
The chapter will first describe (Section 7.2) the expectations of the UNGPs in relation to the 
responsibility of business enterprises to communicate (UNGPs 17 and 21), as well as the 
corresponding duty of States to adopt appropriate measures to ensure such communication by 
business enterprises (UNGP 3). This will be followed (Section 7.3) by an examination of the 
factual considerations and rationales which prompted the European Commission to propose the 
adoption of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive. It is argued that the Directive has the 
potential to serve as a useful regulatory tool that can lead to improvements in the human rights 
performance of companies. More precisely, the required disclosure can enable stakeholders (i.e., 
regulators, NGOs, business enterprises, consumers, investors) to evaluate, compare and hold 
companies accountable for their human rights performance.  
Next, the chapter examines (Section 7.4) the Non-Financial Reporting Directive in detail to 
determine whether and the extent to which the minimum disclosure requirements articulated in 
the Directive correspond with the expectations set out in the UNGPs, and specifically regarding 
the responsibility to communicate set out in UNGPs 17 and 21. Assuming that the Directive does 
intend to give effects to these two UNGPs, the chapter also examines the way in which and detail 
to which the Directives defines disclosure requirements related to human rights due diligence. 
The fifth section (Section 7.5) will explore in detail the legal effects that the Directive has 
already had and, more specifically, those that it is likely to have upon the expiration of its period 
for transposition, in relation to human rights. The CFREU having acquired the same binding 
nature as the EU Treaties with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon,5 the Directive should 
be interpreted in accordance with EU protected fundamental rights. The first sub-section 
concentrates on the so-called ‘indirect effect’ of the Directive, according to which national 
measures should be interpreted in light of the Directive, and EU protected fundamental rights 
(most notably, the rights recognised in the CFREU), in particular in the light of the rights to 
respect of private life and the right to freedom of expression. It will be concluded that, while EU 
                                                
 4 Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework. U.N.Doc. A/HRC/17/31, UNGP 3 (March 21, 2011) [hereinafter UNGPs] 
(by John Ruggie). 
 5 See Article 6(1) of the Treaty of Lisbon, OJ C 306/13 2007. See further, CFREU, OJ C 83/02 2010. Please note 
that the CFREU had been formally proclaimed in December 2000 in Nice by the European Parliament, Council 
and Commission. 
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law mandates national disclosure obligations to be interpreted in the light of the Directive and in 
the light of EU protected fundamental rights, the content of the Directive itself and, in particular, 
the ‘comply or explain’ modality, might not necessarily further the cause of those stakeholders 
intending to rely on the Directive for the purpose of obtaining enhanced disclosure from 
corporations. 
The second section examines whether the Directive has direct effect (i.e., whether it is directly 
applicable by courts and authorities at the national level). It is argued that the Directive is 
unlikely to acquire direct effect, not necessarily because it is a Directive, but because its 
provisions on mandatory disclosure are unlikely to be considered by the CJEU as ‘clear and 
unconditional and not contingent on any discretionary implementing measure’.6 Perhaps more 
importantly, to the extent that such direct effect is framed as obligations for (non publicly-
owned) corporations vis à vis stake holders (NGOs, shareholders, etc.), it would be hard for the 
Directive to overcome the CJEU’s prohibition of direct effect of Directives.7 Which is not to say 
that the Directive will not have any legal effects. Apart from the indirect effects referred to in the 
preceding paragraph, stakeholders might file a complaint for a breach of EU law before the 
European Commission in order for the Commission to bring an action against the Member State 
in question before the CJEU pursuant to Article 258 TFEU. All in all, by enacting the Directive, 
the EU opted for a type of legal instrument which has potentially sweeping implications in the 
rights of stakeholders when it comes to the disclosure obligations of corporations. However, 
irrespective to the type of instrument chosen, and as noted in the preceding section in relation to 
the ‘comply or explain’ example, it is uncertain whether the content of the Directive will 
contribute to further the rights of stake-holders. A point which I will analyse in more detail next. 
The chapter (Section 7.6) will then examine the potential effectiveness of the Directive in 
fostering business disclosure practices corresponding with UNGPs. It is argued that too much 
flexibility for corporations in meeting their disclosure requirements risks easing the disclosure 
requirements on undertakings to an extent that the potential effect of the Directive on human 
rights compliant conduct by business enterprises becomes diluted. I argue that the Directive can 
become a powerful tool in the regulation of business in relation to human rights, provided that 
certain conditions are met related to, inter alia, the reporting audience, stakeholder participation 
and the approach of reporting.  
The seventh section (Section 7.7) will explore the connections between the human rights due 
diligence concept and the concept of the group entity. I argue that the concept of the group entity 
that will be applied is crucial for the effectiveness of the Directive and EU Member States should 
consider adopting a functional approach to the group entity, one that refers to the subject matter 
of the Directive to determine the concept of the group entity. The chapter finds that approaches 
to the group entity that do not focus on legal control but on whether the undertaking has `the 
power to exercise, or actually exercises; dominant influence or control` over another undertaking 
or whether the company pursues a common management policy for the group as a whole are the 
most suitable approaches to the group entity in light of the effective operationalisation of human 
rights due diligence.  
                                                
 6 Case 44/84, Hurd, 1986, E.C.R. 29, ¶ 47. 
 7 Case 91/92, Faccini Dori, 1994, E.C.R. 3325. 
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The eighth section (Section 7.8) will reflect on the extraterritorial applicability of provisions of 
the Directive and their potential extraterritorial indirect regulatory effects. The final section 
(Section 7.9) will explore the legal implications of the disclosure requirements under the 
Directive, as well as complementary national legislations in the UK and the US that require 
business enterprises to disclose information on slavery and trafficking-related risks in corporate 
supply chains. I argue that the disclosed information may expose business enterprises to greater 
liability risks under various of sources of national and EU law, inter alia, the law of negligence 
and company law.  
 The UNGPs and the Corporate Responsibility to Disclose on Human Rights 7.2
The UNGPs provide that, where States have laws in place that are intended or have the effect of 
requiring business disclosure on respect for human rights, these laws should be enforced 
effectively and their adequacy assessed periodically.8 This entails that States must enforce 
existing laws that set out such requirements and, from time to time, review these in order to 
ensure these laws provide the necessary coverage in light of prevailing circumstances. The 
UNGPs indicate that States should encourage, or where appropriate require companies to 
communicate on how they address their human rights impacts. The UNGPs suggest that it would 
be appropriate for States to require business enterprises to communicate in the presence of a 
significant risk to human rights that may result from the nature of the business operations or the 
operating context. The laws setting out such disclosure requirements should be sufficiently clear 
in order for right-holders and business enterprises to be able to rely on the information thus 
disclosed in order to exercise their rights. Moreover, States should provide sufficient guidance to 
business enterprises, which cover expected outcomes, best practices, advise on methods, human 
rights due diligence. Particular attention should be paid to the challenges posed to the respect for 
human rights of gender and vulnerable and marginalised groups.9  
The UNGPs also stress the importance of such disclosure requirements in contributing, together 
with other areas of law and policy, to the realisation of an environment conducive to business 
respect for human rights. Whether disclosure obligations will realise their full potential depends 
on the adequacy and effective enforcement of these requirements. More precisely, the 
effectiveness of these requirements depends on their ability to trigger the disclosure of 
information that meets, in form and substance, a minimum standard of accuracy, accessibility, 
and quality. Consequently, in drawing up disclosure requirements, States should consider 
whether communications reflect a balance between disclosure and risks. Disclosure should thus 
provide the most optimal representation of an undertaking’s respect for human rights while 
minimising the potential adverse impacts that such disclosure may have on human rights. 
Disclosure may not create undue risks to the safety and security of the individuals. Other factors 
that should be weighed into the balance are: (i) the respect for the legitimate requirements of 
commercial confidentiality; and (ii) a certain responsiveness to the size and structure of the 
undertaking.10  
                                                
 8 UNGPs, supra note 4, GP 3. 
 9 Id. Commentary to GP 3. 
 10 Id. 
  276 
It follows from the interaction between Pillar 1 and 2 of the UNGPs that the responsibility to 
disclose, as an integral part of the human rights due diligence process, can and, where 
appropriate, should be legally required and enforced by States through mandatory disclosure 
obligations in order to ensure business enterprises disclose in practice. The underlying rationale 
is that the responsibility to disclose would be operationalised most optimally if the human rights 
due diligence concept were to inform national disclosure regulations and where these regulations 
require undertakings to disclose in accordance with the UNGPs. If such outcome materialises, 
this would enable States to strengthen their human rights protection by ensuring that business 
enterprises publicly disclose information on their human rights risks and their human rights due 
diligence that individuals need to exercise their human rights. Such national laws and regulations 
can add clarity to the requirements to disclose in conformity with the UNGPs in a particular 
country context. These can also contribute to the further development of due diligence through 
national jurisprudence, as the UNGPs note that States should ‘give weight to such self-reporting 
in the event of a judicial or administrative proceeding’, and adopt laws to this effect.11  
 The Non-Financial Reporting Directive: Origin and Objectives 7.3
The following sections will examine the factual origins, the rationale of the EU Commission to 
issue the proposal for the Non-Financial Reporting Directive, and the objectives of the Directive 
with regard to fostering improvement in the disclosure and actual performance of business 
enterprises in relation to human rights. 
7.3.1 Legislative History and Factual Origins  
The European Commission first expressed its commitment to issue a legislative proposal on non-
financial disclosure in the Single Market Act 2011. The Act was set out to contribute to the 
objectives of the EU 2020 Strategy to bring the EU on course towards ‘smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth’.12 The Act recognises the importance of transparency in the transition towards 
a sustainable global economy, and the need to enhance it.13 14 The Act identifies a trend towards 
these objectives, which is visible in new business models integrating these social considerations. 
The view is that this trend should also be reflected in the single market, which could be achieved 
by ensuring a level playing field and by supporting initiatives that enhance fairness and 
contribute to the fight against social exclusion. The Act expressed the commitment of the 
Commission to present a legislative proposal on the transparency of the social and environmental 
                                                
 11 Id. Commentary to GP 3. 
 12 Transparency thus also contributes to the goal set out in Article 3(3) of the Treaty of the European Union to 
establish an internal market and sustainable development based on ‘a highly competitive sustainable market 
economy’ TEU, Article 3(3). The terms Commission and EU have sometimes been used interchangeably in the 
light of the Commission’s leading role in EU policies in relation to CSR and business and human rights.  
13  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, at 12, COM (2011) 681 final (Oct. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Commission, A renewed EU CSR 
Strategy]. 
 14 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Single Market Act Twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen 
confidence "Working together to create new growth", at 5, COM(2011) 206 final (Apr. 13, 2011). 
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information provided by companies in all sectors to contribute to the first objective, to level the 
playing field.15 The Commission reiterated this commitment in its renewed EU CSR Strategy,16 
and both these initiatives were presented as part of a package of measures, titled the ‘Responsible 
Business Package’.17 On 16 April 2013, the European Commission issued a legislative proposal 
to amend the 4th and 7th Accounting Directives on Annual and Consolidated Accounts, 
78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC.18 The EP expressed its support for a legislative proposal on 
disclosure of non-financial information in two Resolutions.19 20 Upon approval by the EP on 15 
April 2014 and the Council of the European Union on 29 September 2014, the Directive 
2014/95/EU amending Directive 2013/34/EU on Non-financial information and diversity 
information was adopted on 22 October 2014.21 The date of transposition of this EU Directive 
into national law is 6 December 2016. After the transit period has passed, business enterprises 
should start reporting as per January 2017. The EU Commission has committed to publish non-
binding guidelines for reporting on non-financial information by the end of 2016. 
                                                
 15 Id. at 14-15. 
 16 Commission, A renewed EU CSR Strategy, supra note 13, at 12. 
 17 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, 
the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Data Protection 
Supervisor: “Responsible Businesses” package, COM(2011) 685 final (25 Oct., 2011).  
 18 This proposal outlined regulatory requirements for certain large undertakings and groups to disclose their non-
financial performance as regards, amongst others, respect for human rights, in their annual and consolidated 
financial statements and related reports. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards disclosure of non-financial and 
diversity information by certain large companies and groups, COM(2013) 207 final (16 Apr., 2013) 
[hereinafter Proposal Non-Financial Reporting Directive]. 
 19 In its Resolution entitled ‘Corporate social responsibility: accountable, transparent and responsible business 
behaviour and sustainable growth’ of 6 February 2013, the European Parliament expressed its support for the 
adoption of a legislative proposal ‘allowing for high flexibility of action, in order to take account of CSR’s 
multi-dimensional nature and the diversity of the CSR policies implemented by businesses, matched by a 
sufficient level of comparability to meet the needs of investors and other stakeholders as well as the need to 
provide consumers with easy access to information on businesses’ impact on society’. Resolution on Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Accountable, Transparent and Responsible Business Behaviour and Sustainable Growth, 
Eur. Parl. Doc. P7 TA(2013) 0049 (6 Feb., 2013). Also see Resolution on Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Promoting Society’s Interests and a Route to Sustainable and Inclusive Recovery, Eur. Parl. Doc. P7 TA(2013) 
0050 (3 Feb., 2013).  
 20 The European Parliament has been a staunch supporter of a regulatory approach to CSR. The European 
Parliament issued a critical report on the theme of business and human rights in 2009, stipulating that a legal 
turn to CSR was ‘most necessary’ to advance the business and human rights agenda. Amongst a variety of 
policy recommendations, the report suggested the development of a legal framework for foreign investment 
protection that ensures, next to investor protections, accountability for human rights violations, mandatory 
reporting on human rights performance, regulated benchmarks on CSR and the establishment of accountability 
mechanisms in EU external relations that target business enterprises directly, rather than only States. It also 
emphasised that the EU should strengthen accountability for corporate human rights violations by working 
towards the establishment of ‘victim-oriented accountability and redress mechanisms on a global scale’, 
including an EU-wide ombudsman. European Parliament Business and Human Rights in External Relations: 
Making the EU a Leader at Home and Internationally, at 81, EXPO/B/DROI/2009/2, PE407.014 (23 April, 
2009), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2009/407014/ 
EXPO-DROI_ET(2009)407014_EN.pdf. 
 21 Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1.  
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7.3.2 Rationales and Objectives   
An impact assessment was carried out, which considered the case for improving the transparency 
of non-financial information, meaning environmental, social and governance information, 
including information on the diversity in the composition of a government board. The impact 
assessment pointed to the inadequacy of such non-financial information as the main issue, in 
terms of both the quantity and quality. The impact assessment recognized the potential of the 
proposed Directive to increase the transparency and comparability of non-financial information 
that is available, which in turn could affect the capacity of both business enterprises and other 
stakeholders to measure, monitor and manage the performance of business enterprises and 
groups, and their impact on society more generally.22 An important objective thus was to affect 
the disclosure practices of large undertakings and groups to an extent that it reaches a sufficient 
scale and quality to meet stakeholder needs.  
7.3.2.1 Quality and quantity of reporting 
First, the impact assessments documents confirmed a trend in the EU context that reporting 
practices of companies had improved in terms of the number of reports issued, but that 
deficiencies had remained in terms of both the quantity and the level of quality in reporting. 
There were statistics showing an increase in the total number of reports, reaching up to 4000 in 
2010 and covering 80% of the world’s largest companies, and also that reliance on the GRI 
guidelines in the preparation of these reports increased to over 850 in 2011.23 The total number of 
reports accounted, however, for only 6% of the total of 42000 EU large companies, the majority 
of which furthermore originated from only four EU member states (the UK, DE, ES, and FR).24  
With regards to the quality of disclosure, a stakeholder consultation found that the information 
disclosed failed to meet stakeholder expectations. The information disclosed was said to lack in 
materiality and balance. Companies tended to cover the positive rather than the negative, and to 
not reflect on performance and material negative externalities, or aspects that were relevant to 
stakeholders, particular risk management aspects and human rights. Reports were not issued 
consistently and annually, and, furthermore, often not subject to independent verification, hence 
their accuracy and reliability of information was questionable. The comparability of information 
was compromised due to reliance on what most users considered as ‘poor’ key performance 
indicators.25  
These finding broadly aligns with studies that have documented a similar trend in non-financial 
disclosure practices, in both the EU context and beyond.26 For instance, the 2013 UNGC Annual 
                                                
 22 Proposal Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 18,  Recital 3. 
 23 Commission Staff Document Impact Assessment, accompanying the document proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards 
disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large companies and groups, SWD (2013) 127 
final, at 10 (16 Apr. 2013) [hereinafter Commission Staff Document Impact Assessment]. 
 24 Id. at 10. 
 25 Id. at 10-11. 
 26   A review by the GRI of trends in human rights reporting found that ‘the quality of human rights reporting in 
2009, in general, still falls far short when measured in relation to certain key principles and elements of good 
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Implementation Survey indicates that reporting on human rights remains insufficient. Only 29% 
out of the total of 8000 company members of the UNGC indicates to publicly disclose on human 
rights policy and practices. The rate of disclosure tends to be higher for large companies (40%) 
than for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) with less than 250 employees (18%).27 A 
more recent study commissioned by Shift in 2013-4 on human rights reporting by leading 
companies, and in relation to the UN Guiding Principles, indicates that ‘many companies already 
disclose information about their human rights performance in relation to the key components of 
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, as set out in the UN Guiding Principles’. 
The study also found weaknesses in that ‘most disclosure on human rights is at present limited to 
relatively general statements about process, with little information disclosed about how these 
relate to specific risks or impacts, or company responses to them.’28 
7.3.2.2 Regulatory gaps   
The impact assessment indicates that, in the EU context, both national regulation and markets 
have failed to provide an adequate solution to insufficient reporting on non-financial 
information. An important reason for why markets have been insufficient to move companies 
relates to the disputed business case for disclosure. There is no uncontested evidence that the 
long-term benefits of being more transparent outweigh the short-term costs. These short-term 
costs can be significant and more discernible and imminent than the long-term benefits of 
disclosure.29 This finding supports the notion that companies do not tend to disclose unless they 
are compelled to do so, by means of market pressure, or if absent, national legislation imposing 
mandatory disclosure requirements.30 The enforcement of business disclosure thus is difficult to 
achieve in practice without State intervention.31 The assessment also supports the argument that 
CSR more generally does not flow naturally under the force of market mechanisms only, but 
                                                                                                                                                       
human rights reporting’. Reporting on potential negative human rights impacts was identified as a continuing 
challenge, as well as reporting in a balanced, comprehensive and effective manner by focusing on the most 
relevant issue and placing these within a wider sustainability context. GRI, Corporate Human Rights Reporting 
– An Analysis of Current Trends, at 1 (2009), 
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/Human_Rights_analysis_trends.pdf. The SRSG observed in its 
2007 report that business enterprises tend not to present a complete and systematic account of companies’ 
adverse human rights impacts, and therefore reporting is lacking in materiality. ‘[A]anecdotal descriptions of 
isolated project and philanthropic activity often prevail’. Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Mapping 
International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, A/HRC/4/35 (Febr. 19, 2007) 
(by John Ruggie). 
 27 UN Global Compact, Global Corporate Sustainability Report, at 8, 16 (2013), 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/global_corporate_sustainability_report.html.  
 28   Shift, Evidence of Corporate disclosure relevant to the UN Guiding Principles (June 
2014),  http://shiftproject.org/sites/default/files/Evidence%20of%20Corporate%20Disclosure%20Relevant%20 
to%20the%20UN%20Guiding%20Principles%20on%20Business%20and%20Human%20Rights.pdf . 
 29 Id. at 2-3. 
 30 Nicola Jägers, Will transnational private regulation close the governance gap?, in Human Rights Obligations of 
Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect?, 295, 315 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 
2013). 
 31 Id. at 295, 315. 
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depends for its success on effective regulatory intervention to create the conditions for CSR to 
work.32  
The non-financial disclosure by companies in the EU had been partly regulated by the EU 
regime on non-financial disclosure, which had previously been governed by the Fourth Council 
Directive 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types of companies and Seventh 
Directive 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts, as amended by Directive 2006/46/EC. This 
regime did not impose disclosure obligations on companies, however.33 34 This followed from the 
wording of Recital 10 of the Preamble of Directive 2006/46/EC, which noted that ‘companies 
whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and which have their registered 
office in the Community should be obliged to disclose an annual corporate governance 
statements’ and that ‘where relevant, companies may also provide an analysis of environmental 
and social aspects necessary for an understanding of the company’s development, performance 
and position’.35 The limiting concepts set out therein were formulated in too open-ended 
language to impose a clear legal obligation on companies.36 In the absence of clear obligations, 
business enterprises perceived the reporting regime as ‘voluntary’.37 The Directive thus had a 
limited effect of compelling business enterprises to disclose. 
7.3.3 Fragmentation 
The Impact Assessment also notes an increasing number of national disclosure regulations 
imposing obligations on companies to provide information about their social impacts. 
Fragmentation in the European landscape resulting from national legislations imposing diverse 
disclosure requirements on companies turned out not only to be costly for companies operating 
in multiple countries, but also to complicate efforts to compare and benchmark performances 
                                                
 32 According to Olivier de Schutter: 
 Potentially most important of all, however, is the fact that the ‘business case’ for CSR produces, at the 
rhetorical level, a powerful consequence: it serves to create the impression that the development of CSR 
will make natural progress, in a sort of evolutionary growth driven by market mechanisms, without such 
progress having to be encouraged or artificially produced by an intervention of public authorities. There is a 
very thin line between the idea that ‘CSR is profitable for business’ and the idea that ‘CSR may take care of 
itself’. This consequence should be avoided at all costs. There is a need, clearly identifiable, for a 
regulatory framework to be established, if CSR is to work. This is not in contradiction with the voluntary 
character of CSR. On the contrary, it attaches its meaning to voluntary commitments. 
 Olivier de Schutter, Corporate Social Responsibility: European Style, 14 European Law Journal, 219 (2008). 
 33 Id. 219, 232. 
 34 Earlier proposals to amend the 4th and 7th Council Directive to create obligations for business enterprises to 
disclose in their annual review on environmental, social, and other aspects relevant to an undertaking of the 
company’s development and position had been abandoned. On this issue, see id. 203, 231. 
 35 Directive 2006/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 amending Council 
Directives 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 83/349/EEC on consolidated 
accounts, 86/635/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial 
institutions and 91/674/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance undertakings, 
Recital 10, 2006/46/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 224) 1. 
 36 Commission Staff Document Impact Assessment, supra note 23, at 12.  
 37 Id. at 12; Jägers, supra note 30, at 295, 315. 
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across the internal market. The cross-border nature of business operations called for greater 
coordination at the EU level. The proposal Directive thus aimed at harmonising the proliferation 
of national legislations and to enhance the ‘relevance, comparability and consistency’ of the 
information disclosed by companies and groups in the EU and to lift transparency to a similarly 
high level across the EU.38 
7.3.4 Disclosure as a Regulatory Tool 
The main rationale for the EU Commission to issue the Non-Financial Reporting Directive thus 
is to affect and coordinate the regulation by EU Member States of the disclosure of non-financial 
information by companies with the aim of enhancing the quality and quantity of such disclosure, 
which had before been inadequate. There is potential for the Directive to serve as a useful 
regulatory tool that can lead to improvements in the human rights performance of companies. 
The Directive can illicit disclosure by companies of information that can enable stakeholders (i.e. 
regulators, NGOs, business enterprises, consumers, investors) to evaluate, compare and hold 
companies to account for their human rights performance. Business enterprises can be incited to 
take their responsibility seriously if these stakeholders inflict costs or rewards on them for (non-) 
compliance. The effectiveness of the Directive in achieving this objective will depend on how 
Member States will implement the provisions of the Directive and the preparedness of regulators 
and stakeholders to pressure companies to adhere to the disclosure requirements.39 The required 
disclosure has the potential to have positive effects on business respect for human rights in 
various ways. The effectiveness of Directive will depend on a number of factors however, which 
will be elaborated in Section 7.6. 
First, the disclosure of relevant non-financial information can strengthen accountability by 
improving the ability of NGOs and civil society actors to monitor business performance. More 
specifically, the disclosure requirements can lead to the disclosure by undertakings of relevant 
and accurate information that civil society organisations and right-holders can rely on to monitor 
and hold business enterprises to account for preventing adverse human rights impacts through 
due diligence, and once human rights impacts have occurred, for their effective remediation. In 
order for NGOs to discharge their role in monitoring business performance, they may need 
information on the human rights policies and human rights risks of business undertakings that 
undertakings may not be prepared to disclose voluntarily in the absence of a legal requirement 
that obliges them to do so. The disclosure requirements thus may legally require and enforce the 
disclosure of information that would otherwise not be publicly available. Stakeholders rely on 
the information disclosed to monitor and exert direct pressure on undertakings to meet their 
responsibility to respect human rights. Disclosure can also allow for the legal enforcement of 
corporate obligations ex post the occurrence of actual adverse human rights impacts. The 
information disclosed may be useful in establishing liability under national tort laws.40 
                                                
 38 Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Recital 21. 
 39   Liesbeth Enneking, et al., Zorgplichten van Nederlandse ondernemingen inzake international maatschappelijk 
verantwoord ondernemen: Een rechtsvergelijkend and empirisch onderzoek naar de stand van het Nederlandse 
recht in licht van de UN Guiding Principles, 624 (Boom Juridisch, 2016). 
 40 See, for further detail, the sections 6.3.3.1. 
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Consumers, who rely on the disclosed information to make informed purchasing decisions, may 
exert such pressure. Also, investors find use in the transparency of comparable and accurate 
information, which they rely on to measure and compare the performance of companies. 
Enhance disclosure can result in better-informed investment decisions. It can furthermore 
empower institutional shareholders in exercising their corporate governance rights to monitor the 
activities and behaviour of directors, and to intervene where necessary.41 Research has shown 
that the availability of information can be critical for leveraging business behaviour through 
alternative avenues, e.g., transnational private regulation.42 43  
Second, the implications of the disclosure requirements that undertakings must collect the 
information to meet these requirements can affect the capacity of business enterprises to measure 
and monitoring their own risks and performance regarding respect for human rights. While 
process oriented, the human rights due diligence is linked to performance in that findings must 
be integrated and acted upon. Better measurement as a result of greater transparency can 
translate into improvements in policies and processes to discharge their responsibility to respect 
human rights.44 45 46 The pressure that NGOs may exert as a result of their improved monitoring 
role also can have the positive impact of creating greater human rights awareness within business 
enterprises and spur improvements in business performance in relation thereto.47 
                                                
 41 Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne, Corporate Finance Law: Principles and Policy, 523-540 (2nd ed., Hart 
Publishing, 2015). 
 42 Nicola Jägers notes how NGOs can use this information to pressure companies to join private or hybrid 
regulatory initiatives and to comply with the standard set out therein, to which companies have committed 
themselves when joining. The availability of information becomes of greater importance where the monitoring 
and verification mechanisms that these initiatives have in place are insufficient in themselves to ensure that 
relevant information is available to stakeholders. The availability of information, hence, is also critical for the 
effectiveness of these transnational private initiatives. Jägers, supra note 30.  
 43 GRI, Making Headway in Europe: Linking GRI’s G4 Guidelines and the European Directive on Nonfinancial 
Disclosure and Diversity Disclosure, at 3 (2015). 
 44 The UNGPs indicate that a human rights due diligence process must contain at least the following elements:: 
‘assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking 
responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed’. UNGPs, supra note 4, GP 17.  
 45 Other benefits for companies related thereto include enhanced trust, brandvalue and responsiveness to 
stakeholders. Commission Staff Working Document Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards disclosure of Nonfinancial and diversity 
information by certain large companies and groups, § 5.2 SWD(2013) 128 final (16 April, 2013). A study 
based on an analysis of the cost/benefit assessment of mandatory reporting requirements showed that European 
companies perceived identifying and controlling risks an important, although not the most important, benefit of 
transparency. The companies said that the main benefits of transparency were enhancing the credibility of the 
company and improving transparency of reporting. Also, enhancing the brand image of products was considered 
very important, while improvements to internal culture and the ability to react with stakeholders were 
considered important. European Commission Disclosure of Nonfinancial Information by Companies (Final 
report), at 27-30 (December 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/finance/accounting/docs/non-financial-
reporting/com_2013_207-study_en.pdf. 
 46 Commission, A renewed EU CSR Strategy, supra note 13, at 11. 
 47 Commission Staff Document Impact Assessment, supra note 23, at 6.2.3. 
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The business case for disclosure suggests that transparency can have economic value by 
facilitating the measurement and monitoring by companies of their risks and opportunities more 
generally. Disclosure of relevant information also allows companies to meet the demand for 
information by relevant stakeholders, including consumers, investors and NGOs. In the absence 
of legal obligations, business respect for human rights in practice largely depends on the 
voluntary uptake by undertakings of the UNGPs following from social pressure.48  
Disclosure also can make change in business behaviour and markets visible and manageable, and 
can facilitate the channelling of this change towards the goal of creating a ‘sustainable global 
economy’.49 Transparency is perceived as ‘a “smart lever” to strengthen citizen and consumer 
trust and confidence in the Single Market and to encourage sustainable economic growth’.50 
 The non-financial Reporting Directive and the Human Rights Due Diligence Concept: 7.4
Exploring the Links 
The following section aims to determine through an examination of the text of the Non-Financial 
Reporting Directive whether, and if so, to what extent, the disclosure requirements related to 
human rights articulated therein conform to the expectations set out in UNGP 17 and UNGP 21. 
The first section examines the type and number of companies that are subject to the Directive 
and the scope of their obligation to disclosure on human rights. The second section focuses on 
the way in which and detail to which the Directive defines disclosure requirements related to 
human rights and due diligence. 
7.4.1 Mandatory Disclosure on Corporate Respect for Human Rights 
The Directive 2014/95/EU introduces legal requirements for certain large undertakings and 
groups to disclose information on non-financial issues and, inter alia, human rights. It sets a 
minimum legal benchmark regarding the content of this disclosure, as well as the frequency, 
form and means of this disclosure. The following section focuses on the disclosure requirements 
that apply to certain large undertakings individually. Article 19a(1) of the Directive defines the 
disclosure requirement as follows: 
Large undertakings which are public-interest entities exceeding on their balance-sheet 
dates the criterion of the average number of 500 employees during the financial year shall 
include in the management report a non-financial statement containing information to the 
extent necessary for an understanding of the undertaking’s development, performance, 
position and impact of its activity, relating to, as a minimum, environmental, social and 
employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters. 
The Directive applies to ‘large undertakings’, the size threshold of which is determined by 
reference to the ‘average number of employees, balance sheet total and net turn over’.51 The 
                                                
 48 Jägers, supra note 30, at 295, 308. 
 49 Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Recital 3. 
 50 Commission Staff Document Impact Assessment, supra note 23, at 2. 
 51 Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Recital 14. 
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criterion of the average number of employees during the financial year is determinant, and 
should exceed at least 500 on the date of the balance sheets.52 Only public interest entities are 
subject to the Directive, which entities are defined as listed companies, credit institutions, 
insurance undertakings, and entities designated by Member States as public interest entities.53 
These undertakings must disclose through the formal means of a non-financial statement in the 
management report. The disclosure requirements extend beyond what is necessary to understand 
the economic affairs of the undertaking to also include information on the undertaking’s impact 
on public interest issues, including respect for human rights. 
Undertakings that are subject to the Directive have an obligation to disclosure on respect for 
human rights only ‘to the extent necessary’. This suggests that the non-financial statement should 
only contain information that is relevant and sufficient for an understanding of the undertaking’s 
development, performance and position and the impact of its activities. The Directive does not 
further specify the target audience whose understanding of the company should be informed by 
this information. Also, the Directive does not specify the standard by which to determine when 
information is relevant and thus ‘necessary’. The Directive does note that certain minimum 
requirements regarding the extent of the disclosure apply and that ‘the undertakings subject to 
this Directive should give a fair and comprehensive view of their policies, outcomes, and risks’.54 
In the absence of further clarification of ‘to the extent necessary’ for the purpose of the 
Directive, the company has discretion to decide itself when it is necessary to provide 
information, at least to a certain extent. 
The Directive introduces minimum legal requirements regarding the content of this disclosure. 
The requirements relate to the type and extent of information that large undertakings subject to 
the Directive should disclose. Pursuant to Article 19a (1), this information should cover the 
following. 
(a) a brief description of the undertaking’s business model; 
(b) a description of the policies pursued by the undertaking in relation to those 
matters, including due diligence processes implemented; 
(c) the outcome of those policies; 
(d) the principal risks related to those matters linked to the undertaking’s operations, 
including, where relevant and proportionate, its business relationships, products or 
services which are likely to cause adverse impacts in those areas, and how the 
undertaking manages those risks; 
(e)  non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business.55 
                                                
 52 Accounting Directive, supra note 2, Article 3.4. 
 53 Id.   
 54 Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Recital 5. 
 55 Id.  
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EU Member States must ensure in their national legislation that business enterprises disclose, at 
a minimum, on: (a) the business model of the undertaking; (b) the human rights policies pursued 
by the company, including its due diligence processes; (c) the outcome of those policies; (d) the 
‘principal’ human rights risks related to matters that are linked to the undertaking’s operations, 
including ‘where relevant and proportionate’, its business relationships, products or services, and 
how the undertaking manages these risks; and (e) relevant non-financial key performance 
indicators. 
There is a discernible conceptual influence of the UNGPs on the text of the Directive. This 
influence is apparent from the concepts on which the disclosure requirements are construed, in 
particular, the concept of ‘due diligence’, as well as the concepts delimiting the content and the 
extent of the required disclosure. 
The requirement that undertakings disclose information that is sufficient to provide a fair and 
comprehensive overview of their human rights policies, the outcomes of those policies and the 
risk-management implemented to prevent human rights abuses corresponds to the expectation set 
out in the UNGPs.56 The Directive also expressly mentions that undertakings should disclose on 
their due diligence processes implemented. The Directive furthermore extends the scope of the 
required disclosure beyond the human rights risks that the undertaking may be involved in 
through its own operations to risks that may be linked to the undertaking’s business 
relationships, products and services. This is important in that it requires undertakings to disclose 
information on (sub-) subsidiary entities and their supply chains, and the human rights risks 
relating to their activities that are directly linked to the parent undertaking.57 These provisions 
suggest broad alignment between the disclosure requirements as related to human rights and the 
responsibility to communicate as defined by UNGP 17 and UNGP 21. 
There are other elements that point to alignment with the expectations set out under the UNGPs. 
The requirement that the non-financial statement covers information on adverse human rights 
impacts is a case in point. The disclosure on respect for human rights, after all, is concerned with 
managing potential adverse human rights impacts. The disclosure must include information on 
the outcomes of human rights due diligence policies, which requires, in fact, reflection of not 
only an undertaking’s potential but also its actual human rights impact. The Directive appears to 
orient disclosure primarily to policies and its processes, including human rights due diligence, 
however, rather than to actual outcomes and impacts. 58  This is by ways of exempting 
undertakings from their obligation to disclose on outcomes if all other obligations under Article 
19a 1. have been fulfilled.59 The Directive calls for the disclosure of information on retrospective 
management processes, to the extent that business enterprises must provide a description of the 
due diligence policies they have implemented. It also requires disclosure on forward-looking 
                                                
 56 Id. Recital 5, ¶ 2.   
 57 Recital 6 affirms that ‘the non-financial statement should also include information on the due diligence 
processes implemented by the undertaking, also regarding, where relevant and proportionate, its supply and 
subcontracting chains, in order to identify, prevent and mitigate existing and potential adverse impacts’. Id. 
Recital 6, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1.  
 58 Id.  
 59 Id. Article 19a, ¶ 2.  
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management processes in that disclosure must cover due diligence processes that are ongoing to 
manage potential human rights risks. 
7.4.2 Conceptual Clarity: The Due Diligence Concept 
The broad alignment of the disclosure requirements set out in the Directive with the UNGPs 
should be welcomed, because this increases the likelihood of the Directive having impacts on the 
disclosure practices and actual human rights due diligence by undertakings in practice. The 
Directive presents deficiencies, however, in that the disclosure requirements relating to human 
rights are formulated in ambiguous language. The Directive does not specify the content and the 
degree of detail of reporting in relation to the ‘business model’, ‘policies’ and ‘due diligence’. 
For instance, there is no exact definition of due diligence in the text of the Directive, nor are its 
exact requirements in relation to reporting on due diligence implemented relating to human 
rights defined. The Directive is silent with regards to the specific elements of due diligence that 
undertakings should report on, and to what extent these correspond to expectations of human 
rights due diligence as defined by the UNGPs. For instance, there is no provision in the Directive 
that indicates that the non-financial statement should include information on how the company 
has integrated the findings relating the outcome of its human rights due diligence in the 
processes or functions of the undertaking or any action taken in response to these outcomes. The 
Directive is also silent with regards to the tracking of responses and stakeholder engagement. In 
the absence of further clarity, the undertaking itself determines the content and detail of the 
disclosure relating due diligence. 
Where the disclosure requirements on human rights risks are concerned, which are articulated 
under the Article 19a (1) (d,) the Directive does not specify what constitutes ‘principal’ risks. 
Recital 8 provides some guidance, noting that ‘the undertakings which are subject to this 
Directive should provide adequate information in relation to matters that stand out as being most 
likely to bring about the materialisation of principal risks of severe impacts, along with those that 
have already materialised’. The Recital suggests that disclosure should reflect on human rights 
matters that respect for human rights may give rise to, and not just on any matters, but prioritise 
those matters that stand out as most likely to give rise to ‘principal risks of severe impact’. These 
impacts may be likely to materialise or may have materialised already.  
The Directive notes that ‘severity’ must be judged in relation to the ‘scale and gravity’ of these 
impacts.60 The Directive thus prescribes as a minimum legal requirement that an undertaking has 
a duty to disclose on human rights risks in the presence of matters reflecting the principal risks of 
severe human rights impacts. The Directive not only establishes the presence and delimits the 
scope of the disclosure requirements by reference to the qualification of human rights risks as 
‘principal’ and ‘severe’, but also by reference to the undertaking’s involvement in these risks. 
Pursuant to the Directive, the non-financial statement must include information on matters 
reflecting risks that are linked to the undertaking’s business relationships, products or services. 
The Directive thus sets out the requirement that companies report on all their principle risks of 
                                                
 60 This resonates with UNGP 21, which recognises that severe human rights risks can give rise to an elevated 
responsibility to disclose–– that is, to disclose formally. UNGPs, supra note 4, GP 21. 
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severe impacts, irrespective of whether these risk are caused by the entity concerned, or whether 
these result from the activities of other undertakings that can be linked to the undertaking. 
This disclosure obligation is triggered only when such disclosure is ‘relevant and proportionate’, 
however.61 The Directive does not specify what constitutes ‘relevant and proportionate’ for the 
purpose of the Directive. It is reasonable to assume that Article 19a 1.(d) should be 
contextualised in relation to Article 19a1(b), which requires disclosure on the human rights 
policies, including the human rights due diligence processes that the undertaking has 
implemented. Disclosure on matters linked to a company’s business relationships, products or 
services then could be seen as ‘relevant and proportionate’ where these issues reflect human 
rights risks that give rise to a due diligence responsibility by the company.62 Since the Directive 
fails to define the due diligence concept in the human rights context, however, the disclose 
requirements that mirror this concept are also ambiguous. 
The Directive does not expressly note that the undertakings subject to the Directive should 
disclose by reference to the UNGPs, although it is mentioned that national implementing 
measures should permit undertakings to rely on international frameworks, including the UNGPs. 
The Directive thus leaves flexibility for EU Member States, which must transpose the Directive 
into national law by 6 December 2016,63 to decide what is the meaning of ‘due diligence’, what 
constitutes ‘principal’ risks and when disclosure on issues is ‘relevant and proportionate’ under 
national law. The Directive leaves discretion to EU Member States as to how to define these 
concepts, and whether to define these in reference to the expectation set out under the UNGPs, 
including relating the responsibility of companies to communicate under UNGP 17 to 21. EU 
Member States are permitted, but not required, to introduce such improvements.64 Clarity may 
result from the guidelines on non-financial disclosure that the EU Commission is expected to 
publish. These may set out a clear expectation that undertakings should disclosure by reference 
to the UNGPs. The potential impact of these guidelines on State practices will be limited, 
however, not only by reason of their non-legally binding nature, but also because they are due to 
be published by the same date on which the transition period ends, 6 December 2016. 
Absent clarity of the concepts, the Directive creates uncertainty and allows for possible 
divergence between EU Member States as to how their national laws define due diligence and 
the degree to which these laws ensure large undertakings effectively disclose in reference to the 
human rights due diligence concept described by UNGP 17 and 21. As will be elaborated below, 
this discretion undermines the potential of the Directive to generate indirect regulatory effects on 
business disclosure and human rights due diligence in practice. Where the language of the 
                                                
 61 Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Article 19a. 1(d). 
 62 To be noted is Recital 6, which reflects the conceptual influence of the UNGPs on the Directive, indicating that 
‘the non-financial statement should also include information on the due diligence processes implemented by the 
undertaking, also regarding, where relevant and proportionate, its supply and subcontracting chains, in order to 
identify, prevent and mitigate existing and potential adverse impacts’. Id. Recital 6.  
 63 Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Article 4.1. 
 64 Recital 1 of the Directive notes ‘the possibility for Member States to require, as appropriate, further 
improvements to the transparency of undertakings’ non-financial information, which is by its nature a 
continuous endeavor’. Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Recital 1. 
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Directive is formulated in open-ended language, this can also undermine the capacity of the 
Directive to have ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects, to which I will turn next. 
 The Non-Financial Reporting Directive in the Light of the Doctrines of ‘Direct’ and 7.5
‘Indirect’ Effect 
It could be argued that an optimal use of the Directive requires that stakeholders (citizens, 
NGOs, shareholders, etc.) can rely on its provisions when a company does not comply with its 
requirements. The following section thus aims at ascertaining the exact legal effects the Non-
Financial Reporting Directive may have for stakeholders, and right holders in particular. 
This section will focus first on the doctrine of the so-called ‘indirect effect’ of the Directive, 
according to which national measures should be interpreted in light of EU law, including the 
Directive (see Section 7.5.1. below). Moreover, given that the provisions of the Directive should 
be interpreted in accordance with EU protected fundamental rights, and that EU protected 
fundamental rights also have ‘indirect effects’, it is argued that an interpretation of the Directive 
(and its implementing national measures) should be adopted that is most favourable to EU 
protected fundamental human rights, in particular the right to respect of private life and the right 
to freedom of expression.  
This section will then examine whether the Directive has the so-called ‘direct effect’ (see Section 
7.5.2. below). It is argued that the Directive is unlikely to have direct effect. The following 
considerations come to the fore: (i) the Directive’s provisions are unlikely to be considered by 
the CJEU as ‘clear and unconditional and not contingent on any discretionary implementing 
measure’;65 and, perhaps more importantly, (ii) attempts to invoke the hypothetical direct effect 
of the Directive are likely to face the obstacle of the CJEU’s refusal to recognise the so-called 
‘horizontal’ direct effect of Directives, i.e., to recognize that a Directive can impose obligations 
in proceedings between individuals.66   
7.5.1 Indirect Effect of the Directive and EU Protected Fundamental Rights 
The Directive is capable of having ‘indirect effect’,67 an effect referred to as ‘the principle of 
interpretation in conformity with Union law’.68 As noted by Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, pursuant to 
the doctrine of ‘indirect effect’, the CJEU ‘TEU place[d] all public authorities, and therefore also 
judicial authorities, under a duty to interpret the national law which they have to apply as far as 
possible in conformity with the requirements of Union law’.69 More precisely, the CJEU 
introduced in Van Colson the principle of indirect effect, according to which national authorities 
                                                
 65 Case 44/84, Hurd, 1986, E.C. R. 29, ¶ 47. 
 66 Case 91/92, Faccini Dori, 1994, E.C.R. 3325. 
 67 See P. Craig & G. De Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 200 (Oxford University Press 5th ed. 2011). 
See further, T. Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law, at 235 (Oxford University Press 8th ed. 
2014) and R. Schütze, European Union Law, at 105 (Cambridge University Press. 2015).  
 68 See K Lenaerts & P Van Nuffel, European Union Law, ¶ 21-007 (Sweet & Maxwell 3rd ed. 2011). 
 69 Id, referring, inter alia, to Case 106/98, Marleasing, 1990, E.C.R. 4135, ¶ 8 and Case 60/02, Criminal 
Proceedings against X, 2004, E.C.R. 651, ¶¶ 59-60. 
  289 
(including courts) have to interpret national laws ‘as far as possible’ in conformity with 
European law.70 In the subsequent Marleasing ruling, the CJEU held that a Directive can have 
such indirect effect, irrespective of whether the Directive has been transposed. In the case of the  
Non-Financial Reporting Directive, by operation of such effect, national laws would have to be 
interpreted in light of this Directive. To be noted is that the effect of the Directive is indirect by 
reason of this effect being imposed by national law, instead of by the Directive itself.   
According to the case-law of the CJEU,71 indirect effect does not apply, as such, before the 
expiration of the deadline for implementation of a directive (in the case of the Directive, 6 
December 2016).72 However, before that date, and pursuant to the Inter-Environmental Wallonie 
ruling of the CJEU,73 Member States must not enact any legislation that could seriously 
compromise the attainment of the result required by the Directive. Consequently, during this 
period, national legislation must be interpreted, to the extent that is possible, in a manner 
conducive to avoiding this.74  
The Non-Financial Reporting Directive defines the objectives of the Directive as follows: ‘to 
increase the relevance, consistency and comparability of information disclosed by certain large 
undertakings and groups across the Union’.75 Given that the rationale behind the Directive is to 
enhance transparency to a similarly high level across the EU, it is necessary for EU Member 
States to adopt adequate and effective means for the application and enforcement of the 
Directive, in order for this objective to be achieved.76  These national implementation measures 
may not go against the objective of the Directive. This may affect the discretion of national 
authorities in areas of law different from financial regulation as well. The implementing 
measures, moreover, must uphold EU-protected fundamental human rights when implementing 
EU Directives, which will be assessed in detail below. 
Of particular interest, in relation to indirect effect, is the Directive’s provision that requires large 
undertakings to disclose information ‘to the extent necessary for an understanding of the 
undertaking’s […] respect for human rights’.77 In the light of that provision and, given the 
importance the Treaties award to fundamental rights (see Articles 2 and 6 TEU), the duty to 
interpret Secondary legislation, such as the Directive, in the light of the Treaties,78 (and the fact 
                                                
 70 See Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann, 1984, E.C.R. 1891. 
 71 See Case 212/04, Adelener, 2006, E.C.R. 6057. 
 72 See Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Article 4(1).  
 73   See Case 129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie v Région Wallone, 1997, E.C.R. 7411. 
 74 See Case 212/04 Adeneler, 2006,  E.C.R. 6057, ¶¶ 107-124. See Hartley, supra note 67, at 239. 
 75 Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Recital 21. 
 76 The Directive notes that ‘EU Member States should ensure that effective national procedures are in place to 
enforce compliance with the obligations laid down by this Directive, and that those procedures are available to 
all persons and legal entities having a legitimate interest, in accordance with national law, in ensuring that the 
provisions of this Directive are respected’. Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Recital 10. 
77    Emphasis added.  
78  See, inter alia, Cases 305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones , 2007, E.C.R. 5305., ¶ 28 and Cases 386/08 
Brita, NYR, ¶ 39 and Case 63/09 Walz [NYR], ¶ 22. 
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that the Treaties themselves have indirect effect),79 when interpreting the national measures 
implementing the provisions of the Directive, the requirement to disclose should be widely 
interpreted in order to further these rights. Moreover, UNGP 3 articulates that, in meeting their 
duty to protect, States should ‘encourage, and where appropriate require business enterprises to 
communicate how they address their human rights impacts’.80  
Unlike, as we will see in more detail in the following section, ‘direct effect’, the doctrine of 
‘indirect effect’ applies also to scenarios where the interpretation of the Directive can affect the 
legal position of individuals in a disadvantageous way.81  Consequently, stakeholders can rely on 
the indirect effect of the Directive before national courts to make sure corporations fully give 
effect to the Directive. 
The provisions of the Directive should be interpreted in accordance with EU protected 
fundamental rights including, inter alia, the right of respect for private and family life (Article 7 
CFREU) and the right to freedom of expression (Article 11 CFREU).  
7.5.1.1 The Right to Respect for Private and Family Life  
Article 7 CFREU establishes that ‘everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and 
family life, home and communications’. This right corresponds to, both in meaning and scope, 
the right to private life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR. Pursuant to Article 52(3) 
CFREU, ‘[i]n so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention’. 
Consequently, the rulings by the ECtHR applying the provisions of the ECHR equivalent to 
Articles 7 and 11 CFREU (namely, Articles 8 and 10 ECHR) are of the utmost relevance when it 
comes to determining the scope of the (EU protected) fundamental rights. 
The ECtHR held in the 1998 Guerra Ruling that Article 8 ECHR created a positive duty on the 
part of the State to provide information on environmental risks related to the applicants’ 
exposure to chemical emissions by a factory. The denial of this information prevented the 
individual and his family from assessing the risks to their lives and home. This case law suggests 
that, under certain circumstances, States may have a positive obligation to make available to the 
public certain information that would otherwise not become known, in order to secure an 
individual’s right to private life.82 Article 8 of the ECHR may thus result in the creation of a 
positive obligation on the part of States to ensure that information about the potential and actual 
human rights risks of undertakings is publicly available.   
 
                                                
79 See Case 5-88,  Wahchauf, 1989, E.C.R. 2609, ¶ 19. See Lenaerts & Van Nuffel, supra note 68, ¶ 21-007. 
80  UNGPs, supra note 4, GP 3. 
81 See Case 106/98, Marleasing, 1990, E.C.R. 4135.  The only limit to this applicability would be that individuals 
would not be able to rely on the Directive in order to obtain the imposition or aggravation of criminal liability 
on individuals, see Case 60/02, Criminal Proceedings against X, 2004, E.C.R. 651. See further Craig & De 
Búrca, supra note 67, at 204. 
82  Guerra and Others v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, Eur. H.R. Rep. 1998-I (1998). 
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7.5.1.2 The Right to Freedom of Expression  
Article 11 CFREU establishes the right to freedom of expression, which ‘shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authorities regardless of frontiers’. The scope of this right, which mirrors that of Article 10 of the 
ECHR, thus includes, inter alia, the receipt of information. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR 
has established that integral to the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR is the 
right to receive information. The right of freedom of expressions was initially viewed as creating 
only a negative obligation for States to refrain ‘from restricting a person from receiving 
information that others wished or might be willing to impart on him’.83 The Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR, has held that Article 10 does not give rise to a positive duty for States to collect and 
disseminate information to the public on their own motion.84 More recently, however, decisions 
by sections of the ECtHR suggest the Court may be abandoning this narrow approach.  These 
recent decisions have pointed to a general ‘direction of travel’85 in the case law, departing from 
the Grand Chamber’s narrow interpretation of Article 10 ECtHR and towards the notion that 
Article 10 gives rise to a positive right of access to information.86  
The cases in which certain sections have recognised this positive right involved the legitimate 
gathering of public information by NGOs. More precisely, the ECtHR has held that the activities 
of NGOs warrants similar protection as those of the press by reason of these NGOs having a 
similar function to social ‘watchdog’.87 This case law suggests that Article 10 of the ECHR might 
create (or be on the verge of creating) a right to access public information and a positive 
obligation on States to make available certain information of public interest. While the Grand 
Chamber ECtHR has not yet confirmed this interpretation, a substantial body of case-law of the 
court seems consistent with this interpretation. This interpretation would furthermore follow 
developments in international law, the interpretation of Article 10 ECHR should be interpreted in 
accordance with. The right to freedom of expression finds an international equivalent under 
Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 13(1) of the IACtHs. These provisions have both been 
interpreted as giving rise to a right to access information held by public bodies. 
7.5.1.3 The effects of the ‘indirect’ effect of the Directive and EU Protected Fundamental 
Rights 
There is case law of the ECtHR supporting the view that States have a legal obligation to ensure 
a level of disclosure about the due diligence policies and human rights risks of these 
undertakings that provides right-holders with the information they need to vindicate their rights. 
An interpretation of the Directive that is most favourable to giving effect to these rights (and 
their equivalents under EU law) should be adopted, one that takes this State duty to protect 
                                                
83   Guerra and Others v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, Eur. H.R. Rep. 1998-I (1998), ¶ 53. Also see, Leander v 
Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, Eur. Ct.H.R (1987), ¶ 74. Gillberg v. Sweden, App. No. 41723/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2012), ¶ 83. 
84   Guerra and Others v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, Eur. H.R. Rep. 1998-I (1998), ¶ 53. 
85   Kennedy v The Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20, [217]. 
86  Guerra and Others v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, Eur. H.R. Rep. 1998-I (1998). 
87  Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, App. No. 48135/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), ¶ 20. 
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human rights into account. National disclosure obligations, including those deriving from acts of 
implementation of the directive, should be interpreted by reference to the Directive and to the 
CFREU (and, through it, the ECHR).  
The Directive permits EU Member States to require further improvements to the transparency of 
undertakings disclosure on human rights.88 However certain provisions in the Directive may 
restrict EU Member States from doing so. While the Directive sets out certain conditions 
regarding the modality by which EU Member States must require enterprises to disclose on 
human rights, these conditions seem more oriented towards ensuring that national 
implementation measures allow for flexibility in order to ease the burden of disclosure on 
undertakings, rather than to impose clear disclosure obligations on undertakings. The Directive 
creates incentives but no obligation for undertakings to rely on international frameworks, inter 
alia, the UNGPs in their disclosure. 
The ‘comply or explain’ modality is an example in point. The Directive provides that an EU 
Member States should oblige an undertaking to report on its human rights policy and if it does 
not pursue such a policy to provide in their non-financial statement a ‘clear and reasoned’ 
explanation for why they are not doing so.89 This policy does not amount to a requirement that 
undertakings pursue a human rights policy in case it is not already pursuing one, but merely, that 
the undertaking explains why it is not doing so. This explanation must be ‘clear and ‘reasoned’. 
It should be noted, in this regard, that research shows that, in practice, undertakings that were 
subject to the ‘report and explain’ requirement tended not to disclose as they should, giving 
invalid, general or false explanations.90 This prompted the EU Commission to issue guidance and 
to assist companies in improving the quality of these explanations.91  
In any event, if transposing the ‘comply or explain’ modality into national law becomes 
mandatory for EU Member States, which appears to be the case, the Directive would have the 
perverse result of pre-empting EU Member States from adopting a more stringent reporting 
obligation that would not accept a mere explanation, but that would require companies to adopt a 
human rights policy and to acquire the level of knowledge it should have about its human rights 
risks. Disclosure requirements that not only solicit disclosure about the understanding that an 
undertaking has, but that also requires undertakings to be proactive in order to acquire the level 
of understanding that it should have about its human rights policies and risks aligns with the 
ethos of the human rights due diligence concept. Human rights due diligence requires business 
enterprises to enquire and investigate their human rights impacts with the aim of preventing these 
impacts.  
However, the obligations of EU Member States to respect EU protected fundamental rights may 
require EU Member States to impose a more demanding disclosure requirements on 
                                                
 88 Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Recital 1. 
 89 Id.  
 90 See Dániel Gergely Szabó & Karsten Engsig Sørensen, New EU Directive on the Disclosure of Non-Financial 
Information (CSR), 12 European Company and Financial Law Review (2015).  
 91 Commission Recommendation of 9 April 2014 on the quality of corporate governance reporting (‘comply or 
explain’), 2014  O.J. (L 109) 43. 
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undertakings. EU Member States may be under a legal obligation to require improved disclosure 
from undertakings not only about the understanding they have, but also about the level of 
understanding they should have on their human rights policies and risks. Adopting such national 
disclosure regulations mandating greater transparency from undertakings may be necessary for 
States to secure the right of individuals to receive the information on the basis of which they can 
assess the risks to their human rights. Since the national implementation measures that require 
more stringent disclosure requirement would extend beyond the minimum requirements of the 
Non-Financial Reporting Directive, they may be susceptible to control of compatibility with 
national standard of human rights protection by national courts. A more demanding disclosure 
requirement may be necessary in order for States to meet their legal obligations to ensure the 
right to private life and the right to freedom of expression. 
It remains to be seen, in short, how, if at all, the CJEU will interpret the ‘indirect effect’ of the 
(not always satisfactory, from the perspective of its content) Directive in the light of the (also 
indirectly effective and hierarchically superior provisions of the) CFREU and EU protected 
fundamental rights. 
7.5.2 Direct Effect  
The question arises whether, after the expiration of the deadline for transposition, stakeholders 
(NGOs, shareholders, individuals, etc.) can rely on the Directive before the national authorities 
and courts of the EU Member States in order to obtain enhanced disclosure from corporations. 
Pursuant to Article 288 TFEU, ‘[a] directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, 
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the 
choice of form and methods’. Consequently, it is implicit in the very nature of an EU Directive 
that Member States have the discretion to choose the preferred method and form of 
implementation. Unlike Regulations, in relation to which the literality of Article 288 TFEU 
expressly provides that they will be ‘directly applicable’, the TFEU does not contain any 
provision in relation to whether Directives can be directly applicable. Direct effect is the capacity 
of Community law to give rise to rights and obligations directly, i.e., without the need to be 
implemented by national law.92 According to Professors Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, 
pursuant to the doctrine of direct effect ‘provisions of binding EU law which are sufficiently 
clear, precise and unconditional to be considered justiciable can be invoked and relied on by 
individuals before national courts’.93 
The CJEU has recognised that Directives can have direct effect provided that certain general 
requirements for direct effect are met.94 The CJEU established these criteria in its seminal Van 
Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen ruling, noting that, in order for 
provisions in an instrument of EU law to be directly effective, the provisions should be: (i) 
                                                
92 Or, more precisely, without the need, in the so-called ‘dualist’ countries from the perspective of classic 
International law, to adopt a domestic measure giving effects to the provision in question from International / 
European law. See Schütze, supra note 67, at 76.  
93 See Craig & De Búrca, supra note 67, at 181. See further, Hartley, supra note 67, at 209. 
94  See Case 41/74, Van Duyn, 1974,  E.C.R. 1337. 
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precise; (ii) unconditional; and (iii) not dependent on implementing measures.95 Whether the 
Non-Financial Directive, or certain of its provisions, create direct effect is ambiguous. It calls for 
an examination of the criteria outlined in the not always consistent Van Gend en Loos case-law.96  
An analysis which should be done on a case-by-case basis for each provision.   
It is argued that the Directive is unlikely to acquire direct effect. The following considerations 
come to the fore: (i) the Directive’s provisions are unlikely to be considered by the CJEU as 
‘clear and unconditional and not contingent on any discretionary implementing measure’;97 and, 
perhaps more importantly, (ii) attempts to invoke the hypothetical direct effect of the Directive 
are likely to face the obstacle of the CJEU’s refusal to recognise the so-called ‘horizontal’ direct 
effect of Directives, i.e., to recognize that a Directive can impose obligations in proceedings 
between individuals.98 The CJEU in Marshall refused direct horizontal effect for Directives, 
which it justified by the reason that a Directive is addressed to EU Member States, and cannot 
‘of itself’ impose obligations on individuals.99 The Directive may still be invoked in proceedings 
between individuals, however, for the purpose of creating vertical direct effect, if one of the 
parties is an undertaking that can be designated as an emanation of the ‘State’.100  
The absence of direct effect of the Directive does not mean that stakeholder are completely 
deprived from invoking it against the corporations under the Directive’s reporting obligations.  
First, as previously indicated, individuals can invoke the ‘indirect’ effect of the Directive, and of 
EU protected fundamental rights, to obtain an interpretation of national law in conformity with 
EU law. Second, national courts are under an obligation to leave unapplied national rules 
contrary to the Directive, in certain cases, in proceedings between individuals.101 Professors Craig 
and De Búrca refer to this possibility as ‘incidental horizontal effects’.102 Third, while probably 
remote in practice, individuals retain the possibility, under the Francovich case-law of the 
                                                
 95 See, inter alia, Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 1963, E.C.R. 1 (1963); Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgium, 1974, 
E.C.R. 631; Case 43/75, Defrenne v Sabena, 1976, E.C.R. 455; Case 36/74, Walrave v Association Union 
Cycliste International, 1974, E.C.R. 1405; Case 126/86, Zaera v Instituto Nacionale de la Seguridad Social, 
1987, E.C.R. 3697. 
 96   Lenaerts and Van Nuffel indicate that the CJEU ‘has not invariably formulated the test in the same way’, see   
Lenaerts & Van Nuffel, supra note 68, ¶ 21-056. 
 97  This is how the test for direct effect was formulated in Case 44/84 Hurd ,1986, E.C. R. 29, ¶ 47. 
 98 Case 91/92 Faccini Dori, 1994,  E.C.R. 3325. 
 99   Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton, 1986, E.C.R. 723. See further, Schütze, supra note 67, at 98.  
100 An undertaking that is subject to the Directive may qualify as a ‘State’ by application of the Foster criteria. The 
CJEU in Foster v British Gas held that ‘State’ ought to be construed widely, and encompasses within its scope 
‘a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, 
for providing a public service under the control of a State and has for that purpose special powers beyond those 
which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals’. See Case 188/89 Foster, 1990, 
E.C.R. 3313, for a recent confirmation of the test see Case 180/04, Vasallo, 2006, E.C.R. 7235. See further 
Schütze, supra note 67, at 100 and Craig & De Búrca, supra note 67, at 196. 
101   See, e.g., Case 194/94 CIA Security International SA v Signalson, 1996, E.C.R. 2201 and Case 443/98,   
Unilever, 2000, E.C.R. 7535. 
102 See Craig & De Búrca, supra note 67, at 200, see further Schütze, supra note 67, at 101.  
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CJEU,103 to sue the EU Member States for damages if they fail to give full effect to the Directive, 
including if they fail to obtain from the corporations subject to reporting obligations the levels of 
disclosure required by the Directive.  
Fourth, the CJEU has held more recently that general principles of EU law can bind private 
parties and that the content of a general principle of EU law can be inferred from a Directive.104  
Given that the Treaties are widely perceived as having ‘horizontal’ direct effect,105 and that EU 
protected fundamental rights have the status of both general principles of EU law and (to the 
extent that they have been incorporated to the CFREU) Primary legislation, the Directive could 
potentially be very helpful to clarify the scope of directly applicable fundamental rights (be they 
general principles of EU law or provisions in the CFREU). 
Fifth and finally, the possible lack of direct effect of the Directive does not in any manner 
diminish the obligations, for all EU Member States, to give effect to it. More precisely, if EU 
Member States fail to require from corporations the information referred to by the Directive, the 
European Commission, acting on its own motion or after a complaint from a stakeholder, can 
bring the Member State in question before the CJEU, which can declare that the Member State 
has breached EU law (see Article 258 TFEU),106 and even impose a lump sum or penalty 
payment on the Member State in question if the latter consistently refuses to give effect to the 
Directive in question (see Article 260 TFEU). Other EU Member States may also bring the 
matter before the CJEU (see Article 259 TFEU).  
All in all, by enacting the Directive, the EU opted for a type of legal instrument which has 
potentially sweeping implications in the rights of stakeholders when it comes to the disclosure 
obligations of corporations.  However, irrespective to the type of instrument chosen, and as noted 
in the preceding section in relation to the ‘comply or explain’ example, it is uncertain whether 
the content of the Directive will contribute to further the rights of stake-holders. A point which 
we will analyse in more detail next. 
 The Non-Financial Reporting Directive: Flexibility of Action and Effectiveness 7.6
The following section will examine the discretion that is left to EU Member States in the 
transposition of the Directive into national law and the potential effects that this discretion may 
have on the regulatory effects of the Directive in terms of affecting and coordinating the 
regulation of factors on which business disclosure in the EU depends in practice. The first 
section will examine the flexibilities that are built into the disclosure requirements. The second 
section will assess the form and type of information that companies must disclose, the audience 
to whom disclosure is owed and the monitoring and verification of compliance with the 
disclosure obligations. 
                                                
 103 See Cases 6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and others, 1991, E.C.R. 5357, ¶¶ 39-41. 
 104 See Case 144/04 Mangold v Rüdiger Helm, 2005, E.C.R. I-9981. 
105 See Case 435/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP 
and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, 2007, E.C.R. I-10779. See further Craig & De Búrca, supra note 67, at 189.  
 106 This was the case, e.g., in Case 205/98, Commission v. Austria, 2000. See further K. Lenaerts, et al., EU 
Procedural Law, ¶ 5-05  (Sweet & Maxwell. 2014). 
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7.6.1 The Disclosure Requirements and Flexibility 
It follows from Recital 3 in the Preamble to the Directive that the EU legislator intended to allow 
for ‘high flexibility of action’ considering that account should be had of ‘the multidimensional 
nature of [CSR] and the diversity of the CSR policies implemented by businesses matched by a 
sufficient level of comparability to meet the needs of investors and other stakeholders as well as 
the need to provide consumers with easy access to information on the impact of businesses on 
society’.107 The rationale for the EU legislator to allow flexibility in the disclosure requirements 
is thus to facilitate a balanced and comprehensive representation in order for different 
stakeholders to have a understanding of the performance of the company in relation to all various 
aspects of CSR and to respond to the demands for sufficient or material information in relation to 
these respective areas by stakeholders whose interests are engaged in these areas. The Directive 
provides a non-exhaustive list that includes, apart from respect for human rights, the areas 
environmental, social and employee matters, anti-corruption and bribery matters.  
There are various provisions in the Directive that permit or require EU Member States to leave a 
significant degree of flexibility for companies under their national disclosure requirements, as a 
result of which the disclosure requirements leave considerable discretion for companies to decide 
how to disclose and what information to include in the non-financial statement. 
One example is the ‘comply or explain’ policy outlined above. This provision requires that States 
provide business enterprises with the discretion to not disclose on human rights policies if they 
are not pursuing one and to provide an explanation instead. The Directive does not prescribe how 
this explanation should be drawn up, which leaves further discretion to companies to decide how 
to formulate this explanation. There may not be sufficient incentives for business enterprises to 
provide an informed explanation in the absence of further guidance, as experiences in the 
corporate governance context have shown.108  
Another example is that the Directive permits an EU Member State to exempt an undertaking 
from its obligation to disclosure through a non-financial statement, provided that the undertaking 
publishes a separate report for the same financial year that covers the information required for 
the non-financial statement. Certain conditions must be met.109 The separate report should be 
published with the management report or made publicly available on the undertaking’s website, 
no later than six months after the balance sheet date.110 This exemption should apply irrespective 
of whether the undertaking uses a national, Union-based or international framework. EU 
                                                
107  Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Recital 3. 
 108 Directive 2013/34 EC applies a similar ‘comply-or-explain’ principle, setting out the requirement that 
companies provide in their corporate governance statements an explanation of the part of the corporate 
governance code they depart from. Research showed that, in practice, undertakings that were subject to this 
requirement tended not to disclose as they should, giving invalid, general or false explanations. See Szabó & 
EngsigSørensen, supra note 90, at 12. This prompted the EU Commission to issue guidance and to assist 
companies in improving the quality of these explanations. Commission Recommendation of 9 April 2014 on the 
quality of corporate governance reporting (‘comply or explain’), supra note 91.  
 109 Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Article 19a 4, Recital 6. In the case of the parent-undertaking, 
this report must refer to the whole group. See id. Article 29a 4. 
 110  Id. Articles 19a.4. 29a.4. 
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Member States may also exempt a parent or a subsidiary undertaking subject to the Directive 
from its obligation to disclosure, if this undertaking is included in the consolidated financial 
statement or separate report of another undertaking.111  
The Directive also allows for flexibility in the substantive disclosure requirements. This is 
unsurprising. The requirements to disclose formally may impose a disproportionate burden on 
certain undertakings. There is support for the view that the design of these requirements should 
give regard to the circumstances of the undertaking, in terms of its size and the complexity of its 
actions, the specific risk and challenges that the company faces, and the objective of disclosure. 
In other words, the flexibility in the disclosure requirements allows for reporting that balances 
and responds to the circumstances of business enterprises and stakeholder demands, which are 
specific to the different areas that the concept of CSR encompasses.  
Where EU Member States allow too much flexibility for undertakings in meeting their disclosure 
requirements, this can have the adverse effects of undermining the effectiveness of the Directive 
in relation to human rights. There is the risk that disclosure requirements on undertakings are 
eased to an extent that the potential effect of the Directive on improving disclosure practices of 
companies in the function of human rights protection becomes diluted. I argue that the Directive 
can be a powerful tool in the regulation of business performance in relation to human rights, 
provided that certain conditions are met.  
7.6.1.1 Disclosure on Positive Human Rights Impacts 
While the Directive requires that business enterprises include information on their adverse 
human rights impact and due diligence, it does not preclude business enterprises from also 
including a description of their positive impacts. The Directive requires that a business enterprise 
disclose information that is essential for an understanding of the ‘impact of activity, relating to, 
as a minimum [...] respect for human rights’.112 As the formulation ‘as a minimum’ reflects, the 
Directives sets a minimum benchmark requirement. As stipulated in Article 19a(1)d, an entity 
subject to the Directive must disclose on, at a minimum, the adverse human rights impacts that 
are linked to its operations, including through its business relationships, products and services. 
This corresponds with the duty to disclose as it is defined by the UNGPs that requires companies 
to disclose on how they identify and manage their negative human rights impacts. 
A non- financial statement may, however, also include a description of the policies pursued to 
promote or fulfil human rights. Such disclosure on positive impacts is not sufficient to meet the 
duty to disclose on impacts related to a company’s respect for human rights, since the latter is 
linked to adverse human rights impacts. Positive contributions to the protection and fulfilment of 
human rights are laudable, but do not offset the responsibility to respect human rights as outlined 
in the UNGPs, or compensate for adverse human rights impacts. 
Under the present Directive, there is a reasonable possibility that business enterprises will 
disclose on their positive human rights impacts. This is in part because the EU considers these 
positive impacts as integral to the concept of CSR. The EU definition of CSR, i.e. ‘the 
                                                
 111 Id. Articles 19a.3. 29a.3. 
 112 Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Article 19a.1. 
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responsibility of enterprises for their impact on society’ reflects this. It mentions merely 
‘impact’, rather than ‘adverse impact,’ and thus does not exempt positive impacts on human 
rights from its scope. The purpose of CSR, as it is defined in the EU CSR Policy, also reflects 
this. It is defined as twofold: (1) ‘maximising the creation of shared value for their 
owners/shareholders and for their other stakeholders and society at large’; and (2) ‘identifying, 
preventing and mitigating their possible adverse impacts’.113 The purpose of ‘maximizing the 
creation of shared value’ suggests an approach that views the simultaneous creation of economic 
and social value as key to the long-term success of business, and beneficial to society at large.114 
The maximisation of the positive contributions of business enterprises to human rights is integral 
to CSR. 
Business enterprises may have strong incentives to report on the positive, rather than the 
negative. Disclosing on the positive human rights impacts may be a means for business 
enterprises to neutralise the critique115 and to offset the short-term costs (e.g., legal liability, 
reputational damage, consumer boycotts, disinvestment, etc.) that openness about adverse human 
rights impact may trigger. The discretion left to business enterprises to disclose their positive 
impacts on human rights is not desirable, because this allows business enterprises leeway to 
present an incomplete or misleading picture about the company’s actual performance relating to 
their respect for human rights.116 
7.6.1.2 Reporting Audience 
A related issue is the audience to whom business enterprises owe the duty to disclose. The duty 
to disclose on adverse human rights impacts as it is defined by the UNGPs is, in the first 
instance, owed to right-holders whose rights may be adversely affected by the activities of 
business enterprises. This is reflected in UNGP 21, which stipulates that communication entails 
‘providing a measure of transparency and accountability to individuals or groups who may be 
impacted and to other relevant stakeholders, including investors’.117 The fact that right-holders 
are the primary addressees has implications for the instance and content of disclosure. Arguably, 
a determination of what constitutes ‘relevant and proportionate’ in Article 19. 1 (d) depends on 
whether such disclosure is relevant and material to right-holders to have an understanding of a 
company’s responsibility for human rights. Disclosure is particularly relevant if human rights 
risks meet a threshold of severity or significance. As mentioned previously, it needs to be further 
                                                
 113 Commission, A renewed EU CSR Strategy, supra note 13, at 6. 
 114 Porter & Kramer, Creating Shared Value 89 Harvard Business Review (2011).  
 115 As Parker & Howe note, ‘[B]usinesses will always seek to neutralise critiques of their adverse human rights 
impacts and to bring any new initiatives to regulate business and human rights back within the rubric of the 
“business case” and “risk management” since this provides greater opportunity for management discretion and 
profit-orientation in the way they respond to human rights concerns’. C. Parker & J. Howe, Ruggie’s 
Diplomatic Project and its Missing Regulatory Infrastructure, in The UNGPs on Business and Human Rights 
Foundation and Implementation, 275 (R. Mares ed., 2011).  
 116 This may trigger wrong responses from stakeholders. The disclosure of an accurate representation of a 
company’s performance is essential to foster meaningful dialogue among stakeholders, through which potential 
human rights impacts can be identified and mitigated, as well as to achieve legitimacy and long-term trust 
among stakeholders. 
 117 UNGPs, supra note 4, Commentary to GP 21. 
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clarified what this threshold is exactly and when it is reached. Disclosure would furthermore not 
be proportionate if it were not accurate or sufficient to provide right-holders the measure of 
transparency and accountability they need to evaluate and compare the performance of business 
enterprises in an optimal manner.118  
Arguably, the relevance and proportionality of disclosure is in part determined from the 
perspective of the target audience. Since the Directive does not specify that disclosure on human 
rights impacts is owed principally to right-holders, business enterprises have leeway to tailor 
their disclosure to provide an understanding of their impact that is relevant and sufficient to a 
particular audience, but not to right-holders. The disclosure may be tailored to meet the need for 
information by relevant stakeholders more generally, or more narrowly, i.e., by shareholders or 
investors. In either case, business enterprises may discharge its disclosure requirements through 
an approach that is not necessarily most appropriate or right from a right-holder perspective and, 
as a result, sufficient to meet the standard of the duty to disclose as stipulated in the UNGPs. The 
Directive thus does not enforce such standard by imposing on States to adopt legislation that 
requires business enterprises to adopt reporting practices and to provide information that is 
relevant and appropriate from a right-holder perspective. 
7.6.1.3 Stakeholder Participation 
The EU CSR policy recognises that collaboration with stakeholders is an integral part of CSR. It 
specifies that to discharge their responsibility, business enterprises should have in place a process 
to integrate human rights, amongst other public interests issues ‘into their business operations 
and core Strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders’.119 A requirement of stakeholder-
engagement in disclosure, however, is absent from the directives. The fact that the duty to 
disclose is owed to right-holders entails that right-holders must be involved in the disclosure 
process. Stakeholder engagement in disclosure is important to ensure that business enterprises 
are not only aware of and understand the human rights issues that affect them, but also the 
implications that these issues may have for the human rights due diligence duties of companies 
more generally and their responsibility to disclosure more specifically. In other words, 
stakeholder engagement is important in part to define the parameters of the duty to disclose from 
a right-holder perspective and in light of the circumstances of the company. Stakeholder 
engagement is important to determine the existence, nature and scope of a company’s duty to 
disclose on its respect for human rights. 
For instance, UNGP 21 suggests that the need to disclose can become more apparent if 
stakeholders bring concerns to the attention of the company.120 Engagement of right-holders is 
important to assess whether the information disclosed is ‘sufficient’ to evaluate the due diligence 
performance of the business enterprises from a right-holder perspective. 121  Stakeholder 
                                                
 118 Sufficient information is also important for right-holders to effectively participate in processes through which 
human rights due diligence is shaped, as well as to hold business enterprises to account in cases of actual 
adverse human rights impacts. 
 119 Commission, A renewed EU CSR Strategy, supra note 13, at 6. 
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engagement is important in prioritising the human rights issues that pose the most significant 
risks from a right-holder perspective for the purpose of disclosure.122 More generally, it is also 
important to assess the special human rights risks faced by individuals from groups or 
populations that are at heightened risk of vulnerability or marginalisation and gender-specific 
risks and their implications for the duty to disclose. Without stakeholder engagement, identifying 
the parameters of human rights due diligence and their implications for disclosure may not be 
possible in practice. 
7.6.1.4 SMEs 
Another important feature of the Directive is the high minimum size threshold that is applied, 
which has the effect of excluding a significant percentage of large undertakings123 and SMEs124 
from its applicable scope of disclosure obligations. The effect of exempting SMEs in particular is 
potentially large, since SMEs represent an approximate number of 22.3 million and make up 
99.8% of EU enterprises.125 The estimated total number of large undertakings that are subject to 
the disclosure requirements under the Directive is 6000. This number is lower than the 18,000 
entities that were initially meant to be covered. The reason is that the applicable scope was 
limited to public interest entities. 
The main rationale justifying the exemption of SMEs is that the disclosure requirements would 
place too great a burden on these entities.126 Avoiding this burden corresponds with the think-
small-first principle. The exemption is also not incompatible with the UNGPs per se, in that the 
UNGPs also do not require that SMEs communicate through formal means, except when certain 
conditions apply. A degree of flexibility is built into the human rights due diligence concept, 
which allows companies to discharge their responsibility through means that are proportionate to 
their capacity, which relates, amongst other factors, to size, management structures and 
resources. Size thus is a relevant factor in determining the means of disclosure; however, it is not 
the only factor, nor the most important factor. The primary factor in determining the form of 
disclosure is the nature of the human rights risks. Companies must communicate formally if 
formal means are most appropriate in light of the nature of the adverse human rights impacts of a 
company. A company must disclose formally if the circumstances of a company pose risks of 
severe human rights impacts.127 The UNGPs recognise different forms of formal reporting, 
                                                
 122 Id. Commentary to GP 21. 
 123 Also, certain large undertakings whose average number of employees falls below 500 are not subject to the non-
financial disclosure requirements. For the purpose of the Directive, a large undertaking has on average 250 
employees during the financial year. 
 124 The Directive distinguishes between micro, small and medium-sized undertakings. The size of these 
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purpose of the Directive, the average number of employees for micro-undertakings is below 10, for small 
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 125 Eurostat, Statistics on small and medium-sized enterprises, (September 2015), 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-environment/sme-definition_en. 
 126 Accounting Directive, supra note 2, Recital 26. 
 127 UNGP 21 stipulates that business enterprises have a responsibility to disclose in a formal manner if this form 
best reflects the human rights impacts of an enterprise. It also recognizes a responsibility to report formally if 
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including traditional annual reports, corporate responsibility/sustainability reports, online updates 
and integrated financial and non-financial reports.128  
The Directive’s exemption of SMEs from the disclosure obligations can be seen as problematic, 
for various reasons. First, it conveys the impression that SMEs, by mere fact of their size, have 
less or no human rights responsibilities, or that they are absolved from their responsibility to 
communicate how they address their human rights impacts, or have no reporting obligations. 
This does not conform to the expectations of the UNGPs, according to which the responsibility 
to respect applies ‘fully and equally’ to all business enterprises.129 Also, the responsibility to 
communicate, which is integral to human rights due diligence, applies to any company, 
irrespective of its size. Excluding SMEs from mandatory reporting a priori exempts SMEs from 
having to disclose formally on their adverse human rights impacts. 
Arguably, whether it is appropriate that SMEs disclose through a non-financial statement in the 
annual report should be determined on a case-by-case basis. The understanding is that all SMEs 
can have potential human rights risks, including severe risks. The potential human rights impacts 
of a single SME, as well as the cumulative impact of the many SMEs in the EU, can be 
significant and meet the threshold of severity. The principle that companies should disclosure 
through formal means in the presence of severe human rights risks applies to all business 
enterprises, irrespective of size. SMEs are no exception. If SMEs create, contribute to or are 
directly involved in potential severe adverse human rights risks, because the scale, scope or the 
irremediable character of these risks meets a certain minimum threshold, the UNGPs set out that 
they disclose formally. 
The a priori exclusion of SMEs from the scope of the proposed regulation entails a missed 
opportunity to increase the quantity of reporting, as well as to effectuate significant change in 
improving human rights reporting and due diligence practices in the EU. This is because the 
overwhelming majority of companies in the EU are SMEs. Mandatory reporting requirements 
could incentivize SMEs to give attention to their human rights due diligence responsibility, 
especially if there are few market incentives that do so. They could also promote SME 
participation and engagement in CSR governance initiatives. They can also provide incentives 
for SMEs to joint CSR governance initiatives, be they sector, business or issue specific, or 
focused on CSR more generally, and to draw from their expertise, guidance and tools to 
discharge their reporting obligations. Such membership could promote the interaction, 
collaboration, learning and the pooling of resources among SMEs.130  
The reporting requirements could also make SMEs more apt to anticipate and act upon new 
business opportunities that arise on international markets, e.g., to meet demands in developing 
countries. More generally, mandatory reporting requirements for all companies could be a great 
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 130 Business and Human Rights Initiative, Global Compact Network Netherlands, How to Do Business with 
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stride forward in fostering responsible business environments across the EU, enhancing 
productivity and innovation through the creation of shared values, and could propel SMEs on the 
international plane. 
7.6.1.5 Integrated Reporting 
The approach that underlies the disclosure requirements is that of ‘integrated reporting’, although 
the Directive does not expressly prescribe that companies adopt integrated reporting as 
developed by the International Integrated Reporting Council.131 This approach to reporting views 
the integration of financial and non-financial information, in a comprehensive and coherent 
manner, as critical to creating value and ensuring the long-term success of the company.132 One 
benefit of the approach of integrated reporting is that it can make visible the link between the due 
diligence processes and policies in the public interest of respect for human rights, on the one 
hand, and the business strategies and policies involving its economic activities and its 
relationships, on the other hand. 133  Disclosure can create awareness among directors and 
management of the company, as well as stakeholders, about potential incoherencies in processes 
and policies that inhibit a company from meeting both interests. As stipulated by the 
commentary to UNGP 16, business enterprises should strive for greater coherence.134  
The approach of integrated reporting seems more appropriate than alternative approaches that the 
Commission considered for the Directive, i.e. the disclosure of information through a stand-alone 
report (detailed reporting) and the establishment of a mandatory EU reporting standard. First, 
integrated reporting could entail that disclosure on human rights impacts must meet the 
requirements as disclosure on financial or other public interest issues. Since the statement on 
human rights impacts is integrated in financial reporting obligations, disclosure on human rights 
impacts must be treated on par with financial disclosure, for instance, regarding accessibility and 
verification. A non-financial statement on human rights impacts is more likely to be subject to 
auditing and other types of assurance requirements. In this regard, integrated reporting seems 
more appropriate than reporting through a separate CSR report that may not entail such 
requirement for companies.135  
Since the management is responsible for the preparation of reports and financial statements, the 
responsibility to disclosure on adverse human rights impacts is effectively lifted from a CSR 
department to management level. Management reports inform the decision-making of directors. 
It follows that at least in theory, integrated reporting is more prone than a stand-alone CSR report 
                                                
 131 Szabó & EngsigSørensen, supra note 90. The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) defines an 
integrated report as one which is a ‘concise communication about how an organisation’s strategy, governance, 
performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead to the creation of value over the 
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 132 The European Parliament suggested that the Disclosure directives recommend that European businesses apply 
the UNGPs and that they should be harmonised with integrated reporting as currently being developed by the 
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC). Resolution on Corporate Social Responsibility: Promoting 
Society’s Interests and a Route to Sustainable and Inclusive Recovery, supra note 19, at 73. 
 133 UNGPs, supra note 4, GP 16. 
 134 Id. GP 16.  
 135 Shift, Update to John Ruggie’s Corporate Law Project: Human Rights Reporting Initiatives (2013). 
  303 
to bring respect for human rights to the attention of the board. As a result, integrated reporting is 
more likely to raise the profile of adverse human rights impacts within the company and make it 
an issue at the board level. To the extent that integrated reporting can make visible and 
contribute to a better understanding of the link between human rights and business activities, it 
can incite directors to take action to integrate human rights more consistently into core business 
operations and strategies, rather than address human rights at the periphery. If respect for human 
rights furthermore were to be accorded a central position within the management report, it may 
well also take on a more central role in the change and improvement of business policies and 
strategies in practice. 
7.6.1.6 Reporting Frameworks 
Pursuant to Article 19a1, EU Member States must allow undertakings that are subject to the 
Directive to rely on national, Union-based or international frameworks. Consequently, an 
undertaking that is subject to the Directive may choose but, depending on the national 
transposition measures, may not be legally required to disclose on the basis of the UNGPs, or 
other recognised international frameworks.136 By referring to the UNGPs, the Directive also 
acknowledges the value thereof, and encourages business responses to the UNGPs more 
generally. The Directive also implicitly incentivizes business enterprises to use this standard in 
meeting their disclosure obligations pursuant to the Directive. By disclosing in conformity with 
the UNGPs, undertakings would comply with, and go beyond the minimum requirements 
established under the Directive. 
Recital 6 of the Preamble expressly mentions apart from the UNGPs, inter alia, the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, as a framework that undertakings can take account of. 
Since there is alignment between the expectations set out by these frameworks on human rights 
due diligence, national implementation measures that permit or require disclosure in accordance 
with these frameworks has the same effect of encouraging business responses to the UNGPs. EU 
Member States should ensure that if business enterprises rely on an international framework, that 
they specify this. Where the reliance on the UNGPs is made explicit, this may facilitate and 
reinforce the tracking of responses to the UNGPs.137 If companies do choose to rely on an 
international framework, and make this explicit, the Directive leaves EU Member States the 
option to require that the information disclosed in conformity with the respective standard 
specified be verified by an independent assurance service provider.138  
The Directive also implicitly recognises the legitimacy, and encourages the uptake of the GRI by 
referring to this reporting initiatives as one of the international frameworks that business 
enterprises can rely on in the reporting under the Directive. The GRI has been widely recognised 
as the leading organisation in sustainability reporting. This is reflected in the sheer number of 
reporting organisations, totalling 7,959 (as per August 2015). In the EU context, a study shows 
                                                
 136 The European Parliament has expressly noted that the Directives for non-financial disclosure presented an 
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that the GRI139 is the international framework that European companies, and especially large 
companies, most frequently use to develop their reports.140 The GRI’s newest release, the GRI G4 
Sustainability Guidelines (GRI G4), is fully aligned with, and allows for reporting performance 
against the UNGPs, amongst other global frameworks.141  
By encouraging companies to rely on the GRI, the Directive reinforces its potential indirect 
regulatory effect in leveraging business compliance with the disclosure requirements that align 
with the UNGPs.142 This potential regulatory effect could be further strengthened by the 
collaboration between the GRI and the ‘Human Rights Reporting and Assurance Frameworks 
Initiative’ (RAFI).143 144 145 146 Civil society voices have expressed their support for the UN 
Framework, while States have indicated they are considering ways to integrate the UN Reporting 
Framework into their policies, including through their NAPs.147  
                                                
 139 The GRI is a sustainability reporting framework that provides guidance to companies on how to disclose their 
sustainability performance. The framework consists of Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, Sector Supplements 
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 140 Commission Staff Document Impact Assessment, supra note 23, at 6. 
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provide companies with a clear roadmap on reporting on the implementation of the UNGP. GRI, GRI and RAFI 
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members of the GRI network, and present opportunities to move forward in the comprehensive and effective 
implementation of the UNGP. The GRI Deputy Chief Executive Teresa Fogelberg notes, ‘[T]he reporting 
practice built by these thousands of companies is a hugely valuable resource, which can be leveraged to 
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improving human rights standards.’ Id. 
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Some countries already have legislation in place requiring undertakings to disclose on the basis 
of the GRI. Denmark has been a pioneer not only for being the first to transform the Directive 
into national law, but also by going beyond the minimum legal requirements therein, inter alia, 
by making reporting in accordance with the GRI mandatory.148 Such mandatory disclosure 
conform the GRI indirectly has the legal effect of requiring disclosure in conformity with the 
UNGPs. Other EU Member States may be encouraged to do the same in response to the 
invitation set out in the 2014 Guidance Document on NAPs for States to adopt measures to 
encourage business enterprises to disclose on human rights due diligence and related impacts and 
to use established reporting guidance such as the GRI.149 
7.6.1.7 Indicators 
The Directive on non-financial disclosure requires that companies subject to its disclosure 
requirements describe non-financial key performance indicators (KPIs). While this criterion 
should encourage undertakings to rely on indicators in their reporting, in the absence of guidance 
about which indicators or types of indicators the undertaking should use, the effects on the 
disclosure practices of companies are uncertain. The Directive, by way of expressly referring to 
the GRI under Recital 6, may incentivize undertakings to join the GRI and to rely on the human 
rights indicators suggested in their disclosure. The GRI G4 features a list of 10 performance 
indicators under the category of human rights. The human rights indicators elicit comparable 
information, both qualitative and quantitative, about results and outcomes that indicate change 
over time in relation to 10 issues: Investment, Non-Discrimination, Freedom of Association and 
Collective Bargaining, Child Labour, Forced and Compulsory Labor, Security Practices, 
Indigenous Rights, Assessment, Supplier Human Rights Assessment, and Human Rights 
Grievance Mechanisms. A section of the GRI G4 identifies links with the UNGP.150 Research 
finds that large companies are using the indicator system proposed by the GRI Framework, and 
are applying some or all of the suggested performance indicators. The indicators used include 
human rights indicators, although these are applied less frequently than indicators in other 
subject areas, notably the environment and labour rights.151   
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7.6.2 Verification 
The Directive stipulates that EU Member States must ensure that a statutory audit or audit firm 
checks the report, but only to determine whether the non-financial statement or the separate 
report has been provided.152 There is no requirement for this audit to determine the conformity 
between the statement and the actual practices of the undertaking. The Directive confers on EU 
Member States an option to choose to require business enterprises to subject the information in 
the non-financial statement or report to verification by an independent assurance service 
provider.153 The Directive does not provide sanctions, but confers on EU Member States the 
obligation to ensure that appropriate liability rules are in place for the purpose of liability for the 
drawing up and publishing of, inter alia, the management reports in accordance with the 
Directive. The Directive provides that these liability rules should be applicable to the members 
of the administrative, management and supervisory bodies of an undertaking, which are 
generally responsible for drawing up these reports. Article 33 of the Directive stipulates: 
1. Member States shall ensure that the members of the administrative, management 
and supervisory bodies of an undertaking, acting within the competences assigned 
to them by national law, have collective responsibility for ensuring that: 
(a) the annual financial statements, the management report, the corporate 
governance statement when provided separately and the report referred to 
in Article 19a(4); and 
(b) the consolidated financial statements, the consolidated management 
reports, the consolidated corporate governance statement when provided 
separately and the report referred to in Article 29a(4),  
are drawn up and published in accordance with the requirements of this Directive and, 
where applicable, with the international accounting standards adopted in accordance 
with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002. 
The liability for non-financial disclosure on human rights falls to the national laws of the EU 
Member States, which furthermore have discretion to determine the extent of this liability.154 If 
EU Member States do not go beyond the minimum requirements in their national 
implementation measures, liability could arise in situations where the non-financial statement or 
the alternative separate report is missing. 
 Human Rights Due Diligence and the Concept of the Group Entity 7.7
The Directive sets out disclosure requirements not only for individual business undertakings, but 
also for parent companies that belong to a large group. The application of disclosure 
requirements to groups is relevant in the context of regulating business respect for human rights.  
This is due to the fact that the actions of corporations often have human rights impact through 
                                                
 152 Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Article 19a 5. 
 153 Id. Article 19a 6. 
 154 Accounting Directive, supra note 2, Recital 41. 
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the activities of entities having the legal form of legally distinct legal entities, i.e., the group’s 
subsidiaries.  As a result, the concept of group that ends up being applied will be crucial for the 
effectiveness of the Directive. More precisely, the due diligence concept is linked to the group 
entity. 
Article 29(a)1 of the Directive defines the disclosure obligations for a parent company of large 
groups as follows: 
‘Public-interest entities which are parent undertakings of a large group exceeding on its 
balance sheet dates, on a consolidated basis, the criterion of the average number of 500 
employees during the financial year shall include in the consolidated management report 
a consolidated non-financial statement containing information to the extent necessary for 
an understanding of the group’s development, performance, position and impact of its 
activity, relating to, as a minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect 
for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters.’ 
The subjects of the Directive are parent companies of large groups.155 The size threshold 
requirement is defined by reference to the balance sheet total, net turnover and average number 
of employees.156 The criterion of the average number of employees during the financial year is 
determinant, which, on the balance sheet dates, should exceed, on a consolidated basis, the 
minimum threshold of 500 employees. The disclosure requirements set out in Article 29(a) of the 
Directive thus intend to apply only to the parent undertakings of large groups that are public-
interest entities. The obligation to draw up a consolidated management report seems to apply 
only to the parent undertakings that are of the type listed in Annex I and II of the Directive on 
annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types 
of undertakings.157 This statement should be included in a consolidated management report or, 
alternatively, in a separate report for the whole group.158  
The Directive requires a similar type of disclosure from parent undertakings of certain large 
groups under Article 29(a) as from large undertakings individually pursuant to Article 19(a). A 
parent should disclose the business model of the group, the human rights policies that the group 
has pursued, including the due diligence implemented, the outcome of these policies and how the 
group manages the human rights risks that are linked to the group’s operations including, where 
relevant and proportionate, the group’s business relationships, products or services.159 For the 
purpose of the Directive, however, the consolidated non-financial statement should include the 
activities of a parent undertaking and subsidiary undertakings in consolidation of the group as a 
whole. The parent undertaking of a group that is subject to the disclosure obligations under 
Article 29(a)(1) thus must take into consideration, in a consolidated manner, its own human 
rights policies and due diligence processes and those of the subsidiaries of the group. 
                                                
 155 Id. Article 7. 
 156 Id. Article 3.7. 
 157 Id. Article 21. 
 158 Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Article 29a4. 
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As a consequence, the Directive has potential indirect regulatory effects that extend to group 
entities. As a result of the disclosure obligations deriving from the Directive, a parent company 
should inquire and assess the human rights policies, outcomes and risks arising from the 
activities of all undertakings in its group and to reflect on these activities in the consolidation of 
the group as a single economic entity. This exercise can result in greater awareness by the parent 
company about the group’s involvement in human rights risks and the applicable laws and 
standards. This awareness and the potential legal, reputational and financial implications for 
failing to respond to these risks should prompt a parent entity to be proactive in taking the 
necessary measures to improve not only its own performance, but also to communicate and 
ensure that subsidiary entities in the group are aware about the human rights risks and applicable 
standards in order for these risks to be managed. 
With Article 29(a), the Directive thus acknowledges the significance of regulating the disclosure 
of group entities in a consolidated manner. The disclosure requirements thus can have positive 
effects on the group policies relating to human rights. In this regard, it is unsurprising that the 
Directive creates incentives for subsidiary and parent entities to disclose on a consolidated basis. 
It does so by creating an exemption for a subsidiary undertaking and its subsidiaries from their 
disclosure obligations under Article 19(a)(1) if the respective undertaking is included in the 
consolidated management report or the separate report of another undertaking. The same applies 
to a parent undertaking that is also a subsidiary undertaking.160 
The concept of the single group entity is important for the regime on non-financial disclosure for 
a number of reasons. First and foremost, of course, the concept of group determines whether the 
disclosure obligations under Article 29(a)(1) apply to a parent company and, if applicable, which 
undertakings this parent should include in the consolidated non-financial statement. The concept 
of the group thus delimits the boundaries of the obligation, in that it determines which 
undertakings are regarded as part of the group for the purpose of the applicability of the 
obligations of the Directive. Second, the concept also determines the scope of the disclosure 
obligations of the parent undertaking under Article 29(a)(1), in terms of the human rights 
policies, risks and outcomes of the subsidiary entities that the parent entity must disclose on in 
consolidation. Finally, the concept of the group affects the applicability of the disclosure 
obligations to group entities with different organisational structures. 
For the purposes of the Directive, a group is defined as ‘a parent undertaking and all its 
subsidiary undertakings’.161 Whether an undertaking is a ‘parent undertaking’ and whether ‘a 
subsidiary entity’ belongs to a group are determined by reference to the notion of control. A 
parent undertaking is defined as ‘an undertaking which controls one or more subsidiary 
undertakings’.162 Article 22 of this Directive further clarifies the different notions of control that 
bring entities within the boundaries of a group for the purpose of drawing up a consolidated 
management report. There is no reason to assume that the group should be considered differently 
in relation to the drawing up of the management report and the consolidated non-financial 
statement that should be included in this report. 
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The Directive identifies different concepts of the group entities that EU Member States may rely 
on in formulating their disclosure obligations. These are the following: 
Article 22 
‘The requirement to prepare consolidated financial statements 
1.  A Member State shall require any undertaking governed by its national law to draw 
up consolidated financial statements and a consolidated management report if that 
undertaking (a parent undertaking): 
(a) has a majority of the shareholders’ or members’ voting rights in another 
undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking); 
(b) has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the 
administrative, management or supervisory body of another undertaking (a 
subsidiary undertaking) and is at the same time a shareholder in or member of 
that undertaking; 
(c) has the right to exercise a dominant influence over an undertaking (a 
subsidiary undertaking) of which it is a shareholder or member, pursuant to a 
contract entered into with that undertaking or to a provision in its 
memorandum or articles of association, where the law governing that 
subsidiary undertaking permits its being subject to such contracts or 
provisions. 
A Member State need not prescribe that a parent undertaking must be a shareholder in or 
member of its subsidiary undertaking. Those Member States the laws of which do not 
provide for such contracts or clauses shall not be required to apply this provision; or 
(d) is a shareholder in or member of an undertaking, and: 
(i) a majority of the members of the administrative, management or 
supervisory bodies of that undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking) who 
have held office during the financial year, during the preceding financial 
year and up to the time when the consolidated financial statements are 
drawn up, have been appointed solely as a result of the exercise of its 
voting rights; or 
(ii) controls alone, pursuant to an agreement with other shareholders in or 
members of that undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking), a majority of 
shareholders’ or members’ voting rights in that undertaking. The Member 
States may introduce more detailed provisions concerning the form and 
contents of such agreements. 
Member States shall prescribe at least the arrangements referred to in point (ii). They 
may subject the application of point (i) to the requirement that the voting rights represent 
at least 20 % of the total. 
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However, point (i) shall not apply where a third party has the rights referred to in points 
(a), (b) or (c) with regard to that undertaking.’ 
The Directive thus delineates the notion of ‘group’ by reference to a relationship of control 
between the parent undertaking and a subsidiary entity, which can be inferred from the parent 
holding a majority of voting rights, an agreement with other shareholders or members or in 
certain circumstances where the parent is a shareholder in or a member of a subsidiary.163 The 
definition of the group thus centres around the notion of control and designates a group as an 
economic entity that encompasses a parent entity and one or more subsidiary entities that relate 
to the parent through relationships of control.164 A subsidiary entity is regarded as constituting 
part of the group by reason of the parent having control over it. 
The Directive supports an approach to group entities that broadly corresponds with the way 
group entities have been treated commonly by different areas of the law, that is as a collective of 
distinct and separate legal entities, each potentially having their own distinct legal personality as 
determined by the domestic legislation of their country of origin or seat, and which are connected 
through a relationship of ownership and control.165 This approach to the concept of group thus 
sets out the boundaries of the group by reference to ownership and control. As a result, those 
subsidiary undertakings that the parent undertaking does not have control over are excluded from 
the group (for the purposes of the Directive). The Directive delimits the scope of the required 
disclosure in that the parent undertaking will not need to report on the activities of these 
undertakings that it does not exercise control over in its consolidated non-financial statement. 
The choice for this approach to group entities has the effect that parents of economic entities that 
display a more tightly integrated organisational structure, in which a controlling entity exists that 
has strategic or operational control over distinct and separate legal entities, are included in the 
scope of application of Article 29(a)1 of the Directive.166 Crucially, the subsidiary entities that 
the parent has control over should be included in the consolidated account, irrespective of their 
location.167  
However, this approach may not fare well in the context of the integrated networked entity, 
which displays complex and less hierarchical organisational structures.168 The parents of these 
                                                
 163 Id. Article 22.1, Recital 31.  
 164 Id. Recital 31. 
 165 According to Eroglu, an MNE can be depicted in a strictly legal sense as ‘a collection of corporate entities, each 
having its own juridical identity and national origin, but each in some way connected by a system of centralized 
management and control, normally exercised from the seat of primary ownership’. Muzaffer Eroglu, 
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Elgar, 2008).  
 166 According to Eroglu, an MNE can be depicted in a strictly legal sense as ‘a collection of corporate entities, each 
having its own juridical identity and national origin, but each in some way connected by a system of centralized 
management and control, normally exercised from the seat of primary ownership’. Id.  
 167 Accounting Directive, supra note 2, Article 22.6. 
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responsibility for decision-making is de-centralised and differentiated between subsidiary entities in the group. 
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types of entities may not be subject to the requirements under Article 29(a)1 because the control 
structures that should bring its subsidiary entities within the bounds of the group for the purpose 
of the Directive may simply not exist. 
This is undesirable for several reasons. The complex moderns group structures have been 
recognised to pose one of the main obstacles to effective regulation.169 As the SRSG has noted, 
getting a multinational corporation to assume responsibility to respect human rights for the entire 
group, rather than to atomise it down to various constituent units in the group, is a fundamental 
question for business and human rights.170 As a consequence, the Directive may not create 
additional incentives for the parents of these types of undertaking to concern themselves with the 
human rights policies and due diligence processes of other entities within the group. The 
potential effects of the Directive in regulating the transparency and improving the behaviour of 
these types of group entities is delimited by the concept of the group entity in regard. In addition, 
the concept of the group allows entities to rely on their organisational structure to escape the 
disclosure requirements under this provision. This is something the Directive expressly seeks to 
avoid, noting that its purpose is to not allow the possibility for an undertaking to exclude itself 
from the scope of the Directive ‘by creating a group structure containing multiple layers of 
undertaking established inside or outside the Union’.171 
In this regard, it is important that the Directive allows EU Member States to adopt a broader 
approach to group entities. The Directive confers on EU Member States the choice to require 
undertakings to draw up a consolidated management report if: 
(a) that undertaking (a parent undertaking) has the power to exercise, or actually 
exercises, dominant influence or control over another undertaking (the subsidiary 
undertaking); or 
(b) that undertaking (a parent undertaking) and another undertaking (the subsidiary 
undertaking) are managed on a unified basis by the parent undertaking.172 
The provision permits EU Member States to require a parent undertaking to draw up a non-
financial statement that encompasses not only those undertakings that it exercises dominant 
influence over, but also those that it has the power to exercise dominant influence over. EU 
Member States may also consider that if the parent undertaking pursues a common management 
policy for the group as a whole or has a common administrative, management or supervisory 
                                                                                                                                                       
as geographically. Independent decision-making tends to displace formal and bureaucratic procedures, 
amounting to a de-bureaucratisation of these procedures. The organizational structure of modern group entity 
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 169 O. De Schutter et al., Human Rights Due Diligence: the Role of States, Part III (2012). 
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the Gap, 29 (Robert C. Bird, et al. eds., 2014) (forthcoming 2014), available at: 
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body, that this is sufficient to uphold a finding of a group entity that encompasses the parent 
undertaking and the other undertakings that are subject to this management policy.173  
One may consider the value of these approaches to the group entity in function of the substance 
of the Directive, and the operationalisation of the human rights due diligence concept. It is not 
uncommon for EU law to adopt a functionalist approach to the concepts of undertaking and 
group. The EU Competition law regime more generally relies on such a functional approach.  As 
noted by Jones: 
Despite the centrality of the concept of an ‘undertaking’ to the scope of, and relationship 
between, the EU competition law provisions, the term is not defined in the Treaty. 
Rather, the meaning of the term has been left for elucidation in the case law. It is now 
trite law that a functional approach is taken to the concept of an undertaking and that it 
encompasses any entity (including individuals, legal persons such as companies and 
partnerships, state and public bodies) engaged in economic activity, regardless of its legal 
personality or status, or the way in which it is financed. Further, it has also been long 
accepted that the term undertaking is not necessarily synonymous with natural or legal 
personality but denotes ‘an economic unit for the purpose of the subject-matter of the 
agreement in question even if in law that economic unit consists of several persons, 
natural or legal’. It is therefore a “complex concept involving human and physical 
components jointed in the pursuit of a single economic activity.174 
EU Competition law thus adopts a functional approach, in that the subject matter of the 
agreement determines the concept of the undertaking. The ‘economic unit’ thus is not defined by 
reference to the law of any State. The undertaking encompasses any entity ‘engaged in economic 
activity regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed’175 (i.e., it 
might encompass individuals, legal persons and, under certain circumstances, State and public 
bodies’).176 An entity engaged in economic activities may not necessarily be synonymous to a 
natural or legal personality. 
To be noted is that the UNGPs do not provide guidance with regards to the approach to group 
entities that EU Member States should adopt. There is no definition of corporate groups in the 
UNGPs. The UNGPs also do not pronounce on how the human rights due diligence concept 
applies to corporate groups and/or on how responsibility should be allocated or attributed to 
undertakings within a group.177 The human rights due diligence concept nevertheless provides a 
foundation for the regulation of group entities. The following characteristics of the human rights 
due diligence concept may be especially relevant in this regard. 
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The parent undertaking and the subsidiary entity are distinct and independent legal entities. The 
responsibility to exercise human rights due diligence applies to all business enterprises, 
irrespective of the organisational or ownership structure.178 All undertakings in the group thus 
have a responsibility to respect human rights. Parent undertakings thus should not be able to rely 
on their organisational structure as a means to evade responsibility for its involvement in the 
adverse human rights impacts that may result from the activities of a business relationship. The 
responsibility of an entity does not cease to exist if these entities conduct business through a 
corporate group, though the means through which these entities meet their responsibility may 
vary according to whether, and the extent to which, they do. 
The human rights due diligence responsibility of a parent or another entity within a group does 
not end at the legal boundary of an individual entity, unlike is often presumed by a strictly legal 
conception of group entities.179 The responsibilities of an undertaking transcend the legal 
separation between entities in the group and reaches across the operations of these entities and 
their business relationships to adverse human rights risks. The corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights gives rise to a regulatory requirement for companies to have a human rights policy 
and human rights due diligence processes in place. Business enterprises have a responsibility to 
act, for instance by exercising control or to use their leverage over a business relationship as 
necessary in order to cease, prevent or mitigate their contribution to adverse human rights 
impacts, or in the case of direct linkage, to prevent and mitigate the adverse impact. 
A functional approach to the group entity, similar to the one applied within the EU Competition 
law regime, would refer to the subject matter of the specific area of EU law to determine the 
concept of the group entity. The purpose of the Directive is to increase ‘the relevance, 
consistency and comparability’ of information that certain large undertakings and groups 
disclose relating to, inter alia, respect for human rights. This information should include a 
description of the human rights policies, outcomes and risks of the undertaking or group, 
including the due diligence processes implemented in order ‘to identify prevent and mitigate 
existing and potential adverse impacts’.180 When selecting an approach to the group entity that 
keeps with the objective of the Directive, consideration thus may be given to the responsibility of 
a parent to exercise human rights due diligence by managing their relationship with its business 
partners in order to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts. 
The question arises how the approaches to group entities that EU Member States can adopt under 
the Directive, which are anchored on dominant influence or a common management policy, fare 
in function of the objective of the Directive where human rights are concerned. 
The Directive confers on EU Member States the choice to require undertakings to draw up a 
consolidated management report if: 
                                                
 178 The commentary to UNGP 14 stipulates that the responsibility to respect human rights may exist irrespective of 
‘ownership and structure’. Also noted is that ‘[t]he means through which a business enterprise meets its 
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(a) that undertaking (a parent undertaking) has the power to exercise, or actually 
exercises, dominant influence or control over another undertaking (the subsidiary 
undertaking).181 
This approach evolves around the potential or actual strategic control that an undertaking can 
exercise over a subsidiary entity. One may turn to the EU competition law regime for guidance 
on how one can determine that a parent undertaking has the power to exercise, or actually 
exercises, dominant influence or control over another undertaking that the latter undertaking may 
be treating as part of the group. 
A similar approach to the concept of group has a well-defined scope in the context of EU 
Competition law.  For example, the concept of group is frequently resorted to in the context of 
Council Regulation No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the 
‘EUMR’). 182  The EUMR governs the appraisal by the Commission of the so-called 
‘concentrations’ (a term of art encompassing mostly mergers and acquisitions but also certain 
joint ventures having an effect in the market similar to a merger)183 that have a ‘Community 
Dimension’184 for their compatibility with the common market.185 A concentration significantly 
impeding effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part thereof, is 
prohibited.186 Concentrations encompass situations involving a change in control as a result of 
the merger of two previously independent undertakings or the acquisition by one or more 
undertakings of rights that confer on these undertakings the possibility of exercising decisive 
influence on another undertaking.187 The EUMR allows for the finding of an economic unity in 
the latter scenario, where through the acquisition of rights the parent undertaking is conferred the 
possibility of exercising decisive influence over another undertaking (control being defined, for 
the purposes of EU merger control as ‘the possibility of exercising a decisive influence’).188 
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Pursuant to EU Merger Control rules, that decisive influence, which a parent may acquire on a de 
jure or de facto basis, can be established on the basis of shareholdings, property rights, assets, 
and/or through contracts and shareholder agreements.189 The scope of the group entity extends to 
cover undertakings that the parent has acquired positive control over by reason of having 
acquired the rights to determine the entity’s strategic direction. The group also encompasses 
undertakings that the parent has acquired negative control over by reason of having acquired the 
right to block important strategic decisions to be followed by the subsidiary.190 
An application by analogy of the notions of group and, ‘control’ under the EUMR, (in particular 
the notion of ‘de facto control’) to the concept of group under the Directive on non-financial 
disclosure, would result in disclosure obligations applying not only to business enterprises that 
exercise such dominant influence, but also to undertakings that, by reason of having certain 
rights (e.g., through contract agreements and shareholder agreements), have the possibility to (de 
facto) exercise decisive influence over another undertaking. The literality of the Directive’s 
conception of the group is restrictive, in that the group depends for its existence on the power of 
the parent to exercise dominant influence or control over an entity. Contrarily, the due diligence 
responsibility that applies to a parent of a group presumes that a parent can and, where necessary, 
should exercise control and/or influence over a subsidiary undertaking as necessary in order to 
prevent and mitigate its human rights risks. 
Arguably, the objective of the Directive supports a wider conception of the group as a collection 
of individual enterprises that are engaged in the pursuit of an economic activity, which includes 
those undertakings that the parent has, or should have, control or influence over in order to 
prevent and mitigate adverse human rights impacts. 
The Directive also confers on EU Member States the choice to require undertakings to draw up a 
consolidated management report if: 
(a) that undertaking (a parent undertaking) and another undertaking (the subsidiary 
undertaking) are managed on a unified basis by the parent undertaking.191 
The Directive notes that ‘Member States should be entitled to require that undertakings not 
subject to control, but which are managed on a unified basis or have a common administrative, 
managerial or supervisory body, be included in consolidated financial statements’.192 
This approach to group entities gives weight to the unified management policy that links a parent 
to other undertakings within a group. The respective approach keeps with the human rights due 
diligence concept, in that it gives rise to a responsibility for a parent to have risk-management 
processes in place in order to prevent and mitigate adverse human rights impacts that it may be 
involved in through its relationships. Due diligence requirements thus give rise to requirements 
                                                
 189 Jones, supra  note 174, footnote 70. EU Merger Regulation, supra note 182, Arts. 3.1(b) and 3.2. Commission 
Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, Recital 16, 2008 (C 95) 1. 
 190 Jones, id. at 311. 
 191 Accounting Directive, supra note 2, Article 22.2. 
 192 Id. Recital 31. 
  316 
related to the management of its business relationships. Human rights due diligence requirements 
more generally are often aimed at promoting organisational corporate cultures in order to prevent 
adverse human rights impacts.193 This concept of the group also may be too restrictive for the 
purpose of the Directives however, in that the group depends for its existence on whether the 
parent and other economic entities are managed on a unified basis. 
The human rights due diligence concept seems to support a wider conception of the group as a 
collection of individual enterprises that are engaged in the pursuit of an economic activity and 
these undertakings are, or should be, linked through risk-management processes that are aimed at 
the prevention and mitigation of adverse human rights impacts. 
These approaches to the group entity as articulated under Article 22.2 resonate better with the 
substance of the Directive, and the regulatory responsibility of business enterprises to conduct 
human rights due diligence, than the approach to group entities under Article 22.1 of the 
Directive. 
Arguably, EU Member States in transposing the disclosure obligations to national law should 
make their determination of the approach to group entities on the basis of their consideration of 
the substance of the Directive and the human rights due diligence concept. The approach should 
ensure that the disclosure obligations apply to all types of group entities and extend to all human 
rights risks that a group entity may be involved in. 
One should consider that human rights due diligence gives rise to obligations for all types of 
group entities, irrespective of their organisational structure, including the less integrated modern 
group entity that displays less hierarchical organisational structures. The management structures 
of these modern group entities are often premised on aspects of cultural control, common group 
policies and extensive communication.194 Approaches to group entities that are based on a 
determination of certain types or degrees of control might escape these entities. 
Undertakings should draw up a consolidated non-financial statement that presents a 
comprehensive picture of the human rights policies and due diligence processes of all their 
business relations in consolidation. These non-financial statements could then capture the human 
rights impacts that the parent undertaking and the subsidiary undertakings are involved in, 
including those that are caused by the undertakings themselves and those resulting from the 
activities of their business relations, in consolidation of the group.195 
I argue in favour of the application of a common concept of the group to be applied throughout 
national disclosure obligations, not only for the purpose of delimiting the boundaries of the 
corporate group for the purpose of substantive disclosure, but also for delimiting the applicable 
scope of these requirements. This would ensure consistency between the different provisions in 
                                                
 193 De Schutter et al., supra note 169, § IV. 2.  
 194 Eroglu, supra note 165, at 23.  
 195 The Directive recognises this when noting that ‘the scope of this Directive should be principles-based and 
should ensure that it is not possible for an undertaking to exclude itself from that scope by creating a group 
structure containing multiple layers of undertakings inside or outside the Union’. Accounting Directive, supra 
note 2, Recital 6.  
  317 
the Directive. It may also increase the effectiveness of the Directive in regulating the 
transparency of undertakings in relation to human rights. This could potentially increase the 
relevance of the Directive in the strengthening of the legal framework supporting business 
respect for human rights. 
As a consequence of the linkage between the human rights due diligence concept and the group 
concept, the Directive through the disclosure requirements may have regulatory effects by 
creating incentives for group entities to improve both their disclosure practices and their actual 
human rights due diligence. The Directive recognises that the responsibility of the parent 
undertakings extends beyond the human rights impacts that the undertaking itself causes, and 
includes also the impacts that result from the activities of other entities in the group and business 
relationships, provided that the undertaking contributes to or is directly linked to these 
impacts.196 The Directive entails that parent companies should be concerned with the human 
rights policies and impacts of subsidiary undertakings in the group and the group’s business 
relationships in practice. This also serves the aim of capturing the human rights risks that the 
group is involved in, irrespective of whether these are caused by the company itself or are result 
of the activities of a subsidiary entity or a business relationship. Where a parent company is 
directly linked to adverse human rights impacts through its operations and activities, i.e., its 
business relationships, services or products, those adverse impacts fall within its scope of 
responsibility. 
The linkage between the human rights due diligence concept and the group concept is also of the 
essence where ensuring access to remedies is concerned. The UNGPs address the corporate 
group within the context of the ‘third’ (access to remedies) pillar. There is an international legal 
obligation for States to ensure that those affected by business-related human rights abuse have 
access to an effective remedy, at least when these abuses occurred in the territory and/or 
jurisdiction of the State.197 An integral element of the duty to protect is that States should ensure 
that the domestic judicial mechanisms through which these abuses are addressed are effective, 
including by reducing relevant legal barriers that could lead to a denial of access to remedies.198 
The UNGPs note that the way in which responsibilities are attributed among members of a 
corporate group under domestic and civil laws can erect legal barriers that prevent legitimate 
cases from being brought before a court. The UNGPs expressly refer to access to information 
and expertise as an example of a frequent imbalance between parties to a business and human 
rights claim that can give, create, or compound, legal barriers more generally.199 States can rely 
on mandatory disclosure regulation as one means to address these informational imbalances 
between parties by requiring business enterprises to make publicly available internal information 
that is relevant for victims seeking redress for human rights abuses. The disclosure of 
information on the allocation of responsibilities within the corporate group seems especially 
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relevant.200 Transparency on the level of control or leverage that a business is required to 
exercise in order to meet its human rights due diligence responsibility might be sufficient to 
serve as a basis for liability. According to Backer, such a level of control may ‘suggest a degree 
of intertwining sufficient to trigger the application of equitable considerations of joint effort and 
thus, potentially joint liability, under a broad reading of traditional municipal veil-piercing 
rules’.201 
The links between mandatory disclosure and transnational supply chain litigation is the focus of 
the next section. 
 The Extraterritorial Dimension of the Directive: Disclosure on Respect for Human Rights 7.8
in Corporate Supply Chains 
7.8.1 The Extraterritorial Dimension of the Directive  
The Directive provides in Article 19a(d) and Article 29a(d) that undertakings should include in 
their non-financial statement information on ‘the principal risks related to those matters linked to 
the undertaking’s [including, where applicable, the group to which the undertaking belongs] 
operations including, where relevant and proportionate, its business relationship, products or 
services which are likely to cause adverse impacts in those areas, and how the undertaking 
[including, where applicable the group to which the undertaking belongs] manages those risks’. 
Those undertaking subject to the disclose requirements should thus disclose on the ‘principal’ 
human rights risks that are linked to the individual undertaking’s or group’s operations by their 
business relationships, services or products. The Directive does not draw a distinction with 
regards the location of these ‘principal’ human rights risks within the EU or in a third State. 
Apart from disclosing these principal risks, the undertaking must disclose how these are being 
managed. The Directive indicates in Recital 6 that the non-financial statement ‘should also 
include information on the due diligence processes implemented by the undertaking, also 
regarding, where relevant and proportionate, its supply and subcontracting chains, in order to 
identify, prevent and mitigate existing and potential adverse impacts’.202 The requirements under 
Article 19a(d) and Article 29a(d) that companies disclose on how they manage their human 
rights risks should thus be contextualized in relation to the undertaking’s or group’s duty to 
disclose on their due diligence processes implemented.  
As noted, the Directive does not indicate the geographical location of these human rights risks. 
Whether the impacts are located inside or outside of the jurisdiction of the EU Member State in 
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which the company is incorporated, or within or outside the territory of the EU, appears not to be 
an issue for the applicability of the disclosure obligations. Purposive interpretation, with certain 
nuances outside the scope of these pages, is of paramount importance in the interpretation of EU 
law, including Secondary legislation such as the Directive is, by the CJEU. As noted by 
Professors Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, ‘the Court […] examines the whole context in 
which a particular provision is situated and gives the interpretation most likely to further what 
the Court considers that provision sought to achieve’.203  According to consistent case-law of the 
CJEU, the scope of acts of Union institutions needs to be determined by taking into account their 
wording, context and objectives.204  Moreover, where a provision of Union law is open to several 
interpretations, preference must be given to that interpretation which ensures the effectiveness 
(effet utile) of the provision in question.205 
Hence and, consistent with EU case-law206, an interpretation of the requirement set out in the 
Directive should take into account the context and the objectives pursued by this Directive. In 
this regard, undertakings should include, where ‘relevant and proportionate’, in their non-
financial statement information about existing and potential adverse human rights impacts that 
are linked to its operations that occur outside the territory of the EU as well.  
If the Directive were to be interpreted as drawing a distinction between the human rights impacts 
of companies within or outside the territory of the EU, then this would be contrary to the 
objective the Directive pursues in relation to human rights. It should be recalled that the 
objective of the Directive, as set out in Recital 21 is to ‘increase the relevance, consistency and 
comparability of information disclosed by certain large undertakings and groups across the 
Union’.207 Moreover, as can be gathered from Recital 3, such disclosure is meant to ‘hel[p] the 
measuring, monitoring and managing of undertakings' performance and their impact on society’. 
As regards the extent of disclosure, according to Recital 5, in order for the purpose of the 
Directive to be achieved, the information included in the non-financial statement should, at a 
minimum, ‘give a fair and comprehensive view’ of the company and group’s human rights 
‘policies, outcomes and risks’.208  
If the company would not be required to, and therefore would not disclose on its human rights 
risks that are located outside the EU territory, this would suggest that the company does not have 
such risks, which would be inappropriate. An interpretation that would require business 
enterprises to report its human rights impacts that occur outside of the territory of the EU as well, 
and how it manages these seems necessary for the effet utile of the Directive. Apart from serving 
the effet utile of the Directive, a purposeful interpretation would be consistent with the 
expectations set out in the UNGPs, which companies may rely on to comply with the 
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requirements. The UNGPs define human rights due diligence as a regulatory responsibility for 
business enterprises that transcends the territorial boundaries of a State and extends to the 
undertaking or group’s business relationships, products and services and the human rights 
impacts linked thereto, anywhere in the world.  
In order to ensure the effective application of the Directive in light of the objective that 
companies should provide a ‘fair and comprehensive’ view of their respect for human rights, the 
disclosure should thus include information on the companies or group’s human rights policies, 
outcomes and risks, including the potential and actual human rights risks that are located outside 
the EU and how these are managed. A purposeful interpretation of the Directive in accordance 
with the aforementioned objective entails that the applicable scope of the disclosure requirements 
laid down in the Directive extends outside the EU.   
The potential extension of the effects of the application of the Directive outside the EU would be 
consistent with a wider trend within EU law. As noted by Scott, ‘extraterritoriality is a 
phenomenon that is both tolerated by the EU and that is increasingly practiced in its name’.209  
More precisely, commentators have noted that the CJEU has not flinched from adopting a 
purposeful interpretation and recognizing the extraterritorial applicability of certain EU 
Regulations, inter alia, in the area of welfare requirement for animals.  
The CJEU delivered a preliminary ruling on 23 April 2015 in the case Zuchtvieh-Expert GmbH v 
Stadt Kempten210, in which the court held that the requirements under Regulation No 1/2005 on 
the protection of animals during transport and related operations211 were applicable outside the 
EU. The Court noted that Regulation No 1/2005 is based on Protocol (No 33) on protection and 
welfare of animals, which is annexed to the Treaty. The substance of this Protocol is to be found 
in Article 13 TFEU, which is a provision of general application of the TFEU treaty. Article 13 
TFEU indicates that Community and the Member States, in formulating and implementing 
Community’s policies on, inter alia, agriculture and transport, should have regard to the welfare 
requirements of animals. The Court also noted that the provisions of the Regulation should be 
interpreted and applied in accordance with the basic principle established in Recital 5 and 11 of 
the Regulation in question, according to which ‘animals must not be transported in a way likely 
to cause injury or undue suffering to them, considering that, for reasons of animal welfare, the 
transport of animals over long journeys should be limited as far as possible’.212  
The CJEU considered that Regulation No 1/2005 is applicable to all stages of a long journey for 
animals concerned that commences in the territory of the EU but ends outside that territory, 
including those stages of the journey that take place on the territory of one or more third 
countries. The Court furthermore considered that Article 14(1) of the Regulation should be 
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interpreted as meaning that an authority of the place of departure may grant acceptance of 
transport only if the journal log submitted to that authority is realistic and indicates that the 
provisions of the regulation will be complied with, ‘including for the stages of the journey which 
are to take place in the territory of third countries’. The authority may require changes to those 
arrangements to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Regulation throughout the 
journey.213  
In addition, the CJEU delivered a preliminary ruling regarding the scope of the prohibition of 
marketing laid down in provision 18(1)(b) of Regulation 1223/2009 on cosmetic products214 (the 
‘Cosmetics Regulation’). This provision of the Cosmetics Regulation prohibits the marketing of 
products that incorporate ingredients that have undergone animal testing in third countries. The 
CJEU applied a purposive interpretation and held that this article must be interpreted as 
prohibiting the marketing of cosmetic products containing some ingredients that have been 
subject to animal testing outside the EU in order to meet the legislative requirement of third 
countries and to market the products in those countries.215 The Court noted that, pursuant to case 
law, ‘when a provision of EU law is interpreted, it is necessary to consider not only its wording 
but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is 
part’.216  
The aim of the Directive is to ‘comprehensively harmonise the rules in the Community in order 
to achieve an internal market for cosmetic products while ensuring a high level of protection of 
human health.’ The Court also noted that certain rules of the Regulation are intended to establish 
a level of animal protection in the cosmetic sector that exceeds that applicable in other sectors. In 
this light, the Court noted that article 18(1)(b) ‘makes no distinction depending on where the 
animal testing at issue was carried out’ and that ‘[t]he introduction, by interpretation, of such a 
distinction would be contrary to the objective relating to animal protection pursued by 
Regulation No 1223/2009 in general and by Article 18 in particular’.217 The court held that 
allowing prohibited animal testing outside the EU would seriously compromise the attainment of 
the objective of the Regulation to actively promote the use of non-animal alternative methods to 
ensure the safety of products in the cosmetics sector.  
7.8.2 The Scope of the Disclosure Requirements 
The exact scope of the requirements to disclose on human rights risks laid down in Article 19a(d) 
and Article 29a(d) is not well-defined. However, such scope is important to determine what 
information companies should include in their non-financial statements. Undertakings may be 
exposed to legal liability under national law in case they failed to provide this information. The 
Article indicates that business enterprises should disclose their ‘principal’ risks and the need to 
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disclose on the adverse human rights impacts that are linked to an undertaking’s relationships 
that are ‘relevant and proportionate’.218 The Directive adopts an approach to delimiting the scope 
of the disclosure obligations, which, as outlined below, aligns with that of the UNGPs, by 
focusing disclosure on information about matters that pose significant human rights risks.  
The UNGPs provide some guidance, but also are not unambiguous about the point where the due 
diligence responsibility of business enterprises ends. The SRSG has noted more generally that 
the scope of a company’s responsibility to respect human rights is ‘defined by the actual and 
potential human rights impacts generated through a company’s own business activities and 
through its relationships with other parties, such as business partners, entities in its value chain, 
other non-State actors and State agents’.219 The commentary to UNGP 17 recognizes that it may 
be ‘unreasonably difficult’ for business enterprises with complex supply chains involving a large 
number of entities to conduct human rights due diligence for all these entities.220 In order to 
ensure that human rights due diligence does not impose a too heavy burden on companies, 
business enterprises ‘should identify general areas where the risk of adverse human rights impact 
is most significant […] and prioritise these for human rights due diligence’.221 
Human rights issues thus should be prioritised in accordance with the significance of the adverse 
human rights risks of the company. Accordingly, the duty to disclose in the context of supply 
chains entails a focus on human rights issues or topics. The relevance of these human rights 
issues must be determined according to the issues that pose the most significant risks of adverse 
human rights impacts. Accordingly, it follows that the responsibility to disclose in the context of 
supply chains, in terms of content disclosure, should be determined in light of the nature and 
significance of potential adverse human rights impacts. 
Recital 8 of the Directive stipulates that companies must disclose on matters that are ‘most 
likely’ to bring about the materialisation or actual occurrence of ‘principal’ risks. The Directive 
aligns with the UNGPs when setting the condition that whether risks reach the threshold of 
‘principal´ risks and thus should be disclosed in the non-financial statement, depends on the 
severity of these impacts, which relates to their scale and gravity: 
‘The undertakings which are subject to this Directive should provide adequate 
information in relation to matters that stand out as being most likely to bring about the 
materialisation of principal risks of severe impacts, along with those that have already 
materialised. The severity of such impacts should be judged by their scale and gravity. 
The risks of adverse impact may stem from the undertaking’s own activities or may be 
linked to its operations, and, where relevant and proportionate, its products, services and 
business relationships, including its supply and subcontracting chains’. 
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If the formulations of ‘relevant and proportionate’ would be interpreted in conformity with the 
concepts of the UNGPs, assessments of what would meet the threshold of ‘relevant and 
proportionate’ would be based on human rights. What counts as ‘relevant’ is information that 
reflects the human rights risks that arise through business relations and that meet a minimum 
threshold of ‘severity’ and ‘significance’. The reference to the ‘principal risks’ suggests that, if 
such human rights risks exist, business enterprises must prioritise and disclose information that is 
most significant. Important is the target group, in that information must be judged based on its 
significance to right-holders. That what counts as ‘relevant’ is information on principal risks that 
have materialised and the human rights issues that are most likely to materialise into principal 
human rights risks.  
7.8.3 Extraterritorial (indirect) Regulatory Effects  
As a consequence of the disclosure requirement being construed on the due diligence concept 
and the scope of application extending to operations and adverse human rights impacts 
irrespective of whether these occurred at home or abroad, the Directive takes on potential 
extraterritorial (indirect) regulatory effects. This is important because the legal responsibilities 
of business enterprises for human rights often are delimited by national boundaries. The 
mismatch between the national reach of State legal systems and the activities of business 
enterprises that reach transnationally and are subject to the regulation of more than one 
jurisdiction is a well-known regulatory challenge in the area of business and human rights.222 
The extraterritorial indirect regulatory effects of the Directive can have positive impacts on the 
human rights performance of individual undertakings and groups. The Directive provides a 
regulatory response to resolving supply chain challenges that EU businesses are facing in their 
operations and value chains throughout the EU and third countries.223   
The parent undertaking that is subject to the Directive must report on all operations and 
relationships of undertakings within the group, irrespective of geographical location. 
Consequently, a parent entity must not only consider their own activities, operations and human 
rights impacts, but also subsidiary entities and business relationships connected to its activities. 
The Directive in and by itself does not require that undertakings actually exercise due diligence 
to manage the human rights risks linked to its operations. It merely requires the disclosure of 
their policies and human rights due diligence or, in case the undertaking does not pursue one, to 
provide a clear and reasoned explanation for why this is the case.224 The requirements to disclose 
human rights nevertheless confirms the existence of and expectation that companies should have 
a minimum level of understanding and take action as appropriate to its circumstances to manage 
the human rights risks that are linked to the company’s or group’s operations through its business 
relationships. 
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The Directive recognises that the legal duty of undertakings to disclose reaches the company’s 
operations and the human rights risks linked thereto, irrespective of whether these operations and 
risks are located at home or abroad. The process of disclosure potentially promotes internal 
awareness and drives companies to act, especially if the parent conducts enquiries in order to 
obtain this minimum level of information. The public disclosure of information may expose the 
company to external pressure and costs may be inflicted on the company where stakeholders 
decide on the basis of the company’s performance and impacts. In this respect, the disclosure 
requirements may have the effect in practice of encouraging undertakings and groups to assess 
and regulate the activities of subsidiary entities or other business relationships down their supply 
and sub-contracting chains to know the potential and actual human rights risks in which they 
may be involved in order to disclose these risks and how they manage these risks.  
 Legal Implications of Mandatory Disclosure on Due Diligence 7.9
The Directive in and by itself does not create any legal consequences for companies that do not 
abide by the reporting requirements. The Directive confers on EU Member States the obligation 
to ensure that appropriate liability rules are in place for the purpose of liability for the drawing 
up and publishing of, inter alia, the management reports in accordance with the Directive. There 
are other legal implications to the mandatory disclosure requirement that may seem less obvious. 
The mandatory disclosure of business enterprises on human rights due diligence may expose 
companies to increased liability risks under other areas of law. A company that has publicly 
misrepresented its human rights due diligence may be exposed to liability risks when that fact 
becomes known, for instance.225 The disclosed information may expose business enterprises to 
greater liability risks under other sources of national and EU law, inter alia, the law of 
negligence and company law. The following scenarios are explored further below:  
a) The disclosure indicates that a company has knowledge about potential human rights 
violations that it may contribute to, or may be involved through its business relationships 
and fails to respond by taking appropriate measures.226 The disclosed information may be 
used as evidence in a legal claim against a company.  
b) The disclosed information may be relied on to evidence a breach of director’s duties, as a 
result of which a director(s) may incur legal liability in certain circumstances. 227 
Shareholders may rely on specific information on human rights due diligence disclosed in a 
non-financial statement in order to discharge their stewardship role and hold directors to 
account for acting in breach of their directors’ duties.  
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The aim of this section is to identify possible legal implications of mandatory disclosure on 
human rights due diligence. The discussion takes into account other laws that set out 
requirements for mandatory disclosure of human rights due diligence, and that these can have 
similar legal implications. A brief analysis follows of two supply chain transparency legislations 
that are aimed at enhancing company transparency and disclosure on slavery and human 
trafficking-related risks in a company’s business and supply chains, UK Modern Slavery Act of 
2015228 and the California Supply Chain Act.229 
The Directive introduced general requirements for the disclosure of information on human rights 
by certain large companies, which are applicable irrespective of the sector in which these 
companies operate. The EU has also adopted disclosure requirements for companies that are 
active in the extractive industry or the logging of primary forests, which are furthermore 
combined with due diligence requirements.230 Such disclosure requirements have not been 
extended to other sectors, 231  though the EU Commission has recently issued a political 
understanding and declaration indicating that it will consider mandatory due diligence in the 
minerals sector, however, combined with voluntary disclosure.232 EU Member States may 
consider introducing more specific mandatory disclosure obligations on human rights due 
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diligence that are tailored to certain issues or sectors.233 The NAPs indicate that States have 
already adopted such specific mandatory disclosure requirements. In addition to general or 
specific disclosure requirements, EU Member States could consider adopting regulatory 
measures that enable stakeholders to obtain the information they need to hold business 
enterprises to account, and additional guidance.234  
7.9.1 The UK Modern Slavery Act 2015235 
The UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 requires commercial organisations that supply goods and 
services to prepare an annual public slavery and human trafficking statement. This statement 
should describe the steps that the organisation has taken during the preceding financial year to 
ensure there is no slavery and human rights trafficking in its organisation or supply chains, or 
that it has taken no such steps.236 The ‘commercial organisation’ is defined broadly for the 
purpose of the Act, encompassing within its scope partnerships and corporate bodies that carry 
on any part of their business in the UK.237 The Act applies to commercial organisations that have 
a total turnover of at least £36 million,238 which in practice amounts to an estimated 12.000 
active UK companies. 239  The statement should be approved and signed by the senior 
management of the company, which may be a director or an equivalent, depending on whether 
the organisation is a corporate or a limited liability partnership. The business must publish the 
statement on the website of the organisation and a link to this statement on a prominent place on 
the website’s home page. If the business does not have a website, it must provide a copy of the 
statement upon written request within 30 days upon receipt of this request.240 
This Act provides a non-exhaustive list of issues that a company can include in the statement: 
(a) the organisation’s structure, its business and its supply chains; 
(b) its policies in relation to slavery and human trafficking; 
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(c) its due diligence processes in relation to slavery and human trafficking in its 
business and supply chains; 
(d) the parts of its business and supply chains where there is a risk of slavery and 
human trafficking taking place, and the steps it has taken to assess and manage 
that risk; 
(e) its effectiveness in ensuring that slavery and human trafficking is not taking place 
in its business or supply chains, measured against such performance indicators as 
it considers appropriate; and 
(f) the training about slavery and human trafficking available to its staff. 
As is the case for the EU Directive on non-financial disclosure, this Act requires business 
enterprises to make publicly available information that reflects the expectations set out in the 
UNGPs, as applicable in the specific context of slavery and human trafficking-related risks in a 
company’s business and supply chains.241 
7.9.2 California’s Transparency in Supply Chain Act of 2010 
Another regulatory initiative that sets disclosure requirements on risk-based due diligence in 
supply chains is the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, which went into 
effect in 2012.242 This Act requires retail sellers and manufacturers to disclose their efforts, if 
any, to eradicate human trafficking and slavery from their direct product supply chains. The 
applicable scope of the Act is limited to sellers and manufacturers doing business in the state of 
California. Only businesses that have annual worldwide gross receipts of $100 million or more 
are subject to the Act. The Act seeks to ensure that consumers have the information to 
distinguish between companies on the merits of their efforts to supply products that are not 
tainted by slavery and trafficking and, through their purchasing decisions, to exercise leverage 
over companies to assume responsibility for managing the slavery- and trafficking-related risks 
in their product supply chains. The companies must disclose by means of a post on their Internet 
website specifying ‘[a] conspicuous and easily understood link to the required information 
placed on the business’s homepage’. Alternatively, if the business does not have a website, the 
company must provide the written disclosure upon request by a consumer, within 30 days of 
having received the request. 
The companies that are subject to the Act must disclose at minimum to what extent, if any, the 
company verifies its product supply chains to evaluate and address risks of human rights 
trafficking and slavery and the nature of these risks. If a third party did not carry out this 
verification, the company should disclose this. The companies should also provide information 
on the supplier audits it conducts to evaluate compliance by these suppliers to the company’s 
standards for trafficking and slavery in supply chains. It should be specified if the audit were not 
independent and unannounced. The Act requires companies to disclose on the certification by 
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direct suppliers whether the materials that are incorporated into the product comply with laws of 
the country in which they are doing business. In addition, the disclosure should cover 
information on internal accountability standards and procedures for employees or contractors and 
training of employees and management on human trafficking and slavery, in particular with 
respect to mitigating risks within the supply chain of products. 
7.9.3 Mandatory Disclosure on Human Rights Due Diligence and Transnational Supply Chain 
Cases 
The EU Directive on non-financial disclosure and the afore-mentioned supply chain transparency 
legislations in the UK and US set out the requirement that business enterprises disclose their 
level of understanding about the human rights risks in their supply chains. It is not inconceivable 
that the information about human rights policies and due diligence processes that business 
enterprises disclose may be used as a basis for initiating, or may be given weight as evidence in 
transnational supply chain litigation. The information disclosed may serve as evidence of 
‘knowledge’ that is constitutive of ‘aiding and abetting’ human rights violations in their supply 
chains and, thus, may trigger the application of potential legal liability for companies. An 
example of a case illustrating this connection between transparency legislations and allegations 
of knowingly ‘aiding and abetting’ human rights violations is Hershey. 
In Hershey, a US court denied a motion to dismiss a complaint by a stockholder of the Hershey 
Company (‘Hershey’), the largest chocolate producer in the US, seeking an order to permit the 
inspection of certain books and records of Hershey under section 220 of Delaware corporate law. 
The purpose of the demand was the investigation of mismanagement or wrongdoing by 
Hershey’s corporate officers or directors, in relation to violations of laws related to slavery and 
human trafficking. The plaintiffs contended that Hershey may be complicit in violations of 
federal, state or international law by purchasing large amounts of cocoa and cocoa-related 
products from Ghana and the Ivory Coast, where the use of illegal child labour on cocoa 
producing farms is pervasive. Relevant facts of the case were Hershey’s large market share in the 
US, the company’s long-standing awareness of the problem, the fact the company was unable to 
represent that it only sourced certified cocoa from these countries, and Hershey’s undertaking to 
do so by 2020. The court held that it was reasonable to infer from these facts that there was a 
probability that at least some of Hershey’s products were tainted. 
The plaintiffs contended violations of the national laws of these countries prohibiting the use of 
exploitive child labour and human trafficking. They also raised the US Trafficking Victims 
Protection and Reauthorization Act of 2008 (the ‘VPRA’), which makes it a crime to ‘knowingly 
benefit [...], financially, or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which 
has engaged in the providing or obtaining [of] labor or services’ by means of force, threats or 
intimidation, and also includes a duty to inform. The plaintiffs also contended that Hershey had 
violated the California Transparency Supply Chain Act of 2010 by making misleading 
disclosures about the true effectiveness of its supplier code of conduct in addressing illegal child 
labour. The court held that the evidence provided a credible basis from which the court could 
reasonably infer possible violations of law that Hershey may be involved in, that qualified as 
wrongdoing or mismanagement. 
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The court noted that Hershey’s sustainability efforts (monitoring suppliers, and programs, and 
ending supplier contracts) supported the finding that ‘Hershey’s has deep involvement in and 
control over its supply chain’. The court thereby also gave consideration to Hershey’s market-
leading status and dominant market share.243 The court held that ‘Hershey’s relationships with its 
suppliers could support a finding of the use of labor for an aiding and abetting claim’.244 
The court held that Hershey’s cocoa sustainability efforts support the idea that Hershey was 
related to, and had knowledge about, instances of child trafficking on cocoa farms in Ghana, 
from which it can be inferred that Hershey may have acted in breach of the VPRA. More 
specifically, the court notes that ‘one possible inference from the complaint is that Hershey’s 
cocoa sustainability efforts, which admittedly and necessarily put Hershey in contact with 
farmers in West Africa, results in Hershey knowing of instances involving the use of trafficked 
children on cocoa farms in Ghana that would have triggered the duty to inform’.245 
The non- financial information disclosed by a company also may serve as evidence of the 
company having assumed a ‘legal duty of care’ in relation to the activities of a subsidiary entity 
or business relationship. As examined  in greater detail in Chapter 6, the three-stage test 
developed in Caparo industries plc v Dickman that has been applied in the UK in order to 
determine whether a legal duty of care attached to a company requires: (a) the foreseeability of 
the harm; (b) the existence of a relationship characterized by law as one of ‘proximity’ or 
‘neighborhood’ between the party owing the duty and the party to whom the duty is owed; and 
(c) whether the situation is one in which it is fair, just or reasonable that the law should impose a 
duty of care.246 The disclosure requirements expect companies to disclose information that might 
expose a company to increased liability risks, more specifically where this information indicates 
that the parent company had ‘superior’ knowledge about relevant aspects of the industry or some 
operational control over a subsidiary entity in the particular circumstances of the case. As noted 
by Zerk, ‘information on intra-group management systems, organizational structures and lines of 
communication are all potentially relevant.’247   
Access to information on business performance in relation to respect for human rights can help 
individuals to overcome the legal obstacles that the evidentiary duties currently poses to 
individuals in their efforts to obtain civil remedies before a national court in direct tort liability 
cases. To be noted is the commentary to UNGP 3, indicating that States should encourage, and 
where appropriate require business enterprises to communicate on their respect for human rights, 
for instance through ‘provisions to give weight to such self-reporting in the event of any judicial 
or administrative proceedings’.248 The responses of companies to the use of disclosure in 
litigation and extent to which substantive disclosure on human rights due diligence will be given 
                                                
 243 Hershey, C.A. No. 7996-ML (Del. Ch. November 8, 2013), at 9-10. 
 244 Id. at 20 
 245 Id. at 19. 
246   Id. at 32.   
247  Jennifer A. Zerk, Legal Aspects of corporate Responsibility Reporting: Panacea, Polyfilla or Pandora’s Box, 3 
New Academy Review 3, 22 (2004). 
248  UNGPs, supra note 4, Commentary to GP 3. 
  330 
weight in court proceedings remains to be seen. As noted previously, there are concerns that 
tensions between company’s objective of mitigating legal liability risks and undertaking due 
diligence to manage risks to human rights might instill a sense of caution within companies as to 
what information to include in their disclosures.249  
7.9.3.1 A Rebuttable Presumption of a Legal Duty of Human Rights Due Diligence and the EU 
Directive on Non-Financial Disclosure 
In the previous chapter, I set out the case for a legal duty of human rights due diligence concept 
as a standard of negligence under national tort law.  More specifically, I proposed the creation of 
a legal duty of human rights due diligence that would impose strict liability on a company for 
causing adverse human rights impacts and negligence liability for a company’s involvement in 
the human rights impacts resulting from the activities of a business relationship through either 
contribution or direct linkage. The standard of negligence liability would entail a rebuttable 
presumption and a company would be able to present a convincing defense by providing credible 
evidence of human rights due diligence. 
Arguably, the creation of this rebuttable presumption of a legal duty of human rights due 
diligence could strengthen mandatory disclosure regimes. The creation of a legal duty of human 
rights due diligence could address the tensions and counterbalance the disincentives that 
currently have an adverse effect on the disclosure practices of business enterprises, for at least 
two reasons.  
First, the internal information that a business enterprise discloses in its annual report could be a 
source of evidence from which the court could infer that the company has not acted in breach of 
the proposed legal duty of human rights due diligence. 
Second, there would be greater consequences for a company that would provide in its non-
financial statement an uninformative explanation, or an explanation merely indicating that it does 
not have human rights processes or policies in place. If a legal duty of human rights due 
diligence were to be created, this would entail that human rights due diligence is the legal 
standard and that the company should have a certain level of understanding about its human 
rights risks resulting from the actions of its business relationships. A court could imply from the 
statement that the company does not have the level of understanding it should have.  
Consequently, if the disclosure by a company in its non-financial statement could serve as 
evidence from which a court could reasonably infer unawareness on the part of the company, this 
could expose the company to greater liability risks and should incentivize active knowledge 
acquisition on the part of such a company in order to obtain a certain legal of awareness about its 
own actions and those of its subsidiary entities. 
The proposed rebuttable presumption of a legal duty of human rights furthermore would entail a 
reversed burden of proof.  Nevertheless, legal and practical obstacles would continue to exist in 
the absence of national laws that ensure companies publicly disclose information on their human 
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rights impacts and due diligence as required by the human rights due diligence concept under the 
UNGPs, or that enable individuals to obtain such information on request. 
7.9.4 Mandatory Disclosure and the Link to Director’s Duties 
 
A duty to act in the interest of the company may imply that companies must give consideration 
to the human rights risks of the company, because not doing so may entail legal or reputational 
risks for the company. The information that companies disclose in their non-financial statement 
may be relied on to evidence a breach of director’s duties, as a result of which a director(s) may 
incur legal liability in certain circumstances.250 Shareholders may rely on specific information on 
human rights due diligence disclosed in a non-financial statement in order to discharge their 
stewardship role and hold directors to account for acting in breach of their directors’ duties.   
7.9.4.1 UK Companies Act  
The UK Companies Act 2006 requires directors to act so as to promote the success of the 
company. More specifically, a director should act ‘in the way he considers, in good faith, would 
be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole’.251 This duty corresponds to acting in the best interests of the company, to which the 
director owes this duty. The UK Companies Act 2006 endorses an enlightened shareholder 
approach. In acting in the best interest of the company, the company must give proper 
consideration to wider interests, which are reflected in the matters that are listed under section 
172 of the Company Act. This list indicates that directors should have regard to, inter alia: (i) 
‘the interests of the company’s employees’; (ii) ‘the need to foster the company’s business 
relationships with suppliers, customers and others’ and, in particular, (iii) ‘the impact of the 
company’s operations on the community and the environment’. 
The factor last mentioned, ‘the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment’ has been interpreted as being capable of including human rights considerations.252 
A reading of this provision of section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006 suggests that ‘to have 
regard to’ these factors entails that ‘directors must give proper consideration to these factors, but 
does not mean that directors have to give primacy to, or cannot act consistently with, these non-
shareholder interests’ and that ‘the impact of decisions on the company’s long-term interests 
continues to be key’.253 
There is a special mandatory disclosure regime regulating directors’ duties in the UK. Directors 
may incur liability for non-compliance with the disclosure requirements or for false or 
misleading statements that are included in these reports.  
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In the UK, this disclosure is regulated by the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and 
Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013, which was integrated into the UK Companies Act 2006, 
and entered into force on 1 October 2013.254 This regulation introduced legal requirements for 
directors of a parent company to disclose each financial year.255 This Act imposes a duty on 
directors to produce annual accounts of the individual company and of the undertakings included 
in the company group through a consolidated report, a so-called ‘group strategic report’.256 These 
accounts should give ‘a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or 
loss’ of these companies.257 The accounts and reports must be audited.258 The auditor should in 
carrying out this function have regard to the duty of directors not to approve accounts unless they 
give ‘a true and fair view’. The UK Companies Act 2006 imposes different disclosure 
requirements on different kinds of companies.259 260 An exemption may apply to companies that 
belong to a small companies regime for the purpose of the Regulation.261 
The requirements are shareholder-oriented in that they are designed and intended to enhance the 
disclosure of information that is material to ‘the members of the company’.262 The purpose of the 
requirements is, as stipulated in section 414C, to ensure that members of the company have 
sufficient information to understand and to assess the performance of directors in discharging 
their duty under section 172 (duty to promote the success of the company). The content of this 
disclosure, which must include, as stipulated in section 414C, an analysis of the performance, 
development and position of the company is responsive to this purpose. 
While the disclosure is most likely to relate to the economic affairs of the company, it may also 
require the disclosure of the performance of the company in relation to human rights. The scope 
of disclosure is defined by the scope of the directors’ duty to promote the success of the 
company, which, as elaborated above, is capable of including human rights considerations.263 
The disclosure requirements placed on quoted companies, which are more extensive, explicitly 
refer to human rights. Quoted companies264 must, as stipulated in section 414C, disclose on 
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human rights issues and describe the policies and their effectiveness related to these issues.265 
They must rely thereto on the analysis of key performance indicators relating to human rights. 
The requirement to disclosure on human rights issues and policies, and the effectiveness of these 
policies applies ‘to the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or 
position of the company’s business’.266 
There is considerable discretion for companies to determine when human rights impacts reach 
the threshold that reporting on these impacts becomes ‘necessary’. This threshold is not clearly 
defined. If the strategic report does not contain information on human rights, there must be a 
statement indicating this is the case. No obligation is imposed on quoted companies to obtain and 
provide this information, or to give an explanation for why this information is missing. The 
regulation thus follows a model of reporting that is less stringent than the ‘comply or explain’ 
model. 
The disclosure in the strategic report is subject to similar verification requirements as other 
financial reporting. The strategic report must be audited,267 although exceptions from the audit or 
the requirements apply for certain companies. The audit report should state whether the strategic 
report gives a true and fair view and has been prepared in accordance with the relevant financial 
reporting framework.268 The audits are also shareholder-oriented in that the audit report is 
addressed to the members of the company. Additionally, the audit report must reflect on the 
consistency between the information in the strategic report and the company’s annual account.269 
The Regulation provides a liability regime for failure to submit the required report, for non-
compliance with the applicable requirements for reporting more generally, and for false or 
misleading statements.270 Liability may arise for every director in case no strategic report has 
been filed for the respective financial year, unless the director took all reasonable steps for 
securing compliance with this requirement.271 The director that has acted in breach of this duty 
has committed an offence and is liable to pay a fine. 
If the group strategic report has been prepared and approved by the board of directors and signed 
on its behalf, but does not comply with the requirements of the Regulation, each director of the 
company may incur liability. Liability of directors can arise for having approved the strategic 
report knowing that the report did not comply, or was reckless as to whether it complied, and 
having omitted to take reasonable steps to secure compliance with those requirements, or to 
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prevent the report from being approved.272 This breach of directors’ duties also amounts to an 
offence, liability for which may be imposed on each of the directors in the form of a fine.273 
The director may incur liability if the director’s report contains a false statement to the auditor 
and the director (i) ‘knew that the statement was false, or was reckless as to whether it was false’, 
and (ii) ‘failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the report from being approved’. A director 
that is found to have committed this offence may be liable for imprisonment or a fine.274 
The Regulation also provides a liability regime for false or misleading statements made in the 
strategic report. A director may be held liable to compensate for any loss suffered as a result of 
any untrue or misleading statement in the strategic report or any omission from the report. 
Directors may also incur liability for fraudulent behaviour in regard to statements in the strategic 
report that directors knew to be untrue or misleading, or omissions that directors knew to be 
dishonest concealment of material fact.275 
To the extent that disclosure on human rights is required, a director that acts in breach of their 
duties by failure to comply with this disclosure requirement may be subject to derivative action 
by shareholders in certain circumstances. The provisions governing this derivative action are set 
out in Part 11 of the UK Companies Act. A derivative claim entails that a shareholder brings 
proceedings against a director or another person in respect of a cause of action vested in the 
company in order to seek relief on behalf of the company. A two-stage procedure applies for the 
court to determine whether to allow a derivative claim to proceed. While shareholders make a 
prima facie case for obtaining permission in the first phase, the court reviews evidence and, upon 
hearing the claim, may grant permission for the claim to continue in the second phase.276 A court 
may refuse the continuation of the derivative claim where the person acting in accordance with 
the duty of a director to promote the success of the company would not seek to continue the 
claim. 
The enlightened shareholder management approach permits directors to have regard for human 
rights impacts as part of their duty to act in the promotion of the success of the company. This 
duty is primarily owed to the members of the company, rather than society at large. Directors can 
give consideration to wider interests in their decision-making, provided that doing so is in the 
best interests of the company. That human rights is amongst these wider interests that directors 
should consider is not expressly mentioned, but can, and arguably should, be implied from the 
list of matters that directors should have regard for in their decision-making.277 The UK 
Companies Act 2006 falls short in imposing a clear obligation on directors have regard to human 
rights, however. 
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There may be a corresponding duty to disclose on human rights in the strategic report. While 
directors of quoted companies are expressly required to disclose on human rights, this obligation 
stops short of an obligation to provide substantive information. Its requirement can be easily met, 
however, by simply stating that the strategic report does not contain information on human 
rights. These provisions decrease the exposure of directors to liability in relation to their duty to 
disclose. Consequently, the regulation and liability regime on disclosure appear to have a limited 
potential effect in encouraging directors to consider respect for human rights in their decision-
making. 
 Conclusion 7.10
The Directive, in short, intends to serve as a regulatory tool that can induce business reporting 
and performance that corresponds with the expectations of the UNGPs.  
The focus of the preceding pages was on the potential of the Directive to affect transparency and 
reporting on human rights by EU businesses in practice and ensure that business enterprises 
disclose information to which stakeholders can resort to in order to meaningfully assess human 
rights-compliant behaviour against internationally recognized standards, and the UNGPs in 
particular.278 More precisely, this chapter explored the connections between the approaches of 
the Directive to defining the scope of the application, obligation and required substance and the 
human rights due diligence concept. The previous analysis suggests that the adoption by the EU 
of disclosure requirements for certain companies on human rights due diligence, while being a 
welcome development, nonetheless provides only a partial response to the UNGPs, and in certain 
aspects, may even restrict EU Member States in their implementation of the UNGPs. 
The chapter analysed the so-called ‘indirect’ and ‘ direct’ of the Directive. It is argued that the 
Directive is unlikely to acquire direct effect because its provisions on mandatory disclosure are 
unlikely to be considered by the CJEU as ‘clear and unconditional and not contingent on any 
discretionary implementing measure’.279 Perhaps more importantly, to the extent that such direct 
effect is framed as obligations for (non publicly-owned) corporations vis à vis stake holders 
(NGOs, shareholders, etc.), it would be hard for the Directive to overcome the CJEU’s 
prohibition of direct effect of Directives.280 Which is not to say that the Directive will not have 
any legal effects. Apart from the indirect effects referred to in the preceding paragraph, 
stakeholders might file a complaint for a breach of EU law before the European Commission in 
order for the Commission to bring an action against the Member State in question before the 
CJEU pursuant to Article 258 TFEU.  
All in all, it is concluded that by enacting the Directive, the EU opted for a type of legal 
instrument which has potentially sweeping implications in the rights of stakeholders when it 
comes to the disclosure obligations of corporations. However, irrespective to the type of 
instrument chosen, and as noted in the preceding section in relation to the ‘comply or explain’ 
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example, it is uncertain whether the content of the Directive will contribute to further the rights 
of stake-holders.  
More precisely, the Directive does not articulate human rights due diligence to a great level of 
detail, leaves (too much) flexibility for companies to decide what information to disclose, and 
creates exceptions that allow business enterprises to abide by the minimum disclosure 
requirements without actually disclosing any substantive information on their respect for human 
rights. A prominent example of the Directive’s flaws is the ‘comply or explain’ principle, 
allowing undertakings not to disclose information regarding their human rights policies in case 
an undertaking does not pursue one, and to provide a clear and reasoned explanation for why this 
is the case instead.281 Also, as noted above, the Directive appears more responsive to mandating 
disclosure on human rights policies and risks than on actual outcomes. The undertakings may be 
exempted from their obligation to disclose on actual outcomes if they meet certain conditions.282 
The effectiveness of the Directive in fostering business compliant conduct would be enhanced, 
for instance, if EU Member States would articulate the reporting obligations on human rights due 
diligence in more exacting language, extending their scope of application to a broader group of 
enterprises, and call for independent third-party verification against objectively verifiable 
indicators.283 
The Directive confirms the importance of regulating and increasing the transparency of human 
rights due diligence within a corporate group. It was found that the Directive supports an 
approach to the notion of ‘group’ that might potentially go beyond the more traditional 
conception of the group entity in law that centres on notions of control and ownership. The 
application of such traditional approach to delineate the boundaries of the group entity for the 
purpose of disclosure on human rights would be unduly restrictive. This is in part because this 
approach has the effect of certain undertakings remaining external to business disclosure. 
I argued in support of a functional approach to the group entity that is determined by reference to 
the subject matter of the Directive. The human rights due diligence concept was explained as a 
regulatory concept that gives rise to responsibilities for companies that transcend the legal 
boundaries of distinct legal entities and extend to the impacts resulting from the activities of 
(subsidiary) entities that such companies control but of also those that they have or should 
exercise leverage over. The human rights due diligence concept thus supports the application of a 
broader concept of the group entity that views a group as a collective of parent undertaking and 
subsidiary entities that each may have separate legal personalities, but that are, or should be, 
connected through risk-management processes that are aimed at the prevention and mitigation of 
adverse human rights impacts. 
The Directive permits, but does not require, EU Member States to apply this approach to group 
entities when articulating their national disclosure requirements. I argue that EU Member States 
                                                
 281 Non-Financial Reporting Directive, supra note 1, Article 19a.2., Article 29a.2. 
 282 Id. Recital 6. 
 283 UNGPs, supra note 4, Commentary to GP 21, indicates that ‘independent verification of human rights reporting 
can strengthen its content and credibility’. 
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should apply this approach, and should do so consistently, for the purpose of defining the 
applicable scope of both the Directive and the substantive disclosure requirements. 
This chapter also argued that the Directive, in the light of its objectives and pursuant to well 
established case-law supporting a purposive interpretation of secondary EU legislation should 
have certain extraterritorial effects. More precisely, as a consequence of the reporting 
requirements not drawing a distinction as regard to location of the human rights impacts and 
these requirements being construed on the human rights due diligence concept, the Directive 
carries potential extraterritorial (indirect) regulatory effects. The disclosure requirements can 
serve as a means to induce undertakings to carry out human rights due diligence, which also 
entails having regard to the conduct of sub-contractors and entities in their supply chains that 
may be causing adverse human rights impacts.284  
The chapter also reflected on the connection between the Non-Financial Reporting Directive and 
the evidentiary duties under tort law relating to the parent responsibility and liability for human 
rights harm.  
In short, the Directive has provided the conditions and conceptual anchors to foster State 
practices to lift transparency on human rights to higher levels, but still depends on these EU 
Member States to take it further. Case law suggests that international human rights law imposes a 
legal duty on States to do so. 
 
 
                                                
 284 According to Buhmann, human rights reporting may function along the lines of ‘reflexive law’, meaning that 
‘the process of developing the report will generate insight on stakeholder views and social expectations as well 
as the firm’s performance, which companies may apply for self-regulatory purposes’. K Buhmann, supra note 
230, at 281, 292. 
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 The EU’s Contribution to the Normative Evolution of the Corporate Responsibility to 8




The chapter takes measure of the EU’s commitment and concrete efforts to promote responses to 
the UNGPs.  The aim is to assess the potential and actual contribution of the EU to fostering 
business compliance with the corporate responsibility to respect human rights in the EU and 
beyond.  This chapter will focus on the EU CSR Strategy through which the EU coordinates its 
business and human rights related activities. The European Commission (the ‘Commission’) 
presented this strategy in a Communication entitled ‘A renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for 
Corporate Social Responsibility’ (the ‘EU CSR Strategy’) on 25 October 2011.  The EU CSR 
Strategy provides a policy framework for the promotion of CSR in the EU. The Commission 
stresses in this communication that human rights are a prominent aspect of CSR, and that the EU 
seeks policy consistency with global approaches, inter alia, the UN Guiding Principles, in 
promoting CSR. The EU CSR Strategy presents an updated definition of CSR, ‘the responsibility 
of enterprises for their impact on society’, and a new plan of action that advances a ‘smart-mix’ 
approach that, next to voluntary measures, envisages a role for complementary regulation. 
This chapter seeks to assess the EU’s approach and concrete efforts to foster respect for human 
rights by business enterprises in the EU and beyond.  First, by assessing the new EU definition of 
CSR presented therein and then assessing the concrete actions taken by the EU that translate this 
EU CSR strategy into practice.  The focus is on the activities of the EU to affect and coordinate 
the regulation of factors (context, content, institutional setting) that contribute to human rights 
compliant conduct by business enterprises in practice. The EU advances a dynamic regulatory 
approach that fosters responses by the EU itself, EU Member States, third countries, multi-
stakeholder initiatives and business enterprises.  
This chapter argues that there is scope for the EU to increase its level of engagement with the 
UNGPs in order to actively implement this commitment. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the objective that the EU has set itself ‘to make the fundamental rights provided for in the 
Charter as effective as possible’,2 may entail an obligation for the EU to seriously consider 
taking all actions that are within its competences to do so. The chapter also notes that the 
substance of the efforts of the EU and the regulatory responses by the EU, States, business 
enterprises and other actors to the UNGPs, provide indication of evolving practices in relation to 
corporate responsibility and accountability for human rights and the crystallization of corporate 
respect for human rights in the EU context.   
 
                                                
 1   This chapter is based on a report written for the FRAME Project, see Bijlmakers, et al., Report on tracking CSR 
responses FRAME Deliverable 7.4 (Nov. 2015, 2014), http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/Deliverable-7.4.pdf. 
 2    Communication from the Commission Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental 
rights by the European Union, 3, COM (2010) 573 final (Oct. 19, 2010).  
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 The Evolution of EU CSR Policy and its Human Rights Dimension 8.2
8.2.1 The Origins of EU CSR Policy 
CSR made its debut in the EU political sphere in 1993, when the then-President of the 
Commission, Mr. Jacques Delors, called on European business enterprises to mobilise and join 
the fight against social exclusion.3 4   
It was only in 2001, however, that CSR formally became an item in the EU political agenda.  At 
a special meeting organised in Lisbon, 23–24 March 2000, the European Council made an appeal 
to the sense of social responsibility of corporations with regards to ‘best practices on lifelong 
learning, work organisation, equal opportunities, social inclusion and sustainable development’.5 
The concept can be understood in relation to the strategic Lisbon goals set out for 2010. At a 
meeting in Gothenburg later that year, the European Council noted that the EU Sustainability 
Agenda ‘completes’ the political commitments set out in 2000 Lisbon Strategy by adding a third 
environmental dimension to this Strategy.6  The European Council thereby recognised that ‘in 
the long term, economic growth, social cohesion and environmental protection must go hand in 
hand’.7 It appears that the idea behind the CSR concept was for business enterprises to engage in 
learning practices and the sharing of experiences on the implementation of the shared objectives, 
from which best practices may be discerned.8 
In July 2001, the Commission issued its Green Paper, ‘Promoting a European Framework for 
corporate social responsibility’ (the ‘Green Paper’).  This document officially launched the EU 
CSR Policy.9 In the Green Paper the Commission defined CSR as ‘a concept whereby companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction 
with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis’.10 CSR was conceived as business driven and 
process oriented, in that business enterprises could manage through CSR stakeholder relations 
and increase their ‘license to operate’.11 Stressing the business case for CSR, the communication 
                                                
 3 Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM 
(2001) 366 final, at 3 (July 18, 2001) [hereinafter Commission, Green Paper].  
 4 Business networks were created in response to this call, including CSR Europe. CSR Europe, CSR Europe: A 
key partner for EU engagement on CSR, http://www.csreurope.org/sites/default/files/CSR%20Europe%20-
%20A%20Key%20Partner%20for%20EU%20engagement%202014.pdf 
 5 Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council (Mar. 23-24, 2000). 
 6 In Lisbon, the European Council set the strategic goals ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion’. Id. ¶ 5. 
 7 Communication from the Commission. A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy 
for Sustainable Development, COM (2001) 264 final (May 15, 2001) [hereinafter Commission, A Sustainable 
Europe]. 
 8 Olivier De Schutter, Corporate Social Responsibility: European Style, 14 European Law Journal, 203, 206 
(2008). 
 9 Commission, Green Paper, supra note 3. 
 10 Id. at 6. 
 11 Id. at 12. 
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noted that such an inclusive approach could result in ‘long term strategy minimising risks linked 
to uncertainty’.12 CSR was not seen as a substitute for the development of relevant regulation or 
legislation. The communication noted that ‘in countries where such regulations do not exist, 
efforts should focus on putting the proper regulatory or legislative framework in place in order to 
define a level playing field on the basis of which socially responsible practices can be 
developed’.13 
The main aim of the Green Paper was to ignite innovative practices, greater transparency, new 
partnerships and business initiatives on CSR. CSR was presented as an instrumental value in the 
advancement of the strategic goal decided in Lisbon for the Union: ‘to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’.14 The Green Paper also 
intended to stimulate innovative thinking about the manner in which the EU could assume a 
meaningful role of promoting CSR, at the European and international level. The European 
approach was to mirror and correspond with international initiatives, inter alia, the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the active promotion to which the Commission was 
committed.  The EU approach was aimed to ‘complement and add value to existing activities’ 
by: 
- providing an overall European framework, aiming at promoting quality and coherence of 
corporate social responsibility practices, through developing broad principles, approaches 
and tools, and promoting best practice and innovative ideas, 
- supporting best practice approaches to cost-effective evaluation and independent 
verification of corporate social responsibility practices, ensuring thereby their 
effectiveness and credibility.15   
The Communication ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A business contribution to Sustainable 
Development’, issued by the Commission in 2002, presented an EU Strategy for CSR.16  Despite 
calls by trade unions and civil society for a regulatory framework to set ‘minimum standards’ 
and ensure ‘a level playing field’, the renewed Strategy aligned with the business case for CSR.  
Business enterprises had largely discarded a regulatory approach as an inapt ‘one-size-fits all 
solution’ that would ‘stifle creativity and innovation’ and could ‘lead to conflicting priorities for 
enterprises in different geographical areas’.17 In the face of an increasingly polarised debate, the 
EU opted for the strictly voluntary approach favoured by the business community. The tools that 
the EU thus introduced to put its CSR policy to practice included only non-mandatory ‘soft’ 
tools, e.g., the increase of knowledge about the positive impact of CSR, the exchange of 
                                                
 12 Id. at 6. 
 13 Id. at 22.  De Schutter, supra note 8, at 207. 
 14 Commission, Green Paper, id. at 6. 
 15 Id. at 18. 
 16 Communication from the Commission concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A business contribution to 
Sustainable Development, COM (2002) 347 final (July 2, 2002) [hereinafter Commission, A business 
contribution to sustainable development].  
 17 Id. at 4. 
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experiences and good practices, the facilitation of convergence and transparency, and the 
promotion of CSR management skills. 
The Communication set the stage for the creation of an EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum (the 
‘MSF’) on CSR.  The MSF was intended to serve as a forum for dialogue that, through the 
exchange of good practices and experiences, the development of a common EU approach and 
guiding principles, and the identification of areas for action, could contribute to transparency and 
convergence of CSR practices and instruments. Greater transparency and convergence was 
desirable especially in the areas of codes of conduct, management standards, accounting, 
auditing and reporting, labels, and socially responsible investment.18 19  Convened in 2002, the 
MSF brought together representatives of business networks, trade unions, employer 
organisations and civil society to fulfil a mandate that was more restricted than the 2002 
Communication initially had advocated.  The objective of ‘identifying and exploring areas where 
additional action is needed at the European level’ had been omitted, hence the exclusion of the 
possibility to table proposals for a regulatory framework.20  The MSF’s Final Report, presented 
at its final High-Level Meeting in June 2004, did not push for greater commitments in the form 
of legal engagement.21 The outcome left many disappointed, especially NGOs that expressed that 
the EU should assume ‘the lead role in the development of an effective EU framework for 
CSR’,22 a view the EP shared. As certain NGOs did not endorse the findings in the report, no 
consensus was reached in the end.23 
The Commission’s 2006 communication ‘Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs:  
Making Europe a Pole of Excellence on Corporate Social Responsibility’ redirected EU CSR 
                                                
 18 Id. at 17. 
 19 De Schutter notes that the Commission diverged from prevailing business views to CSR by recognising a role 
for the EU to facilitate convergence in a proliferating body of CSR instruments in order to (i) avoid confusion 
and market distortions and (ii) to ensure a proper functioning of the EU internal market and a level playing 
field.  De Schutter, supra note 8, at 208. 
 20 Id. at 213. Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, 277 (2008). 
 21 The report pointed to the soft-tools of awareness raising and knowledge improvement, developing capacities 
and competences to mainstream CSR, and ensuring an enabling environment for CSR.  The report did 
recommend that public authorities ensure that there is both a legal framework and the right economic and social 
conditions in place to allow corporations that wish to go further through CSR to benefit from this in the market 
place, both in the EU and globally.  However, as no concrete proposals were tabled as to what such a framework 
could entail, the legal ramifications of EU CSR policy remained ambiguous.  European Multistakeholder 
Forum on CSR: Final Results & Recommendations, 12, 15 (June 29, 2004), available at 
http://www.indianet.nl/EU-MSF_CSR.pdf.  See Jan Wouters & Nicolas Hachez, The EU Corporate Social 
Responsibility Strategy: A Business-Driven, Voluntary and Process-Oriented Policy, 1 Journal of European 
Social Policy, 19 (2009). 
 22 Loew Thomas, The Results of the European Multi-stakeholder Forum on CSR in the view of Business, NGO 
and Science.  Discussion Paper (2005), available at 
http://www.4sustainability.de/fileadmin/redakteur/bilder/Publikationen/Loew-2005-Results-of-the-EMS-
Forum-in-the-View-of-Business-N..pdf.  Social Platform, et al., NGOs call on Commission and Council to shift 
gears after Multi-Stakeholder Forum:  European CSR process must move from dialogue to action (2004), 
available at http://www.corporatejustice.org/IMG/pdf/NGOCSRopenletterFINAL290604.pdf. 
 23 De Schutter, supra note 8, at 214. 
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policy towards the objectives of the re-launched Lisbon Partnership, i.e., growth and jobs. The 
Lisbon 2005 Strategy marked the marginalisation of the EU’s social dimension: as social policy 
was relegated to the benefit of economic growth,24 so was EU CSR policy.  The Commission’s 
acknowledgement that ‘enterprises are the primary actors in CSR’ and that the Commission ‘can 
best achieve its objectives by working more closely with European enterprises’ constitute 
examples of this trend.25 The 2006 communication introduced the creation of the European 
Alliance for CSR, a business-led initiative that sought to create a wider partnership between 
enterprises, States and relevant stakeholders. The creation of the Alliance prompted civil society 
organisations to abandon the Multi-Stakeholder Forum in 2006, and to boycott a later attempt by 
the EU to reconvene the forum in 2009. 26  The Alliance further narrowed interests and 
participants to a powerful coalition of like-minded anti-regulation actors.27 
The EU CSR Policy since 2001 has been correctly depicted as a ‘business-driven, voluntary and 
process-oriented’ approach.28  This approach triumphed under the 2006 communication, which 
set out the ambition of the Commission to further through its EU CSR Policy the priorities set by 
the Lisbon Strategy and at making the EU ‘a Pole of Excellence on CSR in support of a 
competitive and sustainable enterprise and market economy’. 29  The Commission’s 2006 
communication also indicated that the Commission would follow the work of the SRSG.30  
When the Multi-Stakeholder Forum was reconvened in November 2010, and business enterprises 
and NGO representatives reunited to discuss CSR developments and ways forward towards the 
creation of a new communication,31 a special session was devoted to the integration of the UN 
Framework on Business and Human Rights.32 
8.2.2 EU CSR Policy and Human Rights 
The communications that were presented by the Commission until 2011 and that guided its 
policymaking on CSR gave only marginal attention to human rights. The Green Paper 
                                                
 24 Ipek Eren Vural, Converging Europe Transformation of Social Policy in the Enlarged European Union and in 
Turkey, 10 (Routledge, 2011). 
 25 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic 
and Social Committee, Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs:  Making Europe a Pole of 
Excellence on Corporate Social Responsibility, COM (2006) 136 final, 2 (March 22, 2006) [hereinafter 
Commission, Partnership for Growth]. 
 26 NGOs succinctly reorganised themselves in the Corporate Coalition for Corporate Justice.  Benedek, W. et al., 
Improving EU Engagement with Non-State Actors, FRAME Deliverable 7.2, at 16-17 (Mar. 31, 2015), 
available at http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-content/materiale/reports/14-Deliverable-7.2.pdf 
 27 J Fairbrass, Exploring Corporate Social Responsibility Policy in the European Union: A Discursive Institutional 
Analysis, 49 Journal of Common Market Studies, 962 (2011). 
 28 Wouters & Hachez, supra note 21, at 111. 
 29 Commission, Partnership for Growth, supra note 25, at 11. 
 30 Id. at 8. 
 31 For further information on the EU Multi-stakeholder forum, see, http://www.csr-in-
commerce.eu/news.php/en/26/multistakeholder-forum-discusses-future-eu-csr-policy. 
 32 Executive Summary: EU Multi Stakeholder Forum on Corporate Social Responsibility (February 3-4, 2015), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/8774/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native. 
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acknowledged that CSR had ‘a strong human rights aspect, particularly in relation to 
international operations and global supply chains’.33  It also noted that the EU had an obligation 
to ensure respect for human rights in the framework of its development cooperation policy.34  
Human rights did not figure prominently in the documents that followed, however.  If mentioned 
at all, human rights were linked to the EU external policies, notably in relation to the EU trade 
and development policies, 35  as tools to promote human rights protection in developing 
countries.36 
The Green Paper noted that the EU has an obligation to ensure respect for human rights in the 
framework of its development cooperation policy.37  The Commission’s 2002 Communication on 
CSR presented the Cotonou Agreement on development cooperation as concrete action taken in 
this respect. The Commission also pledged to promote CSR in accordance with the 
Communications on ‘The EU role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third 
countries’38 and ‘Promoting Core Labour Standards and improving Social Governance in the 
context of Globalisation’.39  Accordingly, the Commission had various tools at its disposal to 
promote responsible human rights conduct by business enterprises abroad, including ‘the use of 
bilateral dialogue with governments’ and ‘additional trade incentives under the EU’s Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP)’, the promotion of ‘CSR in multilateral and global fora like the 
OECD’ and the possibility of direct engagement with multinational enterprises.40 
EU CSR policy did not award a prominent role to the pursuit of human rights objectives through 
the EU internal policies, however. One reason might have been the reluctance of Member States 
to give the EU more leeway to act in this domain. Action could arguably have been taken by the 
EU internally nevertheless, under the ERTA case law on the EU’s implied powers,41 to the extent 
that it complemented public efforts for sustainability and fully respected the subsidiary principle, 
e.g., to further other EU policies and facilitate convergence between different CSR instruments.  
The fact that this has not been the case reflects the incongruence inherent in the EU’s 
                                                
 33 Commission, Green Paper, supra note 3, at 52. 
 34 Id. at 52. 
 35 European Parliament Business and Human Rights in External Relations:  Making the EU a Leader at Home 
and Internationally, EXPO/B/DROI/2009/2, PE407.014 (April 23, 2009), available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2009/407014/EXPO-DROI_ET(2009)
407014_EN.pdf. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Commission, Green Paper, supra note 3, at 52.  
 38 European Commission Communication, The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and 
Democratization in Third Countries (8 May 2001). 
 39 European Commission Communication, Promoting Core Labour Standards and Improving Social Governance 
in the Context of Globalization (18 July 2001). 
 40 Commission, A business contribution to sustainable development, supra note 16, at 22-23. 
 41 Case 22/70, ERTA, 1971, E.C.R. 263. See e.g., Jaques H. J. Bourgeois, External Relations Powers of the 
European Community, 22 Fordham International Law Journal, 149 (1998); Piet Eeckhout, EU External 
Relations Law  (Oxford University Press. 2011). 
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institutional regime of human rights protection more generally, which tends to be externally 
focused.42 
8.2.3 The EU Response to the Protect, Respect Remedy Framework and the UNGPs 
A greater emphasis on human rights in the renewed EU Strategy for CSR was expected in 
response to the UNGPs that had been officially ‘endorsed’ by the HRC as the authoritative 
global standard on business and human rights earlier that same year. The mandate of the SRSG 
created momentum for the Commission to give new vigor to the human rights dimension of EU 
CSR policy. The Commission has closely followed and supported the SRSG’s work throughout 
the latter’s six-year mandate (2005-11). The Commission and (subsequently) Union delegations 
actively participated in consultations organised by the SRSG in Geneva and delivered statements 
to the HRC upon the presentation of the SRSG’s annual reports. 
In 2009, the EU Presidency noted that the UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework 
constitutes ‘a significant input to the CSR work of the EU’ and recommended that the EU and its 
Member States further the UNSRSG’s work in relation to all the three pillars.43  In addition, the 
Presidency encouraged the implementation of human rights within bilateral trade and investment 
agreements, export credit guarantees and overseas development programmes, as well as 
awareness raising of and assurance that business enterprises respect human rights wherever they 
operate. Moreover, the Presidency recommended awareness of an adherence to international 
human rights instruments, enhanced access to legal and non-legal remedies and the full 
implementation of appropriate mechanisms, at all levels.44 
Steps were taken to push the SRSG’s work forward and promote a stronger human rights focus 
in CSR business activities in the years leading up to the endorsement of the GPs by the HRC in 
2011, yet these were rather modest. The Commission did not divert much from the soft tools that 
it introduced previously in its CSR policy. Priority areas included awareness raising (e.g, 
business enterprises must respect human rights wherever they operate), improving dialogue 
between all stakeholders, sharing experiences internationally and measuring results. Moreover, 
the Commission pointed to the various European policies and initiatives that were already in 
                                                
 42 De Búrca explains this discrepancy as follows. Art. 2 TEU recognises respect for human dignity and human 
rights as foundational principles of the Union; ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities’. Whilst Art. 3(5) TEU involving human rights in external relations is 
formulated broadly, asserting that the protection of human rights is an overarching objective in all EU external 
relations, Art. 3(3) TEU dealing with human rights within internal EU policies, on the other hand, specifically 
names the internal EU policy fields that implicate human rights-related objectives; ‘It shall combat social 
exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and 
men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child’.  Its scope is hence delimited to 
‘those areas of EU power or competence which directly promote human rights – i.e., mainly anti-discrimination 
and social inclusion policy’. The enactment of the Charter of Fundamental Rights has changed little in this 
respect.  The restrictive clauses of Art. 51(2), 51 and 6 TEU inhibit the Charter from modifying the powers and 
tasks in the Treaty in any way.  See Gráinne de Búrca, The Road Not Taken:  The EU as a Global Human 
Rights Actor, 105 American Journal of International Law, 38 (2011). 
 43 European Union, Protect, Respect, Remedy - Making the European Union Take a Lead in Promoting Corporate 
Social Responsibility (2009). 
 44 Id. 
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place, the importance of implementing human rights within bilateral trade and investment 
agreements, export credit guarantees, and overseas development programmes, the European 
Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy 2011-13, and its support for the addition of a 
human rights chapter to the OECD Guidelines, which were in the process of being updated at 
that time.45 In terms of concrete action, the Commission commissioned a study on the legal 
requirements to facilitate an effective implementation of the UNSRSG’s framework46 and a 
study on responsible supply chain management practices by European enterprises, the results of 
which were correlated with the PRR Framework.47 The Commission also published a guide on 
the integration of social considerations in public procurement 48  and launched public 
consultations on non-financial reporting.49 
While the PRR Framework thus assumed a prominent role in reshaping the human rights aspect 
of EU CSR policy, the initial efforts of the Commission were limited to clarifying the potential 
of existing policies and legal structures in facilitating the implementation of the Framework.  The 
EU’s voluntary approach to CSR, in which the law had not figured, including as far as its human 
rights aspect was concerned, remained unaltered.50 The EU voluntary approach to CSR resonates 
with the Commission’s initiative on ‘better regulation’51 and its commitment towards a business-
friendly environment.52 However, it flies in the face of the regulatory approach favoured by 
many, including the EP. 
                                                
 45 European Multi-stakeholder Forum on CSR, Session 5: Integrating the UN Framework on Business and Human 
Rights in the EU and Globally, Issue Paper (29-30 November 2010). 
 46 Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the Environment applicable to European Enterprises 
operating Outside the European Union (October 2010), available at http://www.corporatejustice.org/study-of-
the-legal-framework-on.html. 
 47 M van Opijnen & J Oldenziel, Responsible Supply Chain Management Potential Success Factors and 
Challenges for Addressing Prevailing Human Rights and Other Csr Issues in Supply Chains of EU-Based 
Companies (2011). 
 48 European Commission, Buying Social: a Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public 
Procurement (2010). 
 49 European Commission, Summary Report of the Responses Received to the Public Consultation on Disclosure of 
Non-Financial Information by Companies (2011). 
 50 If addressed at all, the official communications noted how national governments, notably developing countries, 
ought to promote an appropriate legal framework to support those business enterprises seeking to go further in 
CSR. The Final Recommendations of the MSF stipulate that the EU and public authorities have a role in 
promoting sustainable development to the extent that ‘as it is a clear responsibility of national governments to 
promote democracy and human rights, governments provide the appropriate legal framework for protecting 
human, social and economic rights of citizens, and a climate conducive to economic, environmental and social 
progress particularly in developing countries. European Multistakeholder Forum on CSR: Final Results & 
Recommendations, supra note 21, at 16. 
 51 The European Commission’s Better Regulation Programme was launched in 2005 to simplify EU legislation 
and to enhance its effectiveness and clarity. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union, COM(2005) 97 final 
(Mar. 16, 2005). 
 52 An approach involving additional obligations and administrative requirements for business risks are counter-
productive and would be contrary to the principles of better regulation’ the Commission holds. Commission, 
Partnership for Growth,  supra note 25, at 13. 
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A staunch supporter of a regulatory framework, the EP issued a critical report on the theme of 
business and human rights in 2009, stipulating that a legal turn to CSR was ‘most necessary’ to 
advance the business and human rights agenda.53 Amongst a variety of policy recommendations, 
the report suggested the development of a legal framework for foreign investment protection that 
ensures, next to investor protections, accountability for human rights violations, the mandatory 
reporting on human rights performance, regulated benchmarks on CSR and the establishment of 
accountability mechanisms in EU external relations that target business enterprises directly, 
rather than only States. The Parliament also emphasised that the EU should strengthen 
accountability for corporate human rights violations by working towards the establishment of 
‘victim-oriented accountability and redress mechanisms on a global scale’.54 Nevertheless, 
despite these innovative approaches presented in the report, the Commission did not take 
concrete steps towards their implementation until recently. 
The commitment of the EU to the PRR Framework was a welcome development. At the occasion 
of the presentation of the draft UNGPs to the HRC on 30 May 2011, the EU commended the 
SRSG and his team for ‘the outstanding work accomplished’ in elaborating the draft GPs, which 
it referred to as an ‘admirably clear and authoritative policy framework’.55 The EU announced 
that it would ‘continue to explore ways to further develop its approach and practices’ with 
respect to the implementation of the GPs. The EU’s reaction on the ‘smart mix’ of regulatory and 
voluntary policy instruments outlined by the GPs in relation hereto was reserved. The ‘smart 
mix’ of instruments would pose a ‘challenge for all parties concerned’, it highlighted. Its 
effectiveness would depend on the pursuit of the multi-stakeholder dynamic in the 
implementation phase, the EU noted, and on ‘[p]olitical commitment, policy coherence and wide 
awareness raising will be needed’.56 
 The Renewed EU CSR Strategy 2011-2014 8.3
The Commission issued ‘the renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility’ 
(‘the EU CSR Strategy’) on 25 October 2011.57  This strategy was launched against the backdrop 
of the financial and economic crisis, which had negative effects on the general level of trust in 
corporations. The crisis encouraged EU Member States to call on business enterprises to address 
these negative effects, including by taking responsibility for the adverse impacts of their 
operations on human rights, in conformity with international standards.  The magnitude of these 
impacts had become increasingly visible through a number of high profile cases of human rights 
violations committed by business enterprises.58 
                                                
 53 European Parliament, Business and Human Rights in EU External Relations: Making the EU Leader at Home 
and Internationally, at 81 (2009). 
 54 Id. at 87. 
 55 European Union, EU Comments on the draft Guiding Principles for the implementation of the UN 'Protect, 
Respect and Remedy' Framework, D(2011) 702246 (Jan. 31, 2011). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, COM (2011) 681 final (Oct. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Commission, A renewed EU CSR Strategy]. 
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The EU renewed its CSR policy with the aim ‘to create conditions favourable to sustainable 
growth, responsible business behaviour and durable employment generation in the medium and 
long term’.59 The Commission ‘introduces new elements which can help further extend the 
impact of the policy’, ‘and seeks to reaffirm the EU’s global influence in this field, enabling the 
EU to better promote its interests and values in relations with other regions and countries […] to 
guide and coordinate EU Member State policies and so reduce the risks of divergent approaches 
that would create additional costs for enterprises operating in more than one Member State’.60 
The EU coordinates its approach to business and human rights through the EU CSR Strategy.61  
There are various new elements to the EU CSR Strategy in relation to human rights. 
First, the EU CSR Strategy clarifies that the EU commitments and policies on business and 
human rights are framed as part of this broader EU CSR Strategy and agenda for action. The first 
two instalments of the EU’s CSR Strategy, as above mentioned, dated respectively 2002 and 
2006, hardly referred to human rights. These instruments conceived of CSR as a voluntary 
initiative by business enterprises to ‘integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders’.62 The EU CSR Strategy identifies 
‘[t]he need to give greater attention to human rights, which have become a significantly more 
prominent aspect of CSR’.63 The human rights responsibilities of business enterprises are 
therefore approached through the comprehensive lens of CSR. This also suggests that human 
rights should be read in light of the afore-mentioned purpose of CSR, which is to promote 
sustainable growth, responsible business conduct, and durable employment generation. 
The Commission seeks alignment with global approaches in its efforts to promote CSR, 
including its human rights aspect. The Commission lists five ‘internationally recognised 
principles and guidelines’ in this context. These instruments are the OECD Guidelines for 
MNEs, the UNGC, the ISO 26000, the ILO Tri-partite Declaration, and the UNGPs. According 
to the Commission, these instruments in combination represent ‘an evolving and recently 
strengthened global framework for CSR’.64 Where the promotion of the human rights aspect of 
CSR is concerned, the EU notes that it ‘fully endorses’ the UNGPs and points to the other 
instruments afore-mentioned as ‘support for businesses in addressing the UNGPs’.65 
Second, the EU redefined its understanding of CSR as ‘the responsibility of enterprises for their 
impacts on society’. This definition corresponds to the expectations set out under the UNGPs 
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that business enterprises have a responsibility to respect human rights.66 The absence of an 
express reference to CSR as voluntary marked a significant departure from the EU’s previous 
definition of CSR.67 In particular, the fact that the EU definition no longer expressly refers to 
CSR as voluntary, suggests that the EU no longer rejects, a priori, regulatory measures as a 
means to promote CSR. Indeed, the EU CSR Strategy now expressly recognises ‘[t]he need to 
acknowledge the role that complementary regulation plays in creating an environment more 
conducive to enterprises voluntarily meeting their social responsibility’.68 
Third, the Commission presents a new agenda for action. This agenda reflects a greater focus on 
human rights, as ‘a significantly more prominent aspect of CSR’, and a ‘smart mix’ approach to 
promoting CSR and business respect for human rights. This ‘smart mix’ approach, next to 
voluntary measures, views a role for State regulation in promoting corporate responsibility and 
for human rights. This approach somewhat differs from the (also referred to as ‘smart mix’) 
approach that the UNGPs advance, in that, under the EU approach, business enterprises are 
expected to take the lead in the development of CSR, while States have only a complementary 
role.69 The Strategy notes ‘the need to acknowledge the role that complementary regulation plays 
in creating an environment more conducive to enterprises voluntarily meeting their social 
responsibility’.70 
The Commission maintains that ‘[t]he development of CSR should be led by enterprises 
themselves’, the ‘mandatory’ element only being complementary to business initiatives, as 
‘[p]ublic authorities should play a supporting role through a smart mix of voluntary policy 
measures and, where necessary, complementary regulation, for example to promote 
transparency, create market incentives for responsible business conduct, and ensure corporate 
accountability’.71 This is the reverse of the approach promoted by the UNGPs, which is premised 
on the understanding that States are primarily responsible for ensuring business respect for 
human rights, though the UNGPs have been interpreted differently in relation to this point.72 
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The EU promotes a multi-stakeholder approach that engages EU Member States, business 
enterprises and non-business stakeholders.73 The European Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR 
that gives expression to such a multi-stakeholder approach will be discussed below. 
In the following sections a more detailed examination of the new EU CSR definition and Plan for 
Action will be undertaken. The focus will be on the EU approach and efforts to foster human 
rights compliant business practices in the EU and beyond. Compliance by business enterprises 
depends on the concept of CSR and the impact that the substantive requirements have on 
companies, as well as how well States and non-State actors regulate factors that explain 
compliance by business enterprises to this standard, through various governance systems. 
This section examines the extent to which the EU definition of CSR corresponds to the 
expectations set out under the UNGPs. This analysis is followed by an assessment of the EU plan 
of action. The aim is to examine the concrete actions that the EU has taken and their 
effectiveness in terms affecting and coordinating the regulation of factors that explain human 
rights compliant behaviour by business enterprises in practice, in the EU and beyond.  The 
assessment reflects on the follow-up that is exercised in the EU, as well as the impact these 
actions have had, and are having on the actors that are addressees of these measures, inter alia, 
EU Member States, third countries, business enterprises, multi-stakeholder initiatives, societal 
actors etc. 
The aim is to determine how well the EU’s approach corresponds with the concepts and intent of 
the UNGPs.74 The focus is on aspects that bring the EU’s CSR Policy into greater alignment with 
the UNGPs. The assumption is that greater alignment with the UNGPs can optimise the EU 
contribution of the emerging business and human rights regime. The analysis focuses on actions 
that have been identified in the EU plan of action 2010-2014, and that are especially relevant for 
fostering business respect for human rights. The analysis draws from the EU ‘Staff Working 
Document’ that the EU published in 2015, which surveys the measures the EU has taken in order 
to implement the UNGPs along the three pillars.75 
8.3.1 EU Competences in the Area of Business and Human Rights 
A question that arises when examining the contribution of the EU to the promotion and 
implementation of the UNGPs is the competences that the EU has to act in the area of business 
and human rights. The defining characteristics of EU law in this domain are the principles of 
conferral and subsidiarity. According to Article 5(1) TEU: ‘[t]he limits of Union competences 
are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’. Pursuant to the principle of conferral, enshrined in 
Article 5(2) of the TEU, ‘the EU shall only act within the confines of the competences conferred 
upon it by the Member States in pursuance of the objectives set out in the Treaties’. Pursuant to 
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the principle of subsidiarity, as provided for in Article 5(3) TEU, ‘[…] in areas which do not fall 
within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or 
at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved at Union level’.76   
These principles are relevant for understanding how the role of the EU in advancing business and 
human rights objectives relates to the role of EU Member States, which have their own sphere of 
competence. As the Commission Staff document notes, the EU may only exercise those 
regulatory competences that are conferred upon it by the EU Treaties,77 the scope and content of 
which furthermore varies according to different legal and political fields. The Commission 
recognises that business and human rights is cross-cutting and touches upon a wide range of such 
areas, inter alia, ‘human rights law, investment and trade law, consumer protection law, civil 
law, and commercial law, corporate or penal law’.78 
The Commission Staff Document recalls the status of EU Fundamental Rights under EU law.  It 
refers to Article 2 of the Treaty that recognises the pre-imminence of respect for human rights as 
one of the values upon which the EU has been founded. According to Article 2 TEU: ‘[t]he 
Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights’. The document also refers to the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which was ‘solemnly proclaimed’ on 7 December 2000, and acquired the 
same legal value as Treaties when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. According to Article 
6(1) TEU: 
The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at 
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. 
Also relevant, but not expressly referred to in the EU Staff document, is Art. 6(3) TEU that 
codifies the case law of the European courts according to which EU fundamental rights are 
general principles of EU law:79 
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the 
Union’s law. 
All EU actions, including legislative proposals,80 must thus be defined and implemented in a 
manner compatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a legally binding instrument and 
                                                
 76 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 61, at 4. 
 77 Id. at 4. 
 78 Id. at 4. 
 79 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
1970, E.C. R. 1125. 
 80 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 61, at 17. 
  351 
general principles of EU law (and in particular EU-protected human rights). This also entails that 
EU Member States, when implementing EU rules or acting within the scope of EU law, are 
bound by EU-protected human rights.81 
The Commission Staff document furthermore specifies that the Charter ‘does not extend the EU 
competencies’ and applies only to EU member States when implementing Union law. The EU 
thereby places emphasis on due regard for Art. 51(2) of the Charter, which could be argued to 
apply the principle of subsidiarity to this field, meaning that the promotion of the application of 
the EU Charter by EU institutions and bodies should occur within the bounds of their respective 
powers. Art. 51(2) of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights specifies that ‘[t]his Charter does 
not establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or modify powers and 
tasks defined by the Treaties’.   
The Commission Staff document identified a number of fields where the EU has competences to 
take action to promote the implementation of the UNGPs, in the areas of external action (Art. 21 
TEU), the right to equality and non-discrimination (Art. 10 TEU), trade relations and agreements 
(Art. 207(1) TFEU), development cooperation (Art. 208(1) TFEU), economic, financial and 
technical cooperation (Art. 212 TFEU), humanitarian aid (Art. 214 TFEU) and migrant workers’ 
rights. This list of fields is not exhaustive and the EU has competences in other areas that might 
be relevant for business and human rights not referred to in the document, such as, e.g., the EU 
internal market. 
8.3.2 A New Definition and Approach to CSR 
The renewed EU CSR Strategy presents a new definition of CSR as ‘the responsibility of 
enterprises for their impacts on society’.82 There are certain aspects of the EU definition of CSR 
that bring this closer alignment between the EU approach and the expectations set out in the 
UNGPs. 
A prominent example of this is that the definition does not include an express reference to its 
voluntary nature. This is, in and of itself, striking, in that it constitutes a clear departure from the 
previous EU definition of CSR, which referred to the voluntary integration of social and 
environmental concerns into business operations.83 The new definition thus accommodates for 
the recognition set out in the UNGPs that CSR is not a strictly voluntary exercise by nature.  
Indeed, the EU CSR strategy notes that ‘[r]espect for applicable legislation, and for collective 
agreements between social partners, is a prerequisite for meeting that responsibility’.84 
The core concepts that constitute the foundation of the EU’s new definition of CSR, i.e., 
‘responsibility’ and ‘impact’, also bring the EU definition closer to the conceptual framework of 
the UNGPs. The UNGPs recognise that business enterprises have a ‘responsibility’ to respect 
human rights by managing their actual or potential adverse ‘impacts’ on human rights. 
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Also the two elements that the EU views as integral to CSR bring its new definition into greater 
alignment with the UNGPs. Apart from respect for applicable law, business enterprises should 
have in place a process to integrate, inter alia, human rights ‘into their business operations and 
core strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders’.85 
The EU CSR Strategy notes that the aim of this responsibility is two-fold:  (1) ‘maximising the 
creation of shared value for their owners/shareholders and for their other stakeholders and 
society at large’; and (2) ‘identifying, preventing and mitigating their possible adverse 
impacts’.86 87 
By referring to maximising the ‘creation of shared value’, the EU CSR Strategy suggests an 
approach that views the simultaneous creation of economic and social value as key to the long-
term success of business and, ultimately, beneficial to society at large.88  This approach supports 
the understanding that human rights and economic objectives are compatible and can be pursued 
simultaneously.  The EU strategy encourages business enterprises ‘to adopt a long-term strategic 
approach to CSR, and to explore opportunities for developing innovative products, services and 
business models that contribute to societal wellbeing and lead to higher quality and more 
productive jobs’.89 
Next to the positive, the communication also points to the negative as integral to CSR:  business 
enterprises are expected to conduct CSR for the purpose of addressing their possible adverse 
impacts on society. This corresponds with the notion also set out in the UNGPs that business 
enterprises have a responsibility for their adverse human rights impacts, and that promoting 
positive impacts on human rights is desirable but in itself not sufficient for business enterprises 
to meet this responsibility. 
The EU language of ‘identifying, preventing and mitigating’ is clearly inspired by and aligns 
with the human rights due diligence responsibility set out under UNGP 15(b). Business 
enterprises are encouraged ‘to carry out risk-based due diligence, including through their supply 
chain’ in order to discharge their responsibility. The Commission addresses in this regard only 
‘large enterprises, and enterprises at particular risk of having such impacts’. While thus 
consistent with the UNGPs in terms of the concepts applied, the EU’s definition suggests that 
human rights due diligence may not be required from all companies, at least not in the absence of 
a ‘particular risk’ of having adverse human rights. 
The EU CSR Policy recognises that CSR is a flexible concept that leaves discretion to companies 
to meet their responsibility in a manner appropriate to their circumstances. 90  While this 
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responsibility is applicable to all business enterprises, the text notes that the complexity of the 
CSR process that enterprises should have in place to integrate human rights into their operations 
and core strategy ‘will depend on factors such as the size of the enterprise and the nature of its 
operations’.91 With regards to SMEs, this process ‘is likely to remain informal and intuitive’.92 
To be noted is that the EU definition of CSR is primarily oriented towards the responsibility of 
business enterprises for the prevention of potential adverse human rights impacts. There is no 
mentioning of corporate responsibility for the remediation of actual human rights impacts.93 
The conceptual alignment between the corporate responsibility to respect human rights as 
defined by the UNGPs and the new EU CSR definition can thus be clearly discerned. However, 
this new EU CSR definition has not been articulated in sufficiently precise language, at least 
where human rights are concerned. A crucial element that the EU definition does not expressly 
refer to, at least beyond the specific case afore-mentioned, is the human rights due diligence 
process that business enterprises should have in place according to the UNGPs.  The absence of 
an express reference to this element in the EU CSR definition is unhelpful, for at least two 
reasons. The concept of human rights due diligence is an essential element of the responsibility 
of business enterprises, partially because the character and scope of conduct that the 
responsibility to respect human rights requires from companies is defined by this concept. The 
concept furthermore links the responsibility of business enterprises to international human rights 
standards, which provides the benchmark that business conduct should be assessed against. 
Since the EU’s definition of CSR is articulated at a (too) abstract level, its normative force and 
likely impact on the behaviour of companies in the EU is likely to be reduced. The EU definition 
of CSR is insufficiently detailed to incite, in and of itself, business enterprises to be proactive 
and exercise human rights due diligence in accordance with the expectations set out in the 
UNGPs. There is scope for the EU CSR definition to be interpreted in ways that divert from the 
concept and intent of the UNGPs. The failure to refer to the concept of human rights due 
diligence or to international human rights standards could be illustrative of the EU still viewing 
business’s responsibility for human rights through the lens of ‘CSR’ and, thus, primarily as a 
voluntary and business enterprise driven enterprise. 
 An Agenda for Action 2011-14   8.4
On 25 October 2011, the Commission also presented out a new agenda for action for the period 
2011-2014. This agenda contains EU actions aimed at promoting CSR, as well as business 
respect for human rights more specifically.  This section will assess the EU’s approach to foster 
human rights-compliance conduct by business enterprises. The agenda indicates that the EU seek 
greater alignment between the European and global approaches to CSR. The Commission notes 
that it will ‘promote European interests in international CSR policy developments, while at the 
same time ensuring the integration of internationally recognised principles and guidelines into its 
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own CSR policies’.94 The section first identifies aspects of this agenda that bring the EU’s 
approach closer to that of the UNGPs.  This will be followed by an examination of concrete EU 
actions that are especially relevant in term of affecting and coordinating the regulation of the 
factors (context, content, institutional setting) that explain business respect for human rights in 
practice, in and outside the EU. The addressees of EU action are the EU itself, EU Member 
States, third countries, business enterprises, NGOs and other relevant stakeholders. 
 The Impact of EU Action on Fostering Business Responses to the UNGPs 8.5
8.5.1 Fostering Business Responses to the UNGPs:  the Concept of Corporate Respect for 
Human Rights 
The Commission sets out various policy actions that can foster business responses to the UNGPs.  
This is first of all by giving increased recognition to the concept of the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights. As mentioned above, the EU’s renewed definition of CSR is broadly 
aligned with the UNGPs, although the former does not articulate the requirements that it imposes 
on companies with regards to human rights as specifically as the latter. The EU agenda for action 
recognises that business enterprises have a responsibility to respect human rights, and notes that 
this concept conforms to international principles, inter alia, the UNGPs. The EU sets out a clear 
expectation that business enterprises should respect human rights. The EU’s action plan notes 
that it ‘[e]xpects all European enterprises to meet the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights, as defined in the GPs’.95 
The Commission furthermore seeks to provide clarity about the implications of this 
responsibility for companies, which can vary according to their circumstances. The Commission 
has thus developed human rights guidance for three business sectors: (i) ‘employment and 
recruitment agencies’; (ii) ‘information and communication technology (ICT)’; and (iii) ‘oil and 
gas’.96 These instruments embody an effort by the Commission to add precision to the concept 
and elaborate on the implications that the definition may have for business enterprises operating 
in the respective sectors. The guides provide practical steps for translating the UNGPs into 
business, without imposing a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.97 The Commission has furthermore 
issued guidance for small and medium-sized enterprises,98 and five case studies, which reflects a 
similar effort to leverage through the impact that this definition may have on this size-related 
type of enterprise. 
The Commission also sets out actions aimed at promoting awareness about business respect for 
human rights and the capacities that may need to be developed for business enterprises to be able 
to abide by this norm in practice. Relevant action in this regard is the Commission’s commitment 
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to raise awareness about business respect for human rights in areas where the State fails to meet 
its duty to protect. This involves a process involving the relevant stakeholders (‘enterprises, EU 
Delegations in partnering countries, and local civil society actors, in particular human rights 
organisations and defenders’).99 Other relevant actions focus on promoting business responses to 
CSR more generally through capacity building activities. Relevant actions are, inter alia, the 
creation of a multi-stakeholder platform in relevant industrial sectors and the launch of a 
European award scheme for CSR partnerships.100 The Commission also takes action for the 
purpose of a better integration of CSR into education, training and research. 
8.5.2 EU Action to Promote the Union’s Response to the UNGPs 
The EU CSR Policy articulates actions that are aimed at strengthening the Union’s own 
responses to the UNGPs. As mentioned above, the Commission seeks a better alignment between 
European and global approaches to CSR. It is in this context that the plan of action notes that the 
Commission aims ‘to advance a more level global playing field’ and that it ‘will step up its 
cooperation with Member States, partner countries and relevant international fora to promote 
respect for internationally recognised principles and guidelines, and to foster consistency 
between them’.101 
A section of the renewed EU CSR policy agenda is thus devoted to the implementation of the 
UNGPs. The Commission in this section identifies ‘coherence of EU policies relevant to 
business and human rights as a critical challenge’.102 The Commission has pointed to the need 
for coherence at different levels (‘within different EU institutions; between those institutions; 
and between the EU and its Member States). The EU promotes policy coherence through the EU 
CSR Strategy and the coordination of the implementation of different aspects of this strategy 
through various processes and procedures. The Staff document also points to the legally binding 
force of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which applies to all the actions that the 
institutions and bodies of the Union undertake within their respective mandates. 103 The 
Commission also views the implementation of the UNGPs as instrumental in furthering the 
human rights objectives of EU policy (e.g., ‘child labour, forced prison labour, human 
trafficking, gender equality, non-discrimination, freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining’).104 
The EU also seeks to promote CSR through its external policies. The EU promotes coherence 
between internal and external EU policies, and policy consistency with human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, through the Action Plans on Human Rights and Democracy, which are 
further strengthened by the cooperative efforts of European Council’s Working Group on Human 
Rights aimed at mainstreaming human rights in all aspects of EU external relations.105 The 
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Commission indicated that it would ‘make relevant proposals in the field of trade-and-
development’.106 A study has shown that none of the trade agreements that are in force in the EU 
today contain within their human rights clauses an express reference to the UNGPs (or, for that 
matter, any other CSR instruments). Also no such reference to the UNGPs can be found in the 
sustainable development chapters of the so-called ‘new generation agreements’, including that 
which has been concluded with Canada most recently.107 
With regards to development policy, the EU has a legal commitment to promote coherence based 
on Art. 208(1) of the TFEU,108 which entails ‘avoiding that other policies undermine the primacy 
development objective of poverty eradication, and creating synergies between other policies and 
the objectives of development policy’.109 The EU agenda signals the EU’s support for private 
sector development in EU development cooperation, indicating that ‘by promoting respect for 
human social and environmental standards, EU enterprises can foster better governance and 
inclusive growth in developing countries’. The Commission indicated that, where appropriate, it 
would ‘propose to address CSR in established dialogues with partner countries and regions’.110  
An example of concrete action related to development policy is the Commission’s intention to 
‘identify ways to promote responsible business conduct in its future policy initiatives towards 
more inclusive and sustainable recovery and growth in third countries’.111 
The Staff EU Document points to various partnerships that the EU has engaged in to support 
responsible business practices among European companies in developing countries and 
responsible supply chain management. A prominent example is the ‘Sustainability Compact for 
Continuous Improvement in Labour Rights and Factory Safety in Ready-Made Garment and 
Knitwear Industry in Bangladesh’ (the ‘Sustainability Compact’). The Sustainability Compact is 
a partnership between the EU, the ILO, Bangladesh and the US initiated in response to the Rana 
Plaza factory fire, that has as its objective ‘to improve labour, health and safety conditions for 
workers as well as to encourage responsible businesses in the ready-made garment industry in 
Bangladesh’.112 Also mentioned in the Staff EU Document is an initiative by the EU, the 
Government of Myanmar/Burma, the US, Japan, Denmark and the ILO to ‘Promote 
Fundamental Labour Rights and Practices in Myanmar/Burma’.113 
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For 2013, the Commission committed to issue a report stipulating the EU priorities in the 
implementation of the UNGPs. This report has not been delivered. Instead, the Commission 
issued the afore-mentioned Staff document that surveys the measures that the EU has taken, in 
order to implement the UNGPs. 
8.5.3 EU Action to Promote State Responses to the UNGPs 
The EU furthermore seeks to foster State responses to the UNGPs. The agenda identifies various 
actions that may affect and coordinate the regulation of business conduct by EU Member States 
through their national law and policy system. Important in this regard is the invitation by the  
Commission to EU Member States to develop national plans for CSR,114 and specific national 
plans for the implementation of the UNGPs. The EU assumes a guiding and coordinating role in 
promoting the development of such NAPs. The Commission furthermore noted its intention to 
‘create with Member States in 2012 a peer review mechanism for national CSR policies’.115  
These actions are elaborated below. 
The new agenda for action comprised, next to these voluntary measures, regulatory action.  
These regulatory measures by harmonising national legislations can contribute to greater 
coherence and convergence in State regulation of business conduct across the EU. Such 
regulation can foster EU Member State responses to the UNGPs,116 as well as improve the 
functioning of the internal market. The legislative proposal for the (in the meantime adopted) 
Directive on non-financial disclosure is expressly referred to as an example of such regulatory 
action.117 This Directive further harmonised at Union level the disclosure requirements for 
certain companies related to, inter alia, human rights.118 Also expressly mentioned in the EU 
agenda is the 2011 review of the Public Procurement Directives and the commitment of the 
Commission to facilitate the better integration of social and environmental considerations into 
these Directives.119 This review resulted in adoption on 11 February 2014 of a new set of public 
procurement Directives (see Section 8.7.1). 
Other regulatory EU measures not mentioned in the agenda but relevant for regulating business 
and human rights are the proposed revision of the Shareholders Rights Directive (see Section 
8.7.3), the new country-by-country reporting obligations for large extractive and logging 
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 118 For a detailed analysis of this Directive, see Chapter 7. 
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companies on payments to governments,120 the proposed EU Regulation on conflict minerals,121 
and the new EU Directive 2011/36/EU on trafficking in human beings. The European Investment 
Bank (“EIB”) integrated the UNGPs into the updated version of the EIB’s ‘Environmental and 
Social Handbook’ that was released in 2013. This handbook sets out standards that staff and 
external actors should adhere to when investing in non-EU countries.122 
8.5.4 EU Action to Promote Responses to the UNGPs through Markets and Social Pressure 
The EU policy agenda furthermore includes actions that promote compliance through market and 
social compliance mechanisms. The plan of action notes that the EU seeks to leverage policies in 
the area of ‘consumption, public procurement and investment to strengthen market incentives for 
CSR’. A prominent example that may affect business conduct in relation to human rights is the 
afore-mentioned commitment of the Commission to facilitate a better integration of social and 
environmental considerations into EU Public Procurement Directives (see Section 8.7.1).123  
Another example is the EU’s invitation to European asset managers and asset owners, especially 
pension funds, to sign up to the UN Principles for Responsible Investment.124 The Commission 
furthermore promotes various initiatives to enhance supply chain transparency, and has issued a 
draft Regulation to create ‘a EU system of self-certification for importers of tin, tantalum, 
tungsten and gold which choose to import responsibly in the Union’ (see Section 8.7.2).125 
8.5.5 EU Action to Promote Business Responses to the UNGPs 
The EU seeks to foster compliance by business enterprises by promoting the recognition by 
business enterprises of their corporate responsibility to respect human rights. The Commission 
invites companies to renew their efforts to respect to these internationally recognised principles 
and guidelines. The EU invites certain companies to commit to these initiatives and to monitor 
the commitments made. More specifically, the Commission asks all European-based 
multinational companies to make a commitment by 2014 to respect the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration.126 All large European enterprises furthermore are invited to commit to take account 
of at least one of the afore-mentioned instruments:  the UNGC, the OECD Guidelines for MNEs, 
or ISO26000.127 The Commission further expresses its intention to ‘monitor the commitments 
made by European enterprises with more than 10.000 employees to take account of 
internationally recognised CSR principles and guidelines’.128 
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In March 2013, the Commission issued a study of Policy References made by 200 randomly 
selected large EU companies to internationally recognised CSR Guidelines and Principles. This 
survey was issued as part of a project to monitor commitments made by European enterprises 
with more than 1,000 employees to take account of internationally recognised CSR principles 
and guidelines.129 The study indicated that a very low number of 5 out of 200 sample EU 
companies made a policy reference to the UNGPs. A larger percentage of 23% referred to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.130 The study indicated that company references to any 
of the internationally recognised CSR Guidelines and Principles vary per country of origin.  Out 
of the 3% of all sample companies that referred to the UNGPs, making most reference to the 
UNGPs were the samples from Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Sweden.131 The EU study 
on Policy References made by large EU Companies indicated that companies with more than 
10.000 employees are more likely to refer to internationally recognised CSR instruments. Some 
5 percent of sample companies with more than 10.000 employees referred to the UNGPs, while 
sample companies with less than 10.000 employees referred to the UNGPs three times less.132 
The EU agenda includes action aimed at fostering business compliance by promoting self-and 
co-regulatory processes. Such processes can be a powerful means for business enterprises to 
meet their responsibility. The EU agenda indicates that the effectiveness of such self-and co-
regulatory processes depends on various factors.  In the words of the agenda: 
Experience suggests that self and co-regulation processes are most effective when they:  
are based on an initial open analysis of the issues with all concerned stakeholders, in the 
presence of and if necessary convened by public authorities such as the European 
Commission; result, in a subsequent phase, in clear commitments from all concerned 
stakeholders, with performance indicators; provide for objective monitoring mechanisms, 
performance review and the possibility of improving commitments as needed; and 
include an effective accountability mechanism for dealing with complaints regarding 
non-compliance. 
The Commission committed to improve the effectiveness of the CSR process by launching a 
process to develop a code of good practice for self- and co-regulation exercises in cooperation 
with enterprises and other stakeholders. 
8.5.6 The Agenda for Action:  EU Follow-Up 
As indicated above, the most recent EU CSR strategy expired in December 2014, and for the 
moment, no new strategy is forthcoming. The follow-up to this agenda has been a joint 
undertaking by the different DGs having competences in the various areas touched by the 
agenda. DG Growth has assumed a leading role for the definition of policies. Information on 
development and achievements in the realisation of these priority actions have been published on 
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the website of this DG.  Status updates of implementation of the EU CSR strategy overall have 
been communicated through an implementation table.133 
An inter-service coordination group was created that gathered all DGs having relevant 
competences relating to CSR, including on business and human rights. An interviewed official134 
confided that despite initial enthusiasm for collaboration amongst the different services, the field 
proved to be so fragmented that actors were discouraged and coordination returned to a minimal 
level. This suggests that the coherence that UNGP 8 is set out to promote, in order to ensure that 
different departments and agencies that shape business practices are aware and observe 
international human rights obligations, seems not to have translated into practice at EU 
operational level. 
Interviews have shed light on a severe deficit of coordination and leadership in this regard, 
evidenced notably by the lack of a new CSR strategy to replace the expired 2011-2014 plan.  
Another sign of such difficulties is the fact that the 2012 Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy foresaw in Action 25(b) to ‘[p]ublish a report on EU priorities for the effective 
implementation of the UNGPs’. This report was never published, as was confirmed by an 
interviewed EU official, because coordination was ‘too difficult’.135 
The coordination of the EU’s implementation efforts has proceeded through the Annual Review 
Meetings on CSR. Initiated by the Commission in 2011, these review meetings convene the 
High-Level Group of Member State Representatives on CSR, representatives of organisations 
that are members of the multi-stakeholder Forum Coordination Committee and representatives 
from organisations responsible for internationally recognised CSR guidelines and principles at 
the end of each year to jointly monitor implementation of the EU CSR Policy.136 
 EU Action:  Fostering Responses to the UNGPs 8.6
The following sections focuses on a selection of policy actions that are of special relevance for 
the evolution of the corporate respect for human rights into a more binding norm, including their 
transposition into a hard norm (i.e., ‘legalisation’) at the national and EU level. The aim is to 
determine the extent to which these EU actions foster human rights compliant behaviour 
conform the concepts and intent of the UNGPs. 
8.6.1 National Action Plans 
As noted above, the EU views it has an enabling and coordinating role for what concerns 
fostering State responses to the UNGPs.  The EU has encouraged EU Member States to develop 
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 134 Interview date: 10 June 2015. 
 135 Interview date: 10 June 2015. 
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national plans for CSR and for the implementation of the UNGPs.137  More specifically, the EU 
has invited: 138 
Member States to develop or update by 2012 their own plans or national lists of priority 
actions to promote CSR in support of the Europe 2020 strategy, with reference to 
internationally recognised CSR principles and guidelines and in cooperation with 
enterprises and other stakeholders, taking account of the issues raised in this 
communication. 
The EU has also asked EU Member States to develop ‘national plans for the implementation of 
the UN Guiding Principles’.139 In 2012, the Council reiterated the call to EU Member States to 
issue specific action plans on the implementation of the UNGPs by 2013 in its EU Action Plan 
on Human Rights and Democracy.140 The EU has furthermore organised a peer review process in 
2013-14 (see Section 8.6.2) and issued a new Compendium on CSR National Public Policies in 
the EU (see Section 8.6.3).141 
The UK was the first to publish a NAP on business and human rights in September 2013.  
Several other EU Member States have followed suit, though far passed the deadline that has been 
set, there is no comprehensive EU-wide coverage in this regard. According to the Commission 
Staff Working Document: 
Several governments have adopted CSR statements or policies that mention human 
rights. To date, six Member States (United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, 
Finland and Lithuania) have published their plans and at least seven more EU Member 
States are currently preparing national action plans on business and human rights.  
Likewise, more than half of the EU Member States […] have adopted National Action 
Plans on CSR, which incorporate human rights issues.  Several other Member States are 
also preparing national action plans on CSR, with final versions expected to be released 
in 2015 and 2016.142 
Sweden published its NAP on business and human rights in August 2015.143 The NAPs – either 
CSR or specifically on the UNGPs – are thus in different stages of development. Some are still at 
the stage of intentions, other are in an early drafting phase, while others would be close to 
finalised.144 Some CSR NAPs have however been in existence for a while and have already 
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undergone review and been updated.145 Some NAPs on the UNGPs are also currently undergoing 
review, or are scheduled for review in the near future.  To sum up, all EU Member States except 
for one have developed, formally committed to, or started to develop a NAP on CSR,146 but 
timings and practices greatly diverge as to this. 
The EU and its Member States are seen as precursors in the development of NAPs on the 
UNGPs.147  The WG BH has invited States to consider NAPs on business and human rights on 
several occasions, yet only a total of 25 NAPs had been adopted in July 2015.148  To be noted is 
that the WG BH has not expressed a preference with regard to the model for States to publish 
their NAP (e.g., as a standalone document or as a component of a broader human rights or CSR 
strategy). Of greater importance is their qualitative contribution to the implementation of 
UNGPs. 149  The WG BH has noted that NAPs have appeal because of the ‘qualitative 
characteristics’ that they can bring to the implementation of the UNGPs. NAPs are flexible 
instruments that enable States to implement their UNGPs in a ‘holistic and integrated’ manner 
that is furthermore responsive to ‘the diversity of business and human rights problems’ and 
‘regulatory environments’ of a country, ‘organic’ and based on the needs of the individual 
community.150 
In order to guide States in the development of their NAPs, the WG BH has issued a document 
entitled ‘Guidance on National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights’151 in 2014, which 
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was subsequently updated in November 2015.152 This guidance document presents a model 
process for States to develop, implement and update a NAP. This guide suggests that the 
effectiveness of NAPs as a vehicle for effectively implementing the UNGPs depends on their 
actual content, the process by which they are developed, follow-up and meaningful stakeholder 
engagement in this process. 
As regards the content, the guide articulates certain substantive elements that should be included 
in a NAP. The State should give recognition to the UNGPs as the authoritative document that 
founds their actions, and express and further specify their expectations that business enterprises 
respect human rights conform the UNGPs. States should identify strategic considerations, 
highlight priority areas and discuss practical and actionable policy measures that the State plans 
to undertake in order to make progress, and to specify mechanisms and processes for monitoring 
the progress that has been achieved. The State should articulate measures that are ‘specific and 
achievable’.153 
With regards to the process of articulating the policy strategies, the guide recommends that 
States undertake a baseline assessment. This assessment informs the identification of gaps in 
State protection of human rights and of the laws, regulations and policies that are linked to these 
gaps.  An evaluation of the extent to which business enterprises meet their responsibilities under 
pillars 2 and 3 of the UNGPs is part of this exercise. The assessments on adverse impacts and 
gaps in protection provide an evidential basis that States can build on to identify priority areas 
associated with the implementation of the UNGPs in the national context, in a joint effort 
between States and stakeholders.154 
NAPs furthermore provide a platform for meaningful multi-stakeholder engagement in this 
process, including the review and follow-up. Stakeholder engagement is important, not only for 
the realisation of human rights in and of itself, but also as a means to enhance the quality and 
effectiveness of the NAPs. Stakeholder engagement in itself is constitutive of human rights 
protection by allowing stakeholders to have a say in and give direction to the policy strategies 
that affect their lives. The input and involvement by stakeholders in this process, as well as their 
support for both the process and output in the form of the NAP can enhance the effectiveness of 
NAPs. The NAP process should be ongoing in order to be responsive to the evolving 
circumstances. 
The guidance document also identifies four principles that should underlie government 
responses: (i) all commitments in the NAP ‘need to be directed towards preventing, mitigating 
and remedying current and potential adverse impacts’; (ii) ‘the UNGPs should be used to identify 
how to address adverse impacts’ and, when addressing the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights, ‘promote the concept of human rights due diligence as the thread ensuring 
coherence in Government activities’; (iii) ‘Governments should identify “a smart mix” of 
mandatory and voluntary, international and national measures’, and; (iv) ‘Governments should 
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take into account differential impacts on women or men, and girls or boys and make sure the 
measures defined in their NAP allow for the effective prevention, mitigation and remediation of 
such impacts’.155 
The European Group of National Human Rights Institutions has published a similar piece 
entitled ‘Implementing the UNGPs on Business and Human Rights: Discussion paper on national 
implementation plans for EU Member States’. This discussion paper relates to both process and 
content and explicitly picks up on the Commission’s invitation to EU Member States to develop 
NAPs for the implementation of the UNGPs.156 
The process-related recommendations highlight amongst other aspects, that EU Member States 
should undertake a base-line study and gap analysis of their legislations and policies with 
reference to the UNGPs. The purpose is ‘to provide a credible, transparent basis for national 
UNGPs implementation plans that set clear and strategic milestones’. EU Member States should 
ensure ‘periodic monitoring and reporting on progress, according to verifiable criteria’. An 
important consideration apart from accountability, is to support ‘effective mainstreaming of the 
UNGPs into international monitoring and reporting processes’. The process should be 
transparent, participatory and adequately resourced.157 
The paper furthermore outlines a number of content-based specifications for NAPs.158  One of 
these specifications is that NAPs should be comprehensive, meaning that they should address all 
relevant issues under all three pillars of the UN Framework. Moreover, the paper calls for NAPs 
to ‘include reasonably precise targets and objectives, that are achievable within reasonable time 
frames, to which easily understandable and verifiable performance indicators are attached, and 
with phased milestones for delivery, wherever appropriate’.159 
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a Recommendation on human 
rights and business on 2 March 2016, which is addressed to the Member States of the Council of 
Europe.160 The Recommendation indicates that ‘if they have not yet done so, Member States 
should develop and adopt plans on the national implementation of the [UNGPs]’161 and ‘ensure 
their publication and wide distribution’.162 States are recommended to address all three pillars of 
the UNGPs and the Recommendation in their NAP. The NAP furthermore should be 
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benchmarked not only to the UNGPs, but also to the Recommendation itself. The 
Recommendation further clarifies the implications of the State duty to protect human rights, 
including under the ECHR and the European Social Charter, the European Social Charter 
(revised) and its Additional Protocol. 
The process-related recommendations indicate that States should refer to the guidance by the 
WG BH and other available guidance in the development of their NAPs. States furthermore 
should ‘continuously monitor the implementation’ of their NAPs, ‘periodically evaluate and 
update them’ and ‘share their best practices concerning the development and review of [NAPs] 
with each other, with third countries and relevant stakeholders’.163 The Council of Europe 
recommends that States engage with stakeholders in all stages of this process (e.g., ‘business 
organisation and enterprises, NHRI, trade unions and non-governmental organisations’).164 
The usefulness of NAPs as a tool for implementing the UNGPs thus is undeniable.165 The NAPs 
on business and human rights, or NAPs that address business and human rights within the 
context of CSR, allow for planning ahead and provide clarity on approaches and activities of EU 
Member States in relation to business and human rights, and in response to the UNGPs.166 NAPs 
also have limitations as they are not a measure of State’s actual compliance to the UNGPs. A 
NAP does not necessarily provide a complete picture of all activities that a State plans or 
undertakes, or an accurate depiction of the State’s implementation measures instituted. Also 
NAPs may not provide an adequate depiction of the effectiveness of such measures, and the 
extent to which these measures foster business compliance. The fact that most NAPs have not 
been subject to monitoring or revision is relevant in this regard. The policy actions that EU 
Member States outline in these NAPs nevertheless provide an indication of the approaches, 
priorities and measures that EU Member States select and how and to what extent these respond 
to the country-specific factors and regulatory environments that shape business responses to the 
UNGPs. 
The EU has put in place two instruments aimed at evaluating NAPs with the particular aim of 
evaluating their potential for implementing the UNGPs. The two initiatives are a peer review 
mechanism, and an EU-wide compendium of Member States’ CSR practices. 
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8.6.2 Peer Review Mechanism 
The Commission committed in its EU CSR Strategy to ‘create with Member States in 2012 a 
peer review mechanism for national CSR policies’.167 The EU organised seven peer review 
sessions of NAPs between October 2013 and October 2014, involving all EU Member States 
over the course of 7 days of meeting, involving four Member States each day. These peer 
reviews aimed at facilitating learning amongst EU Member States on national CSR policies and 
measures. While focused on CSR more broadly, it was also intended for discussion on the 
UNGPs.168 The peer review process also allowed the Commission to form an understanding of 
the state of play in the development of national CSR policies, and to identify common and 
country-specific themes. Reports on the peer review were made publicly available on the 
Commission’s website.169 
Member States also perceived the process as useful, as it created opportunity to support the 
exchange of best practices, policy approaches and mutual learning.170 One interviewed official, 
however, indicated that the peer-review exercise was ‘not extensive’ and that it ‘just scratched 
the surface’. No commitments were made by Member States regarding future practice, and no 
formal recommendations or conclusions were adopted or any plans made for follow-up.  Some 
ideas for further action have none the less been raised, for instance to consolidate the peer review 
process by looking at formal benchmarking or setting targets for different activities or policy 
areas.171 
Next to the formal peer review, the Commission also hosts a high-level group of Member State 
Representatives which meets 2 or 3 times annually to share their activities. However, these two 
meetings typically have a very full agenda, which, by the participants’ admission, does not allow 
much time for Member States to learn from each other.172 
8.6.3 Compendium on CSR National Public Policies in the EU 
The Commission in 2014 issued a new Compendium on CSR National Public Policies in the 
EU.173 This publication follows previous editions of the EU Compendium on CSR policies, 
issued in 2006, 2007 and 2011, respectively.174 The Compendium takes as a starting point the EU 
understanding of CSR as outlined in the EU CSR strategy, ‘the responsibility of enterprises for 
their impacts on society’. The main objective is to analyse the state of play in the development of 
proposed EU Member State policy actions on CSR, including in relation to business and human 
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rights.175 It provides transparent information on actions taken and progress achieved by the 
European Commission towards the implementation of its EU CSR Strategy, the policy 
approaches of EU Member States on CSR, including the state of play of their NAPs, and the 
rationales for the priorities set by NAPs. The following analysis focuses on human rights. 
The Compendium includes thematic sections covering a wide range of CSR aspects, and reflects 
on common approaches and practices related to human rights. The thematic sections that are 
especially relevant for human rights are global CSR approaches, CSR in SME’s, human rights 
and responsible supply chain management, social and employment policies, CSR reporting and 
disclosure, and sustainable public procurement.176 The Compendium includes an Annex that 
provides complementary information on measures taken or planned by each EU Member State 
and links to relevant documents. Furthermore, it is based on the findings of the seven 
abovementioned CSR peer reviews, a questionnaire,177 and the existing NAPs on CSR and the 
UNGPs. 
The Compendium points to various country-specific factors – cultural, economic, institutional 
and political – that EU Member States consider in their national priority setting.  Some are 
especially relevant for shaping policies and priorities on business and human rights.178  One of 
these factors is the structure of the economy, in terms of the number and share of multinational 
companies, SMEs and micro-economies. States that are the seat of many multinational 
enterprises may focus on different problems and measures than countries that have a relatively 
higher number of SMEs. States that are home to business enterprises that experience higher 
vulnerability to brand risks due to exposure to foreign trade or because they have complex 
supply chains with participating units in less economically developed countries tend to have 
more advanced policies.179 The level of institutionalised stakeholder engagement and awareness 
of CSR is another factor. States with less institutionalised and developed stakeholder structures 
may give priority to strengthening their stakeholder engagement structures and capacity before 
developing human rights policies.180 
Also relevant is the prevailing understanding of CSR in the country in question. The 
Compendium indicates that legislative approaches are more common in countries that place 
greater emphasis on the responsibility of business enterprises. This suggests that a national 
definition of CSR that expressly refers to the responsibility of companies, rather than merely to 
CSR as a voluntary activity, may lend itself more easily to the development of a regulatory 
approach. With regard to existing policy and regulatory frameworks, it was noted that the 
presence of State-owned enterprises might affect CSR policies and approaches where the social 
responsibility of these enterprises tends to be treated differently than for other entities. This is the 
case notably, but not exclusively in Nordic countries. With regard to the structure of policy 
                                                
 175 European Commission, supra note 58, at 7. 
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making, where the policy-making structure of States is multi-layered, this can translate into more 
complicated CSR policies involving more levels of governance.181 
The Compendium furthermore reflects on thematic priorities related to business and human 
rights that emerge across many EU Member States and elaborates on initiatives by EU Member 
States in these thematic areas. One finding is that EU Member States have a tendency to 
‘integrat[e], disseminat[e] and shap[e]’ their UNGP actions within their broader CSR policy,182 
thereby mirroring the EU approach. A strong thematic area is the support to SMEs in the 
development of CSR approaches. Some States opt for a holistic approach and seek to support 
SMEs in meeting their human rights responsibilities through a combination of different types of 
instruments (FR, DE).183 
EU Member States also tend to focus on company reporting and disclosure requirements.184 This 
may be partly in anticipation of the new EU Directive on Non-Financial Disclosure185 that will 
need to be implemented by EU Member States by 2017 (see Section 7.4). This Directive 
explicitly aligns with the UNGPs as it integrates an aspect of the corporate human rights due 
diligence requirement and is expected to further scale up and improve disclosure practices across 
the EU, at least in relation to the disclosure of certain large enterprises. 
8.6.4 Analysis of NAPs 
An examination of existing EU NAPs indicates that they already meet certain key elements 
outlined by the guidance with regard to both the NAP process and outcome. 
For instance, the observation that the identification of priorities actions should be based on base-
line assessments has found resonance with EU Member States.  Denmark, for example, included 
in its NAP a systematic baseline survey of government measures aimed at implementing the 
UNGPs, with a view to identifying gaps.186 Likewise, Germany recently conducted such a 
baseline study187 for the NAP it is currently developing.188 Some EU Member States like the 
                                                
 181 Id. at 14. 
 182 Id. at 20–22. 
 183 Denmark established Regional Business Development Centres that provides holistic services to regional and 
local businesses in the form of inter alia week campaigns to raise awareness, courses on supply chain 
management, guidance on due diligence, stakeholder dialogues, seminars and workshops.  Id. at 16–19. 
 184 Id. at 8. 
 185 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 
2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and 
groups, 2014 O.J.  (L 330) 1. 
 186 The Danish Government, Danish National Action Plan – implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, 24 (March 2014). 
 187 Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, National Baseline Assessment, (April 2015). 
 188 See process description here: Auswärtiges Amt, Nationaler Aktionsplan “Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte” 
(Sept. 24, 2015).   
  369 
Netherlands have held multi-stakeholder consultations and/or interviews at different stages of the 
process with more than 50 relevant stakeholder groups, including business enterprises.189 
With regard to the substance, an EU Compendium of EU Member States Business and Human 
Rights practices evidence that many EU Member States have integrated the full range of the 
UNGPs into their national policy frameworks and commonly address the key thematic issues of 
supply chain management, support for SMEs, reporting and public procurement. Moreover, it 
would seem that EU Member States are putting the smart mix approach into practice, which the 
UNGPs recommend and the Commission supports and encourages. This is illustrated by the mix 
of different types of instruments that EU Member States employ, ranging from legal instruments 
to partnering instruments to promote business respect for human rights.190 
 EU Regulatory and ‘Smart Mix’ Measures 8.7
8.7.1 The Revision of the EU Public Procurement Directives 
Public procurement191 is an important nod in the EU’s internal market fabric, as European 
contracting authorities spend approximately 18 per cent of GDP on procuring works, goods and 
services.192 The legal public procurement regime performs a coordinating function, as it ensures 
that procurement procedures align with principles of the Treaty and serve the goals of effective 
competition, non-discrimination and the effective allocation of public funds.  Public procurement 
has also been recognised as a ‘powerful lever for achieving specific goals’.193 On 11 February 
2014, the Council adopted a new set of public procurement Directives to regulate the national 
public procurement laws and policies of EU Member States, which includes Directive 
2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts, 194 Directive 2014/24/EU on public 
                                                
 189 Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN, National Action Plan on Business and 
Human Rights, 3 (2014). 
 190 The Commission distinguishes between the following types of instruments:  legal instruments that require CSR 
practices through the application of legislative, executive and judicial power, economic and financial 
instruments that drive CSR practices by using financial incentives and market forces, informational instruments 
that disseminate knowledge on CSR, partnering instruments that aim at voluntary cooperation between 
stakeholders, and hybrid instruments that combine two or more of these instruments. European Commission, 
supra note 174, at 10.  
 191 Procurement entails ‘the acquisition by means of a public contract of works, supplies or services by one or more 
contracting authorities from economic operators chosen by those contracting authorities, whether or not the 
works, supplies or services are intended for a public purpose’. Directive 2014/24/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, 
2014, O.J. (L 94), 65. Art. 1.2. 
192  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social  
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Single Market Act Twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen 
confidence "Working together to create new growth", COM (2011) 206 final, 19 (Apr. 13, 2011). 
 193 European Parliament News, New EU-procurement rules to ensure better quality and value for money (Jan. 15, 
2014, 13:14pm), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20140110IPR32386/new-eu-procurement-
rules-to-ensure-better-quality-and-value-for-money. 
 194 Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of 
concession contracts, 2014 O.J.  (L 94), 1. 
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procurement195 and Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating in the water, 
energy, transport and postal sectors.196  One of the main imperatives for the revision of the Public 
Procurement Directives was to leverage public procurement in support of advancing common 
societal goals. This section reflects on the extent to which the revised and consolidated EU 
Public Procurement Directives encourage States to create economic incentives for business 
enterprises to respect human rights as defined by the UNGPs 5 and 6. 
The new Directives overhaul Directive 2004/17/EC applicable to the sectors water, energy, 
transport and postal services197 and Directive 2004/18/EC for the award of public works 
contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts.198  These former Directives 
provided contracting authorities with the ability to consider social interests in their procurement 
decisions at different stages of the procurement process. The Directives permitted a contracting 
authority to exclude bidders for social considerations,199 including when considering an offer 
abnormally low,200 to apply social criteria in awarding a contract,201 and to lay down special 
conditions of a social nature governing the performance of a contract.202 The permissibility for 
meeting the social needs of the public had to be interpreted strictly. As indicated by the Court of 
Justice,203 notably related to award criteria, the social criteria was to be linked to the subject-
matter of the contract, not retain an ‘unrestricted freedom of choice on the contracting authority’, 
                                                
 195 Directive 2014/24/EU, supra note 191. 
 196 Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, 
2014 O.J.  (L 94), 243. 
 197 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004, Coordinating the 
Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and Postal Services Sectors, 
2004, O.J. (L 134), 1. 
 198 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 31 March 2004 on the Coordination of 
Procedures for the Award of Public Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public Service Contracts, 
2004, O.J. (L 134), 114. 
 199 This is explicit in Art. 45 of Directive 2004/18/EC: A bidder may be excluded if it ‘(e) has not fulfilled 
obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions in accordance with the legal provisions of the 
country in which he is established or with those of the country of the contracting authority’.  Moreover, it is 
implicit to Recital 43 of the same directive; non-observance of national provisions implementing the Council 
Directives 2000/78/EC(15) and 76/207/EEC(16) concerning equal treatment of workers, which has been the 
subject of a final judgment or a decision having equivalent effect may be considered an offence concerning the 
professional conduct of the economic operator concerned or grave misconduct.’  Id. 
 200 Id.  Art. 55.  See also Directive 2004/17/EC, supra note 197, Art. 57.1. 
 201 Id.  As stipulated in Art. 53 ‘Contract Award Criteria’, the contracting authorities shall base an award either on 
the criteria of most economically advantageous or the lowest price only.  With respect to the former, Art. 53(a) 
does not explicitly refer to social concerns as a criteria, however the illustrative list suggests that it is not 
excluded either.  See also Directive 2004/17/EC, Id. Art. 55. 
 202 Id.  Directive 2004/18/EC, Id. Art. 26; ‘Contracting authorities may lay down special conditions relating to the 
performance of a contract, provided that these are compatible with Community law and are indicated in the 
contract notice or in the specifications.  The conditions governing the performance of a contract may, in 
particular, concern social and environmental considerations.’ Id.  See also Directive 2004/17/EC, Id. Art. 38. 
203 See, e.g., Case 513/99, Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne, E.C.J. (A 
municipality which organises a tender procedure for the operation of an urban bus service is entitled to take 
account of ecological considerations concerning the bus fleet offered). 
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be mentioned explicitly, and be in compliance with the fundamental principles.204 Also, these 
conditions could not make the performance of a contract directly or indirectly discriminatory.205 
The new Directives extend the leeway for States to use public procurement in support of 
advancing social policies. The EU Staff document notes how ‘in the future, public authorities 
will be able to take social, labour and environmental concerns into account, with the aim to 
contribute to the implementation of environmental and social policies’.206 An analysis of the 
Directives suggests that procurement authorities may take social considerations into account at 
various stages of the procurement process. The contracting authorities may lay down technical 
specification for performance and/or functional requirements that concern the social 
characteristics of a work, service or supply, provided that these are sufficiently precise to allow 
for a determination of the subject matter and awarding of the contract.207 The authorities may, in 
the technical specifications, require a specific label as proof that the required characteristics are 
adhered to, although certain conditions apply.208 With respect to criteria for qualitative selection, 
a bidder may be excluded based on the awareness of any violation of obligations of EU 
environmental, social and/or labour law, national law, collective agreements or international law 
provisions listed in Annex X,209 which lists eight ILO Labour Conventions.210 The UNGPs are 
not mentioned. 
With respect to the award of a public contract, contracting authorities must apply the criterion of 
the ‘most economically advantageous tender’ (MEAT). The cost-effectiveness approach may 
include the best price-quality ratio. Apart from price and cost, qualitative social characteristics 
are amongst the criteria that may be weighed into this ratio, provided that there is a link to the 
subject matter of the public contract.211 The social characteristics reflecting qualitative aspects of 
the tender submission thus can be balanced against the other MEAT criteria when reaching an 
award decision. Directive 2014/24/EU also provides the option of using a cost-effectiveness 
approach, e.g., a life-cycle costing approach to determine the lowest bidder in a tender 
procedure. Whether next to environmental costs, also social costs could be linked to the life 
cycle over a product, service or work is not clear. Contractors may continue to set conditions 
                                                
 204 Directive 2004/18/EC, supra note 198, Recital 1 and 46. 
 205 Directive 2004/18/EC, Id. Recital 33. 
 206 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 61, at 13. 
 207 Directive 2014/24/EU (supra note 191), Art. 42. See also Art. 40 3(a) of Directive 2014/25/EU (supra note 
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 208 As such, the Directives clarify some of the legal ambiguity involving the usage of labels, stipulating the 
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 209 Directive 2014/24/EU, Id. Art. 57 and Art. 18.2.  See Directive 2014/25/EU (Id.), Art. 80 and Art. 36.2. 
 210 Directive 2014/24/EU, Id. Annex X.  Directive 2014/25/EU, Id. Annex XIV. 
 211 Directive 2014/24/EU,  Id. Art. 67. Directive 2014/25/EU,  Id. Art. 82. 
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based on social considerations with respect to the performance of a contract.212 Contracting 
authorities must furthermore ensure that subcontractors abide by the EU and national laws.213 
Public procurement offers opportunities to leverage the purchasing power of States to incentivise 
business enterprises with which they contract to respect human rights.214 The UNGP 6 affirms 
this potential, indicating that public procurement activities provide States – individually and 
collectively – with ‘unique opportunities to promote awareness of and respect for human rights’ 
by enterprises that they conduct commercial transactions with. ‘States should promote respect for 
human rights by business enterprises with which they conduct commercial transactions’. The EP 
saw the revision of the Public Procurement Directives as an opportunity to create greater 
conformity between public procurement and the international human rights standards ‘laid down 
in the relevant OECD and UN guidelines and principles’, in order to enhance policy coherence at 
the EU level.215 In this context, the EP suggested to draw on the advice of the EHRI, which 
amongst other aspects indicated the need to better integrate human rights considerations into 
public procurements procedures and laws in order to accommodate greater opportunities for 
public purchasers to procure from those who demonstrate the best human rights record.216 
While compliance with human rights when undertaking public procurement is mandatory for 
States, the actual integration of human rights considerations into their public procurement 
decisions is discretionary. The EU Public Procurement Regime does not create a legal obligation 
for States to pursue human rights objectives through their procurement laws and policies. States 
may consider human rights issues in their laws and policies to the extent this does not conflict 
with the Directive and the principles of TFEU. 
There is no legal barrier per se that inhibits the EU legislator from adopting a regulation to 
facilitate or to render the consideration of CSR, and the responsibility to respect human rights in 
particular, mandatory at different stages of the public procurement process. Such legislative act 
could find legal basis in article 114 TFEU in view of the harmonisation of public procurement 
legislation to remove potential barriers to the functioning of the internal markets.  Arguably, such 
barriers can arise if, in the absence of uniform regulations, Member States were to experiment 
with stringent CSR criteria in their public procurement legislation to meet their State duty to 
protect human rights against corporate abuse conform the UNGPs. Moreover, a high level of 
protection would be appropriate not only to implement the UNGPs, but also to strengthen the 
protection of the fundamental rights embodied in the EU Charter. Whilst the Directives suggest 
that the full potential of the EU public procurement regime to promote CSR, and its human rights 
aspect in particular, remains untapped. 
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8.7.2 The EU Draft Conflict Mineral Regulation 
On 5 March 2014, the EP and the Council presented a new Proposal for a Regulation regarding 
the creation of a Union system for due diligence self-certification by responsible importers of 
conflict minerals.217  In May 2015, the EP caused an about turn by voting in support of a 
mandatory EU certification scheme. The discussions on this Proposed Regulation are ongoing 
and no regulation has been adopted thus far.  On 15 June 2016, the EU announced to have 
reached a political understanding on the substantive components of a new conflict mineral 
regulation. This section focuses on the Commission’s proposal to introduce a voluntary self-
certification scheme, which will be followed by reflections on the proposed amendments by the 
EU Parliament and the political understanding. 
Impetus for this EU initiative are the illegal mineral sourcing and trading supporting the 
activities of illegal armed groups and militia in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and the associated human rights abuses and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. This problem has been addressed by UN Security Council Resolution 1952 
(2010), 218 the UN Group of Experts on the DRC and the G-7. There are various other legal and 
policy initiatives on conflict minerals that have been taken at the international, regional and 
national level, as well as institutional and industry backed approaches.219 The link between 
armed conflict and illegal trade in minerals is not limited to the DRC and surrounding countries, 
but occurs in other regions of the world as well.220 The proposed EU regulation is inspired by the 
US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act)221 and 
                                                
 217 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting up a Union system for supply 
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be noted is the decision by the DC Circuit in National Association of Manufacturers v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission of 14 April 2014, which was reaffirmed on 18 August 2015, that the requirement to disclose 
whether any of their products have ‘not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free’ is unconstitutional because it 
violates First Amendment of the U.S.  Constitution.  See, Sarah A. Altschuller, Five on Friday – Five Recent 
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Consumer Protection Act (DFA), adopted in 2010, which affect EU companies directly and 
indirectly, either because they are dually listed in the EU/US, or because they are included in the 
supply chain of US-listed companies and face requests for disclosure on their due diligence.222  
The Proposed Regulation was set out to address one of the main underlying problems, which is 
the lack of due diligence by companies in the upside part of the supply chain, and by 
smelters/refiners in particular. A study showed that out of a total number of 300 smelters for tin, 
tantalum and tungsten only 16-18% conduct due diligence. The rate for an estimated number of 
150 refiners of gold is higher, 40-89% respectively.223 Smelters / refiners are a key segment in 
the mineral supply chain because they are at the last stage in the chain where the minerals’ origin 
can be traced and responsible supply behaviour leveraged.224 Their lack of due diligence 
complicates efforts of downstream users to comply with their due diligence responsibility as 
these depend on smelters and refiners for essential information on the origin of metals and 
trading routes. 
Existing initiatives by EU Member States, third countries and the OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk 
Areas (OECD Due Diligence Guidance) have not provided a sufficient solution. The individual 
actions by EU Member States have not affected the due diligence performance of smelters and 
refiners to a sufficient extent. Their measures have been oriented downstream rather than 
upstream, and hence have not targeted the most effective aspect of the supply chain. These 
measures have also not leveraged a sufficient volume of trade. The US DFA and the voluntary 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance have not met with a sufficient level of compliance, in part of the 
difficulties facing EU downstream users in identifying and leveraging greater transparency from 
smelters and refiners.225 Regional and local efforts to certify products and validate mines are 
fragmented and said to undermine efforts for reconstruction and social cohesion, as well as for 
formalising the small-scale mining sectors.226 The EU can add value by creating a ‘critical mass’ 
and ‘leverage’ at the global level and ensuring harmonised treatment and clarity for business 
enterprises, including a better co-ordination of ongoing due diligence responses across the EU.227 
                                                                                                                                                       
Developments that We’ve Been Watching Closely (Apr. 14, 2016), available at 
http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2016/04/29/five-on-friday-five-recent-developments-that-weve-been-watching-
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 223 Id. at 22. 
 224 Id. at 21. 
 225 Detecting smelters and refiners is complicated due to, inter alia, the complexity of supply chains and a lack of 
organisational capacity among SMEs in particular to exercise due diligence.  Information should furthermore be 
accurate and be provided in an ongoing and timely manner as supply chains change rapidly. Suppliers may 
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The Proposed Regulation seeks to encourage companies to ‘source responsibly’ with the aim of, 
among other things, minimising the financing of armed groups and security forces through 
mineral proceeds in conflict-affected and high-risk areas.228 The specific objectives of the 
Proposed Regulation are to enhance the transparency and visibility of the due diligence practices 
of EU global smelters/refiners through the EU list, as well as to create awareness among their 
governments about due diligence and the importance of improving due diligence compliance.  
The Proposal seeks to create certainty and transparency downstream and to enable downstream 
users to differentiate and switch between suppliers on the basis of inter alia, the ‘EU responsible 
importer certificate’, as well as to create financial incentives for promoting due diligence 
practices among downstream users.  Other objectives are to promote the uptake of the OECD 
Guidelines and to foster demand for ethically and legitimately sourced minerals from due 
diligence compliant smelters/refiners.229 
The Proposed Regulation establishes a voluntary self-certification system for EU importers of 
certain minerals and metals to source responsibly from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.230  
The types of metals and minerals covered are tin, tantalum, tungsten, their ores and metals, and 
gold.  These minerals may originate from any ‘conflict-affected and high-risk area’ in the 
world.231  An importer seeking self-certification as a ‘responsible importer’ would have to 
declare adherence to ‘supply chain due diligence’, which entails a set of obligations that draw 
from and align with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance.232 
An importer, according to Art. 3-7 of the Proposed Regulation, should:  (a) create a management 
system, including by setting out a supply chain policy that uphold the standards set out by the 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance, creating a company-level grievance mechanism and operating a 
chain of custody or supply chain traceability system for both the minerals and metals; (b) 
identify and assess risks in its mineral supply chain and implement a strategy to respond to the 
identified risks; (c) carry out independent third-party audits of supply chain due diligence; and 
(d) disclose annually to Member States’ competent authorities information on the identity of all 
smelters and/or refiners supplying it and independent third-party audit assurances.  In order to 
create transparency and certainty with regards to supply chain due diligence, the EU in 
consultation with the OECD would annually publish a list of responsible smelters and refiners on 
the basis of the information provided. 
The certification scheme would allow for the monitoring of business responses.  The concept of 
‘supply chain due diligence’233 aligns with the UNGPs, hence the certification scheme could also 
                                                
 228 Other objectives are to end market distortions in terms of reduced demand and prices for the formal mineral 
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contribute to the clarification and implementation of the due diligence responsibility of EU 
importers as defined in the UNGPs, within the particular operational context of ‘conflict-affected 
and high-risk areas’ and in relation to commercial activity of sourcing conflict minerals and 
metals.234  The certification scheme would be voluntary however, hence its success would 
depend on the participation of business enterprises. Incentives for companies to seek certification 
should come from the cost/benefit ratio of due diligence of compliance.235 Analysis suggests that 
due diligence compliance would not be unduly burdensome on companies and that benefits 
would exceed the costs of due diligence compliance, which calculated estimates indicate are 
relatively low.236 
Critics have discarded the proposed voluntary EU certification scheme as too weak however.  
NGOs and others have pointed to several shortcomings.237 Some have indicated that the 
proposed scheme would have too little impact on too few companies. According to Global 
Witness, the 400 EU importers (smelters/refiners, traders, and manufacturers) that would be 
targeted by the proposed regulation amount to only 0.05% of the total of companies using and 
trading these minerals in the EU. The regulation would have little impact on their sourcing 
behaviour it argues.238 According to Footer, ‘the fact that the EU has so far chosen to introduce a 
water-down form of supply chain due diligence, which is based on self-certification of 
responsible imports of 3T&G, is a back ward step.  […] it leaves EU manufacturers and suppliers 
with a poor cousin of its US counterpart, §1502’.239 
One of the main reasons for the Commission not having opted for a legal approach was that 
business enterprise might avoid sourcing from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, this being 
the least risky and burdensome in terms of the compliance costs. Some European companies 
indirectly affected by Section 1502 of the DFA and expected to provide evidence of due 
diligence had diverted away from the region.240 Such diversion and the resultant fall in demand 
for minerals could be detrimental for the legitimate trade and may worsen market distortion for 
minerals from the Great Lakes Region. 
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The EP in May 2015 voted 402 to 118 with 171 abstentions in support of a mandatory EU 
certification scheme. The EP requested a binding approach in line with the DFA in its previous 
2010 resolution. The proposed scheme requests ‘all Union importers’ to get certified, including 
companies that use the respective minerals in their manufacturing process. It also introduces 
mandatory third-party audit checks of due diligence. The proposed scheme potentially affects 
880,000 companies, including many SMEs. It extends beyond the amendments proposed by the 
International Trade Committee of the EP to create mandatory compliance for smelters and 
refiners only.  According to some, this intervention would have been ‘hopelessly ineffective’, 
targeting a mere 20 companies.241 The next steps are informal talks with EU Member States to 
seek final agreement on the proposed law and approval by the Commission. 
The EU issued a political understanding on 15 June 2015, introducing the substantive 
components of a new regulation on conflict minerals. A key component of the expected 
regulation is mandatory due diligence for importers of minerals and metals of 3T&G (tin, 
tantalum, tungsten and gold) that originate from an indicated and non-exhaustive list of conflict-
affected and high-risk areas. The requirement to conduct due diligence would be applicable to 
importers of the afore-mentioned minerals whose volume imports exceed a specified annual 
threshold. The Commission indicates that it will call upon external expertise to provide this 
indicated list. The companies that source from countries that are not on the list would maintain 
their responsibility to comply with the due diligence obligations. The OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict and High-Risk Areas will 
serve as the overarching principle of the regulation. The requirements and the recognition of 
existing and future due diligence schemes, which are expected to be a central element of the 
regulation, will be consistent with this guidance. 
The declaration suggests that the intention of the EU is not to introduce new mandatory reporting 
requirements, but to encourage importers to disclose specific information in relating to products 
containing 3T&G on a voluntary basis. The Commission announced that it will develop 
performance indicators specific to the responsible sourcing of conflict minerals, which should 
encourage companies that are subject to the disclosure requirements set out under Directive 
2014/95/EU to disclose such specific information. The EU furthermore declares to also create 
additional tools with the aim to increase the transparency on conflict minerals supply chain due 
diligence practices by all interested downstream companies. 
In addition, the Commission will adopt a written statement indicating that ‘it will consider 
making an additional legislative proposal targeted at EU companies with products containing 
3T&G in their supply chains should it assess that the aggregate efforts of the EU market on the 
responsible global supply chain of minerals is insufficient to leverage responsible supply chain 
behaviour in producer countries, or should it assess that the buy-in of downstream operators that 
                                                
 241 London Mining Network, European Parliament surprise vote for stronger conflict minerals regulation (May 
21, 2015), available at http://londonminingnetwork.org/2015/05/european-parliament-surprise-vote-for-
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have in place supply chain due diligence systems in line with the OECD guidance is 
sufficient’.242 
8.7.3 The EU Proposal on Shareholder Engagement and Transparency at EU Level 
The decision-making by directors may also potentially be influenced by institutional 
shareholders, which have a significant corporate governance role in overseeing the activities of 
the directors of the listed companies in which they have invested and to intervene where 
necessary.  There is increasing support for the view that the human rights impacts may affect the 
long-term interests of shareholders. Apart from derivative action, there are a number of 
mechanisms through which institutional investors can exercise influence over the corporate 
governance of a company.  States may consider adopting rules and regulations that create 
incentives or require institutional investors to discharge this role, inter alia, to encourage 
directors to consider and communicate on human rights impacts. 
The Commission has issued a legislative proposal to regulate shareholder engagement and 
transparency at the EU level.243  This proposal is set out to amend Directive 2007/36/EC on the 
encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU on certain 
elements of the corporate governance statements.  Institutional investors and asset managers own 
a large part of the shares of listed EU companies and therefore can play a significant role in the 
corporate governance of these companies.  The ownership of 44% of the market value of EU-
listed companies by foreign (European or other) owners adds a cross-border dimension.244  The 
proposed Directive aims to encourage shareholders and asset managers to increase the level and 
quality of their engagement with the listed companies they invest in, to adopt a longer-term 
perspective to their investment, and to increase the transparency of shareholders’ engagement 
policies and directors’ remuneration. 
The proposal requires institutional investors and asset managers to develop a policy on 
shareholder engagement (‘shareholder engagement policy’) and to publicly disclose on this 
policy and the implementation thereof.  This engagement policy should determine, amongst 
others, how institutional investors integrate shareholder engagement in their investment strategy, 
monitor and conduct dialogue with investee companies and exercise their voting rights.  The 
proposal adopts a ‘comply or explain’ model; when investors decide to not develop and/or 
disclose an engagement policy, they should give an explanation for why this is the case.  This 
transparency can have positive impacts on investor awareness and decision-making, shareholder 
dialogue and engagement with the investee companies and strengthen corporate accountability to 
civil society. 
                                                
 242 See Political Understanding following the 15 June trilogue, available at 
http://mediacentrum.groenlinks.nl/sites/default/files/political%20understanding%20conflict%20minerals%
2015-06-2016_0.pdf. 
243  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as 
regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain 
elements of the corporate governance statement, COM (2014) 213 final (Apr. 9, 2014).  
244  European Commission, Memo: Corporate governance package: frequently asked questions, 3 (Apr. 9, 2014). 
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The proposal also requires companies to establish a remuneration policy and a remuneration 
report.  It also gives shareholders an approval vote on this remuneration policy every three years 
and an advisory vote on the remuneration report annually. The remuneration policy should be 
aligned with ‘the business strategy, objectives, values and long term interests of the company’.  
The remuneration policy should describe the maximum level of executive pay, how this policy 
contributes to the long-term interests and sustainability of the company and takes into account 
the pay and employment conditions of employees. These requirements respond to a need for 
greater transparency and shareholder rights (a ‘say on pay’) to enable institutional investors to 
hold directors accountable for their pay, especially when this pay does not correspond with their 
long-term performance. These mechanisms can also be instrumental in avoiding conflicts of 
interest and aligning a director’s interests with the long-term interests of the company.  The 
remuneration report should be included in the corporate governance statement that companies 
should publish annually. 
This information in order to ensure that institutional investors have the information to challenge 
this pay, while the requirement that shareholders should have a ‘say on pay’ enables these 
investors to control conflicts of interest and increase the accountability of directors for their 
performance. The proposals also regulate the identification of shareholders, the transmission of 
information and the facilitation of the exercise of shareholder rights. 
The proposals do not expressly mention human rights as a matter that institutional investors 
should take into consideration in their engagement with investee companies, or in their 
assessment of the performance of directors. While the UNGPs do not expressly refer to 
institutional investors, the OHCHR has affirmed that the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights applies to institutional investors, and that the adverse human rights impacts that 
arise from the activities of an entity in which an investor holds shares can be directly linked to 
the investor. The OHCHR has clarified that the investee company is a ‘business relationship’ 
because these human rights can be directly linked to the investor’s operations, products or 
services. The investor’s responsibility for these human rights risks exists irrespective of the 
relative size or percentage of the share it owes in the company. The OHCHR has furthermore 
noted that the investor should seek to prevent and mitigate these human rights risks by using or 
enhancing its leverage to end the harmful practices, or if unsuccessful, end the relationship.245 246 
The EU Parliament has proposed stronger rules that recognise the link between shareholder 
engagement and the non-financial long-term performance of companies. It supports a broader 
understanding of shareholder engagement that involves also the monitoring of non-financial 
performance, risks and social impacts and conducing dialogue and cooperation not only with the 
                                                
 245 Letter from OHCHR, to SOMO and OECD Watch, The issue of the applicability of the Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights to minority shareholdings (Apr. 26, 2013), available at:  
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/globalforumonresponsiblebusinessconduct/2013_WS1_2.pdf. 
 246 The OHCHR notes a number of factors that can explain whether and to what extent an institutional investor has 
leverage over an entity:  (i) the size of the shareholdings, (ii) the degree of direct control by the shareholder over 
the entity, (iii) the ability to incentivise the entity to improve its performance directly or indirectly by engaging 
other actors (governments, business associations, multi-stakeholder initiatives and other shareholders) to 
incentivise change, also in the entity’s sector or industry, and (iv) how the existence or absence of the 
relationships affects the entity’s reputation.  Id. 
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investee company but also with other stakeholders of the company on these non-financial 
matters. According to the EU Parliament, the shareholder engagement policy should reflect on 
these aspects of engagement. The EU Parliament furthermore supports a broader definition of 
stakeholder, which it explains as ‘any individual, group, organisation or local community that is 
affected by or otherwise has an interest in the operation and performance of a company’. 
In the context of remuneration policies for companies, the EU Parliament notes that this policy 
should indicate non-financial performance criteria, ‘including, where appropriate, consideration 
for programmes and results relating to corporate social responsibility’. The performance of 
directors furthermore should be assessed using also non-financial criteria, including 
environmental, social and governance factors. The remuneration report should reflect on how the 
non-financial performance criteria were applied.  The EU Parliament furthermore supports the 
adoption of additional measures to ensure greater involvement of all stakeholders, in particular, 
employees, local authorities and civil society. The consideration is that ‘shareholder rights are 
not the only long-term factor which needs to be taken into consideration in corporate 
governance’.247 
 Analysis  8.8
The Commission indicates in the EU CSR Strategy that the ‘European policy to promote CSR 
should be made fully consistent with this framework’. The Commission refers to the global 
framework for CSR that comprises of a core set of internationally recognised principles and 
guidelines, including the UNGPs. This commitment by the Commission to consistency with, 
inter alia, the UNGPs may not be binding, however it is not without potential legal effects.248  
The analysis indicates that there is scope for the EU to increase its level of engagement with the 
UNGPs in order to actively implement this commitment.  
An area of improvement is the EU definition on CSR. The EU gives recognition and acceptance 
to the corporate responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights through the 
adoption of this common EU CSR definition, which recognises that human rights are a 
prominent aspect of CSR, and are thus conceptually aligned with the UNGPs. However, this EU 
CSR definition is not articulated in precise language where its human rights aspect is concerned, 
and does not articulate the general minimum requirement that companies undertake human rights 
due diligence.249 What is lacking at the EU level is thus the acceptance of human rights due 
diligence responsibility for business enterprises, which is furthermore clearly defined and linked 
to international human rights standards, and conforms with the expectations set out in the 
UNGPs. 
                                                
 247 Recital 2a proposal EU Parliament. 
248  The Commission can only depart from its own statements of policy in a reasoned and motivated manner – and 
in compliance with the general principles of EU law, including equal treatment an legitimate expectations 
(Joined cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri A/S et al v 
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 249 As noted above, the absence of an express reference to human rights due diligence is problematic, because this 
concept defines the extent and limits of the responsibility of business enterprises in relation to human rights and 
connects this responsibility to public/law construction of international human rights law, which provide the 
benchmark that business conduct ought to be assessed against. 
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This chapter considered the extent to which the EU approach to fostering the human rights aspect 
of CSR aligns with the UNGPs. The adoption by the EU of the ‘smart mix’ approach to 
promoting business respect for human rights constitutes a positive development in this regard.  
The EU presents a combination of legally binding and voluntary measures that aim at 
strengthening and coordinating EU Member State responses to the EU, which are combined with 
voluntary measures that promote soft-law initiatives and self-regulatory measures. The EU 
furthermore advances a multi-stakeholder approach. 
A commitment to full consistency with the UNGPs needs to be taken into consideration to the 
extent to which these EU measures promote responses that conform with the UNGPs. Full 
consistency can only be realised if the UNGPs and their core concepts are effectively integrated 
within such measures. The extent to which the EU relies on regulatory measures to promote 
business respect for human rights and the extent to which corporate respect for human rights has 
been integrated into such EU regulatory measures varies considerably across different areas. 
The EU Directive on non-financial disclosure sets out requirements for certain companies to 
make disclosure on, inter alia, human rights, which align with the concepts of the UNGPs.  The 
Directive expressly refers to the UNGPs as an instrument that business enterprises can use in 
their reporting.  However, and as set out in the previous chapter, the Directive is deficient in 
certain important aspects. As a consequence, there may be disparities among national 
implementation measures, which may reduce the effectiveness of the Directive in ensuring a 
minimum level of disclosure that is necessary for the protection of human rights.  While it is 
therefore particularly important that the EU proactively monitors the national implementation of 
the Directive, the Directive makes no provision for such a process.250 
The EU has adopted disclosure requirements for EU companies that are active in the extractive 
industry or the logging of primary forest, which are furthermore combined with due diligence 
requirements.251  These disclosure requirements have not been extended to other sectors.252  The 
                                                
 250 The Commission has a duty pursuant to Art. 17.1 TEU to ensure ‘the application of the treaties and of measures 
adopted by the Institutions pursuant to them’.  To be noted also is that EU-protected fundamental rights are 
applicable to EU Member States not only when implementing acts of the EU, but also to all situations falling 
within the scope of EU law.  See, C-617/10, Akerberg Fransson, E.C.R. (2013). 
 251 The EU Accountancy Directive notes the following: 
In order to provide for enhanced transparency of payments made to governments, large undertakings and 
public-interest entities which are active in the extractive industry or logging of primary forests ( 2 ) should 
disclose material payments made to governments in the countries in which they operate in a separate report, 
on an annual basis.  Such undertakings are active in countries rich in natural resources, in particular 
minerals, oil, natural gas and primary forests.  The report should include types of payments comparable to 
those disclosed by an undertaking participating in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).  
The initiative is also complementary to the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan of 
the European Union (EU FLEGT) and the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place 
timber and timber products on the market ( 3 ), which require traders of timber products to exercise due 
diligence in order to prevent illegal wood from entering the Union market. 
  Directive 2013/34/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial 
statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending 
Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 
78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, Recital 44, 2013 O.J. (L 182) 19.  Also see, Directive 2013/50/EU, of the 
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Commission has recently issued a political understanding and declaration announcing that it will 
propose a regulation to introduce mandatory due diligence requirements in the minerals sector, 
combined with voluntary disclosure. 253 The EU has not considered adopting mandatory 
disclosure in other sectors, or regulatory measures that enable stakeholders to obtain the 
information they need to hold business enterprises to account.254 
While the renewed and consolidated EU Public Procurement Directive allow authorities to take 
social concerns into account in the procurement process, the absence of an express reference to 
corporate respect for human rights, or the UNGPs for that matter, is a significant gap. While 
awareness of any violation of an international law provision may be sufficient for a bidder to be 
excluded, the international human rights standards mentioned are (unduly narrowly) focused on 
international labour standards. 
The discussions on the EU Shareholder Directive are ongoing, yet there is a clear gap in 
engagement with human rights in these law-making processes. 
This lack of engagement with human rights does not sit easily with the objective that the EU has 
set ‘to make the fundamental rights provided for in the Charter as effective as possible’.255 The 
Commission has issued a communication in which it sets out a strategy for the effective 
implementation of the Charter of Fundamental rights by the EU. The Communication notes that 
the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights should serve as a ‘compass for the Union’s policies and 
their implementation by the Member States’.256 This entails that the EU promotes a ‘fundamental 
rights culture’ at all stages of the procedure, from the initial drafting of a proposal within the 
Commission to the impact analysis, and right up to the checks on the legality of the final text.257 
                                                                                                                                                       
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Directive 2004/109/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information 
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 253 For further details, see section 8.7.2. 
 254 See Steering Committee for Human Rights, Explanatory memorandum to Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3 of 
the Committee of Ministers to Member States on human rights and business, § 36, 1249th meeting, COM 
(2016) 18-addfinal (Mar. 2, 2016). 
 255 Communication from the Commission Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental 
rights by the European Union, supra note 2, at 3. 
 256 Id. at 4. 
 257 Id. at 4. 
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The Communication notes that the Commission ‘routinely checks its legislative proposals and 
the acts it adopts to ensure that they are compatible with the Charter’.258 As highlighted by Monti 
and Chalmers, ‘there is a thin line between verifying that EU law-making does not violate 
fundamental rights and moving to a human rights policy in which EU institutions see EU goals 
as increasingly about realisation of the rights and principles in the [Charter] rather than other 
more discrete tasks’. Whilst a case can be made for the former, it sets a more ambitious agenda 
for the Union with a wider remit’.259 As Monti and Chalmers also note: 
Beyond this debate, few would oppose the idea that legislative proposals be verified for 
their impact on fundamental rights.  However, there remains the question of the rigour of 
this process. If it is simply box-ticking, fundamental rights become a rhetorical 
instrument to justify EU law-making.  In that regard, it is a pity that the Court of Justice 
has not yet had the opportunity to rule on whether a procedural failure to engage 
sufficiently with fundamental rights in the legislative process is, by itself, a violation of 
fundamental rights insofar as it shows inadequate care for these.260 
As was noted previously, all EU actions, including legislative proposals,261 must be defined and 
implemented in a manner that is compatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and general 
principles of EU law (and in particular EU-protected human rights). The EU also may need to 
give greater attention to the UNGPs in this regard.  The CJEU held in Kadi: 
In addition, according to settled case-law, fundamental rights form an integral part of the 
general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures. For that purpose, the 
Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States 
and from the guidelines supplied by international instruments for the protection of human 
rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories.  
[…].262 
The UNGPs as an international instrument could thus serve as a source of inspiration for the EU 
courts in their interpretation of the scope of general principles of EU law, especially when 
considering that the EU and its Member States have actively engaged in the process of their 
development (see Section 8.2.3).263 
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The focus in the EU engagement with the UNGPs has been primarily on EU external policy.  
This is reflected in the EU Staff document. The imbalance between internal and external 
competencies is likely to stem from the afore-mentioned incongruence between the internal and 
external dimension of EU policy, as reflected in TEU Art. 3(3) and 3(5). According to De Burca: 
Thus the strategy has been to identify the fields of EU internal policy in which human 
rights concerns are considered relevant by reference to the precise scope of the EU’s 
powers in fields such as social inclusion or anti-discrimination. This strategy is not 
however used in the external domain, in which human rights protection is treated as a 
cross-cutting goal relevant to all domains of EU external action.  It is certainly not the 
case that the EU’s remit or powers are more extensive in the international domain than 
internally, indeed the opposite is arguably true. However, the EU and more specifically 
the Member States have been unwilling to treat respect for human rights as a cross-
cutting concern of internal EU policies, whereas they have asserted it to be such a 
concern in all areas of external policy. 264 
The EU internal and external policy dimensions cannot be kept separate in a satisfactory manner 
however, because, according to Alston and Weiler, ‘[t]hey are, in fact, two sides of the same 
coin’. There are four reasons for this, Alston and Weiler note: 
In the case of the Union, there are several additional reasons why a concern with external 
policy also necessitates a careful consideration of the internal policy dimensions.  Firstly, 
the development and implementation of an effective external human rights policy can 
only be undertaken in the context of appropriate internal institutional arrangements.  
Secondly, in an era when universality and indivisibility are the touchstones of human 
rights, an external policy which is not underpinned by a comparably comprehensive and 
authentic internal policy can have no hope of being taken seriously. Thirdly, […], a 
credible, human rights policy must assiduously avoid unilateralism and double standards 
and that can only be done by ensuring reciprocity and consistency.  Finally, the reality is 
that a Union which is not prepared to embrace a strong human rights policy for itself is 
highly unlikely to develop a fully-fledged external policy and apply it with energy or 
consistency. As long as human rights remain a suspect preoccupation within, their status 
without will remain tenuous.265 
TEU Art. 17(1) read in combination the Articles 2 and 3 of the TEU impose an obligation on the 
Commission to ensure secondary legislation and national implementing measures are in 
compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, ad intra and ad extra. Arguably, these 
articles should be interpreted more broadly as encompassing within their applicable scope all 
areas of EU internal policy in which the EU has competencies, including areas that are not 
expressly recognised under Art. 3(3) as promoting human rights powers directly, but that can 
affect the enjoyment of the rights and fundamental freedoms set out in the Charter. There is 
nothing in the case law that expressly rejects the notion that the EU should treat human rights as 
a cross-cutting issue that is relevant for all areas of internal and external policy. 
                                                
264  De Búrca, supra note 42, at 38. 
 265 Philip Alston & J.H.H. Weiler, An ‘Ever Closer Union in Need of a Human Rights Policy, 9 European Journal 
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It follows that the Commission should review all EU internal policies and laws in which the EU 
has competencies, in order to ensure not only their alignment with EU fundamental human 
rights. Due regard should be has as to whether the development and implementation of these 
measures is undertaken in a manner that is not merely compliant with the Charter, but also gives 
full effect to the rights and principles within the Charter. 
Amongst the areas of EU internal policies in which the EU has competencies and that are not 
covered but can, and arguably should, be used to foster demand for business respect for human 
rights is corporate and securities law. Research has shown that there is a nexus between 
securities and company law and human rights, and that the existence or absence of these laws in 
national jurisdictions can encourage or impede companies’ respect for human rights.266 The link 
between the EU regimes in the area of financial regulation and respect for human rights remains 
to a great extent unexplored, inter alia, securities (prospective and trading on the security 
market), market safeguards and EU mergers.267 
It is reasonable to expect that EU Member States when acting within their sphere of influence 
will take legislative measures to require human rights due diligence from companies.  
International Human Rights law imposes a positive obligation on States to adopt such legislative 
measures as necessary in particular circumstances.268 EU Member States that have adopted 
NAPs have indicated regulatory measures as part of a smart mix. An example of a somewhat 
bold initiative to introduce a legally binding duty of human rights due diligence is France’s 
Proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses 
d’ordre, which was voted by the lower chamber on 23 March 2016 and is now examined by the 
Senate.269 A proliferation of such legislation in the future may perhaps lead to the EU taking 
regulatory measures in order to avoid it creating distortions in the internal market. 
 Conclusion 8.9
 
This chapter took measure of the EU’s efforts to foster responses to the UN Guiding Principles. 
The EU CSR Strategy introduced an EU policy framework for the promotion of CSR. It was 
found that the EU views human rights as an integral and prominent aspect of CSR, and seeks 
policy consistency with internationally recognized principles and guidelines, including the UN 
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 268 See Section 3.3.2. 
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Guiding Principles. There EU CSR Strategy features various new elements that bring the EU 
CSR Policy into greater alignment with the approach advanced by the UN Guiding Principles. A 
prominent example is the updated definition of CSR, ‘the responsibility of enterprises for their 
impact on society`. The EU CSR Strategy also presents a plan of action that advances a ‘smart-
mix’ approach that, next to voluntary measures, views a role for complementary regulation. This 
chapter analysed the concrete actions that the EU has taken and the way these actions have 
affected and coordinated the regulation of factors (context, content, institutional setting) that 
explain human rights compliant conduct by business enterprises, in or outside of the EU.  The 
aim was to assess the EU’s efforts to foster responses to the UN Guiding Principles, by the EU 
itself, EU Member States, third countries, multi-stakeholder initiatives, societal actors and 
business enterprises. 
The efforts of by the EU, States, business enterprises and other actors to advance in the 
implementation of the UNGPs provide indication of evolving practices in relation to corporate 
responsibility and accountability for human rights in the EU context. There is an emerging 
understanding in the EU of the need for business enterprises to respect human rights. The 
negative effects of the financial and economic crisis and the high profile cases of human rights 
violations had made this need apparent. There is also an emerging understanding in the EU of 
international human rights standards being directly applicable to business enterprises. Illustrative 
is the alignment of EU policy with global approaches in its efforts to promote CSR and its ‘full 
endorsement’ of the UNGPs. There is also increased recognition of a shared understanding of the 
substantive requirements of the responsibility of business enterprises in relation to human rights, 
which, as the analysis of the EU definition and the Plan of Action suggest, corresponds with the 
expectations set out in the UNGPs.  
The EU, EU Member States, business enterprises and other non-state actors have adopted a range 
of voluntary and mandatory measures in their efforts to actively promote the implementation of 
the UNGPs. These measures potentially affect the in fact adherence by business enterprise to 
implementing the corporate responsibility to respect by leveraging the factors that affect such 
compliance. As a consequence of the regulatory dynamics that arise out of the combined effects 
of this ‘smart-mix’ of measures, business enterprises are increasingly bound to implementing this 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Business enterprises face binding responsibility 
to respect human rights under a range of sources of law, ranging from transnational laws at 
national and EU level to soft law mechanisms by state and non-state actors at all levels.  
The EU Directives in the area of non-financial disclosure, transparency, public procurement, 
country-by-country reporting, and access to EU courts that have been adapted. These are 
supplemented by, for instance, NAPs on CSR and the implementation of the UNGPs that EU 
Members have published at national level, EU guidance material for business enterprises 
operating in the key business sectors (employment and recruitment agencies, ICT companies, oil 
and gas companies), and EU policy documents and reports. These initiatives take on added 
significance when considered in combination, indicating that the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights is crystalizing into a more binding norm in soft and hard law sources.270   
                                                
270   For a similar argument, see Wood, Reinforcing Participatory Governance Through International Human Rights 
Obligations of Political Parties, 28 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 147 (2015). 
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This chapter argued that there is scope for the EU to scale up its level of engagement with the 
UNGPs in order to actively implement its commitment to make the EU policy to promote CSR 
fully consistent with the global framework for CSR, which comprises of a core set of 
international recognized principles and guidelines, including the UNGPs. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the objective that the EU has set itself ‘to make the fundamental rights 
provided for in the Charter as effective as possible’,271 may entail an obligation for the EU to 
seriously consider taking all actions that are within its competences to do so. 
                                                
271  Communication from the Commission Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental 
rights by the European Union, supra note 2.  
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 The International Legal Status of Business Enterprises: Towards a New Doctrine?  9
 
 Introduction 9.1
This chapter examines the legal status of business enterprises in the international system. 
Traditional approaches to legal personality will be placed in perspective, in part to demonstrate 
the need for adjustment or expansion of these theories and, potentially, for a new doctrine on 
international legal status, one which adequately reflects today’s global governance realities in 
relation to business and human rights. This chapter will address the way in which CSR can be 
analysed in legal terms without recourse to international law in the traditional positivist sense of 
the concept. This will allow the identification and analysis of those characteristics that make 
CSR acquire ‘legal status’ and business enterprises have ‘legal personality’ in a context of global 
governance. The new insights gained will pave the way for the construction of a new doctrine on 
international legal status.  
 The Legal Personality of Business Enterprises: Traditional Conceptions of Legal 9.2
Personality 
According to Brownlie, ‘a subject of International law is an entity possessing internation al rights 
and obligations and having the capacity (a) to maintain its rights by bringing international claims 
and (b) be responsible for its breaches of obligation by being subjected to such claims’.1 Thus 
Shaw notes that ascertaining personality in international law ‘necessitates the consideration of 
the interrelationship between rights and duties afforded under the international system and the 
capacity to enforce claims’. 2   
The legal personality has been addressed in contemporary international practice and doctrine. 
The International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) decided on the legal personality of international 
organisations (‘IOs’) in its Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion. Also international 
tribunals and national courts have considered the legal personality of States, IO’s and other 
entities in their rulings.3 However, in the absence of a ‘centralized law of persons’4 or of an 
authoritative decision-making body in the international legal system that can constitute the legal 
subjectivity of an entity, the question whether an entity is a legal person or subject for the 
purposes of the international Westphalian legal system has been analysed mainly by doctrine.5 
Scholarly debates, however, have not produced a satisfactory answer (let alone one which takes 
                                                
1  J. Crawford, Brownly’s Principles of Public International law, 115 (Oxford University Press 8th ed. 2012). 
2  M.N. Shaw, International law, 143 (Cambridge University Press 7th ed. 2014).  
3  According to Brownlie, ‘[J]udicial decisions are not strictly a formal source of law, but in many instances they 
are regarded as evidence of the law’. Crawford, supra note 1, at 37.  
4  Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in International law (Cambridge University Press. 2010). 
5  A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, 70-71 (Oxford University Press. 2006). It should 
be highlighted that the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Article 38(1)(d)) includes, among the 
‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’, ‘the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations’ or, in the French text, ‘la doctrine’.  
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into account the UNGPs and other recent developments6) to the question of whether international 
law treats business enterprises as subjects of international law. Moreover, there does not appear 
to be an uncontested doctrinal approach on the basis of which the matter may be solved 
conclusively.  
This section conducts a literature review in order to determine the extent to which and reasons 
which would point to business enterprises being legal persons under international law. This 
section will be structured along the main five positions on international legal personality that 
Portman identified in his book ‘Legal Personality in International law’,7 namely: the ‘States-only 
conception’ (see Section 9.2.1); the ‘Recognition conception’ (see Section 9.2.2); the 
‘Individualistic conception’ (see Section 9.2.3), the ‘Formal conception’ (see Section 9.2.4); and 
the ‘Actor conception’ (see Section 9.2.5). This section provides a brief summary of each of 
these conceptions, which will be followed by a discussion of the distinguishing features that 
make States and non-State actors acquire legal personality in the international system. Each of 
these sections will shed light on the different scholarly perspectives on the legal status of 
business enterprises that correspond with the conception that is addressed under the heading in 
question. These conceptions will be confronted with the evolving reality in business and human 
rights. More precisely, the extent to which developments in the implementation of the UNGPs 
inform these debates and the validity of these conceptions in light of the current State of affairs 
in this field will also be examined. 
9.2.1 The ‘States-Only’ Conception 
The first conception on international legal personality identified by Portmann is the ‘States-only’ 
conception. This traditional position in legal conception holds that States are the sole subjects of 
international law. The State’s existence as a matter of fact is key. The Statehood of States and the 
actual behaviour and power they have in social reality are transformed into legal prescription.8 
International law simply takes reality into account: ‘the State precedes the law and becomes a 
‘natural’, ‘original’ or ‘absolute’ international person existing a priori’.9   
The ‘States-only’ conception is premised on understanding of the international legal system as 
organized around States as its main units.10 International law would thus be based on the 
principles of State sovereignty and sovereign equality. Pursuant to the principle of State 
sovereignty, only States can consent to international law, and no rules exist without strict State 
consent. A State is thus bound only by those international norms to ‘which it has explicitly or 
                                                
6   See, however, Pentikäinen, Merja, Changing International ‘Subjectivity’ and Rights and Obligations under 
International law – Status of Corporations, 8 Utrecht Law Review 145 (2012). 
7   Portmann, supra note 4, at 13. 
8   Id. at 265. 
9   Id. at 248. 
10   Without adhering to the ‘States-only’ doctrine, Cassese notes that ‘the fundamental or primary subjects [of 
international law] are not individuals but States. [...] States [...] are the backbone of the [international] 
community. They posses full legal capacity, that is, the ability to be vested with rights, powers, and obligations. 
Were they to disappear, the present international community would either fall apart or change radically’. 
Antonio Cassese, International law, 71 (Oxford University Press. 2005).  
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tacitly agreed’ and by ‘those obligations in the creation of which it has participated’.11 In 
accordance with the principle of sovereign equality, on the basis of which the United Nations are 
‘based’,12 no State is superior to another State or, for that matter, is permitted to impose its will 
on another State.  
According to Portmann, this ‘States-only’ conception can be summarized in the following 
propositions: 
(1) The international community consists only of States. No other entities form part 
of the international realm. Individuals do not exist as independent entities outside 
the borders of their State of nationality. 
(2) International law solely emanates from common State will. International law is 
created only by States and applies alone to those States having consented to it. It 
cannot apply to an entity not having consented to the rule in question. Thus, only 
States can be bound by international law, since only they can consent to it. This 
represents the link between sources and personal application of international law, 
that is, of sources and legal personality.13 
Portmann notes that the ‘States-only’ conception finds expression in, inter alia, the Jurisdiction 
of courts of Danzig Advisory Opinion, and the Ruling in the Lotus case, both by the (League of 
Nations) Permanent Court of International Justice (‘PCIJ’),14 and, arguably, the CJEU’s Van 
Gend and Loos Ruling.15 
Starting from the assumption of the ‘States-only’ view that States are the only subjects of 
international law, any entity other than States, and thus also business enterprises, are 
automatically excluded from having legal personality under international law. Business 
enterprises are conceived as ‘juridical entities’ created under domestic law, which furthermore 
                                                
11   Portmann, supra note 4, at 258. 
12   See UN Charter, art. 2(1). 
13   Portmann, supra note 4, at 47. 
14   Id. at 42. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), ¶ 44.   
 International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States 
therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as 
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing 
independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the 
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed. 
  The position of the Court arguably contrasts with the role the League of Nations assumed in relation to the 
protection of certain minorities (see Peter Hilpold,The League of Nations and the Protection of Minorities – 
Rediscovering a Great Experiment, 17 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 87 (2013). 
15   Note the reference, in Van Gend en Loos, to the (then) EC constituting ‘a new legal order of International law 
[…] the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals’. A contrario, the CJEU 
thus appeared to be of the view that the subjects of traditional international law were only States (see Gend & 
Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, case 26-62, Eur. Ct.H.R (1963). Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘The 
Transformation of Europe’YLJ. 100 (1991), 2403-83, republished in Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Constiution of 
Europe (Cambridge University Press 1999).  
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have no existence outside national borders.16 Business enterprises are only objects, but not 
subjects of international law. International law does not directly apply to them. Consequently, 
business enterprises enjoy no rights or obligations under international law.17 States alone have 
human rights obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights obligations, which they have 
accepted as binding under international treaty law or customary international law. States are 
permitted (and, sometimes, required) to regulate business enterprises indirectly by way of 
national law.18 Business enterprises may thus be indirectly bound to human rights under 
municipal law. According to the ‘States-only’ conception, the rights of business enterprises are 
not enforceable without State intervention.19 Business enterprises thus engage with international 
law only indirectly, through their national governments.20 Thus, Rigaux noted in 1991 that the 
traditional notion of ‘subjects’ of international law does not support the view of business 
enterprises as ‘subjects’ of international law.21 
Scholarly literature22 has referred to the ruling of the Court of Appeals of the US Second Circuit 
2010 decision in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.23 as an illustrative example of an approach 
                                                
16   According to Zerk, companies have been viewed historically as conglomerations of related individual entities, 
the recognition and nationality of which was determined by reference to national law, hence the common view 
that ‘multinationals had no separate status under international law, aside from that enjoyed by its constituent 
entities by virtue of domestic law’. J.A. Zerk, Multinationals and corporate social responsibility: limitations and 
opportunities in International law, 74 (Cambridge University Press. 2006).  
17   Joel Slawotsky, The Global Corporation as International law Actor, 52 Virginia Journal of International law, 
80 (2012). 
18   Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor James Crawford in support of conditional cross-petitioner, Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2009) (no.091418), at 16. 
19   Zerk, supra note 16, at 73 (Cambridge University Press. 2006). 
20   Jonathan I Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International law, Duke Law Journal 
748, 753(1983). 
21   As Francois Rigaux indicated in 1991: 
  Il faut l’affirmer avec force: Les sociétés transnationales ne sont ni des sujects ni des quasi-sujets du droit 
international. L’internationalization du contrat d’Etat […] est fondée sur une pétition de principe, à savoir 
que l’Etat contractrant avec une entreprise ayant la nationalité d’un autre Etat a accepté d’apporter à 
l’exercice de ses droits de souveraineté des limites que l’obligent dans l’odre juridique international. Les 
sociétés transnationales sont des agents jurdiques – publics ou privés, peu importe – soumis à la 
compétence des Etats en qui ne sont destinataires de règles de droit international que par la médiation d’un 
ordre juridique étatique. Si un code de conduite obligatoire devait être adopté, il ne conférerait des droits et 
n`imposerait des obligations aux sociétés transnationales que par sa réception dans l’ordre interne des Etats 
où les règles de conduite seraient directement applicables. 
  Les groupes transnationaux de sociétés on tiré parti du morcellement des compétences étatiques pour 
édificier un pouvoir économique privé transnational qui a réussi à se soustraire à l’exercise de compétences 
étatiques concurrentes (au double sense de ce terme). Pas plus que les sociétés juridiquement distinctes dont 
il se compose, le groupe trans-national de sociétés n’est un sujet – ni primaire ni dérivé – de l’ordre 
juridique international. La puissance de ces groupes et leur capacité de négocier, souvent en position de 
force avec les Etats, ne sauraient leur attribuer la qualité de sujets du droit international que les volontés 
convergentes des Etats seraient seules en mesure de leur conférer.’ 
  François Rigaux, Les sociétés transnationales, in Le droit international: bilan et perspectives, 129, 138 (M. 
Bedjaoui ed., 1991).  
22   Slawotsky, supra note 17, at 269. 
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that supports some of the ‘States-only’ conception’s key assumptions. In Kiobel, the Second 
Circuit court held that the US Alien Tort Claims Act (‘ATCA’)24 did not provide subject matter 
jurisdictions for claims against corporations, because corporate liability has not been ‘accepted 
by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-
century paradigms’.25 The Court held that customary international law created criminal liability 
for a limited number of crimes, but only for natural persons, not for corporations as ‘juridical’ 
persons.26 Corporate liability for such crimes had been ‘steadfastly rejected’ and ‘no international 
criminal tribunal had ever held a corporation liable for a violation of the law of nations’.27  
The Second Circuit thus found in Kiobel that international law does not currently extend the 
scope of liability for a breach of customary international law to corporations. A supporting 
argument was that the corporate concept of corporate liability can only ‘gradually ripen [] into a 
rule of international law […] by achieving universal recognition and acceptance as a norm in the 
relations of States inter se’.28 The court relied on the delineation of customary international law 
provided by Judge Friendly in Vencap, as including only ‘those standards, rules or customs (a) 
affecting the relationship between States or between an individual and a foreign State, and (b) 
used by those States for their common good and/or in dealing inter se’.29 Arguably, this position 
correlates with the conception by the ‘States-only’ position of international law as concerned 
with the relations between States exclusively and emanating from the common will of States, as 
well as its rejection of rules of customary international law or general international law that are 
not based such on express or tacit consent by States (or ‘universal’ practice expressing the 
common will of the international community).30   
The ‘States-only’ conception also finds support in some of the earlier writings of James 
Crawford, who has been included (perhaps not entirely fairly) among ‘the old-fashioned 
positivists’.31 Crawford submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in 2010 in support 
of the defendant in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy.32 In this brief, Crawford 
noted that ‘[m]any rules of Customary International law do not reach this level of specificity and 
universal acceptance. This is true, a fortiori, as concerns corporate responsibility under present 
                                                                                                                                                       
23   Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
24   28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
25   Emphasis added. Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum, supra note 23, at 49. 
26   Id. at 7, 8. 
27   Id. at 9. 
28   Id. at 49. 
29   Id. at 6. 
30  The ‘States-only’ conception thus rejects customary international law that arises out of sustained practice 
(‘custom’) and evidence of States acting out of a sense of obligation (opinion uris), and general rules of 
international law, including norms of a preemptory character (jus cogens norms) that transcend custom and that 
have been accepted by the international community as norm that cannot be derogated from. Portmann, supra 
note 4, at 258. 
31    J. Alvarez, Are Corporations "Subjects" of International law?, 9 Santa Clara Journal of International law, 3 
(2011). 
32    Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy, INC. 244 F.Supp. 2d 289 (Schwartz, D.C. Cir.  2003). 
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International law’.33 Crawford also notes ‘Customary International law, as it stands today, does 
not include a corporate responsibility regime […] Corporations (except where otherwise 
provided by treaty) remain creatures of national legal systems. There is so far no basis in general 
international law for attributing international legal personality to a corporation’.34 The point has 
not been addressed by the US Supreme Court, which denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy after a Second Circuit had upheld a lower 
court’s decision to dismiss the case.35  
The traditionalist ‘States-only’ view may not have disappeared in current day practice, however 
the strength of this conception has eroded, and key assumptions on which this conception is 
based have been discarded by international law.36 There are ample examples of developments in 
the business and human rights domain, which put this ‘States-only’ conception into perspective 
and serve as a reference point to challenge and, eventually, disprove some of its core premises. I 
will highlight two developments which are often referred to in the literature for these purposes.   
The first development relates to point, inherent to the ‘States-only’ conception, that business 
enterprises as creations of national law have no existence in the international system. The by now 
well established influence that business enterprises have come to wield in the international arena 
questions the validity of this assertion. Scholarship has noted this influence in economic, social, 
political and legal terms. The wealth that companies accumulate, which may exceed that of some 
States,37 the engagement of these entities in cross border activities and their share in the 
movement of capital and technology across States is illustrative. 38  Companies impact 
international decision-making processes through their lobbying activities, and exercise political 
roles in the enactment39 of a number of international standards.40 All these are indicative of the 
                                                
33   Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor James Crawford in support of conditional cross-petitioner, Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2009) (no.091418), at 16.   
34  Id. at 2. Crawford also notes, ‘[I]n principle international law operates only horizontally, i.e., between entities 
recognised as having international legal personality such as States and international organizations. The effect of 
international law as binding upon individuals is an exception that has to be formulated explicitly, as is done in 
the instruments imposing international criminal responsibility on natural persons. As it stands, international law 
does not purport to regulate corporations directly but allows or sometimes obliges States to do so and, in the 
course of doing so, to criminalize certain corporate behaviours’. Id. at  4. 
35    Sarah Altschulier, Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy, Inc., 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Oct. 4, 2010), 
http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2010/10/04/supreme-court-denies-certiorari-in-presbyterian-church-of-sudan-v-
talisman-energy-inc/.     
36    Portmann, supra note 4, at 257. 
37    Slawotsky, supra note 17, at 83. 
38    Id. at 84. 
39    These phenomena have caused some to argue that business enterprises have emerged as de facto rule-makers in 
international law. Alvarez, supra note 31, at 6. 
40    Business enterprises participate in international standard-setting processes, have voting rights in the ILO and 
have contributed to the adoption of international agreements. K. Nowrot, New approaches to the international 
legal personality of multinational corporations towards a rebuttable presumption of normative responsibilities, 
1 (1993).  
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‘international scale and importance’ of business enterprises, as a result of which ‘scholars have 
argued that corporations deserve international legal personality’.41 
A second example relates to the presumption of the ‘States-only’ conception that a clear division 
exists between the public and the private sphere.42 The line that separates these spheres has 
become increasingly blurred in practice.43 This erosion is apparent in the activities that are being 
carried out by private corporations in various areas of the public sphere that were previously the 
sole concern of States. As a result of traditional State services having been outsourced and 
privatised, business enterprises are nowadays active in areas ranging from education and policing 
to defence operations and construction of public infrastructures. Conversely, States often operate 
in the private sphere and exercise roles that traditionally belong to the private sector, carrying out 
activities such as ‘providing investment capital, trading in the equity and debt markets, long-term 
ownership of shares in publicly traded corporations, venture capital, commodity extraction, real 
estate development and large scale farming’.44 Also State owned enterprises are acting globally 
and carry out commercial activities in various sectors, including finance. 45  According to 
Slawotsky, ‘[g]iven the blurring of the [public / private] distinction, there is no reason to treat 
corporations differently from States’.46   
The SRSG’ narrative on multifaceted globalization, which encompasses and describes the 
developments referred to in the preceding paragraphs, and his idea of polycentric governance, 
that acknowledges the presence of non-State actors and their governance systems in the public 
domain, as well as their social roles in the progressive realization of human rights, further 
support the notion that the ‘States-only’ conception has lost touch with existing social realities 
and that alternative perspectives on the legal status of business enterprises are warranted and, 
probably, necessary.  
                                                
41   Julian G. Ku, The Limits of Corporate Rights Under International law, 12 Chicago Journal of International law, 
737 (2012). 
42    The exclusion of non-State actors, and business enterprises in particular, as subjects of international law has 
been explained partially in reference to this divide. 
43     Slawotsky, supra note 17, at 85. 
44     Id, at 86-88. 
45    The UNGPs recognize the significance of these entities, which are addressed under the heading of the ‘State-
business nexus’, which refers to situations in which a ‘State acts as an economic actor in its own right, when it 
contracts or otherwise engages with companies to provide services that may impact on human rights, or when it 
conduct commercial transactions (procurement) with companies’. U.N. Working Group on the Issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Report of the Working Group on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Human Rights 
Council, § 21, U.N. doc. A/HRC/32/45 (May. 4, 2016). 
46     Slawotsky, supra note 17, at 86. According to Slawotsky:  
 Moreover, because of unprecedented changes in our world, including but not limited to: aggregation of 
substantial financial resources into large MNCs; globalization wherein large corporations maintain bases 
and operate in nations far from “home”; the partnering between such large corporations and various 
governments; the outsourcing of historically public governmental functions to private corporations and the 
increasing prominence of sovereigns acting in the private sphere, large global corporations and States 
should be treated similarly. 
       Id. at 8. 
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9.2.2 The ‘Recognition’ Conception 
9.2.2.1 Summary 
The ‘Recognition’ conception emerged in response to changing social realities that challenged 
the ‘States-only’ conception, and, more precisely, as a result of the expanding role of 
international organisations in the international legal system. While accepting the basic analytical 
framework of the ‘States-only’ conception, the ‘Recognition’ conception has been posited as a 
corrective doctrine in order to reconcile the ‘States-only’ conception with these changing social 
realities.47 The ‘Recognition’ conception is premised in the understanding that, while States are 
the primary subjects of international law and have full personality, other entities can acquire 
limited international legal personality through their recognition by States. According to this 
conception, States are the highest public authority and the only legislators in the international 
arena and, therefore, the only actors competent to recognize international persons. Consequently, 
the existence of a non-State actor as a limited international legal person and the scope of its 
international personality depends entirely on the will of States. States thus determine which 
entities can participate in the international system and have full discretion in discharging this 
legislative function.48  
According to Portmann, the ‘Recognition’ conception can be summarised in the following 
propositions: 
(1) States are, as a matter of historical fact, the highest authorities in international 
relations. Individuals and entities created by national law are represented by their 
home State in the international arena. 
(2) States being the highest authorities in the international arena, International law 
can only emanate from States will and is only binding on those States having 
consented to it. In their function as international legislators, States can recognize, 
at their full discretion, the entities taking part in the international legal system. 
(3) There is a presumption that only States are international persons. However, States 
can overcome this presumption by (creating and) recognizing non-State entities as 
limited international persons. In the case of non-State entities being subject to the 
sovereign power of one particular State (e.g., individuals), they can only acquire 
international personality with the consent of the State of nationality.49 
Like the ‘States-only’ conception, the ‘Recognition’ conception of international personality thus 
views States as the primary subject of international law.50 Unlike the ‘States-only’ conception, 
the ‘Recognition’ conception no longer regards States as the only international legal subject. 
Entities other than States can acquire the status of international legal subjects, provided that 
                                                
47   Portmann, supra note 4, at 85, 98-99.  
48   Id. at 83-4. 
49    Id. at 84. 
50    Alvarez, supra note 31, at 8. 
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States have consented thereto.51 The ‘Recognition’ conception allows for the possibility that 
business enterprises could have limited international legal status, distinct from States.52 Pursuant 
to this conception, international law may treat business enterprises as subjects of international 
law if States have recognized them as such.53 Companies depend on such personality for their 
existence in the international legal arena and would thus be pre-empted from acting in the 
international system without having acquired international personality. 
There is increasing support for the view that the international community has come to 
accommodate certain categories of actors with a distinct and autonomous international legal 
status, for instance international organizations and individuals. Most scholars, according to 
Clapham, also consider certain types of non-State actors as subjects of International law, notably 
entities ‘on their way to becoming States’ and ‘actors with State-like qualities’. Examples are ‘de 
facto regimes, insurgents recognized as belligerents, national liberation movements (‘NLMs’) 
representing peoples struggling for self-determination, the Holy See, and even the Order of 
Malta’.54 The consideration of business enterprises as international subjects has been less 
forthcoming, however. States have never consented to such status for business enterprises, there 
is no treaty or convention regulating the international legal personality of business enterprises, 
nor have States expressly recognized business enterprises as international legal persons.55 
The following section will elaborate upon some modalities and implications of the ‘Recognition’ 
conception that are of particular relevance in relation to business enterprises. Scholarship 
suggests that international law has recognized non-State actors as legal persons on the basis of 
different distinguishing features. A brief analysis follows of the features that have made such 
actors acquire international legal personality according to the ‘Recognition’ perspective, and the 
extent to which analogies may be drawn to business enterprises. An analysis of the opinion of the 
ICJ’s Reparations for Injuries Advisory Opinion follows first, an opinion which is commonly 
referred to as one of the most important legal manifestations of the ‘Recognition’ conception.56  
 
 
                                                
51    The requirement that no entity can acquire international personality without the consent by States has been seen 
as legitimate by virtue of sovereignty, but also of democracy. Matthias Goldman, We Need to Cut Off the Head 
of the King: Past, Present, and Future Approaches to International Soft Law, 25 Leiden Journal of International 
law, 341 (2012).  
52    Id. at 68. 
53    Portmann, supra note 4, at 82. 
54    Clapham, supra note 5, at 59. 
55    Crawford, supra note 1, at 122. 
56    According to Portmann, the Court examined the functions and powers of the UN as contained in the UN Charter 
in order to determine the intention of EU Member States and concluded that States must have recognized the 
UN as a limited international person by implication, because this personality was indispensible for the UN to 
achieve its ends. The UN had a capacity to bring international claims as a consequence of this personality. 
Portmann notes that ‘[t]he only diversion from a proper application of the recognition concept was that the 
Court regarded the international personality of the UN as opposable to a non-member without examining 
whether the latter had recognized the UN’. Portmann, supra note 4, at 103-104.  
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9.2.2.2 Practice 
9.2.2.2.1 The ICJ Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion 
In its 1949 Reparations for Injuries Advisory Opinion, the ICJ reflected on the legal status of the 
UN as a subject of international law for the purposes of addressing a legal question submitted to 
it by the UNGA. 57 The ICJ held that the UN, as an international organization, ‘is a subject of 
international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, and it has capacity to 
maintain its rights by bringing international claims’.58  
The following considerations come to the fore in relation to the ICJ Reparations for Injuries 
Advisory Opinion: 
• The ICJ was of the view that the UN was an international subject. However, the ICJ 
also held that this did not entail that the UN was a State (or, for that matter, a ‘super-
State’, ‘whatever that expression may mean’, the ICJ indicated), or that its legal 
personality and rights were the same as those of a State.59 International legal status is 
thus not akin to State-hood, and entities that are not States can acquire international 
legal status. The legal personality that can be awarded to entities is not of the same 
nature as that of States, and does not necessarily entail that the same obligations that 
apply to States also apply to these entities.  
• The ICJ noted that ‘[t]he subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily 
identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights’. This suggests that 
international legal status has a flexible nature60 and that the legal personality of non-
State actors can differ in scope and content from the legal status that States or other 
recognized actors have. Non-State actors may have different degrees of legal 
personality depending on the international capacities they have.61   
                                                
57    More precisely, the ICJ addressed the following legal question submitted to it by the UN GA for an Advisory 
Opinion:  
 I. In the event of an agent of the United Nations in the performance of his duties suffering injury in 
circumstances involving the responsibility of a State, has the United Nations, as an Organization, the capacity 
to bring an international claim against the responsible de jure or de facto government with a view to 
obtaining the reparation due in respect of the damage cause (a) to the United Nations, (b) to the victim or to 
persons entitled through him?  
 II. In the event of an affirmative reply on point I (b), how is action by the United Nations to be reconciled 
with such rights as may be possessed by the State of which the victim is a national?’ 
58   See, Reparations for Injuries Suffiered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 
179 (Apr 11). 
59    See, id. 179 
60   Adam McBeth, Every Organ of Society: The Responsibility of Non-State Actors for the Realization of Human 
Rights 30 Journal of Public Law and Policy 33, 64 (2008-2009). 
61    Clapham, supra note 5, at 71.  
  398 
• The ICJ noted that the ‘subjects of law in any legal system’ depend on ‘the needs of 
the community’ 62  and that ‘[t]he development of international law has been 
influenced by the requirements of international life’. 63  This suggests that the 
international legal system is a dynamic system that is responsive to the needs of the 
international community, which may change over time, and demand for the 
recognition of new legal persons at any time.64 
• The ICJ’s Opinion furthermore suggests that the personality of an entity is not of a 
permanent nature. The subject-hood of a non-State type of entity is not fixed, but can 
change over time: States can confer and withdraw rights and duties from a non-State 
entity.65 Changes in the legal personality of an entity thus may be explained in 
relation to changes in the requirements of international life and more generally, the 
international legal system which is continuously evolving and responsive to the needs 
of the community.  
• The ICJ’s Opinion also suggests that the legal personality of an international 
Organisation (‘IO’) is functional; the UN has international legal personality because 
having this status is necessary for the UN to perform its purposes and objectives. 
Dixon thus notes that the ‘personality of organisations is not one of ‘general 
competence’: it is not a personality for all purposes. […] the ‘constitution’ of the 
organisation will set out explicitly some of the attributes of international personality 
that the organisation is to enjoy […].  This may include, for example, the power to 
make treaties, to bring claims, etc.’66  
• It also follows from the ICJ’s Opinion that international legal status does not simply 
befall upon a non-State entity, but needs to be attributed to it.67 Attribution requires 
State action. A State must consent to awarding such status through action, most 
                                                
62    Reparations for Injuries, supra note 58, at 178. Emphasis added. 
63    Id. at 178. Emphasis added. 
64    According to Díez de Velasco: ‘desde una concepción dinámica del [Derecho Internacional] es preciso admitir 
que éste no conoce límites en cuanto a sus sujetos, pues las propias necesidades de la comunidad jurídica 
internacional en un momento dado pueden aconsejar, e incluso exigir, el investir de personalidad internacional a 
determinadas entidades’ ‘From a dynamic conception of [international law] it becomes necessary to recognize 
that it knows no bounds in its subjects, for the specific needs of the international legal community at any given 
time can advise, and even demand, granting legal personality to certain entities’ (translation) Manuel Pérez 
González, La Subjetividad Internacional (I) in Manuel Díez de Velasco:  Instituciones de Derecho Internacional 
Público, (C. Escobar Herhández, ed. 2012). 
65   Nicola Jägers, The Legal Status of the Multinational Corporation Under International law, in Human Rights 
Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, 262 (Michael K. Addo ed. 1999).  
66   Martin Dixon, International law, 127 (Oxford University Press 7th ed. 2013), referring to the Advisory Opinion 
on Nuclear Weapons (WHO Case) and to the PCIJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Jurisdiction of the European 
Commission of the Danube, PCIJ Ser. B No. 14. 
67    The ICJ acknowledged that the UN`s Member attributed international personality to the UN by ‘entrusting 
certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities’ and that this was essential for the UN to 
live up to its purposes and principles as established in the UN Charter. Reparations for Injuries, supra note 58, 
at 178-9. 
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notably the conferral of rights and duties on the respective entity. The UN derived its 
status as a subject of international law from its State members that awarded to it the 
competences to discharge its functions effectively.  
• The ICJ held that the UN has ‘objective’ personality, also where non-members are 
concerned. In the words of Brownlie: ‘[o]ne attribute of the objective [character] of 
legal personality for international organizations is that it renders that personality 
opposable to third parties, even though the organization in question is normally the 
creation of a treaty’.68 
The ICJ in the 1949 Reparations for Injuries Advisory Opinion provides a definition of a subject 
of international law that could be applied to assess whether international law treats an entity, 
including business enterprises, as a subject of international law. What one should look at is 
whether an entity is ‘capable of possessing international rights and duties, and [whether] it has 
capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims’.69  
Some scholars have noted the circular nature of the ICJ’s definition of subjects of international 
law in its Reparations for Injuries Advisory Opinion.70 The exhibition of the indicia by an entity 
presupposes that the entity is a legal person, yet it is the existence of a legal person that is 
considered to determine which the relevant indicia for entities are in the first place.71 Whether an 
entity is a subject of international law is often discerned by implication; ‘the main way of 
determining whether the relevant capacity exists in case of doubt is to inquire whether it is in fact 
exercised’, notes Crawford,72 who adds that ‘all that can be said is that an entity of a type 
recognized by customary law as capable of possessing rights and duties and of bringing and 
being subjected to international claims is a legal person’.73  
The ICJ’s definition provides scope for the possibility that international law treats business 
enterprises as subjects of international law. The ICJ’s Reparations Advisory Opinion supports 
the view that entities that are not States can acquire this status. As articulated by Zerk, that 
‘[t]here is actually nothing in principle that prevents the international community from 
conferring some degree of international legal personality on multinationals’.74 Such status can be 
                                                
68    Crawford, supra note 1, at 170, 171.  Brownlie considers that this is applicable to ‘all international 
organizations’, though it is more likely that a case-by case analysis is more consistent with the text of 
Reparations and Brownlie himself notes the existence of conflicting decisions of the Italian courts on the status 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Branno v Ministry of War (1954) 22 ILR 756; Mazzanti v 
HAFSE (1954) 22 ILR 758. 
69    See Reparations for Injuries, supra note 58, at 179. 
70    Clapham, supra note 5, at 64. 
71    According to Clapham: ‘International law recognizes the capacity to act at the international level of an entity 
that is already capable of acting at the international level. Furthermore, the needs of the community and the 
requirements of international life will throw up new subjects and new capabilities according to those needs; 
where those needs require the capacity to act, there will be recognition of that personality’. Id. at 64.  
72   Crawford, supra note 1, at 115. 
73   Id. at 115. 
74   Emphasis added. Id. at 61 
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conferred on business enterprises by State action.75 Non-State entities may be attributed legal 
personality to varying degrees, according to the extent to which an entity is a beneficiary of 
international rights, bearer of international duties, and / or has a capacity to maintain its rights by 
bringing international claims. Business enterprises thus may be beneficiaries of legal rights that 
are not applicable to other types of international legal persons and vice versa.76  
According to McBeth, relying on the ICJ’s opinion in Reparation, ‘if an entity is capable of 
acting on the international plane – as international organizations and private multinational 
enterprises clearly are – it may be considered to have international legal personality, although the 
extent of that capacity will be determined by the “needs of the international community” and will 
not be the same for every kind of entity”.77 The needs of the international community may thus 
demand for the recognition of business enterprises as legal persons. Partially because of this 
function-based recognition, the international legal personality that business enterprises can 
possibly acquire is distinct from that of States, and may also differ in nature and scope from the 
one (other) non-State entities have. 
Alvarez poses the question of whether business enterprises actually are subjects of international 
law and finds that, applying the ICJ’s definition, the answer ‘is a resounding “yes”’.78  Alvarez 
elaborates: 
If one applies the ICJ’s (circular) reasoning from the Reparation Case, it is easy to 
conclude, based on the international investment regime, that corporations and other 
investors under BITs and FTAs are international legal persons or subjects of International 
law to no less an extent than the Court found was true of the U.N. In the same way that 
the U.N. Charter implicitly recognizes that the United Nations has a distinct personhood 
apart from its member States, investment treaties appear to recognize the distinct 
‘personhood’ of their third party beneficiaries, whose rights appear to be delineated in 
these treaties as distinct from those of the State parties to such treaties. As does the U.N. 
Charter, which recognizes that the U.N. can conclude certain agreements under 
International law,
 
many BITs’ and FTAs’ umbrella clauses explicitly ‘internationalize’ 
investor-State contracts, thereby elevating such contractual assurances to the level of 
inter-State pacts. In addition, most BITs and FTAs, unlike the U.N. Charter (which does 
not confer on the organization the capacity to sue), explicitly provide investors with the 
ability to pursue their claims vis-à-vis States at the international level. To the extent the 
ICJ concluded in the Reparation Case that the ability to act as a person is the principal 
determinant of personhood status, the same conclusion can even more readily be drawn 
                                                
75    As a consequence, and as Kinley and Chambers have pointed out, it is through State behaviour that one can 
determine whether the respective entity is a subject of international law. According to Kinley and Chambers 
(2006), ‘[i]t is only through the behavior of the principal actors, States, that we can establish which entities have 
legal status’. ‘The State behaviour that is required, according to the International Court of Justice, is the 
conferral of both rights and responsibilities on non-State entities’. David Kinley & Rachel Chambers, The UN 
Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International law, 6 Human Rights 
Law Review, 33 (2006).  
76    Zerk, supra note 16, at 73. 
77    McBeth, supra note 60, at 64.  
78    Alvarez, supra note 31, at 3. 
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with respect to corporations and other investors under the international investment 
regime.79 
Authors thus conclude that corporations enjoy legal personality, including also Dixon, for whom 
‘there are circumstances in which the contractual relationship between a State and a corporation 
will be governed by international law. For example, a concession agreement for the extraction of 
oil might be an ‘internationalised’ contract subject to rules of international law’.80  
As a consequence of the circular nature of the ICJ’s opinion, however, any assessment of the 
legal personality made on the basis of the ICJ’s definition cannot provide a definite answer to the 
question whether business enterprises have international legal status. Alvarez thus points out that 
determinations of personhood based on the ICJ’s definition in its Reparations for Injuries 
Advisory Opinion are ‘hardly intellectually rigorous’. The ICJ’s definition thus arguably 
complicates efforts to arrive with certainty at a determination of whether business enterprises 
have international legal personality. 
9.2.2.3 Doctrine  
9.2.2.3.1 International Organizations and Individuals as ‘Derivative’ Subjects  
States are commonly viewed as the ‘original subjects’ of international law. According to 
Cassese, international organizations and individuals can be understood as ‘derivative’ subjects of 
international law, in the sense that they derive their existence from the formal decisions of 
existing subjects. Such formal decision is usually a treaty or an international resolution. 
Individuals and Organisations only exist as international legal persons ‘if groups of States decide 
to grant them legal rights; in addition, these rights remain dependent on the will of those who 
granted them’.81 The international legal status of ‘derivative’ subjects thus depends for its 
creation on an act of consent by States and for its continued existence on the will of States to 
maintain this status. Derivative subjects of international law are created in order to perform 
activities delegated to them by States, and can thus be considered as ‘ancillary’ subjects of 
international law.82 83  
                                                
79    Id. at 12. 
80    Dixon, supra note 66, at 130, quoting Texaco v Libya (1977 ILR 389). 
81    Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, at 77 (1986).  
82    Id. at 77. 
83    According to Worster, International Organisations (‘IO’s) can be understood as ‘limited’ and ‘functional’ 
entities. Most commonly, their legal personality exists only with regards to its members, or in relation to those 
States that have chosen to recognize their personality by other means, e.g., by ‘special law, act or agreement’. 
The organization thus has ‘relative personality’ and thus ‘can operate and is capable of having rights and 
obligations under international law only in its relations with the States that created or interact with it’. It may 
also be implied from the functions that an organization has that international law may treat an IO as a legal 
person, more particularly by an assessment of whether the IO has been granted ‘capacities with meaningful 
independence’. The personality of an IO is ‘limited to the functional rights acknowledged’ by a State. William 
Thomas Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of Non-State Actors, at 7-8 (2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2682444. 
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States or other existing subjects of international law have not formally attributed international 
legal status to business enterprises through an act of formal consent. States create business 
enterprises under domestic law. Business enterprises are generally not considered to possess the 
‘derived’ international legal personality that international law confers on individuals and IOs. 
Cassese also draws this conclusion, noting that States have not ‘upgraded these entities to 
international subjects proper’ and therefore (and reaching the opposite solution to Alvarez’s), 
Cassese was of the view that ‘multinational corporations possess no international rights and 
duties. ‘[T]hey are only subjects of municipal and ‘transnational’ law’, Cassese argued.84  
9.2.2.3.2 States and Insurgents as ‘Original’ Subjects of International law 
Cassese distinguishes another category of ‘original’ subjects apart from States. This category 
encompasses ‘insurgents’ and peoples that are endowed with a representative organization.85 
Subjects in this category exist as a result of ‘a de facto process’.86 Consequently, these non-State 
actors do not depend on the formal decision of States for their existence, hence their 
characterisation as ‘original’ subject of international law. Insurgents derive their existence from 
meeting certain general conditions that qualify them as a de facto State-like entity. According to 
Cassese, the elements that are commonly required are: ‘first, a central structure capable of 
exercising effective control over a given territory […], second, a territory which does not belong, 
or no longer belong to any other sovereign State, with a community whose members do not owe 
allegiance to other outside authorities […]’.87  
Business enterprises typically do not exhibit the sort of representative organization and State-like 
criteria that could qualify them as ‘original’ subjects of international law in a manner similar to 
insurgents. This approach assesses the legal personality of a non-State actor by its assimilation to 
the States ‘to designate it as a de facto State-like entity, all the while without denying that it is a 
State, and hold it to compliance with human rights norms just like a State’.88 The elements set out 
above indicate that the capability to exercise effective control over a territory constitutes a 
distinguishing feature of this type of international legal personality. The existence of a non-State 
actor as an international legal person thus seems to depend in part on its ‘territorial’ existence.89 
Business enterprises typically do not have the capability to exercise effective control over a 
territory,90 hence the possibility of these entities qualifying as ‘original’ legal persons is highly 
unlikely.   
 
                                                
84   Cassese, supra note 81, at 103. 
85   Id. at 77. 
86   Id. at 77. 
87   Id. at 77-78.  
88   Worster, supra note 83, at 15. 
89   According to Lador Lederer, ‘territrorial entities introduce into the law the logic and spirit of their territorial 
existence’. Charney, supra note 20, at 786. 
90   Cassese, supra note 81, at 78.  
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9.2.2.3.3 A Functionalist Approach to Assessing International Legal Personality  
An alternative functionalist approach has been employed by Worster, who arguably stays within 
the boundaries of the ‘Recognition’ conception when indicating that personality remains 
important and that non-State actor are increasingly enjoying relative and functional legal 
personality in the sense of having capacity for international rights and obligations, which 
fluctuate based on functions. Worster notes the following: 
A non-State entity will have personality in the international legal system to the degree to 
which it functions on the international legal plane. […] It appears that the existing legal 
persons assess the actions (or proposed actions) of certain entities and consider the need 
or benefit of engaging with those entities as international legal persons rather than as 
domestic legal persons or unincorporated entities. From this assessment, international 
rights and duties are assigned. 91 
According to Worster, IO’s can be understood as ‘limited’ and ‘functional’ entities. Most 
commonly, their legal personality exists only with regards to their members, or in relation to 
those States that have chosen to recognize their personality by other means, e.g., by ‘special law, 
act or agreement’. The organization thus has ‘relative personality’ and thus ‘can operate and is 
capable of having rights and obligations under international law only in its relations with the 
States that created or interact with it’.92 However, as I have noted, in the Reparations Advisory 
Opinion, the ICJ recognized legal personality to the UN also in relation to non UN members. 
Moreover, international law may treat an IO as a legal person by reference to the functions that 
an organization has, more particularly by an assessment of whether the IO has been granted 
‘capacities with meaningful independence’. 93  The personality of an IO is ‘limited to the 
functional rights acknowledged’ by a State.94  
According to Worster, the personality of insurgents may also be viewed as ‘functional’ in that 
their recognition as legal persons enables their equal treatment to the States they fight, for the 
purposes of the effective and practical application of international law. This approach is arguably 
consistent with the ICJ Reparations for Injuries dicta according to which international legal 
subjectivity can be expanded depending on the needs of the international community. The 
personality of insurgents is thus relative in that the treatment of insurgents as legal persons in 
practice appears to depend on whether it fosters compliance with international (Humanitarian) 
law.95 Worster notes ‘a functional, pragmatic approach is taken, because what matters is whether 
the entity controls territory comparable to a State. The international legal personality of these 
entities, though, is understood as being relative to their nature, role, functions and duties’.96   
                                                
91   Worster, supra note 83. 
92   Id. 
93   Id. at 7. 
94   Id. at 7-8. 
95   Id. at 18. 
96  Id. at  29.  
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Legal scholarship recognizes that insurgents have rights and duties under international law. 
States and IOs have engaged with insurgents directly through the signing of treaty-type 
instruments in which insurgents commonly ‘reaffirm’ their obligations under international 
Humanitarian law. Insurgents have also expressed their promise to abide by their international 
obligations in unilateral statements. According to Worster, State practices that give expression to 
the recognition of insurgents as ‘original’ subjects have been driven in part by a quest to limit the 
impact of their activities on civilian population and to ensure compliance by insurgents with 
international human rights obligations, to which States are also subject. The underlying 
consideration is that non-State armed groups ‘have the capacity to undertake State-like 
organisational policy sufficient for crimes against humanity conviction’.97  
Worster also concludes that there appear to be no barriers to granting legal personality to legal 
entities ‘where the international community deems it appropriate’, and these entities are 
increasingly considered international persons for limited, functional purposes. 98  Worster 
indicates that certain such entities (i.e., the Bank for International Settlements and Eurofirma) 
have been created by treaties, but conform agreement have been incorporated under domestic 
law. These entities have been considered to be ‘de facto international legal persons’.99 Worster 
also noted that legal entities created under domestic law are usually not considered international 
persons, but developments indicate this position to be on the verge of change. There is increasing 
support for the view that business enterprises can be held responsible under international law for 
international crimes, a trend which has been noted by the SRSG.100 Worster also refers to the 
decision by the Special Tribunal of Lebanon in New TV Karma Mohamed Tashin Al Khayat. By 
adopting a functionalist approach, the tribunal reached the conclusion that the nature of 
corporations in the international arena is changing.101 This decision will be examined in more 
detail in section 9.2.5.3.1.   
 
 
                                                
97   Id. at 15. 
98    Id. at  19. 
99   Worster indicates the following,  
  [w]here a treaty formed the basis for the agreement to incorporate under domestic law, the corporation 
might function as an international organization. Both the Bank for International Settlements (‘BIS’) and 
Eurofima (European Company for the Financing of Railroas Rolling Stock) are technically domestic 
corporations, created by treaties but incorporated under domestic law, that have been considered to be de 
facto international legal persons. The BIS unusually included private corporations as parties to the treaty 
alongside States, but that participation does not appear to have changed its status as a treaty. Although 
perhaps we can wonder whether JP Morgan Bank is now a quasi-international person.  
    Id. at  20. 
100  Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, § 66, U.N. doc. 
A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2008) [hereinafter, Ruggie, 2008 Report] (by John Ruggie). 
101   Worster, supra note 83, at 22. 
  405 
9.2.2.4 The ‘Recognition’ Conception and the UNGPs    
While the ‘Recognition’ conception may be considered still as ‘the dominant conception of 
international personality today’102, there is considerable support in scholarly debates for the 
notion that this conception is not entirely suitable for the purpose of appraising of the status of 
non-State actors more generally and, more precisely, of business enterprises.  
The approaches set out above to determining whether States have recognized business 
enterprises as subjects of international law, including by assimilation to States and on the basis of 
State-like criteria, are out of touch with the reality of the international arena. This view correlates 
more closely with the international system as it was perceived in the 1970s when the first codes 
of conducts were negotiated.103 The de facto presence of business enterprises in the international 
system is difficult to qualify in terms of State-related criteria. When a State-based approach is 
applied, it is often (but not always, see Alvarez, as set out above) concluded that business 
enterprises have not been recognized as international subjects. The existence of business 
enterprises as powerful players at the international level is thus ignored, leading to theories of 
legal personality inconsistent with the international reality. According to Clapham, ‘[t]rying to 
squeeze international actors into the State-like entities box is, at best, like trying to force a round 
peg into a square hole, and at worst, means overlooking powerful actors on the international 
stage’.104   
Scholars that seek to ascertain the status of business enterprises as subjects of international law 
are bound to run into ‘formalistic legal problems’.105 An analysis of the rights and obligations 
that business enterprises have under international treaties leads Kinley and Junko Tadaki to 
conclude that ‘it is possible to invest in [transnational corporations] sufficient international legal 
                                                
102   Portmann, supra note 4, at 80. 
103   Examples of practices that correlate with this classical approach to international law are the original 
International Investment treaties signed after WWII, which provided for State-dispute settlements systems. 
Slawotsky, supra note 17, at 81. Stephanie Bijlmakers, Effects of Foreign Direct Investment Arbitration on a 
State’s regulatory autonomy involving the public interest, 23 American Review of International Arbitration 245, 
246 (2012). 
         At that time, investors had only a single avenue at their disposal to seek protection for their assets: 
international customary law. A minimum standard of treatment agreed between States allowed investors to 
call upon their home State to exercise diplomatic action, alleging a breach under international law 
amounting to injuries to aliens and their property attributable to the host State. Investment disputes were 
settled through diplomacy or, exceptionally, through inter-State adjudication. Whilst commendable in that it 
kept States in the driver’s seat, it largely forfeited its purpose of fostering a secure investment climate for 
nationals as its proceedings were heavily politicized. The investor was obliged to exhaust all effective local 
remedies in the State. Given the domestic courts’ tainted reputation of being inefficient and bereft of 
fairness and impartiality, this was a burdensome process. Moreover, if the home State proved willing to 
bring a claim on its behalf, an action the State was not legally obliged to undertake, and the outcome 
accepted by its State ruled in its favor, the host State was under no legal obligation to pay compensation to 
the investor. 
104  Clapham, supra note 5, at 80.  
105   Id. at 77. 
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personality to bear obligations, as much as to exercise rights’.106 There are no convincing answers 
as to whether States have already done so, however. The SRSG holds this view noting that  
‘[n]othing prevents States from imposing international legal responsibility for human rights 
directly on corporations. But the evidence we reviewed does not indicate that they have already 
done so to any appreciable extent’.107  
The ‘Recognition’ position of international law, according to which business enterprises are 
mere ‘objects’ of international law has been deemed ‘unhelpful’.108 Partially because of this 
subject/object distinction, efforts to define and appreciate the relationship of business enterprises 
with human rights become more complicated. According to Clapham, ‘[i]nternational lawyers 
realize that the role of non-State actors is too important to be ignored, yet feel constrained by the 
‘rules’ on subjectivity to develop a framework to explain the rights and duties of non-State actors 
under international law’.109 The SRSG has avoided dwelling on the question of the international 
legal personality of companies as ‘unhelpful’, noting that ‘[l]ong-standing doctrinal arguments 
over whether corporations could be “subjects” of international law, which impeded conceptual 
thinking about and the attribution of direct legal responsibility to corporations, are yielding to 
new realities’.110  
The SRSG did not express his preference for the ‘Recognition’ position, or, for that matter, of 
any other doctrinal position on the legal status of business enterprises. Neither did the SRSG 
issue an opinion on the desirability of States extending recognition to business enterprises as 
legal subjects. Apart from there being a potential lack of authorities supporting such personality, 
it appears reasonable to assume that avoiding getting dragged into doctrinal debates was 
imperative for the SRSG to advance in the effective fulfilment of his mandate. In an exercise of 
principled pragmatism, the SRSG seems to have skilfully avoided debate getting into a quagmire 
of doctrinal discussions.111  
According to the ‘Recognition’ conception, nothing prevents in principle States to recognize 
business enterprises as subjects of international law. An analysis de lex lata suggests that 
business enterprises have certain rights under international investment treaties. Such rights seem 
insufficient to convince some scholars that States have recognized business enterprises as 
‘subjects’ of international law, however. According to Pentikänen, ‘[d]ebates on this matter are 
characterised by strong resistance to include corporate entities among the subjects of 
                                                
106  Higgins has referred to the reliance on the subject-object dichotomy in much of doctrinal writings as not ‘not 
particularly helpful’. Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and process: International law and how we use it, 77 
(Clarendon Press. 1994). 
107  J. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 20 (John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 31, 2007). 
108   Higgins, supra note 106, at 50. 
109   Clapham, supra note 5, at 61. 
110   Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and 
Accountability for Corporate Acts, § 20 A/HRC/4/35 (Febr. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Ruggie, 2007 Report] (by 
John Ruggie). 
111   Pentikäinen, supra note 6, at 153. 
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international law, and until recently suggestions that corporations be considered as having 
international legal personality were exceptional. Many authors have simply left the question 
open’.112 
This reluctance to recognize business enterprises as legal persons may thus be explained by 
policy considerations, and arise out of concern about the potential undesirable effects that such 
act of recognition may have in terms an (arguably over) extension of legitimacy and rights to 
companies. In defence of the traditional view, Merja Pentikäinen argues for instance that 
‘attempting to extend legal duties under human rights law to non-State actors bestows on such 
actors an unfortunate legitimacy, which will undermine the authority of the State and dilute the 
responsibility of States with respect to their human rights obligations. Changing the original 
course would allegedly cause the unravelling of the whole human rights project’.113   
In the same vein, Alvarez has warned that, recognizing corporations as subjects of international 
law, ‘may be a very bad idea’.114 More precisely, Alvarez draws attention to the ‘risks of 
deducing, from the fact of personhood or subject-hood, that corporations have certain rights and 
obligations under international law’ and to the ‘unintended consequences that may emerge when 
international lawyers argue in hierarchical manner, top down, that corporations are international 
legal persons and are to be treated legally as the functional equivalent of either States or natural 
persons’.115 This position will be addressed in the next section. 
There has been considerable debate about the policy (dis) advantages of ‘upgrading’ business 
enterprises as legal subjects or as quasi- subjects of international law.116 The enhanced legitimacy 
that comes with such recognition and the conferral of rights, duties and capacities on 
corporations on the basis of such recognition may also be viewed positively. Some of the afore-
mentioned concerns may be alleviated where international legal personality is approached from a 
‘functional’ perspective. The conferral of legal status to business enterprises could have positive 
effects where the rights, duties and capacities that are applicable to companies correlate with the 
particular social role that business enterprises play in the international system, and apply only 
insofar and do not extent beyond that what is necessary in order to ensure the effectiveness of the 
system in relation to the realization of human rights. From such a functionalist perspective, it 
would thus also be unnecessary and, possibly inaccurate, to conceive and treat business 
enterprises legally as functionally equivalent to States or individuals.  
The ICJ’s opinion in Reparations supports the view that recognition of legal personality to 
business enterprises is allowed and may be required if this were necessary for the ‘community’ 
or ‘required’ for ‘international life’. To be noted is the important dictum by the ICJ that the 
‘subjects of law in any legal system’ depends on ‘the needs of the community’117 and ‘[t]he 
                                                
112  Id. at 147. 
113  Id. at 147. 
114  Alvarez, supra note 31, at 3. 
115  Id. at 9. 
116  Clapham, supra note 5, at 60.  
117  Reparations for Injuries, supra note 58, at 178. 
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development of International law has been influenced by the requirements of international 
life’.118 The question that might be useful to address is not whether recognizing business 
enterprises as subjects of law is desirable, but whether it is necessary. In other words, from a 
functionalist perspective, it may be relevant to consider whether the objective of the international 
legal system to ensure the effective realization of human rights leads to the normative conclusion 
that certain rights duties and capacities should be conferred on business enterprises.119  
9.2.3 The ‘Individual’ Conception 
9.2.3.1 Summary 
The third conception on international legal personality identified by Portmann is the ‘Individual’ 
conception. The‘Individual’ conception was formulated by Lauterpacht.120 At its core, this 
conceptions places the individual (and not the State) as ‘as an a priori international person having 
certain basic rights and duties’. This claim is derived from the combination of two key 
assumptions: ‘the first is the view that the State is a functional entity governed by individuals 
who are subject to the rule of law in the interest of those being governed; the second is the notion 
of international law as consisting of fundamental principles of law being superior to expression 
of State will (constitutional principles of ius cogens character)’.121 This conception constitutes a 
rejection of the positivist doctrines of international personality, and thus also of certain key 
assumptions on which the ‘States-only’ and the ‘Recognition’ conceptions of legal personality 
are based.  
Individuals are the ultimate subjects of the international system. They have a status as a-priori 
international legal persons. Hence, individuals do not depend on an expression of State will for 
their existence as legal persons. The status of individuals is closely linked to these entities having 
basic rights and duties. ‘The justification of the international legal order, like any legal system, 
rests in protecting individual freedom and well-being. Hence, this law must necessarily address 
the individuals in direct terms’.122  
The State is viewed in functional terms, as an entity governed by individuals. The purpose of its 
existence is to respresent ‘certain interests of the individuals composing it’ and the State ‘in 
particular is under a duty to preserve individual freedom’.123 The interests that the States pursue 
internationally are assumed to be no different from the interests of the individuals composing it: 
                                                
118   Id. at 178. 
119  According to Zerk, the attribution of the international legal personality to entities, including business enterprises, 
is ‘functional, and is influenced by the area of regulation (and the role of the particular participant in it), the 
powers conferred upon the ‘person’, and the aims and needs of the international community overall’. J Zerk, 
supra note 16, at 75. 
120   Portmann, supra note 4, at 127, quoting Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Subjects of the Law of Nations’, in Elihu 
Lauterpacht (ed.), International law:  Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht (Cambridge University 
Press, 1947). 
121   Id. at 127.  
122   Id. at 131.  
123   Id. at 130.  
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‘international norms agreed on by States will in general be intended for strengthening the well-
being of individuals in some form’.124 No strict divide is therefore presumed to exist between the 
public and the private sphere under the ‘individual’ conception.125  
The ‘Individual’ conception accepts the existence of sources of law that do not emanate from the 
will of State, and extend beyond treaties and custom, including also natural law principles.126 
This conception presupposes the existence of general international rules that are of concern to all 
States, including fundamental legal principles and peremptory norms of international law (the so-
called norms of ius cogens).127 Ius cogens norms constitute a category of certain overriding 
principles. They have been distinguished from ordinary customary law by their source; norms of 
jus cogens are not derived from international custom or treaty.128 They depend for their existence 
on opinion iuris, to a greater extent than ordinary customary international law. An opinion iuris, 
moreover, which is furthermore conceived in more collective terms, hence these norms resemble 
more closely legal fundamental principles.129   
Portmann notes, ‘[o]n a level of fundamental principle, therefore, international law, like all law, 
can direct rights and duties towards individuals (be they acting on behalf of the State or in 
private matters) and entails basic rights and duties of the individual’.130 The individual is of legal 
interest to all States, which owe an obligation to the international community to guarantee certain 
fundamental freedoms and rights of individuals.131 The existence of general international law 
norms that restrict State power in the interest of the individual illustrates that individual freedom 
must be protected against infringements by the State.132  
 
According to Portmann, the ‘Individual’ conception can be summarized as follows: 
(1) The State is a corporation consisting of individuals, some of them being 
authorized to exercise public functions. The State is not a higher organic body 
having a special moral status. Correspondingly, there is no difference of principle 
between State and individual interests. The strict distinction between international 
and municipal law as well as between Public and Private law essentially 
disappears too. On a level of fundamental principle, therefore, international law, 
like all law, can direct rights and duties towards individuals (be they acting on 
behalf of the State or in private matters) and entails basic rights and duties of the 
individual.  
                                                
124  Id.  
125  Id. at 133. 
126  Id. at 131. 
127  Id. at 258. For a classic definition of jus cogens refer to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the law of 
Treaties of 23 May 1969. 
128  Id. at 263. 
129  Id. at 262. 
130  Id. at 133. 
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(2) The sources of international law include general principles of law. As a result, the 
international personality of the individual does not depend on expressions of State 
will (e.g., recognition), but is established through the general principle 
proclaiming individuals to be the ultimate addressees of all law. Certain 
fundamental international rights and duties are attached to the individual’s status 
as an international person.133 
The ‘Individual’ conception finds expression in the Nuremburg Judgements, the application of 
international criminal law norms to individuals and private entities at national level, litigation 
against private actors for violations of international human |rights law (e.g., under the US 
ATCA), human rights law, and the ICJ’s findings in, inter alia, the Barcelona Traction case of 
1970.134  
The ‘individual’ conception thus provides scope for business entities created under national law 
to exist as international legal persons. International legal rights and obligations may be 
applicable to business, ‘insofar as there are no logical reasons precluding analogy with 
international human beings’.135 There are a number of arguments on which scholars have relied 
that support the notion that business enterprises can be directly bound by norms of international 
law, which are founded on the ‘Individual’ conception. Most notable is the view, which was also 
supported by the authors of the UN Norms, that the UDHR is addressed to ‘all organs of 
society’, including business enterprises, and that consequently, human rights obligations, as set 
out in the UDHR, apply to business enterprises like any other ‘organ’ in society. The UDHR 
indicates that human rights are a manifestation of human dignity136, though their source of 
obligation and means for implementation are contained elsewhere.137 138    
  
                                                
133   Id. at 133. 
134   Id. at 128. The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg v Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 33-4, 
(Feb. 5).  
       [A]ll States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection… Such obligations derive, for example, in 
contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from, the 
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and 
racial discrimination. 
135   Id. at 274. 
136   Wood, Reinforcing Participatory Governance Through International Human Rights Obligations of Political 
Parties, 28 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 158 (2015). 
137  ‘While the UDHR is the most universally accepted reference point for identifying the content of inherent human 
rights that are guaranteed by international law, both the source of the rights and the means for their 
implementation – the specific obligations to respect, protect, and promote human rights in various 
circumstances – are contained outside the Declaration’. McBeth, supra note 60, at 53. 
138   Human dignity has been recognized as a source of human rights, inter alia, in the preambule of the UDHR: 
‘Whereas the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’. Article 1 stipulates: ‘All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should 
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III) 
A, U.N. Doc. A/Res/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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9.2.3.2 Practice  
9.2.3.2.1 The US ATCA 
This ‘Individual’ conception finds support in certain legal practice under the ATCA that predates 
the 2010 Second Circuit decision in Kiobel. In Sosa, the Supreme Court instructed139 lower courts 
to consider ‘whether international law extends the scope of liability […], if the defendant is a 
private actor such as a corporation or individual’.140 District Judge Schwartz, in his 2003 opinion 
in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy found that the Second Circuit’s 
interpretations of international law indicate that ‘corporations may be held liable for jus cogens 
violations of international law’141 and ‘that actions under the ATCA against corporate defendants 
for such substantial violations of international law, including jus cogens violations, are the norm 
rather than the exception’.142 The Judge also noted that ‘substantial U.S. and international 
precedent indicates that corporations may be responsible, in certain cases, for violations of 
international law’.143 The Judge reasoned that ‘[g]iven that private individuals are liable for 
violations of international law in certain circumstances, there is no logical reason why 
corporations should not be held liable, at least in cases of jus cogens violations’.144  
The opinion by Judge Schwarts supports the view that business enterprises may be conceived as 
legal persons by analogy to individuals for the purpose of corporate liability for violations of jus 
cogens norms. The 2010 Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel, rejecting subject matter jurisdiction 
in relation to corporations, may have disrupted this previous case-law. However it has not led to 
its revision. As noted above, the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit held in Kiobel that 
corporate liability was an issue of subject matter jurisdiction and that one is to look to 
international law, not domestic law, to determine jurisdiction over corporate defendants. The 
court went on to conclude that international law did not provide for liability for violations of 
customary international law to legal persons. 145 The US Supreme Court has not yet decided on 
this point.146 As a result, the 2010 Kiobel decision is not binding on courts of other circuits. Post-
                                                
139   Mattew Daforth, Corporate Civil Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: Exploring Its Possibility and 
Jurisdictional Limitations, 44 Cornell International law Journal 665(2011). 
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145 The court’s majority opinion found that ‘imposing liability on corporations for violations of customary 
international law has not attained a discernible, much less universal, acceptance among nations of the world in 
their relations inter se. Because corporate liability is not recognized as a “specific, universal, and obligatory” 
norm, […] it is not a rule of customary international law that we may apply under the ATS. Accordingly, 
insofar as plaintiffs in this action seek to hold only corporations liable for their conduct in Nigeria (as opposed 
to individuals within those corporations), and only under the ATS, their claims must be dismissed for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction’. Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum, supra note 23, at 43.  
146  The main issue under consideration by the Supreme Court in Kiobel was not corporate liability for violations of 
customary international law, but the extraterritorial applicability of the ATCA, more specifically ‘whether and 
under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the ATS, for violations of the law of 
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2010 Kiobel rulings by the district courts in Doe v Exxon and Flomo v Firestone rejected the 
opinion. For example, in Flomo v Firestone147 the court noted that cases at lower levels ‘hold or 
assume [] that corporations can be liable [for violations of customary international law]’. After 
referring to the 2010 Kiobel decision as an ‘outlier’, the court found the factual premise of this 
opinion to be incorrect, which was that customary international law does not bind a corporation 
because it has never been prosecuted (civilly or criminally) for violating customary international 
law.148 
9.2.3.3 Doctrine  
One of the implications of the ‘individual’ conception is that there can be real effects to business 
enterprises having the status of international legal subjects.149 Alvarez, argues that there may be 
‘risks’ to equating business enterprises to persons for this purpose, providing illustrative 
examples of legal consequences that could emerge in the investment regime if business 
enterprises as new subjects of international law were to have equal standing to States.150  
Business enterprises might be accorded equal standing alongside States, as the rights of business 
enterprises would no longer derive from, and be dependent upon, State consent. If international 
law were to treat business enterprises as legal subjects, due process and other guarantees might 
be seen as applicable to the investor regime. The interpretations of investor rights may extend 
broader protections to business enterprises as a ‘person’ than was the case before, when business 
enterprises were considered merely as ‘aliens’. Depending on the circumstances, the position of 
business enterprises in the international investment regime vis-à-vis the State may be 
strengthened. This could further tip the balance in investment arbitration proceedings in favor of 
the rights of investors, Alvarez argues.151   
                                                                                                                                                       
nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States’. Kiobel v Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013), at 1. 
 
147  The US Court of Appeals (Seventh Circuit) addressed the question ‘whether a corporation or any other entity 
that is not a natural person (the defendant is a limited liability company rather than a conventional business 
corporation) can be liable under the Alien Tort Statute, and, if so, whether the evidence presented by the 
plaintiffs created a triable issue of whether the defendant has violated “Customary International law”’. See, 
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co LLC, 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir, 2011).   
148  The court furthermore indicated that the answer to the question of corporate liability is not to be found in 
customary international law, but is a matter of procedure or remedy for the federal judiciary to decide under 
national law. See, id. 
149   Alvarez argues that there is awareness among scholars that the concept of international legal personality can be 
‘deconstructed’ in function of the pursuit of a normative agenda, he notes. If lawyers treat the designation of 
business enterprises as international legal persons literally, this could have unintended and adverse 
consequences for human rights. Alvarez, supra note 31, at 9. 
150  In the words of Alvarez: ‘[m]y point is strikingly simple, even banal. It is that even in our progressive era, when 
scholars acknowledge that all legal concepts are constructed and can be deconstructed to suit distinct normative 
agendas, when corporation are designed as “persons,” many, including judges and arbitrators, may treat this 
literally. […] not all of the results will be progressive’. Id, at 23. 
151   Alvarez suggests that States may no longer be able to rely on their rights to waive the rights of an investor to file 
a claim, to terminate or restrict previous treaty commitments, to change their minds through formal amendment 
or mutual subsequent practice or to terminate their BIT or to exit from ICISD arbitration where this would 
threaten the rights of investors. States furthermore may be no longer able to rely on the Articles of State 
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Business enterprises may be treated as equivalent to individuals and thus entitled to benefit from 
similar rights and protections as natural persons.152 Alvarez warns about the negative effects this 
may have on human rights. The importation of human rights standards into investment-State 
disputes may foster trans-judicial communication between investor-State tribunals and human 
rights. There are risks of human rights getting ‘lost in translation’ as these are applied by 
arbitrators whose expertise lies mainly in Commercial law. An equally undesirable scenario 
would be if interpretations of rights guaranteed in investment treaties that extend extensive 
protections to business, for instance the right to prompt, adequate, and effective compensation to 
property holders, would gain traction from the international human rights systems, which, 
Alvarez notes ‘has been notoriously reticent about accepting property rights as human rights’.153  
The notion of the ‘individual’ conception according to which international law treats 
corporations as associations of individuals and as functionally equivalent to individuals for 
particular purposes has been upheld at national level for some time. An illustration is the 
controversial US Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v Federal Election Commission154, 
in which the court noted, inter alia, that ‘First amendment protection extends to corporations’ and 
‘political speech does not lose First Amendment [] protection “simply because its source is a 
corporation”’. The court ‘rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other 
associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment [] simply because such 
associations are not “natural persons”’.155 According to Alvarez, ‘the idea that has persuaded our 
courts to date is that corporations are merely groups of persons and that what is illegal for one 
individual to do should be equally illegal for a group of them, even when this group is formed to 
make a profit’.156   
From a human rights perspective, the treatment of business enterprises as international legal 
persons equivalent to human individuals seems less problematic. In fact, there appears to be wide 
approval within the academic community for recognizing corporate rights under international 
Human Rights law. As noted by Ku, the justification or impulse for this support is the benefits 
that the conferral of such rights on companies may have in terms of strengthening the recognition 
and commitment by companies to human rights and their responsibilities. As articulated by 
Professor Lucien Dhooge, ‘concurrent recognition of freedoms and guarantees imbues human 
rights law with enhanced standing. Such recognition is essential in convincing corporations to 
appreciate human rights and their responsibilities’.157   
It seems that supporters of the ‘individual’ conception have no strong objections to applying 
human rights to business enterprises in scenarios that are identical to the corresponding human 
                                                                                                                                                       
Responsibility in their defense. Since these articles apply to the relationship of States inter se, they would loose 
their relevance. Id. at 23-24. 
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rights obligations of States vis à vis individuals, although this might be unnecessary according to 
some.158 The recognition of international duties for companies could alleviate objections against 
the use of existing, or the creation of new legal mechanisms for the purpose of strengthening 
corporate responsibility and accountability for human rights. According to Knox, if direct duties 
were to apply to companies, the monitoring procedures of the HRC might be applicable to and 
allow the review of corporate conduct, the ATCA might be available to victims of human rights 
abuses in cases where a company has committed a tort in breach of customary international 
(Human Rights) law, and the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute could potentially be expanded in 
order to encompass next to natural persons, also business enterprises as legal persons.159  
9.2.3.4 The ’Individual’ Conception and the UNGPs 
The UNGPs do not preclude the existence of international law obligations for corporations in 
relation to certain international crimes. Existing international obligations are not affected by the 
UNGPs, in and by themselves. The Preamble of the UNGPs expressly provides that ‘[n]othing in 
these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international law obligations […]’. The 
UNGPs recognize that business enterprises should ‘[c]omply with all applicable laws and respect 
internationally recognized rights, wherever they operate’.160 The UNGPs thus recognize the trend 
that business enterprises may be subject to international standards of criminal liability.161 The 
UNGPs note that business enterprises should ‘[t]reat the risk of causing or contributing to gross 
human rights abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever they operate’.162 The rationale is ‘the 
expanding web of potential corporate legal liability arising from extraterritorial civil claims, and 
from the incorporation of the provisions of the Rome Statute of the international criminal court 
in jurisdictions that provide for corporate criminal responsibility.163 In addition, the UNGPs 
indicate that ‘corporate directors, officers and employees may be subject to individual liability 
for acts that amount to gross human rights abuses’.164 
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The SRSG seems to support the view that business enterprises can be liable under certain norms 
of international criminal liability. In this regard, he has noted:  
States need to specify clearly that international standards prohibiting gross human rights 
abuses, potentially amounting to international crimes, apply to all persons, natural and 
legal. Such abuses may arise in areas where the human rights regime cannot be expected to 
function as intended, as in conflict zones or similar sources of heightened risk, and 
typically the allegations involve corporate complicity in acts committed by related parties. 
In those situations, plaintiffs may turn to home country courts because local courts may be 
unable or unwilling to act. 165 
While customary international law thus may create corporate obligations for a very limited set of 
grave human rights violation, he holds the view that international human rights treaties generally 
only addressed business enterprises indirectly through States, he argued.166   
The SRSG has refrained nonetheless from accepting some, if not most of the ‘Individual’ 
conception’s core premises. This can be discerned from the objections the SRSG raised to the 
project of the UN Norms167, which can be considered a manifestation of this ‘Individual’ 
conception. The SRSG considered the language of ‘organs of society’ in the UDHR not to have 
legally binding effects, because ‘preambles, even to binding international instruments are not 
themselves legally binding’.168 The SRSG also noted that the character and nature of the 
responsibilities of business enterprises should reflect the specialized role that business 
enterprises have in relation to human rights, which is not functionally equivalent to States. The 
SRSG noted that business enterprises are ‘specialized economic organs, not democratic public 
interest institutions’ and ‘as such, their responsibilities cannot and should not simply mirror the 
duties of States’.169  
As will be set out in detail below, the SRSG’s project and the approach of ‘principled 
pragmatism’, which the UNGPs incorporate, appear to be a manifestation of the ‘Actor’ 
conception. 
9.2.4 The ‘Formal’ Conception 
9.2.4.1 Summary 
Hans Kelsen elaborated the ‘Formal’ conception as part of his theory pure of law.170 The 
‘Formal’ conception is premised on the key assumption of international legal personality as an 
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entirely open concept. There are no pre-defined assumptions in relation to which entities have 
international legal personality in international law.171 Under this conception, and as noted by 
Portmann, ‘any entity that is addressed by an international norm is an international person’.172 
According to the ‘Formal’ conception, legal persons are mere legal constructions, coming into 
existence as a result of an international norm constituting and addressing them. The ‘Formal’ 
conception furthermore holds that all international norms are ultimately addressed to individuals. 
Other entities are not excluded from becoming international persons, however. An entity has 
legal personality to the extent that it is an addressee of these norms. The legal personality of an 
entity is reflected in ‘the sum of legal norms addressing and constituting it’.173  
The ‘Formal’ conception thus rejects traditional notions of Statehood and the superiority of 
States to law.174 Rather than predate legal systems, States exist as a consequence of the 
international legal system and of international norms constituting and addressing them. 
Consequently, there is no need for State recognition to acquire international legal status. 
Nonetheless, acts of recognition can have evidentiary value in terms of indicating that certain 
norms of general custom apply to the entity in question.175 The ‘Formal’ conception furthermore 
accepts that general rules of international law exist that are relevant for all States. However, it 
rejects the assumption of the ‘individual’ conception that these general rules include fundamental 
legal principles and peremptory norms. These peremptory norms do not have legal validity 
according to the ‘Formal’ conception.176 
According to Portmann, the main propositions of the ‘Formal’ conception can be summarised as 
follows: 
(1) International personality is an open concept. It is used to describe which entities 
are addressees of international rights, duties and capacities. International 
personality is not a precondition for, but a consequence of being addressed by a 
norm of international law. There can thus be no a priori assumption for a certain 
entity to be an international person as personality is only acquired a posteriori. 
(2) There are no further consequences attached to being an international person. In 
particular, international persons do not automatically possess the so-called 
fundamental rights and duties, nor are they automatically authorized to formally 
contribute to the creation of international law. 177 
Extrapolating from this description of the ‘formal’ conception and, more precisely, from its key 
assumption that international personality is an open concept, it seems that business enterprises 
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can be a legal subject according to this conception. The existence of business enterprises as 
international legal persons can be determined on the basis of an assessment of the rights, duties 
or capacities that international law has conferred on these entities, if any. A company is 
presumed not to have any existence outside of the legal system. The actual power and influence 
of companies in social reality appears not to be of the essence for the formal conception. 
International legal personality is merely a descriptive device. Business enterprises become an 
international legal person when an international norm is directed to them, a posteriori to the legal 
system. While originally addressed to individuals, the norm can be imputed to the company in 
accordance with the legal system by reason of individuals being addressed in their functions as 
organs of the company. The company can thus be in effect the addressee of the norm and thus an 
international legal person. Companies exist as international legal persons only to the extent that 
international norms are imputed to them. Since there are no concrete legal consequences attached 
to the conclusion of being a legal person, no definite rights or duties can be derived from a 
potential finding that companies are international persons.178   
9.2.4.2 Doctrine 
An author that arguably embraces the ‘formal‘ conception is Clapham, who reorients the debate 
to capacity and discrete obligations. This is in part to move beyond discussions of whether 
business enterprises are proper or primary179 subjects of international law.180 Clapham thus notes 
that, ‘[w]e need to admit that international rights and duties depend on the capacity of the entity 
to enjoy those rights and bear those obligations; such rights and obligations do not depend on the 
mysteries of subjectivity’.181 In addition, Clapham also notes the existence of panoply of possible 
legal rights and obligations that may be applied to non-State actors. This is irrespective of 
whether these entities have qualities or privileges that resemble those of States.182 Clapham’s 
proposal is to assess the status of non-State actors in the following contexts: ‘first, does the entity 
have the requisite legal capacity directly to acquire rights and obligations under international 
law? And, second, in what circumstances do these actors have the capacity to be party to a claim 
(either as a claimant or as a defendant) at the international level’? 183  
Scholars have assessed the legal personality of business enterprises accordingly: if business 
enterprises possess international rights and obligations under international law and/or have a 
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indispensability to the present structure of the international community’. Cassese, supra note 81, at 77. 
180  Clapham notes: ‘These concerns lose much of their sting when one reorientates the issue and simply asserts that 
corporations have limited international legal personality rather than pretending that multinationals are 
proper/primary subjects of international law with the ‘status’ that implies. As long as we admit that individuals 
have rights and duties under customary international law and international humanitarian law, we have to admit 
that legal persons may also posses the international legal personality necessary to enjoy some of these rights, 
and conversely to be prosecuted or held accountable for violations of the relevant duties’. Clapham, supra note 
5, at 79. 
181  Id. at 69. 
182  Id. at 80. 
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capacity to bring international claims, then they have a degree of international legal 
personality.184 Studies have identified a range of direct rights for business enterprises, notably in 
the area of human rights185  and international investment law, 186 but also in civil liability 
conventions involving environmental pollution.187  
These studies are helpful in recognizing that business enterprises can be considered limited 
international legal subjects, in the sense that they bear and exercise international rights,188 though 
only under specific treaties and conventions, and not (necessarily) customary international law.189 
However, these studies also concede that business enterprises have not acquired international 
human rights duties and thus lack a certain degree of status. According to Gatto, business 
enterprises constitute an ‘anomaly’ in this regard, because unlike all other new subjects of 
international law, ‘their progressive acquisition of rights has not been matched by a similar 
                                                
184  Jan Wouters & Anna-Luise Chané, Multinational Corporations in International law (Leuven Centre for Global 
Governance Studies 2013). Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Rechten en plichten van (multinationale) 
ondernemingen in het internationaal recht  (2007).  
185    Rights for business enterprises have been recognized under Art. 34, 6(1), 10(1), 41 and 8(1) of the ECHR.  
186  Stephanie Bijlmakers, Effects of Foreign Direct Investment Arbitration on a State's regulatory autonomy 
involving the public interest, 23 American Review of International Arbitration 245 (2012). 
 International investment agreements afford foreign investors extensive protection of their economic 
expectations. Protections are granted in Bilateral Investment Treaties, and in regional and plurilateral 
international arrangements, in particular the EU (legitimate expectations being a recognized general 
principle of EU law, with the same force as the EU Treaties) the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA, Chapter XI), the Framework Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Investment Area, 
bilateral and trilateral free trade agreements with an investment component, the Energy Charter Treaty, 
economic integration agreements containing investment protection provisions, such as the agreement 
establishing the COMESA Common Investment Area, specialized multilateral treaties, such as the WTO’s 
trade-related investment measures and service agreements, the OECD Code of Capital Movement, and soft-
law instruments such as the FDI Guidelines of the World Bank. Key protections granted are adequate 
compensation in case of expropriation of investment, most favorable nation treatment, fair and equitable 
treatment, full protection and security, and guarantees of free transfer of funds. The majority of IIAs 
contain an arbitration clause allowing foreign private investors to bring a claim against a host State directly 
before an arbitral panel for an alleged breach of the IIA. While parties may opt for dispute settlement 
through ad hoc arbitration or a State’s national court of arbitration, most IIAs opt for institutional 
arbitration, for example, before the World Bank’s ICSID, in accordance with the ICSID Convention and its 
Arbitration Rules, or before commercial arbitral institutions, for instance, the International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”) Court of Arbitration, the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”), or the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (“SCC”). 
187   Ruggie, 2007 Report, supra note 110, § 20. 
188  They propose that international law treats business enterprises as subjects of international law, despite States not 
having granted them legal rights through a formal decision, the autonomous standing that, according to doctrine, 
applies to international organizations and individuals. Cassese argues that the categories of individuals and 
international organizations can be styled ‘ancillary’ subjects of international law, because these categories 
‘perform activities delegated to them by States, which consider it convenient or appropriate to institute distinct 
centers of action for the furtherance of goals agreed upon by them’. Cassese, supra note 81, at 77. 
189   According to Ku, these rights have been codified in specific treaties and conventions, and therefore, do not 
support the notion that business enterprises are subjects of customary international law more generally. 
According to Ku, business enterprises have acquired such right through ‘specific textual authorization in a 
particular treaty or convention’. This provides an insufficient basis to conclude that business enterprises can be 
recognized as ‘subjects’ of customary international law. Ku, supra note 41, at 729. 
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acquisition of duties’.190 This literature also accepts that international law does not impose human 
rights obligations on business enterprises generally.191 Clearly, companies do have certain 
international obligations for certain international crimes.   
The ‘Individual’ conception accepts that business enterprises are bound under general 
international law to certain international norms that are of a pre-emptory character.  This notion 
is more difficult to ‘digest’ for the ‘Formal’ conception,192 which considers peremptory norms to 
have no legal validity.193 However, the existence of peremptory norms is well-established under 
international treaty law. More specifically the existence of these norms has been recognised in 
Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and in international practice and 
doctrine.194 Also Clapham accepts that non-State actors can be bound by peremptory norms of 
general international law (jus cogens) rules on human rights. Clapham draws attention to the 
usage of the adjective ‘general’ in order to emphasize that these rights and obligations do not 
arise out of ‘custom’, but are rather based on the consideration by the international legal order of 
these rights and obligations ‘as generally applicable and binding on every entity that has the 
capacity to bear them’.195 
The ‘Formal’ conception seems to allow for the argument put forth by Clapham, and according 
to which, if business enterprises have sufficient international personality and capacity to enjoy 
rights under international human rights law, they can also be considered to have sufficient 
capacity to bear international human rights duties.  In the words of Clapham: 
The burden would now seem to be on those who claim that States are the sole bearers of 
human rights obligations under International law to explain away the obvious emergence 
onto the international scene of a variety of actors with sufficient international personality 
to be bearers of rights and duties under International law. If the Sunday Times has 
sufficient personality and the capacity to enjoy rights under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, it might surely have enough personality and capacity to be subject to 
duties under International Human Rights law.196 
                                                
190   Ruggie, supra note 107. 
191  According to Nowrot, business enterprises ‘cannot be regarded as subjects of international law in the sense of 
being addressees of international legal obligations to promote the realization of the global public good’. 
Nowrot, supra note 40, at 566. 
192   Clapham, supra note 5, at 78. 
193   Id. at 258. 
194   Portmann, supra note 4, at 261-264. 
195   Clapham notes: 
       This process started with the 1946 Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals (where individuals were 
held to have duties under international criminal law), was developed by the International Court of Justice 
through advisory opinions declaring the United Nations and its agencies as entities with international rights 
and obligations under general international law, and now finds its application in the litigation brought against 
corporations in the United States for violations of the ‘law of nations.  
       Id. at 87. 
196  Id. at 7. 
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In other words, the fact that business enterprises already have rights entails that international law 
treats business enterprises as a subject of international law. Hence, one can conclude that 
business enterprises can also have duties. In other words, a capacity of business enterprises to 
have international rights seems to imply that the company has international legal personality, and 
thus can also bear international duties. This perspective also suggests that the finding that 
international law already endows company with a degree of legal personality provides a legal 
basis and justification for attributing international human rights obligations on business 
enterprises. The reasoning seems to be simply that, given that business enterprises have direct 
rights under international human rights law, corresponding human rights duties can be implied.  
9.2.4.3 The ‘Formal’ conception and the UNGPs 
Pursuant to the ‘Formal’ conception, business enterprises can be considered international legal 
persons to the extent that international norms are addressed to them.  
The UNGPs and recent developments in the field of business and human rights do not reject the 
view that business enterprises are addressees of international norms (and may thus be viewed as 
international legal persons). The UNGPs address business directly, and the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights that is articulated therein is directly applicable to business 
enterprises. This corporate responsibility to respect human rights is not a legal obligation directly 
imposed on business enterprises under classic international law. The UNGPs support the view 
that the international human rights law generally currently do not bind business enterprises 
directly, at least not in a positivistic manner. The corporate responsibility to respect human rights 
exists nonetheless at the international level as an international ‘standard of expected conduct’ in 
voluntary and soft-law instruments related to corporate responsibility.197 
As a result of the active efforts by many key actors to implement the UNGPs, voluntary soft-law 
instruments have been revisited and brought into alignment with these UNGPs. The corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights is now restated ‘virtually verbatim’ in, inter alia, the 
revised OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the EU CSR Strategy, the international 
Finance Corporation’s (IFC) revised sustainability framework and certain of its performance 
standards, the ISO 26000 and the Equator Principles.198 These and other soft-law instruments 
support the view that, apart from having rights under Investment law and international human 
rights law, business enterprises are the addressees of the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights under soft-law sources.199   
                                                
197  In the words of the SRSG: ‘I refer to the corporate responsibility to respect rights, rather than duty, to indicate 
that current international law generally does not impose human rights obligations on companies directly. At the 
international level, the corporate responsibility to respect is a standard of expected conduct that is 
acknowledged in virtually every voluntary and soft-law instrument related to corporate responsibility, and 
which has now been affirmed by the Human Rights Council. The corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights means to avoid infringing on the rights of others and addressing adverse impacts that may occur. This 
responsibility exists independently of States’ human rights duties. It applies to all companies in all situations’ 
John Ruggie, Address at the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufacturers and Commerce, Sir 
Geoffrey Chandler Speaker Series (Jan.11, 2011). 
198  J. Ruggie, Regulating Multinationals: The UN Guiding Principles, Civil Society, and International Legalization 
(2015). 
199  Wouters & Chané, supra note 184. 
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While this conclusion might be compatible with the ‘Formal’ conception, the SRSG did not 
adhere to his conception when developing the UNGPs. The SRSG’s project deviated from the 
‘Formal’ conception in a number of crucial aspects. More precisely, the ‘formal’ conception 
follows a top down approach to identifying and articulating the responsibility of business 
enterprises, which involves a deductive analysis of international norms. The SRSG adhered to a 
bottom-up approach to finding the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, taking the 
factual existence of business enterprises as a starting point and delineating the responsibilities of 
business enterprises on the basis an inductive process from existing policies and practices. 
According to Alvarez: 
Larry Backer’s description of John Ruggie’s innovative “protect-respect-remedy” 
governance project suggests yet another, even more promising and far more nuanced, 
approach to finding corporate responsibility.
 
Ruggie’s approach is appealing precisely 
because it departs from the hierarchical rigidity embedded in demarcating “subjects” and 
“objects” of International law. Ruggie’s delineation of corporate responsibility is bottom- 
up, not top-down. As elucidated by Backer, it is based not on a priori assertions of 
personhood but on facts on the ground, including the reality that corporations operate 
under a social and not only a legal license; have unique systems of monitoring, 
information gathering, assessment and disclosure; may be made accountable through 
their own conceptions of “due diligence” to shareholders and the wider public; and may 
owe differing human rights obligations depending on their sphere of business, their 
corporate structure, or their relationships with partners and suppliers.
 
Backer’s and 
Ruggie’s conception of corporate responsibility/accountability is evidence-based and 
pragmatic. It is the very antithesis of deducing obligations from formal subject-hood or 
personhood.200 
As the next section will reflect, the UNGPs are not a manifestation of the ‘Actor’ conception 
either. 
9.2.5 The ‘Actor’ Conception 
9.2.5.1 Summary 
The ‘Actor’ conception departs from the assumption that international law is a process of 
authoritative decision making. While in principle there are no international persons according to 
this ‘actor’ only conception. The more flexible notion of ‘participants’ is used instead. 
Participants are ‘all entities’ exercising ‘effective power’ in the international ‘decision-making 
process’. 201  These ‘participants’ in this decision making process have relevance in the 
international legal system in a way that is functionally similar to being an international legal 
persons. ‘The actor approach can thus be considered a qualified conception of international 
personality’.202 Actors are qualified as ‘participants’ merely on the basis of the factual power they 
have. Their existence as ‘participants’ thus does not depend on any formal act of recognition or 
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201  Id. at 208. 
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conferral of capacity onto an entity allowing it to be a participant.203 Legal status and relevance of 
an entity in the international legal system is implied from their actual participation in 
authoritative decision making that takes place in international arenas.204 Also the consequences of 
participation are ‘in principle, governed by factual observations as well’.205  
The ‘Actor’ conception adopts a view of the law that differs from the ‘formal’ conception, which 
views international law as a system of legal rules ‘which are merely applied by the judiciary 
according to legal logic’.206 The view of the ‘Actor’ conception is more pragmatic, in that it pays 
more attention ‘the practical aspects of specific problems’ and views law as ‘synonymous with 
the process in which persons authorized to do so make decisions by taking into account a 
multitude of factors; there is no pre-existing formal rules that determine the outcome of a legal 
matter’.207 The Actor conception presumes that ‘policy reasons are instantly favoured over legal 
rules’ in this decision making process. According to Portmann, this notion ‘is difficult to 
reconcile with the acceptance in international practice and doctrine of general and indeed 
peremptory norms’.208 After all, peremptory norms may not be derogated from, and are ‘non-
negotiable’, independent of whether there are policy considerations standing against them.209  
The Actor proposition insists on effective power, not formal criteria, which establish that actors 
are qualified to participate in international decision making.210 In doing so, this proposition takes 
account of the understanding among American international lawyers in the period after World 
War II that ‘laws had to find resonance in actual behaviour in order to be valid’ and that closer 
attention should be paid to ‘the realities of international life as postulated by international 
realism’.211 Seeking to reconcile the normative with the actual, and placing emphasis on the 
latter, these lawyers responded to the quest that Morgenthau had formulated in 1940 ‘to come up 
with a functionalist approach to international law’. According to Morgenthau, a norm only made 
sense if it has effect in reality, meaning that it influenced actual behaviour. According to 
Morgenthau’s functional perspective on international law, ‘one had to analyse the actual in order 
to find the normative content of the international order’.212  
According to Portmann, the ‘actor’ conception can be summarised in the following two 
propositions: 
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(1) International law is not a set of rules, but an authoritative decision-making 
process. In this process, goals and values of the international community and 
outcomes in particular circumstances are determined. The process takes place in 
different arenas, which range from organized to unorganized. It is authoritative 
and therefore to be distinguished from ‘naked ‘power 
(2) In this authoritative decision-making process, participation is not based on legal 
rules or specific acts of recognition, but on effective power to participate. 
According to the conception, all international lawyers have to do in order to 
establish the personal scope of the international legal order is to analyse organized 
and unorganized international decision-making processes and to determine which 
entities effectively partake in them. The consequences of being a participant are, 
in principle, governed by factual observation as well.213 
The analysis by Portmann suggests that the ‘Actor’ perspective accepts that business enterprises 
can be ‘participants’ like any other actor. International law can better be perceived as a decision-
making process, in which business enterprises can participate alongside States, international 
organizations, and private actors. Their legal status is based on their de factor power, which can 
be assessed on the basis of their actual participation in authoritative decision making processes. 
The actor perspective also supports the understanding that the quality of a norm that articulates 
the duties and responsibilities of business enterprises depends on whether its substance makes 
sense in practice and the impact this norm may have on actual behaviour.    
9.2.5.2 Doctrine 
The Actor conception has been articulated by Ms Rosalyn Higgins QC, the former President of 
the International Court of Justice,214 suggesting that international law can better be perceived as a 
decision-making process, in which non-State actors participate in international law making 
alongside States, international organizations, and private actors. This argument relates to the 
critique by Higgins of the object/subject distinction having become unhelpful. The traditional 
perspective on international law upholds the distinction between ‘subjects’ or ‘objects’ of 
international law. The ‘subjects’ are perceived as bearers of the elements of personhood and 
having been accepted as a ‘subject’ by a rule of international law. ‘Objects’ are defined by 
negation: they are not a ‘subject’. 215 Indeed, not existing as full ‘subjects’ of international law, 
business enterprises automatically fall into the category of ‘objects’ of international law. 
Higgins stresses that the delineation of international legal persons by the dichotomy of 
subjects/objects is clearly restrictive. Partially this is because an either/or approach to 
international legal status is adopted. She notes that there is a sense of artificiality to this binary 
distinction between subjects and objects. While this subject/object distinction may benefit legal 
clarity, she contends that it also ignores the legally relevant fact that business enterprises are not 
entirely absent from the international scene, as the designation as ‘object’ of international law 
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suggests. The traditional positivists that uphold the subject/object distinction thus fail to 
recognize that business enterprises have a legally relevant ‘presence’ in the international 
community.  
As noted above, there is increased recognition for the legal relevance of the role that business 
enterprises have come to exercise in the international community.216 The characterization of 
business enterprises as mere ‘objects’ of international law thus becomes unhelpful, simply 
because it does not capture this reality. Higgins notes that the doctrinal view on international law 
is restrictive, in that its rigidity is insensitive to changes in international legal sphere. The 
subject/object distinction, as Higgins has argued, is too static, has ‘no credible reality’ and ‘no 
functional purpose’. It has also captured the debate in this field: ‘[w]e have erected an 
intellectual prison of our own choosing and then declared it to be an unalterable constraint’, 
Higgins concludes.217  
According to Higgins, business enterprises can be considered participants in international law; 
‘making claims across State lines, with the object of maximizing various values’.218 The SRSG 
supports this position, noting that ‘at minimum transnational corporations have become 
“participants” in the international legal system, as Rosalyn Higgins, […] puts it, with the 
capacity to bear some rights and duties under international law’.219 Also Alvarez supports this 
position, noting that: 
The realities of contemporary international law-­‐‑making processes are a great deal more 
complex. The designation of “participants” recognizes that today, thanks to increasing 
participation rights in a number of international for a for many non-State actors, 
corporations (alongside a number of non-State actors) are now involved in the making of 
international law, including, as addressed below, the making of international investment 
law through investor-State adjudication.220 
Also Zerk expresses its support for this perspective, noting that ‘[t]he idea of multinationals as 
“participants” in the international system provides a much more realistic picture of the role of 
private commercial organisations within the international system than the traditional 
“subject/object” dichotomy’.221 
Alvarez provides a clear articulation of the ‘actor’ perspective in the article ‘Are Corporations 
“Subjects” of international law’.222 Therein he also distances himself from the object/subject 
dichotomy; ‘calling a corporate entity a “subject” or “object” of international law confuses more 
than enlightens’ and ‘[t]he realities of contemporary international law-making process are a great 
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deal more complex’.223 Alvarez holds the view that discussions of whether business enterprises 
are subject or international legal persons are ‘at best a distraction’. Alvarez furthermore 
challenges a number of assumptions that are core to the traditional and positivist approach to 
international legal personality that have been outlined above, raising points that broadly 
correspond with the ‘actor’ conception.  
First, Alvarez seems to be keeping within the actor approach when arguing that a top down 
approach is unsuited to deciding of international human rights obligations;  
In any case, such a top down approach to finding international corporate obligations is 
precisely the wrong way to figure out what obligations make sense or reflect what the 
principal maker of international law, namely States, actually want. Most importantly, 
such a top down approach loses sight of the ways that corporations are distinct from 
States or natural persons. It makes it more difficult to contextualize corporate obligations 
in light of these realities.224 
Alvarez suggests that a top-down approach is unsuited to determine the substance of corporate 
obligations and responsibilities. He draws attention to need to take account of social reality, 
particularly the existence of business enterprises as special organs with specialized functions in 
society, which are different from States and other actors. Attempts to articulate international 
human rights obligations should take account of these realities, in part in order to ensure that 
these obligations to make sense within their evolving context.  
This argument corresponds with assumption of the ‘actor’ position that norms should make sense 
in light of existing realities in order to have actual impact on behaviour. Also Pentikäinen notes 
‘the role of corporations as profit-creating actors and their different roles and capacities vis-à-vis 
States should be paid due regard in considerations of “translating” human rights obligations for 
corporate actors’.225 
Alvarez similarly discards the approach of attributing obligations to business enterprises by 
analogy to individuals or States, which is supported by the ‘individual’ conception, indicating 
that such analogizing is unnecessary for corporate responsibility and accountability;  
Close readers of the work of leading advocates of such responsibility, namely Clapham 
and Ratner, will discover that neither relies on such equivalence. What they assert, 
correctly, is that given the very real differences between corporations and other 
participants in the international legal system, the only viable approach is to delineate 
corporate rights and obligations inductively from the bottom up: to define the rights and 
obligations of corporations by what those entities are and what they are not. This is, in 
effect, what Justice Stevens urged in his dissent, where he argued for case-by-case 
determinations of how best to regulate political speech by corporations. This careful 
delineation of corporate rights and obligations is made more difficult to the extent that 
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corporations are assumed to be ‘international legal persons’ (and/or ‘subjects’) and 
particular corporate responsibilities are simply derived from that assumption. 
The actor-only conception holds there are no real legal effects to business enterprises having the 
status of legal subjects. The status of an international legal subject has been viewed as merely a 
social construct that has no real effect. Since international legal personality is assessed through 
doctrine, rather than determined by an authoritative decision-making body, it has been argued to 
be merely a concept, a formal proposition that lacks any real substance.226 While it can serve, in 
theory, as a basis for deriving human rights and obligations, no real normative effects 
automatically flow from its attribution. This is suggested by Klabbers: ‘[A]fter all is said and 
done, personality in international law, like “subjectivity”, is but a descriptive notion: useful to 
describe a State of affairs, but normatively empty, as neither rights nor obligations flow 
automatically from a grant of personality’.227 
The actor perspective emphasize that entities can be qualified as ‘participants’ on the basis of the 
factual power they have to take part in authoritative decision making processes. This status is 
said not to depend on a formal act of recognition or the conferral of capacity on these entities.  
While such formal acts of recognition thus seem unnecessary for participants to exist as 
international legal persons, this does not negate the fact that, at a minimum, such acts can be of 
relevance as evidence that actors are participant in the international system. While business 
enterprises thus do not depend on a formal act of recognition to exists as ‘participants’ in the 
international legal system, a formal act of recognition can affirm the status of business 
enterprises, and possibly reinforce this status where such recognition affects the in fact influence 
that business enterprises have to partake in international decision making.   
Zerk notes the relevance of examining the degree to which international law recognizes the 
existence of, inter alia, business enterprises in the international legal system. The impetus for 
such inquiry is the growth of human rights law and international economic law, which has 
increased scope for non-State actors to participate in international law.228 The degree of legal 
status that business enterprises have can be assessed along the factors that classical approach 
hold to be indicative of whether an entity is a legal person, i.e., ‘the ability to participate in the 
development of international law through custom, the capacity to enter into international treaties, 
the prospect of direct legal responsibility for breaches of obligations and the ability to bring legal 
claims’.229  Zerk notes that there is greater appreciation of business enterprises as subjects under 
international law; ‘[c]learly companies (and, by extension, groups of companies) do possess 
rights under international law, some of which may be enforced directly (e.g., under treaty-based 
dispute resolution mechanisms), and to this extent can be said to enjoy some degree of 
‘international legal personality’.230    
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9.2.5.3 Practice 
9.2.5.3.1 New Tv Karma Mohamed Tashin Al Khayat Decision 
An illustration is the decision by the Appeals panel of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in the 
interlocutory appeal against New Tv Karma Mohamed Tashin Al Khayat 231, in which the panel 
held that the Tribunal had personal jurisdiction to hold contempt proceedings against ‘legal 
entities’. This case was brought against the media company New TV S.A.L, operating as Al 
Jadeed TV and Ms Karma Al Khayat, Al Jadeed TV’s Deputy Head of News and Political 
Programmes, which had been charged initially with contempt and obstruction of justice. The 
charges had been brought under Rule 60 bis, which notes that ‘[T]he tribunal, in the exercise of 
its inherent power, may hold in contempt those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with its 
administration of justice, upon assertion of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction according to the Statute. 
This includes, but is not limited to the power to hold contempt any person who: […]’. The 
Contempt judge had rendered a decision on 24 July 2014, indicating the tribunal lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the cases against legal persons. The question before the Appeals panel was 
‘whether or not the Contempt Judge erred in his ruling preventing legal persons from being 
prosecuted for contempt and whether such error, if any, led to the invalidation of his decision’. 
The appeals panel answered in the affirmative and found that the Contempt Judge had erred in 
determining that the term ‘person’ in Rule 60 bis excludes legal entities.232  
The panel indicates to have been guided by Art. 3(A) of Rule 3 (A) which calls for an 
interpretation of Rule 60 bis ‘that is consonant "with the spirit of the Statute" together with the 
principles of interpretation laid down in customary international law, international standards on 
human rights, general principles of international criminal law and procedure and, as appropriate, 
the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure’.233  
The panel argued that ‘the ordinary meaning of the word “person” in a legal context can include 
both natural human beings and legal entities’.234 The panel held that Rule 60 bis should be 
interpreted ‘in a manner consonant with the spirit of the Statute’.235 After having considered the 
object and purpose of Rule 60 bis, i.e. ‘to hold accountable those who interfere with the 
administration of justice and to ensure that the exercise of the Tribunal’s primary jurisdiction is 
not frustrated’, the panel arrived at the conclusion that ‘this object would be impeded should 
legal entities be excluded from prosecution as a rule’.236 The panel took into consideration 
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today’s social reality that corporations ‘wield far more power, influence and reach than any one 
person’, noting also that such influence may be a ‘force for the positive development of the 
societies in which they reside’ but also ‘entails greater responsibility’.237 The panel adhered to a 
functionalist perspective238 when arguing the following: 
 […] the prosecution and punishment of legal persons pursues different aims and interests 
than the punishment of national persons alone. Without the ability to address such 
considerations, the authority of the Tribunal to deal with contempt and obstruction of 
justice could be impeded. It would potentially lead to unacceptable impunity for criminal 
actions and effectively yield control over the Tribunal’s proceedings to unaccountable 
legal entities. […] Therefore, it would be contrary to the interests of justice, in our view, 
to shield legal persons when Rule 60 bis does not restrict our inherent power to punish 
contemptuous acts. No person, natural or legal, should be placed above the law or be 
allowed to operate outside of the rule of law. 
The Panel referred to the power of companies, the interests of justice and the need for the panel 
to be able to prosecute and punish legal persons in order to deal with contempt and obstruction of 
justice. The effective exercise of the Tribunal’s primary jurisdiction resulted in the conclusion 
that the panel should have jurisdiction over legal persons.  
The panel also expressed the view that current international standards on human rights and 
corporate accountability and trends in national laws ‘support an interpretation that is consonant 
with imposing criminal liability on legal persons’.239 These international human rights standards 
‘allow for interpreting the term “person” to include legal entities for the purpose of Rule 60 
bis.240 This argument is noteworthy also because the panel, in its examination of evolving 
international standards and corporate accountability, as well as trends in national laws, takes into 
account the UNGPs and other development in the business and human right domain. The panel 
considered that ‘the substance of these efforts is an indicator of the evolving practice in relation 
to corporations at the global level’.241  
The Panel notes ‘an emerging shared international understanding of the need to address 
corporate responsibility’.242 The Panel indicates that ‘international human rights standards and 
the positive obligations arising therein are equally applicable to legal entities’. While not 
providing a clear answer for why this is the case, the Panel does refer to the authoritative opinion 
31 of UN Human Rights Committee, which indicates that the State duty to protect will not fully 
be discharged unless individuals are protected against infringements of their human rights by 
private persons or entities.243 This suggests that the need for greater corporate accountability 
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might lead to the conclusion that international human rights standards should be applied directly 
to companies. The PRR Framework and the UNGPs ‘represents a concrete movement on an 
international level backed by the United Nations for, inter alia, corporate accountability’. While 
non-legally binding, the Panel affirms that the UNGPs support the notion that criminal regimes 
are regarded as an available remedy.244 The panel observes that business enterprises have been 
recognized subjects of International law. All these factors are ‘evidence of an emerging 
international consensus regarding what is expected in business activity, where legal persons 
feature predominantly, in relation to the respect for human rights’.245 
9.2.5.4 The ‘Actor’ conception and the UNGPs  
The UNGPs and the process of its development can be viewed as a manifestation of the ‘Actor’ 
conception. This is evident from the participation of business enterprises in the process as a 
matter of objective fact. The SRSG did not pronounce on the recognition of business enterprises 
as legal ‘subjects’ or ‘persons’ or formal treaty provision as justification for the inclusion of 
business enterprises in this process. Where the SRSG mentioned the legal status of business 
enterprises at all, this was to indicate that doctrinal arguments about whether business could be 
‘subjects’ of International law are ‘unhelpful’.246 Instead, it was primarily the influence of 
business enterprises and their functional role and importance in contributing to the realization of 
human rights that resulted in the conclusion that business enterprises should be included in the 
processes.247 Their involvement in the development process of the PRR Framework and the 
UNGPs by the SRSG’s affirmed and reinforced their de facto existence as ‘participants’.  
The SRSG furthermore primarily relied on policy considerations related to the effectiveness and 
legitimacy in order to justify business involvement in the process. The extent to which business 
enterprises participated in the process stood in stark contrast to the limited involvement of 
business enterprises in the negotiations on international codes of conducts in the 1970s-80s.248 
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The exclusion of business enterprises from decision making then was the result of business 
enterprises being perceived as a threat.249 The lobby efforts and external pressure by business 
enterprises frustrated the decision making process, however. 250 251  Partially because of this 
external exposure, there has been an increased acceptance of these entities partaking alongside 
other State and non-State actors in decision-making processes, which is furthermore perceived as 
imperative for the effectiveness and legitimacy of such processes and outcomes.252  
The actor perspective is also clearly visible in the ‘thick’ stakeholder consensus that the SRSG 
strived for in the development of the UNGPs.  The SRSG has noted: 
Inclusive consultations also matter. All stakeholder groups must be given the opportunity 
to be heard; victims consulted; and the varying situations of different regions taken into 
account. Importantly for my particular mandate, recommendations addressed to business 
have to find resonance there or they will be resisted or ignored.253 
It seems that the imperative to ensure the quality of the UNGPs and the corporate responsibility 
to respect human rights in particular, which is applicable to all business enterprises, led to the 
conclusion that business enterprises should participate in the process.  
The process of developing the UNGPs demonstrates that participation of business enterprises in 
international decision making processes is feasible. The multi-stakeholder approach that the 
SRSG employed did not distinguish between different types of business enterprises, all business 
enterprises could participate. The identification of business enterprises as participants for the 
purpose of International law, which has considered as ‘notoriously difficult’, was 
circumvented.254 255 After all, there exists no universal definition of business enterprises that 
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could be objectively applied for this purpose. Business enterprises thus were defined by 
reference to the law of their country of nationality.   
Addo described the significant of the SRSG’s multi-stakeholder approach as follows: 
The indispensable nature of the multi-stakeholder approach to the development of the 
PRR Framework and GPs affirms the growing importance of non-State actors in 
International law making. This success of the PRR Framework and GPs when contrasted 
with the spectacular failure of the UN Norms may be attributed to the role played by non-
State actors, especially in this context, the lobbying of the business community. As a 
constituency likely to be directly impacted by the emerging standards, their direct 
involvement in the development of the GPs led to a high level of appreciation but also 
affirmed the significance of the principle of subsidiarity in International law-making. The 
lesson for the wider International law making process of consultation and the 
consideration of the perspectives of affected non-State actor communities in the 
preparation of new standards is a compelling one. While the development of International 
law norms such as those concerning diplomacy and international organisations will 
continue to draw on the contribution of State actors, the development of norms such as 
international economic law, international development law or international environmental 
law, for example, with direct impact on non-State actors may have to be approached 
differently from the traditional State-centred process if their full potential is to be 
appreciated.256 
The beneficial effects of business participation in decision making processes may be undermined 
in case of regulatory capture by business enterprises. Calls for caution against such capture have 
expressed by NGOs in the context of the treaty negotiation process. The Treaty Alliance 
advocates for the inclusion of strong provisions in the forthcoming treaty that ‘prohibit the 
interference of corporations in the process of forming and implementing laws and policies, as 
well as administering justice at all national and international levels’.257  The Treaty Alliance has 
also called for caution of potential corporate capture in discussion at all level in the pathway to 
establishing this treaty.258 It is not clear whether the proposal is to depart from the multi-
stakeholder approach to International law making all together, but at a minimum, the NGO 
community calls for stronger measures to ensure that power imbalances in such processes are 
equalized. While strategic manoeuvring in such decision making can be problematic259, and 
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require appropriate measures, these problems are not unsurmountable and it seems that business 
participation is more commonly viewed as positive and essential.  
Avoiding entering doctrinal debate on the legal status of business enterprises corresponds with 
SRSG’s approach of principled pragmatism and served to develop and achieve a consensus on 
the PRR Framework and the UNGPs that reflect the existing standards and practices of States 
and business enterprises. The SRSG reached this understanding of existing standards and 
practices without addressing the international legal status of business enterprises. The UNGPs 
advance the understanding that the responsibility of business enterprises should be discerned 
inductively from practice through which these norms develop and in a manner that reflects social 
reality, rather than mirror the human rights obligations of States or individuals. The UNGPs 
advance the view that business enterprises have responsibilities with regards to all human rights. 
The underlying imperative is that business enterprises are capable of potentially infringing all 
human rights.  
The corporate responsibility to respect has been accepted by the HRC through their adoption of 
the UNGPs and by many more as the shared understanding of what is expected from companies. 
The substance of the corporate responsibility to respect as defined by the UNGPs reflects the 
social role, nature and function that business enterprises have in society. As noted, the UNGPs 
recognize that business enterprises are distinct organs in society that perform an economic role 
and have specialized functions. This role differs from that of States, individuals and other actors 
in the system. The primary interests of companies are commercial and the capabilities that these 
entities have as creations of legal persons under national law (i.e., ‘limited liability, perpetual 
life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets’), which gives them a 
distinct character and certain advantages over other actors. Because of these specific capacities, 
business enterprises have capabilities to exercise significant influence, hence also the possibility 
of their activities having positive and negative effects on the realization of human rights.260 The 
UNGPs also recognize that business enterprises have a special capacity to regulate their business 
relationships, e.g., through contracting. In order to discharge their responsibility to respect 
human rights, business enterprises are expected to employ their capacity to manage their adverse 
human rights impact, including by exercising leverage and control over their subsidiaries and 
other business relationships to the extent necessary and as appropriate.   
As the appeals panel of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon affirmed, the UNGPs constitute a 
global movement for enhanced standards and practices relating to corporate responsibility and 
accountability. The UNGPs set out to promote a continuous process of enhancing exiting 
standards and practices by States and business enterprises related to human rights. Arguably, the 
effective implementation of the UNGPs is ‘transformative and disruptive’ of traditional 
standards and practices relating to business and human rights. The implementation efforts done 
right should result in the further crystallisation of the corporate responsibility to respect human 
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rights into norms of different types of obligation, and their potential transition into ‘hard norms’ 
under national, sub-international (i.e., EU), and international law. The UNGPs affirm the need 
and obligations of States to adopt regulatory measures as necessary and appropriate to ensure 
business enterprises respect human rights.  
When assessment of the degree to which business enterprises are ‘participants’ in the 
international legal system is concerned, one should note this expanding scope of international 
legal system as a result of soft law. The business and human rights domain has seen a 
proliferation of such soft-law initiatives, which articulate international expectations for business 
in relation to human rights and, despite their non-legally binding nature, have a capacity to bind 
actors.261 The increased density of the international legal system is in part a result of the efforts 
by key actors to actively implement the UNGPs. An illustration of a source of soft law are the 
reports by WG BH to the HRC and the UN GA that provide clarity on the application of the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights in specific areas or contexts of practice.262  
The soft-law norms and practices that articulate the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights, which previous chapters have examined in detail, and the partaking of business 
enterprises in their development and enactment of these initiatives, are indicative of evolving 
practice in relation to the nature of business enterprise. These developments viewed in 
combination point to the increased recognition of the corporate responsibility to respect. While 
the UNGPs have not had such impact that this norms has become legally binding generally in 
national, EU, or international level, the norms seems to be crystalizing into more binding form. 
 Conclusion 9.3
Legal scholarship has thus advanced at least five different approaches to appreciating the legal 
status of entities, applying, in the case before us, to business enterprises. These doctrines include 
the classical Westphalian, ‘State-only’ conception, as well as the State-based ‘Recognition’ 
conception. On the one hand, the ‘State-Only’ conception is obviously incompatible with the 
recognition of personality for business enterprises. On the other hand, the ‘Recognition’ 
conception does not preclude States from recognizing business enterprises as legal persons. 
However, under the ‘Recognition’ conception, States have not yet formally recognized 
international legal personality to corporations as a general rule.  It should be noted, though, that 
the SRSG and Philip Alston have indicated unambiguously that corporations have such 
personality for acts such as torture, extrajudicial executions and crimes against humanity. 
The inconsistency with international reality of the ‘State-only’ conception became apparent 
already with the Reparations for Injuries Advisory opinion of the ICJ. Philip Alston and Ryan 
Goodman highlighted in 2010 that ‘[o]ne of the most dramatic developments within International 
Human Rights law over the past two decades has been the growing importance of a range of non-
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State actors’.263 With the clear enhanced relevance of new actors in the international arena arose 
the need of considering new entities as potentially having international legal personality.  
One would tend to think, positivists would regard as authoritative the Reparation for Injuries ICJ 
Advisory Opinion. The ECJ indicated in this Opinion, which is frequently linked to the 
‘Recognition’ conception, that an international legal person is an entity ‘capable of possessing 
international rights and duties, and [whether] it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing 
international claims’.264 Moreover, this opinion appears to allow for a functional approach to legal 
personality that would link such personality to the needs of the international community.265 In 
that sense, as Alvarez and others have noted, there is room for the recognition of the legal 
personality of corporations. However, the application of the State-based ‘Recognition’ 
conception results in many (although not all, see Alvarez), including Ruggie, to conclude that 
business enterprises are not international legal persons, at least, in the words of Ruggie, not to 
‘any appreciable extent’.266 As previously noted, the SRSG and Philip Alston have indicated 
unambiguously that corporations have such personality for acts such as torture, extrajudicial 
executions and crimes against humanity. 
States seem to have not yet formally recognised international legal personality to apply, on a 
general basis, to corporations. Business enterprises are created under national law and States 
have not ‘upgraded’ them to international legal persons proper, which entails that they do not 
possess the type of ‘derived’ legal personality that IOs have. Moreover, corporations also don’t 
have the representative organisation and meet the State-like criteria to qualify business 
enterprises as ‘original’ legal personality in a way similar to insurgents. After all, business 
enterprises do not act or function as a State and their existence may not be captured in ‘territorial 
terms’. The growing influence of these entities in the international system points to this 
conception, because of its adherence to ‘State-like’ criteria, to defeat existing realities. As 
Clapham notes, ‘[t]rying to squeeze international actors into the State-like entities box is, at best, 
like trying to force a round peg into a square hole, and at worst, means overlooking powerful 
actors on the international stage’.267  
From a ‘Formalist’ perspective, Wouters and Chané indicate, ‘[l]enghty debates about the 
international legal subjectivity of [multinational corporations] […] cannot hide the fact that 
MNCs already enjoy considerable rights under international investment law and under 
international Human Rights law’.268 Wouters and Chané are of the view that MNCs ‘do not have 
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binding obligations under international law’ (presumably, other than those deriving from 
international investment law). Similarly, in the words of Malcolm Shaw, the ‘realm [of the 
UNGPs] is that of ‘soft-law, of expectations, of anticipation, not of binding international (as 
opposed to national) regulations’.269 However, the SRSG and Philip Alston have indicated 
unambiguously that corporations have such obligations for acts such as torture, extrajudicial 
executions and crimes against humanity. 
 
The individualist perspective, which entails a rejection of the two aforementioned ‘State-based’ 
conceptions, suggests that business enterprises already exist as international legal persons (which 
is not dependent on State recognition) and international duties and responsibilities can and, 
probably, should) be allocated to them. Moreover, from an ‘Actor’ perspective, the top-down 
approach to delineating the substance of such human rights obligation for companies, and 
furthermore by analogy to individuals (or States), is less appropriate. The assumption is that 
business enterprises exist as specialized organs in society that have a distinct role in the 
international (human rights) system, one that is different from, yet complementary to, that of 
States. Such obligations may not reflect this specialized role of business enterprises and, as a 
consequence, be less effective in having impact on actual business conduct.   
I argue that developments in the business and human rights domain point to business enterprises 
already having a considerable degree of international legal status. The UNGPs have placed CSR 
at the centre of a system of policentric governance (in accordance with the ‘Actor’ conception).  
This system is intended to maximize the effectiveness of human rights (in accordance with the 
‘individual’ conception), not only, but not in the least, by crystalizing in new legislation. As 
efforts to implement the UNGPs are done right, business enterprises are bound to have more and 
more legal status – and renewed (both legal and non-legal) effects.    
States may decide to recognize business enterprises as international legal persons (‘upgrade’ 
them proper) through a formal act of recognition. From the State-based perspectives, such an act 
would constitute a major breakthrough. From a non-traditional perspective (i.e., under the 
‘Formalist’ and ‘Actor’ Perspective), such a formal act would be of lesser significance, because 
no direct legal consequences would necessarily be attached to such act. From an ‘Individualist’ 
perspective, such formal act would also not be constitutive of international rights and obligations 
or legal capacities for companies, but could nonetheless have the positive effect of enhancing 
business’ recognition of, and strengthening their commitment to, human rights and their 
responsibility to respect human rights.  
I keep within the ‘Actor’ conception, whose view of the system corresponds most closely to the 
reality of the UNGPs, when arguing that such a formal act of recognition is thus not necessary, 
since such act is not a requirement for corporations be bearers of duties, rights and capabilities. 
However, I would welcome such act, which can affirm and further clarify the legal capacity that 
business enterprises have to bear international rights and obligations. Such act can generate 
(legal or non-legal) effects. For instance, as noted, it may give direction to national authorities 
and court when addressing the legal duties and responsibilities of companies, and lift obstacles to 
the use or creation of legal mechanisms for strengthening legal corporate responsibility and 
accountability as necessary. 
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Keeping within the thrust of the UNGPs, such act may be viewed as a method and source of 
‘leverage’ that could be used to maximize the effectiveness of efforts to realize international 
human rights and more sustainable globalization. The substance of this legal personality would 
be discerned pursuant to a bottom-up process, on the basis of an inductive analysis from existing 
standards and practices. Such international legal status should reflect the influence these 
enterprises have, their nature and function as economic organs in society and their capabilities to 
make (positive and negative) contributions to the realization of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The legal status of business enterprises would be functional and extends only so far as 
needed to perform this function. 
Such understanding of international legal personality would correspond with the view of 
‘polycentric governance’ on which the SRSG relied in relation to the UNGPs, which is premised 
in the understanding that the public/law and governance, national/international system is an 
essential component, but may not be sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure an effective human 
rights system.270 As the business and human rights field is undergoing transformation, and legal 
duties may further crystalize under national and EU law, the clarification of such legal status 
within the international legal system becomes more relevant. The UN treaty initiative provides 
opportunity to have States formally recognize such international legal personality and clarify the 
corresponding international legal duties and responsibilities of business enterprises.   
The UN treaty-initiative, which seems to revitalize the ‘Individualist’ approach, captures the 
view, not incompatible with the Reparations Advisory Opinion, that the effectiveness of the 
international human rights system may requires that some international human rights duties be 
applied directly to business enterprises. Indeed, pursuant to the dictum of the ICJ in Reparations 
legal personality is linked with the needs of the international community. The ICJ dictum that the 
‘subjects of law in any legal system’ depend on ‘the needs of the community’271 and that ‘[t]he 
development of International law has been influenced by the requirements of international life’272 
may thus suggest that the needs of the international community to ensure the effectiveness of 
human rights may demand for the recognition of business enterprises as international legal 
persons with corresponding rights and duties.   
What seems to be political reluctance to give this initiative greater vigor may be explained in 
relation to the worldview that the movement supporting this initiative adheres to, which departs 
from the polycentric governance approach and may not give due account to the governance role 
of business. Yet, key challenges in relation to business and human rights are of a systemic nature 
and demand a comprehensive view that appreciates the contribution of a multiplicity of actors 
and their governance systems to progress towards business respect for human rights in practice. 
There is need for the actions to reach greater scale and to better cohere (internally and externally) 
in order for cumulative effects to arise and progress to be achieved on a global scale. In the 
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SRSG’s quest, according to Mares ‘for cumulative progress would be explained as an effort to 
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 Conclusion  10
According to De Schutter, the might of multinational enterprises ‘fascinates’. Our reaction to this 
power, De Schutter adds, has been influenced ‘by much publicized situations in which, 
effectively controlled neither by their State or incorporation nor by the State where they operate, 
these global actors seemed to be able to commit human rights violations in complete impunity’.1  
In a globalised world, global governance is no longer reserved to governments alone. As noted 
by Scherer and Palazzo, ‘[t]oday, [multinational corporations] as well as civil society groups 
participate in the formulations in policy areas that were once regarded as the sole responsibility 
of State agencies’.2 Consequently, and as noted by Mares, the SRSG saw in the notion of 
‘polycentric governance’, ‘the way forward to advance the cause of human rights in the global 
economy’. 3  The SRSG’s ‘principled pragmatism” deliberately intends to transcend classic 
legality with a focus (consistent with the ‘Individual’ conception) on the effectiveness of human 
rights. According to the SRSG, in application of  the notion of ‘polycentric governance’ (which 
is, in turn, consistent with the ‘Actor’ conception), there are three systems that develop CSR 
standards: (i) the public system, encompassing law and policy; the (ii) corporate governance 
system, reflecting risk management and the civil governance system, reflecting social 
expectations of stakeholders.4 The SRSG thus placed business respect for human rights at the 
heart of the polycentric global regime, of which the public / law system is also a part.  
As also noted by Mares, the SRSG aimed at moving ‘to a critical mass by leveraging as many 
sources of authority as possible and getting them to interact in a process of cumulative progress’ 
since ‘if one would be tempted to boil down to one word [the SRSG]’s mandate, that word would 
be “leverage”. The SRSG’s quest, then, for cumulative progress would be explained as an effort 
to maximize that leverage through the activation and combination of all sources of leverage”’. 5 
Indeed, the SRSG indicated that ‘a new regulatory dynamic was required under which public and 
private governance systems […] each come to add distinct value for one another’s weaknesses, 
and play mutually reinforcing roles-out of which a more comprehensive and effective global 
regime might evolve, including specific legal measures’.6 Consequently, and unsurprisingly 
pursuant to the Commentary to UNGP 10, ‘[t]hese Guiding Principles provide a common 
reference point in this regard, and could serve as a useful basis for building a cumulative positive 
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 5 Radu Mares, Decentering Human Rights From the International Order: The Alignment and Interaction of 
Transnational Policy Channels, 23 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 173 (2016). 
 6 John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business Multinational Corporations and Human Rights, 78 (W.W. Norton & 
Company. 2013). 
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effect that takes into account the respective roles and responsibilities of all relevant 
stakeholders’. 7  In a nutshell, the SRSG concluded, ‘the [UNGPs] prescribe paths for 
strengthening and better aligning these governance systems in relation to business and human 
rights. They aim to generate a mutually reinforcing dynamic that produces cumulative change’.8 
Also according to the SRSG, ‘the successful expansion of the international human rights regime 
to encompass business enterprises must activate and mobilize the full array of rationales and 
institutional means that affect corporate conduct. That is what the [UNGPs] seek to do’.9 The 
General Principles of the UNGPs thus establishes a link between the UNGPs and these 
objectives, by stating in its third paragraph that ‘these Guiding Principles […] should be read, 
individually and collectively, in terms of their objective of enhancing standards and practices 
with regard to business and human rights so as to achieve tangible results for affected individuals 
and communities, and thereby also contributing to socially sustainable globalization’.10 
And indeed, the UNGPs are crystallizing in a number of developments at the national, 
supranational (EU) level and international level that endorse the approach of the SRSG. Thus, 
Mares notes the ‘emergence of a transnational regulatory regime that, by mobilizing new sources 
of public and private authority, creates a new regulatory dynamic that augments the traditional 
State-centered and territory-based protection of human rights with the leverage brought by 
international economic interdependencies and multinational enterprises’.11 
In the light of which I turn to the research questions this thesis intended to address: 
 
1. Have CSR, and the responsibilities of business enterprises for human rights, been legally 
defined in and fully adopted by International law, European law and national law? (with 
a particular emphasis in UK and US law). 
The answer is, for the time being, partially, but the process is on-going. The UNGPs articulate a 
shared definition of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which the HRC 
‘endorsed’ in 2011. The corporate responsibility to respect human rights thus is recognized to 
exist, not as a legally binding standard founded in international human rights law, but rather as a 
standard of conduct founded on social expectations, more specifically ‘a standard of expected 
conduct acknowledged in virtually every voluntary and soft-law instrument related to corporate 
responsibility’. Consequently, strictly speaking from a formalistic positivist perspective, this 
responsibility lacks a legally binding nature. In legal terms the corporate responsibility should be 
understood as ‘soft’ norm that is founded on societal expectations of compliance. Non-
                                                
 7   Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework. U.N.Doc. A/HRC/17/31, GP 23a (March 21, 2011) [hereinafter UNGPs] (by 
John Ruggie). 
 8 John Ruggie, Opinion: Business and Human Rights – The Next Chapter (Mar 7, 2013).   
 9 Id.    
  10  UNGPs, supra note 7. 
 11 Mares, supra note 5, at 1.   
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compliance with this norm makes business enterprises accountable to the courts of public 
opinion, or charges in actual court occasionally. The SRSG noted:12 
In addition to compliance with national laws, the baseline responsibility of companies is to 
respect human rights. Failure to meet this responsibility can subject companies to the courts 
of public opinion - comprising employees, communities, consumers, civil society, as well as 
investors - and occasionally to charges in actual courts. Whereas governments define the 
scope of legal compliance, the broader scope of the responsibility to respect is defined by 
social expectations - as part of what is sometimes called a company’s social license to 
operate. 
In this thesis I have argued that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, as it is 
currently conceived, should further evolve and acquire normative force and ‘binding-ness’ in 
practice. According to the SRSG: ‘we have achieved, for the first time, broad convergence 
around a common set of politically authoritative and socially legitimated norms and policy 
guidance for business and human rights. This provides us with a strong foundation on which to 
build. But of course, the work of building on it has only just begun’.13     
It is always a matter of legal obligation for States to adopt the necessary rules and regulations to 
ensure that business enterprises respect human rights in practice. The thesis set out the scenario 
of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights acquiring normative force and the 
translation of such responsibility into a ‘hard’ (legally binding) norms at the national, regional 
and international level. The thesis has examined the intensity of implementation efforts, 
identified gaps and assessed the extent to which States have an obligation to incorporate and 
embed the concept of human rights due diligence into existing laws and regulations. 
As a result of the implementation efforts of the UNGPs by many actors, the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights has been accepted in various hard and soft law sources, 
ranging from transnational laws at national and EU level in the area of non-financial disclosure 
to soft law mechanisms by State and non-State actors at all levels. These developments as 
referred to in the next paragraphs become particularly significant when considered in 
combination, thereby indicating that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights has 
begun to crystalize into a more binding norm.  
This thesis has identified and examined a wide range of regulatory measures (voluntary and 
mandatory) that EU Member States, the EU and other non-State actors have adopted in their 
efforts to actively implement their duties and responsibilities under the UNGPs. Some of these 
regulatory measures entail a restatement of the human rights due diligence concept, or aspects 
thereof in ‘hard’ law.  
One example is the UK Modern Slavery Act of 2015, which requires business enterprises to 
make publicly available information that reflects the expectations set out in the UNGPs, as 
applicable in the specific context of slavery and human trafficking-related risks in a company’s 
                                                
  12  John G. Ruggie, Keynote Remarks at Annual Plenary Voluntary Principles on Security & Human Rights 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, Netherlands, at 3 (Mar. 13, 2013). 
 13 Ruggie, supra note 8.  
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business and supply chains.14 Another example from the US is the California Transparency in 
Supply Chain Act of 2010, which sets requirements for retail sellers and manufacturers to 
disclose their risk-based due diligence efforts, if any, to eradicate human trafficking and slavery 
from their direct product supply chains,15 and selective legislation.16   
At EU level, a number of EU Directives have been adapted (or are currently under negotiation), 
which are of particular relevance for regulating the conduct of business in relation to human 
rights in various areas: public procurement17, access to EU courts18, and the new country-by-
country reporting obligations for large extractive and logging companies on payments to 
governments, the EU Directive on non financial disclosure,19 the Shareholders Rights Directive 
and the new EU Directive 2011/36/EU on trafficking in human beings.  
The analysis undertaken in this thesis concludes that these Directives do not define or fully adopt 
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, nor are the UNGPs expressly mentioned 
there-in, or if the case, only in passing. This thesis has highlighted some of these gaps. This 
thesis has also drawn attention to the legal obligation of the EU to consider seriously taking all 
actions that are within its competences to promote business respect for human rights, including 
Company and Securities law. This obligation can be derived from the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the objective that the EU has set ‘to make the fundamental rights provided for in the 
Charter as effective as possible’.20 
The EU Directive on non-financial disclosure sets out requirements for certain companies to 
make disclosures on, inter alia, human rights. This Directive is consistent with the conceptual 
framework put in place by the UNGPs, and expressly refers to the UNGPs as an instrument that 
business enterprises can use in their reporting.21 The proposed EU Regulation on conflict 
minerals has not yet been adopted.22 According to a statement issued by the EU in June 2016, 
setting out the substantive components of a new Regulation on conflict minerals, this Regulation 
could introduce mandatory due diligence requirement for importers of minerals and metals of 
3T&G that is consistent with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chain 
Minerals From Conflict and High-Risk Areas.23  
Apart from legal obligations in ‘hard’ law, the corporate responsibility to respect has been 
recognized and restated in sources of ‘soft’ law. These soft-law norms are not binding from an 
                                                
 14 See, section 7.8.2.1. 
 15 See, section 7.8.2.2. 
 16 See, section 7.8.3. 
 17 See, section 8.7.1. 
 18 See, chapter 6. 
 19 For further details, see, chapter 6. 
 20   See, section 8.8. 
 21 See, chapter 7 
 22 See, section 8.7.2. 
 23 See, id.  
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strictly positivist perspective, however they have legal relevance as articulation of international 
expectations, which are foundational to obligations, and can potentially have as powerful an 
impact as hard law on the behaviour of business enterprises.24  This thesis has identified a 
number of soft-law sources that recognize and articulate the corporate responsibility to respect, 
e.g., the authoritative interpretations of the UN treaty monitoring bodies.25 NAPs on CSR and the 
implementation of the UNGPs that EU Members26 have published at national level, the UN 
reporting framework27, EU guidance material for business enterprises operating in the key 
business sectors (employment and recruitment agencies, ICT companies, and oil and gas 
companies), EU policy documents and reports, and more.  
It should also be stressed, in this regard, that the SRSG has noted that ‘[c]ore elements of the 
Guiding Principles have been incorporated by numerous other international and national standard 
setting bodies, each of which has its own implementation mechanisms, as well as by business 
and other stakeholder groups’. According to the SRSG, examples include the following:28 
• The new OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which have a human rights 
chapter drawn from the Guiding Principles, and which provide for national complaints 
mechanisms in the forty-two adhering states concerning the conduct of multinationals 
operating in or from those states; 
• New provisions in the OECD Common Approaches for Export Credit Agencies, which 
affect access to capital at the national level; 
• The new International Finance Corporation Sustainability Principles and Performance 
Standards, which affect access to international capital—amplified manifold because they 
are tracked by 80+ private sector lending institutions29; 
• ISO26000, which energizes a world-wide army of consultants eager to help companies 
come into compliance.  
                                                
 24  Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and 
Accountability for Corporate Acts, A/HRC/4/35, § 6 (Febr. 19, 2007) (by John Ruggie). 
 25  See, section 4.8.6.5 
 26  See, section 8.3.6.  
 27  See, section 4.8.5.1. 
 28 Ruggie, supra note 8.  
  29  De Schutter also notes that ‘when the International Finance Corporation revised its Sustainability Framework, 
including both Sustainability Principle and Performance Standards, reference to human rights were included, 
reflecting core concepts of the [UNGPs] such as the responsibility for IFC clients to respect human rights and to 
exercise due diligence in order to ensure that they do not negatively affect human rights’ Olivier de Schutter, 
International Human Rights Law, 462 (Cambridge University Press 2014). As the SRSG noted, these principles 
and standards ‘affect companies’ access to international capital, amplified manifold because they are tracked by 
private sector lending institutions party to the so-called Equator Principles, which account for more than three 
fourths of all project financing worldwide’. J. Ruggie, Global Governance and "New Governance Theory": 
Lessons from Business and Human Rights 20 Global Governance, 11 (2014). 
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• In the European Union, the Commission has asked member states to submit national 
plans for implementing the Guiding Principles, and the Commission itself is developing 
additional guidance for several industry sectors and for small and medium-sized 
enterprises; 
• In the United States, the concept of human rights due diligence, a central component of 
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, found its way into Section 1502 of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, in relation to conflict minerals procured in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo;  
• The U.S. government also has referenced the Guiding Principles as a benchmark in a new 
reporting requirement for U.S. entities investing more than $500,000 in Myanmar, now 
that most economic sanctions have been suspended.  
• ASEAN is exploring ways to align its new business and human rights program with the 
Guiding Principles; the African Union is on a similar track. 
• The number of companies developing human rights policies, due diligence procedures 
and grievance mechanisms is rising significantly;  
• International business associations and labor federations have issued user’s guides to the 
Guiding Principles; civil society groups invoke them in their work, as do National Human 
Rights Institutions;  
• A new global resource center for addressing conflicts between businesses and 
communities has been established in The Hague; it is a direct follow-up to the Guiding 
Principles’ provisions on non-judicial remedy, and is appropriately named Access.  
• The Guiding Principles have also featured in a critical U.S. Supreme Court case, Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, brought under the Alien Tort Statute, in which I filed an 
amicus brief correcting mischaracterizations of my mandate’s findings by Shell’s 
attorneys.  
2. In the affirmative, have these responsibilities been defined as a new category of legal 
obligations with corresponding rights and obligations or as a reconceptualization of 
other areas of the law? 
The answer is, paradoxically, both.  On the one hand, the UNGPs did not alter the existing 
obligations of States. The UNGPs also do not expect States to depart from their existing classic 
legal duties to protect in relation to human rights. In the words of the SRSG: ‘[f]or States the 
focus [of the UNGPs] is on the legal obligations they have under the international human rights 
regime’.30  
                                                
 30 Ruggie, supra note 6, at xliv. 
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The SRSG has unambiguously noted that he is of the view that corporations ‘may have direct 
responsibilities under International law for committing international crimes, including crimes 
against humanity, torture, genocide and slavery’.31 These responsibilities lead to classic positivist 
liability under domestic law. 
It goes without saying, and as noted above, these obligations remain unchanged by the UNGPs. 
As indicated in paragraph IV of the Preamble of the UNGPs, ‘[n]othing in these Guiding 
Principles should be read as […] limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State may have 
undertaken or be subject to under International law with regard to human rights’. In fact, 
according to UNGP 1 (a `Foundational Principle`) `States must protect against human rights 
abuse within their territory and / or jurisdiction, including business enterprises. This requires 
taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective 
policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication`.32 
International human rights law imposes a positive obligation on States to adopt such legislative 
measures as necessary in particular circumstances.33 EU Member States that have adopted NAPs 
have indicated regulatory measures as part of a smart mix. One example of an initiative 
(although not mentioned in a NAP per se) to introduce a legally binding duty of human rights 
due diligence is the France’s Proposition to create a duty of vigilance, the latest version of which 
was voted on by the French General Assembly on 23 March 2016. An examination by the French 
Senate in October 2016 led to the adoption of a modified version, which does not contain such 
legal duty, however.34   
On the other hand, the UNGPs have objectives that go well beyond classic legal obligations and 
which can only be properly ascertained by reference to the SRSG’s ‘principled pragmatism’ (and 
skepticism to ‘single bullets’ such as, presumably, a resort alone to positivist law would be) and 
understanding of CSR as a key component of polycentric governance. As Mares notes, 
‘wrapping these elements in a credible narrative of human rights in the global economy-a 
multifaceted narrative that accounts for both risks and opportunities created as the world 
integrates economically’.35 
The SRSG has identified the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and forged a 
consensus around this concept, on the basis of a fact-based analysis of social expectations as they 
have been recognized in existing standards and practices, and multi-stakeholder consultations. 
The starting point for articulating this responsibility was the factual existence of business 
                                                
 31 See Esther Kiobel, et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et Al. (on Writ of certiorari to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit), Brief Amici Cuiriae of Former UN Special Representative for Business and 
Human Rights Professor John Ruggie; Professor Philip Alston; And The Global Justice Cinic at NYU School of 
Law in Support of Neither Party. 
 32   UNGPs, supra note 6. 
 33 See section 4.6. 
 34 See section 6.4.1.2. Also see, http://www.senat.fr/dossier-legislatif/ppl14-376.html, and Nadia Bernaz, 
Unpacking the French Bill on Corporate Due Diligence: a presentation at the International Business and Human 
Rights Conference in Sevilla (Oct. 21, 2016), http://rightsasusual.com/?p=1087 
 35 Mares, supra note 3, at 73.   
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enterprises as powerful entities with capacities to make positive and negative contributions to the 
realisation of human rights and freedoms. Business enterprises are specialized organs of society 
that have a distinct role on the international scene that is different from, yet complementary to 
that of States. The concept of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights reflects this 
reality and, as previously indicated, intends to leverage on it.  
The corporate responsibility to respect, with the human rights due diligence concept as its core 
component, was thus carefully crafted. Human rights due diligence is understood primarily as a 
forward-looking management process that is aimed at the prevention of adverse human rights 
impacts.36 The human rights due diligence concept has also certain unique qualities that lends 
itself for usage as a regulatory concept and legal standard of conduct in different areas of law.37 
The concept is universally applicable as a social/moral norm and has ‘legal pedigree’ in legal 
systems across the world. 38  The conduct of business enterprises is benchmarked against 
international human rights standards. And lastly, the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights is central to the emerging global business and human rights regime. 
The corporate responsibility to respect human rights is formulated in open-ended language.39 
This flexibility furthermore makes the human rights concept adaptable, capable of transcending 
different areas of law and makes the concept flexible for an effective implementation and 
enforcement in different areas of domestic law.40 I have described how national authorities can 
refer to the human rights due diligence concept when revisiting rules and regulations for the 
purpose of realigning them with the expectation that business enterprises ensure the respect for 
human rights by reference to universally recognized human rights standards and principles. The 
concept can give direction to national authorities when addressing gaps in human rights 
protection.  
The studies on the tort liability and private international and the EU Transparency Directive are 
illustrative of the legal (transformatory) effects that the enforcement of human rights due 
diligence in national law can have, in terms of driving conceptual improvements in different 
areas of existing law at all levels (as well as generate transnational effects). 
In the light of the preceding considerations the corporate responsibility to respect human rights 
may be viewed as a reconceptualization of existing laws at national and international level. The 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights is situated at the center of the emerging regime 
on business and human rights. This thesis has described the transformative impact that this 
concept can have on law within this broader context. 
                                                
 36 Sabine Michalowski, Due diligence and complicity: a relationship in need of clarification, in Human Rights 
Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect?, 218-242, 231 (Cambridge 
University Press ed. 2013). 
 37 Jonathan Bonnitcha & Robert McCorquodale, Is the concept of `due diligence` in the Guiding Principles 
coherent? (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2208588. 
 38 Olivier De Schutter et al., Human Rights Due Diligence: the Role of States (2012). 
 39 See, for more detail, chapter 5. 
 40  See id, conclusion. 
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In short, the corporate responsibility to respect may be understood in terms of classic positivist 
obligations, as well as reconceptualization of existing obligations (that exists in social 
expectations, however and detached from legal/public law system in terms of its source of 
obligation and enforcement), under various areas of law at national and sub-national level. There 
is scope for the corporate responsibility to respect human rights to be transposed into a treaty-
like legally binding norm at international level. If this were to materialize, the corporate 
responsibility to respect would be established as a new category of international legal obligations 
(in hard law).  
It would be appropriate to consider this option in the overall business and human rights context, 
and as a method to further compliance and adherence to international human rights, as part of a 
system of polycentric governance.   
3. If the answer to preceding question is that a new category arises, does this constitute the 
breakthrough that makes business enterprises subjects of International law from a 
positivist legal perspective? 
By ‘positivist’, the question appears to refer to classic approaches to legal personality, i.e., the 
‘State-Only’ conception and, at the most, including also the (as previously noted, State based) 
‘Recognition’ conception. In that sense the answer is ‘such responsibility is probably emerging’. 
On the one hand, the ‘State-Only’ conception is obviously incompatible with the recognition of 
such personality. Moreover, in principle, under the ‘Recognition’ doctrine, States have not yet 
formally recognised international legal personality to corporations. 
However, as Wouters and Chané indicate, ‘[l]enghty debates about the international legal 
subjectivity of [Multinational corporations] […] cannot hide the fact that MNCs already enjoy 
considerable rights under International Investment law and under International Human Rights 
law’.41 Wouters and Chané are of the view that MNCs ‘do not have binding obligations under 
International law’ (presumably, other than those deriving from international investment law). 
Similarly, in the words of Malcolm Shaw, the ‘realm [of the UNGPs] is that of ‘soft-law, of 
expectations, of anticipation, not of binding international (as opposed to national) regulations’.42 
However, the SRSG and Philip Alston have indicated unambiguously that corporations have 
such obligations for acts such as torture, extrajudicial executions and crimes against humanity.43  
Moreover, as has been set out in detail in section 9.2.2.2.1 above, the Reparations Advisory 
Opinion of the ICJ, which is frequently linked to the ‘Recognition’ doctrine (and which, one 
would tend to think, positivists would regard as authoritative), appears to leave scope to a 
functional approach to legal personality that would link such personality to the needs of the 
international community. In that sense, as Alvarez and others have noted, there is room for the 
recognition of the legal personality of corporations.  
                                                
 41 Joost Pauwelyn, et al., When structures become shackles: stagnation and dynamics in International law making, 
25 The European Journal of International law, 745 (2014).   
 42 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law, 182  (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
 43 See, Esther Kiobel, et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et Al., supra note 31. 
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The reply to this question (under a purely positivist approach) becomes even blurrier with certain 
post-Kiobel lower courts decisions which appear to depart from Kiobel and with the trends to 
recognise criminal liability to corporations noted by the SRSG.  
In addition, it is not clear that the recognition of legal personality to corporations would foster 
compliance and enhance the effectiveness of the UNGPs since, as set out above, and noted by 
Alvarez, such recognition could potentially detract from the effective protection of human rights 
in the context of investment treaties. 
On the other hand, the inconsistency with international reality of the ‘State-only’ conception 
became apparent already with the Reparations, advisory opinion of the ICJ. Philip Alston and 
Ryan Goodman highlight that ‘[o]ne of the most dramatic developments within International 
Human Rights law over the past two decades has been the growing importance of a range of non-
State actors’.44 With the clear enhanced relevance of new actors in the international arena arose 
the potential need of considering new entities as having international legal personality. Which 
entities and with which consequences probably depends on the perspective of the international 
system one favors. In the words of Malcolm Shaw ‘[a] particular view adopted of the 
[international] system will invariably reflect upon the question of the identity and nature of 
international legal persons’.45   
Nothing appears to preclude, in principle, the recognition as international legal persons of 
business enterprises. As noted by Alvarez, such recognition would be consistent with the dictum 
by the ICJ in Reparations indicating that the development of International law has been 
influenced by requirements of international life, which has resulted in ‘instances of action upon 
the international plane by certain entities which are not States’, thereby allowing for the 
possibility of ‘new subjects of International law’ that are ‘not necessarily […] States or possess 
the rights and obligations of Statehood’. There appear to be no limits to the recognition of legal 
subjects.46 As noted by Joost Pauwelyn, ‘[t]here is no fixed list of subjects of International law 
that is set in stone’.47 Or as highlighted by Portmann, ‘International law is an open system from 
which no entity is a priori excluded’.48 
 
 
                                                
44   Alston & Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights, 1461 (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
45  Shaw, supra note 42, at 143. 
46    Indeed, according to Díez de Velasco, ‘[f]rom a dynamic conception of [International law] it becomes necessary 
to recognize that it knows no bounds in its subjects, for the specific needs of the international legal community 
at any given time can advise, and even demand, granting legal personality to certain entities’ (translation) 
Manuel Pérez González, La Subjetividad Internacional (I) in Manuel Díez de Velasco: Instituciones de Derecho 
Internacional Público, (C. Escobar Herhández, ed. 2012).  
47    Pauwelyn, et al., supra note 41, at 745. 
48   Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in International law (Cambridge University Press. 2010), at 283. 
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4. Can new forms of international CSR regulation be analysed in legal terms, even if they 
are found not to be a part of International law in the legal positivist sense of the word? 
Why? (or why not?). 
As previously indicated, the UNGPs do not preclude (or, for that matter, directly lead to) the 
analysis of corporate responsibility as a part of international law in the legal positivist sense of 
the word. 
However, even if they were to preclude such an analysis, CSR regulation could nonetheless be 
analysed in legal terms, given that, as set out in detail in previous sections of this chapter, 
positivism (and its concomitant approach to legal personality, namely, the ‘State-Only’ 
conception) is only one of the possible approaches to the notion of legal personality. As noted 
above, the UNGPs can be analysed in legal terms by reference to at least the ‘Individual’ 
conception (by furthering actual compliance and the effective protection of human rights) and 
the ‘Actor’ conception. 
The UNGPs place CSR at the center of a system of polycentric governance (in accordance with 
the ‘Actor’ conception) which is intended to maximize the effectiveness of human rights (in 
accordance with the ‘Individual’ conception), not only, but not in the least, by crystalizing in 
new legislation. The SRSG acknowledged the need of legalization, however, as Mares notes, the 
SRSG was of the view that:  
starting with an international treaty would necessarily be the best way forward […]. 
Instead, he called for a narrow treaty-making effort and for changes to domestic law as 
first steps in a longer process of legalization. […] the legacy of Ruggie begins with a 
fundamental break in conceptualizing corporate responsibilities.  He conceived them as 
neither isolated from nor dependent on State obligations, embedded in a global policy 
context where hierarchy and formal legal authority cannot be assumed for convenience, 
but where public authority and the normativity of human rights seek new ways to reassert 
themselves, and in a human rights context where the premium is not on lofty 
reaffirmation of values but on leveraging all available sources of change to make a 
difference for right holders49  
From the perspective of polycentricity, the conduct of business enterprises is governed by the 
implementing measures of various actors, which are founded in sources and processes of 
different types of obligation. These measures, in isolation and combination, create a regulatory 
dynamic and plausibly contribute to the realization of human rights by affecting and coordinating 
the regulation by various actors of factors that leverage business adherence to implementing their 
responsibility to respect human rights.  
The substance of these requirements should be discerned pursuant to a bottom up process, on the 
basis of an inductive analysis from existing standards and practices. The assumption is that (from 
a human rights perspective) business enterprises exist as specialized organs of society that have a 
distinct role in the international scene that is different from, and yet complementary to, that of 
States. From the perspective of the ‘Actor’ conception, the duties and responsibilities of business 
                                                
 49  R. Mares, supra note 5. 
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enterprises should correspond with this social reality in order to make sense and have legal 
effects. It would thus seem inappropriate (and inaccurate) to designate business enterprises as 
subjects by assimilation to States or on the basis of State-like criteria, or by assimilation to 
individuals for that matter. 
It is clear that many of these sources and processes do not fit the traditional sources of law as 
articulated under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. The precise normative force of these standards 
and practices remains difficult to define in traditional legal terms. Conceptually, Joost Pauwelyn 
argues that there does not appear to be a reason for why International law could not evolve to 
include these new actors, sources and processes.50 51 These standards and practices should be 
understood qualify as soft law to the extent these articulate international principles and, despite 
their non-legally binding nature, have the normative potential to bind actors.  
These measures potentially affect the actual adherence by business enterprise to implementing 
the corporate responsibility to respect by leveraging the factors that affect such compliance. As a 
consequence of the regulatory dynamics that arise out of the combined effects of this ‘smart-mix’ 
of measures, business enterprises are increasingly bound to implementing this corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights. Business enterprises face binding responsibility to respect 
human rights under a range of sources of law, ranging from transnational laws at national and 
EU level to soft law mechanisms by State and non-State actors at all levels.  
5. What makes CSR have ‘legal status’ in a global governance context? 
The SRSG himself noted that ‘this unorthodox formulation initially was the most controversial 
conceptual move I made because it was not considered to be fully “rights-based”’.52 However, as 
set out in detail throughout this chapter, ‘not fully “rights-based” is far from being tantamount to 
‘decoupled from rights’.  
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hard to imagine, for example, that the States parties to the ICJ Statute would amend Article 38 to expand 
the sources of International law, or that the UN Charter be re-written to allow explicitly for new actors; no 
such formal decisions are required for International law to evolve. After all, whether new modes of 
cooperation will have an impact or persist will play out not so much at the UN or WTO, or before courts or 
tribunals; but in foreign ministries, national parliaments and regulatory bodies, standard-setting and 
procurement organisations; corporate board rooms and rating agencies, NGO or trade union strategy 
meetings, the media; and individual citizens’/ consumer decisions. The conceptual boundaries of how 
International law may look in the future are wide open.  
   Id. at 745. 
 52  J. Ruggie, supra note 6, at xliv.   
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On the one hand, as indicated in detail throughout this chapter, the UNGPs do not alter pre-
existing (national and national) obligations binding corporations and in fact, award a primordial 
obligation to these when it comes to State. Though the UNGPs do not, in and of themselves, 
create new legal obligations, they certainly reinforce the importance of State adherence to the 
existing obligations.   
On the other hand, to the extent the UNGPs, by placing CSR at the centre of a polycentric system 
of global governance, succeeds in bringing compliance – and achieving changes in the behaviour 
of the corporate world in relation to human rights, CSR has already had the (often legal, in the 
positivistic sense of the word) effects indicated at the reply to question 2 above, and is bound to 
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